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ABSTRACT	  	  	  This	  dissertation	  is	  motivated	  by	  two	  questions:	  How	  does	  the	  emergence	  of	  cloud-­‐computing	  technology	  impact	  major	  countries’	  copyright	  law	  regarding	  the	  issue	  of	  intermediaries’	   direct	   liability?	   What	   should	   Chinese	   legislature	   body	   learn	   from	  those	  countries	  regarding	  this	  issue?	  Answering	  the	  first	  question	  lays	  a	  foundation	  for	  answering	  the	  second	  question.	  	  	  Usually,	   a	   cloud-­‐computing	   intermediary’s	   specific	   activity	   may	   possess	   risk	   of	  violating	  a	  copyright	  holder’s	   right	  of	   reproduction,	   right	  of	  communication	   to	   the	  public	  and	  right	  of	  distribution.	  Comparatively,	  that	  intermediary	  can	  raise	  defenses	  under	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   and	   the	   fair	   use	   doctrine.	   Analysis	   on	   these	   two	  topics	   consists	   of	   two	   parts.	   	   The	   first	   part	   examines	   copyright	   law	   in	   major	  countries	  or	   regional	  organizations	  such	  as	   the	  U.S.,	   Japan	  or	   the	  European	  Union.	  The	  second	  part	  is	  an	  analysis	  of	  current	  related	  Chinese	  legislation	  and	  a	  proposal	  for	   China.	   This	   dissertation	   examines	   relevant	   international	   copyright	   treaties,	  major	  countries’	  related	  legislature	  documents	  and	  related	  cases.	  	  	  This	  dissertation	  offers	  a	  thorough	  legal	  analysis	  how	  cloud-­‐computing	  technology	  affects	  copyright	  worldwide.	  The	  proposal	  at	  the	  end	  consists	  of	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  provides	  four	  general	  legislature	  advices	  for	  China.	  The	  second	  part	  focuses	  on	  how	   China’s	   legislature	   should	   adjust	   copyright	   owner’s	   exclusive	   rights	   and	  intermediaries’	   defense	   theories	   to	   react	   the	   impact	   brought	   by	   the	   cloud-­‐computing	  technology.	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Chapter 1: Introduction 	   In	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	   the	   increasing	   digitization	   of	   copyrighted	   content	  and	   the	   growth	   of	   Internet	   created	   lots	   of	   challenges	   to	   copyright	   law	   area.	   For	  instance,	  copyrighted	  works’	  digital	  copies’	  quality	  was	  approaching	  a	  near-­‐perfect	  condition,	   which	   leads	   to	   copyright	   infringements	   become	   easy	   and	   cheap	   by	  making	  unlawful	  digital	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  works.	  Data	  transmission	  and	  storage	  technologies	   were	   also	   thoroughly	   reformed,	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   spread	   of	   both	  authorized	  and	  unauthorized	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  work.	  1	  	   	  Public	   users	   increasingly	   demand	   storing,	   transmitting,	   accessing	   and	  sharing	   digital	   content	   via	   the	   Internet	   at	   anytime	   and	   anywhere	   with	   less	   cost.	  Emerging	  of	  Cloud	  computing	  technology	  then	  satisfies	  public	  users’	  growing	  need.	  Cloud	  computing	  is	  a	  broad	  term	  in	  describing	  a	  kind	  of	  technology	  services	  through	  the	   Internet.	   It	   is	   a	   general	   term	   for	   the	   numerous	   of	   protocols,	   applications	   and	  transmission	  techniques	  users	  can	  use	  to	  store,	  process,	  manage	  and	  stream	  data	  via	  remote	  servers—which	  often	  controlled	  by	   third	  party	  providers.(Hereafter	   ISPs)2	  Cloud	  computing	  technology	  provides	  convenient,	  easy	  operated,	  less-­‐expensive	  but	  more-­‐expansive	  service.	  For	  instance,	  after	  drafting	  a	  document	  by	  “Microsoft	  Word,”	  one	   could	   directly	   save	   that	   file	   in	   OneDrive,	   a	   cloud	   service	   also	   provided	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Viktor	  Mayer-­‐Schönberger,	  DELETE:	  THE	  VIRTUE	  OF	  FORGETTING	  IN	  THE	  DIGITAL	  AGE,	  52-­‐62	  (2009);	  See	  also	  Marc	  Aaron	  Melzer,	  Copyright	  Enforcement	  in	  the	  Cloud,	  21	  FORDHAM	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  MEDIA	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.403,	  403-­‐04	  (2011).	  2	  ISPs	  in	  this	  dissertation	  specifically	  indicate	  the	  cloud	  computing	  service	  providers.	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Microsoft.3	  	   One	   can	   also	   directly	   store	   photos	   in	   iCloud,	   which	   is	   another	   cloud	  service	   provided	   by	   Apple.4	  Common	   users	   are	   also	   getting	   used	   to	   watch	   TV	  programs	  on	  computers	  or	  other	  devices	  instead	  of	  televisions.	  There’s	  no	  need	  for	  them	  to	  follow	  the	  TV	  programs’	  schedule	  or	  have	  to	  purchase	  a	  cable	  system,	  they	  just	   need	   access	   to	   the	   Internet	   buffering	   by	   the	   cloud	   computing	   technology.	   All	  they	   need	   to	   do	   is	   clicking	   a	   single	   button	   and	   then	   enjoying	   the	   streaming	  video/audio	   contents	   even	   without	   downloading.	   Cloud	   computing	   service	   is	  changing	  people’s	  daily	  life	  silently	  but	  drastically.	  	   However,	   emergence	   of	   cloud	   computing	   services	   actually	   mounted	   the	  existing	   challenges	   to	   copyright	   law	   and	   created	   even	   more	   legal	   loopholes.	   For	  instance,	  through	  the	  cloud	  streaming	  service,	  users	  can	  enjoy	  music,	  TV	  programs	  or	  movies	  before	  the	  entire	  file	  being	  transmitted	  to	  users’	  computers.	  This	  process	  will	   create	   temporary	   copies	  of	   the	   streaming	  works	   in	   the	   cloud	   server	  or	   in	   the	  RAM	  of	  end	  user’s	  computer.	  Thus	  ISPs	  may	  be	  under	  the	  risk	  of	  directly	  infringing	  the	  streaming	  copyrighted	  works’	  right	  of	  reproduction	  by	  creating	  such	  temporary	  copies	   since	   the	  existing	  copyright	   laws	  around	   the	  world	  have	  not	   contoured	   the	  scope	  of	  protected	  copies.	  	  Further,	  a	  new	  used	  market	  for	  digital	  files	  is	  generated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  OneDrive,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OneDrive	  	  (“OneDrive	  (previously	  SkyDrive,	  Windows	  Live	  SkyDrive,	  and	  Windows	  Live	  Folders)	  is	  a	  file	  hosting	  service	  that	  allows	  users	  to	  sync	  files	  and	  later	  access	  them	  from	  a	  web	  browser	  or	  mobile	  device.	  Users	  can	  share	  files	  publicly	  or	  with	  their	  contacts;	  publicly	  shared	  files	  do	  not	  require	  a	  Microsoft	  account	  to	  access	  them.”)	  4	  iCloud,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICloud	  (“The	  service	  provides	  its	  users	  with	  means	  to	  store	  data	  such	  as	  documents,	  photos,	  and	  music	  on	  remote	  servers	  for	  download	  to	  iOS,	  Macintosh	  or	  Windows	  devices,	  to	  share	  and	  send	  data	  to	  other	  users,	  and	  to	  manage	  their	  Apple	  devices	  if	  lost	  or	  stolen.	  The	  service	  also	  provides	  the	  means	  to	  wirelessly	  back	  up	  iOS	  devices	  directly	  to	  iCloud,	  instead	  of	  being	  reliant	  on	  manual	  backups	  to	  a	  host	  Mac	  or	  Windows	  computer	  using	  iTunes.”)	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by	   the	   ISPs	  because	  of	   the	   expansion	  of	   cloud	   computing	   software	   such	  as	  ReDigi	  allowing	  consumers	  resell	  their	  “used”	  copyrighted	  works	  which	  were	  uploaded	  to	  their	   cloud	   lockers	   by	   digital	   distribution.5	  This	   market	   caused	   new	   challenges,	  especially	  regarding	  the	  application	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  (exhaustion	  doctrine)	  and	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine.	  The	  appearance	  of	  this	  second	  hand	  market	  is	  inevitable,	  because	   people	   are	   getting	   used	   to	   purchase	   digital	   music	   recordings	   or	   e-­‐books	  online.	   It’s	   important	   for	   the	   law	   to	   keep	  up	  with	   the	  development	   of	   technology,	  especially	   in	   the	   field	  of	   copyright	   law.	  A	  new	  proposal	   for	   copyright	   law	  must	  be	  considered	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	   Copyright	   owners	  will	   definitely	   protect	   their	   interests	   via	   lawsuits	  where	  copyright	   infringements	   exist—when	   users	   upload,	   stream	   or	   share	   the	   videos,	  music	  or	  e-­‐books	  via	  the	  cloud	  service	  provided	  by	  ISPs.	  Individuals	  are	  difficult	  to	  identify	  or	  located,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  for	  copyright	  owners	  to	  file	  lawsuits	  against	  them.	   There’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   a	   big	   war	   between	   copyright	   owners	   and	   ISPs	   had	  already	  begun,	   for	   instance,	   the	  U.S.	  ReDigi	  Case.	  All	  countries	   that	   involved	   in	   the	  Internet	  world	  are	  currently	  involving	  or	  going	  to	  involve	  in	  this	  war.	  And	  this	  war	  will	  not	  be	  settled	  easily,	  because	  the	  current	  statutes	  in	  all	  countries	  are	  not	  clear	  enough	   in	   solving	   the	   issues	   of	   copyright	   infringement.	   	   Thus,	   clarification	   of	   the	  relevant	   legal	   uncertainties	   is	   necessary	   in	   ending	   the	   war	   between	   copyright	  owners	  and	  ISPs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  ReDigi,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReDigi	  (“ReDigi	  is	  an	  online	  marketplace	  for	  pre-­‐owned	  digital	  music	  and	  the	  only	  cloud	  storage	  service	  that	  verifies	  whether	  each	  music	  file	  uploaded	  for	  storage	  was	  legally	  acquired	  from	  an	  eligible	  source.”)	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There’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   China	   is	   also	   drifting	   in	   the	   war	   between	   copyright	  owners	  and	   ISPs.	  There	  are	   lots	  of	   cloud-­‐based	   services	   in	  China	   that	   actually	   are	  infusing	   in	  people’s	  daily	   life.	  For	   instance,	  NetEase	  music,	  which	   is	   a	   cloud-­‐based	  music	   locker,	   enables	  users	   to	   stream	  music	   files	  without	  downloading	   simply	  via	  devices	  as	  mobile	  phones	  through	  the	  Internet.6	  Baidu	  Cloud	  or	  Sina	  vdisk	  provides	  storing,	   sharing	   and	  other	   functions	   online.7	  Under	   the	   existing	  Chinese	  Copyright	  Act,	  there	  are	  also	  too	  many	  legal	  uncertainties	  in	  deciding	  copyright	  infringements	  relevant	  to	  the	  cloud	  services	  due	  to	  the	  legislature	  vacancy	  regarding	  this	  issue.	  For	  example,	  when	  apply	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  to	  information	  networks	  (the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public),	  Chinese	  literature	  currently	  holds	  two	  standards	  to	  decide	  whether	  there’s	  an	  act	  of	  providing	  files,	  the	  server	  standard	  and	  the	  users’	  perception	  standard.	  However,	  the	  Chinese	  Copyright	  Law	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  guideline	  for	  this	  issue,	  and	  thus	  such	  legislature	  vacancy	  result	  in	  courts’	  different	  decisions	  based	  on	  similar	   facts.	  Further,	  Chinese	  ISPs	  may	  not	  only	   face	  domestic	  copyright	   owners’	   accusation	   but	   also	   International	   copyright	   owners’,	   since	  numerous	   people	   are	   enjoying	   free	   foreign	   countries’	   TV	   programs,	   movies	   or	   e-­‐books	   simply	   via	   the	   Chinese	   cloud	   services.	   All	   in	   all,	   it’s	   necessary	   to	   provide	   a	  reasonable	  proposal	   for	  China	   to	   cope	  with	   these	   existing	   and	  potential	   copyright	  challenges.	  	   In	   order	   to	   solve	   the	   challenges	   and	   fill	   legal	   loopholes	   brought	   by	   cloud	  computing	   technology,	   this	   dissertation	   will	   identify	   problem	   arising	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Andrew	  Godinez,	  The	  Free	  Service	  That	  Will	  Get	  You	  To	  Leave	  Spotify,	  (2015)	  http://android.wonderhowto.com/how-­‐to/netease-­‐music-­‐free-­‐service-­‐will-­‐get-­‐you-­‐leave-­‐spotify-­‐0162417/	  (last	  visited	  Aug	  12,2016).	  7	  Baidu	  Cloud,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baidu_Cloud	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enforcement	  of	  copyright	  in	  this	  cloud	  computing	  era,	  describe	  the	  present	  viability	  of	  major	  countries’	   copyright	   law	  enforcement	   through	  analyzing	  recent	  copyright	  cases,	  and	  discuss	  viable	  solutions	  regarding	  this	  issue	  proposed	  by	  major	  countries.	  This	   dissertation	   will	   take	   the	   U.S.,	   EU	   and	   other	   countries	   as	   examples,	   then	  connect	  the	  former	  discussion	  with	  the	  specific	  situation	  (such	  as	  traditional	  culture	  of	  Sharing)	  in	  China.	  Finally,	  this	  dissertation	  will	  try	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  proposal	  for	   copyright	   law	   legislation	   for	   the	   facing	   cloud	   computing	   technology’s	   China	   in	  the	  end.	  	   Chapter	  2	  will	  present	  general	   idea	  of	  cloud	  computing	  technology.	  What	   is	  the	  different	   kinds	  of	   business	  models	  using	   this	   technology	   such	   as	  music	   locker	  service	   (iTunes),	   video	   sharing	   service	   (Youtube)	   and	   provide	   background	  information	  on	  these	  similar	  services.	  How	  it	  relates	  to	  our	  daily	  life.	  	   Chapter	   3	   will	   analyze	   the	   ISPs’	   direct	   liabilities.	   When	   using	   the	   cloud	  computing	   technology,	   the	   ISPs	   are	   under	   the	   risk	   of	   infringing	   the	   copyright	  owner’s	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  and	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  because	  of	   the	  application	  of	  cloud	  computing	  service.	  This	  chapter	  will	   illustrate	   traditional	   definition	   and	   the	   common	   applications	   of	   these	   three	  exclusive	  rights	  by	  analyzing	  statutes	  and	  cases	  from	  various	  countries,	  then	  analyze	  how	   cloud	   computing	   may	   affect	   them	   in	   those	   countries.	   This	   chapter	   will	  eventually	  provide	  the	  author’s	  proposals	  for	  China.	  	   In	   Chapter	   4,	   I	   will	   discuss	   ISPs’	   potential	   defenses	   when	   facing	   direct	  copyright	   infringements:	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   (exhaustion	   doctrine)	   and	   the	   fair	  use	  doctrine.	  As	   the	  same	  of	  chapter	  3,	   this	  chapter	  will	  also	   first	  analyze	  statutes	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and	  typical	  cases	   in	   the	  U.S.,	  EU	  and	  other	  countries	  and	  come	  up	  with	  a	  potential	  proposal	  for	  China	  based	  on	  the	  Chinese	  specific	  situation.	  	   Finally,	  chapter	  5	  will	  generate	  a	  proposal	  for	  copyright	  legislation	  regarding	  cloud	  computing	  based	  on	  former	  summaries	  for	  China.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   7	  
Chapter 2: Defining Cloud Computing 	   Cloud	   computing	   technology	   refers	   to	   approaches	   to	   diffuse	   computing	  power	  across	  more	   that	  one	  physical	  computer.8	  With	   the	  use	  of	  cloud	  computing,	  the	  boundaries	  of	  computing	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  economic	  rationale	  rather	  than	  technical	   limits	   alone.	   The	   name	   of	   “cloud	   computing”	   was	   derived	   from	  telecommunications	   companies	   who	   changed	   their	   services	   from	   point-­‐to-­‐point	  circuits	   to	   Virtual	   Private	   Networks	   in	   the	   1990s.9	  Thus,	   it’s	   clear	   that	   cloud	  computing	   is	   based	   on	   the	   virtualization	   technology.	   Virtualization	  means	   that	   an	  application	   named	   as	   hypervisor	   creates	   one	   or	   more	   virtual	   computers,	   whose	  simulations	   can	   run	   any	   software.10	  It’s	   the	   virtualization	   technology	   provides	   the	  basic	  nature	  of	  cloud	  computing:	  “e-­‐mail,	  Web,	  or	  file	  servers	  (or	  anything	  else)	  can	  be	  conjured	  up	  as	  soon	  as	  they’re	  needed;	  when	  the	  need	  is	  gone,	  they	  can	  be	  wiped	  from	   existence,	   freeing	   the	   host	   computer	   to	   run	   a	   different	   virtual	   machine	   for	  another	  user.”11	  With	  the	  help	  of	  readily-­‐developed	  virtualization	  technology,	  cloud	  computing	  has	  been	  growing	  in	  size	  –	  a	  global	  scale.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  Melzer,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  403-­‐04.	  9	  See	  Jenna	  Gerber,	  Head	  Out	  of	  the	  Clouds:	  What	  the	  United	  States	  may	  Learn	  From	  the	  
European	  Union’s	  Treatment	  of	  Data	  in	  the	  Cloud,	  23	  IND.	  INT’L	  &	  COMP.	  L.	  REV.	  245	  (2013);	  
See	  also	  Sourya	  Biswas,	  A	  History	  of	  Cloud	  Computing,	  CLOUD	  TWEAKS	  (Jul	  31,	  2016),	  http://cloudtweaks.com/2011/02/a-­‐history-­‐of-­‐cloud-­‐computing/	  	  
Virtual	  Private	  Networks,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_network	  (VPN	  is	  a	  private	  network	  that	  extends	  across	  a	  public	  network	  or	  internet.	  It	  enables	  users	  to	  send	  and	  receive	  data	  across	  shared	  or	  public	  networks	  as	  if	  their	  computing	  devices	  were	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  private	  network.)	  10	  See	  Erica	  Naone,	  Conjuring	  Clouds:	  How	  Engineers	  Are	  Making	  On-­‐Demand	  
Computing	  a	  Reality,	  TECH.	  REV.,	  Jul.-­‐	  Aug.	  (2009),	  at	  54.	  11	  Id.	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   However,	   as	   to	   common	   users	   of	   the	   Internet,	   the	   concept	   of	   “cloud	  computing	  still	  remain	  vague.12	  The	  National	  Institute	  of	  Standards	  and	  Technology	  (NIST)	  defines	  cloud	  computing	  as:	   “	  A	  model	   for	  enabling	  ubiquitous,	  convenient,	  on-­‐demand	  network	   access	   to	   a	   shared	   pool	   of	   configurable	   computing	   resources	  (e.g.,	   networks,	   servers,	   storage,	   applications,	   and	   services)	   that	   can	   be	   rapidly	  provisioned	   and	   released	   with	   minimal	   management	   effort	   or	   service	   provider	  interaction.”13	  To	   common	   people,	   cloud	   computing	   enables	   users	   to	   access	   to	  numerous	  resources,	  such	  as	  remote	  storage.	  The	  users	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  prepare	  infrastructures	  or	  supports	  for	  such	  infrastructures	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  such	  service.	  	   According	   to	   the	   NIST	   definition,	   the	   model	   of	   cloud	   computing	   has	   five	  essential	   characteristics:	   (1)	   on-­‐demand	   self-­‐service,	   which	   allows	   a	   consumer	   to	  unilaterally	  provision	  server	  time	  and	  network	  storage	  as	  needed	  without	  requiring	  human	   interaction	   with	   every	   service	   provider;	   (2)	   broad	   network	   access,	   which	  emphasizes	   the	   network	   availability	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   users	   to	   access	   the	  information	   or	   service	   through	   any	   platform	   with	   a	   broadband	   connection,	  including	  “mobile	  phones,	  laptops,	  and	  PDAs;”	  (3)resource	  pooling,	  which	  means	  the	  providers	  pooled	  computing	  resources	  and	  to	  dynamically	  assign	  resources	  by	  using	  a	  multi-­‐tenant	  model	  based	  on	  customers’	  demand.	  The	  customer	  has	  no	  control	  or	  knowledge	   over	   the	   exact	   location	   of	   the	   provided	   resources;	   (4)	   rapid	   elasticity,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Philip	  Koehler	  et	  al.,	  Cloud	  Services	  From	  a	  Consumer	  Perspective	  2	  (2010),	  available	  at	  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.174.6121&rep=rep1&type=pdf	  	  (	  Cloud	  computing	  is	  a	  “buzzword	  almost	  designed	  to	  be	  vague,	  but….	  is	  more	  than	  just	  a	  lot	  of	  fog.”)	  13	  Peter	  Mell	  &	  Tim	  Grance,	  The	  NIST	  Definition	  of	  Cloud	  Computing,	  NAT’L	  INST.	  OF	  STANDARDS	  &	  TECH.,	  INFO.	  TECH.	  LAB.	  	  available	  at	  http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-­‐145.pdf	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which	   means	   computing	   capabilities,	   can	   be	   elastically	   and	   automatically	   be	  provisioned	   and	   released	   based	   on	   consumer’s	   need;	   (5)	   measured	   service,	  involving	  automatic	  optimization	  of	  system	  resources.14	  	   Based	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  end	  users,	  the	  provider’s	  frame	  work,	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  service	  exchange,15	  there	  are	  three	  different	  versions	  of	  cloud	  computing	  service.	  The	   NIST	   refers	   them	   as	   the	   three	   “service	  model”:	   Software	   as	   a	   Service	   (SaaS),	  Platform	  as	  a	  Service	  (PaaS),and	  Infrastructure	  as	  a	  Service	  (IaaS).	  16	  These	  service	  models	  are	  deployed	  in	  four	  ways—as	  private,	  community,	  public,	  or	  hybrid	  cloud.17	  All	   these	   four	   may	   be	   controlled	   by	   a	   third	   party	   provider.	   A	   private	   cloud’s	  infrastructure	  is	  provisioned	  for	  use	  by	  a	  single	  organization,	  especially	  for	  internal	  use	   by	   employees	   within	   an	   organization.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   a	   community	   cloud’s	  infrastructure	   is	   limited	   to	   consumers	   from	   a	   group	   of	   organizations	   with	   same	  concerns.	  Then,	  a	  public	  cloud	  is	  generally	  open	  to	  the	  public,	  for	  free	  or	  with	  certain	  payments.	  A	  hybrid	  cloud	  combines	  two	  or	  more	  of	  these	  deployment	  models.	  	   As	   to	  common	  users,	   the	  most	   familiar	  clouds	   in	  place	  nowadays	  should	  be	  public	  SaaS	  models.	  Under	  this	  model,	  Facebook,	  Yahoo!	  Mail,	  YouTube,	  Twitter	  and	  Gmail	  are	  all	  included.	  Basically,	  the	  most	  common	  examples	  of	  SaaS	  model	  is	  web-­‐based	   e-­‐mail	   and	   social	   networking	   websites.	   It	   should	   be	   known	   that	   common	  cloud	  storage	  service,	  such	  as	  dropbox,	  Baidu	  Cloud	  Storage,	  that	  provides	  to	  normal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Id.	  15	  See	  Keith	  Jeffery	  &	  Burkhard	  Neidecker-­‐Lutz	  eds	  ,	  The	  Future	  of	  Cloud	  Computing:	  
Opportunities	  for	  European	  Cloud	  Computing	  Beyond,	  European	  Commission	  on	  Information	  
Society	  and	  Media	  (2010)	  available	  at	  	  http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/ssai/docs/executivesummary-­‐forweb_en.pdf	  	  	  16	  NIST	  Definition,	  supra	  note	  13.	  17	  Id.	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users	  is	  also	  included.	  The	  capability	  of	  SaaS	  model	  provided	  to	  the	  consumer	  is	  to	  use	   the	   provider’s	   applications	   running	   on	   a	   cloud	   infrastructure.18	  Users	   of	   SaaS	  model	   do	   not	   need	   to	   have	   technology	   skill	   since	   they	   don’t	   need	   to	   manage	   or	  control	   the	   infrastructure	   including	   networks,	   servers,	   operating	   systems,	   or	  storage.19	  Users	   can	   simply	   access	   provided	   applications	   with	   Internet	   browsers.	  For	  instance,	  an	  user	  of	  Gmail,	  that	  provided	  by	  Google,	  does	  not	  need	  to	  download	  or	   install	   anything	   on	   his	   personal	   computer.20	  He	   can	   simply	   access	   to	   Gmail	   via	  Internet	   browser	   through	   networks.	   Users	   embrace	   the	   SaaS	  model	   that	   leads	   to	  “rapid	  development	  of	  other	  cloud-­‐based	  applications,	   including	  calendars,	  contact	  management,	  word	  processing,	  and	  digital	  photo	  applications.”21	  	   The	   second	  model	   PaaS	   basically	   allow	   programmers	   to	   deploy	   their	   own	  applications,	   “created	   using	   programming	   languages	   and	   tools	   supported	   by	   the	  provider.”22	  It	   can	   be	   read	   into	   three	   parts:	   (1)	   A	   PaaS	   moel	   provides	   hardware,	  operating	  systems	  and	  other	  tools;	  (2)	  users	  should	  have	  modest	  technological	  skills;	  (3)	  users	  can	  develop	  their	  own	  applications	  through	  the	  basic	  hardware,	  operating	  systems	   and	   other	   tools	   provided	   by	   the	   provider.	   However,	   there’s	   one	   more	  element	  here:	  programmers	  only	  have	  “limited	  control	  over	  the	  software	  so	  long	  as	  it	   does	  not	   interfere	  with	   the	  physical	   infrastructure	  of	   the	  provider’s	  network.”23	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Id.	  19	  Id.	  20	  Gmail,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gmail	  (“Gmail	  is	  a	  free,	  advertising-­‐supported	  email	  service	  provided	  by	  Google.”)	  21	  William	  Jeremy	  Robison,	  Free	  at	  What	  Cost?:	  Cloud	  Computing	  Privacy	  Under	  the	  Stored	  
Communications	  Act,	  98	  GEO.	  L.J.	  1195,	  1203	  (2010).	  22	  NIST	  definition,	  supra	  note	  13.	  	  23	  Shahid	  Khan,	  “Apps.	  Gov”:	  Assessing	  Privacy	  in	  the	  Cloud	  Computing	  Era,	  11	  N.C.	  J.L.	  &	  TECH.	  ON,	  259,	  266	  (2010).	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For	  instance,	  Google	  App	  Engine	  is	  within	  the	  PaaS	  model.	  It	  enable	  users	  to	  build	  a	  website	   application.	   And	   Google	   App	   Engine	   is	   free	   on	   certain	   level	   and	   fees	   are	  “charged	   for	   additional	   storage,	   bandwidth,	   or	   instance	   hours	   required	   by	   the	  application.”24	  	  	   The	   third	  model	   takes	   the	   PaaS	  model	   a	   step	   further.	   IaaS	  model	   provides	  users	   the	   capability	   to	   provision	   processing,	   storage,	   networks,	   and	   other	  fundamental	   computing	   resources.25	  Users	   are	   able	   to	   control	   all	   the	   fundamental	  computing	  resources,	  including	  “operating	  systems,	  storage,	  deployed	  applications,	  and	   possibly	   limited	   control	   of	   select	   networking	   components	   (e.g.	   host	   fire	  walls).”26	  	   Along	   with	   the	   instance	   of	   Gmail,	   the	   application	   of	   Gmail	   definitely	  requires	  infrastructure	  such	  as	  storage	  space	  to	  store	  all	  data	  or	  operating	  system	  to	  process	   all	   data.	  The	  provider	  of	  Gmail,	  Google	  may	   choose	   to	   interface	   the	  Gmail	  with	  a	  provider	  offering	  the	  required	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  cloud.	  	  	   The	  development	  of	   Internet	  had	  already	   revolutionized	  data	   transmission,	  which	  directly	  challenge	  the	  current	  copyright	  law	  since	  such	  transmission	  will	  not	  be	   limited	   by	   geographic	   or	   time.	   Users	   are	   getting	   used	   to	   enjoy	   fast	   online	  transmission	   and	   quality	   digital	   copies	   of	   copyrighted	   works.	   Further,	   Cloud	  computing	  is	  designed	  to	  fully	  meet	  consumers’	  demand	  for	  digital	  contents	  in	  less	  time,	   with	   less	   effort	   and	   pay	   less	   money.	   	   With	   the	   unbelievable	   data	   storage	  technology,	   cloud	   computing	  undoubtedly	   expands	  online	  digital	   content.	  Because	  of	   the	   easy	   process	   of	   the	   three	   service	   models,	   more	   and	   more	   companies	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Google	  App	  Engine,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_App_Engine	  	  25	  NIST	  Definition,	  supra	  note	  13.	  26	  Id.	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getting	   involved	   to	   provide	   “users’	   prefer”	   cloud	   computing	   service.	   In	   order	   to	  attract	  more	  users	  to	  gain	  benefit,	  they	  need	  to	  provide	  more	  contents.	  Then,	  users	  are	   able	   to	   enjoy	   copyrighted	   works	   even	   not	   only	   without	   preparing	  infrastructures	   as	   before	   but	   also	  without	   downloading.	   All	   users	   need	   is	   a	   basic	  device,	   which	   is	   able	   to	   get	   to	   the	   Internet.	   	   Users	  may	   not	   consider	   the	   issue	   of	  copyright	   infringements,	   all	   they	  want	  are	  enjoy	  works.	  They	  may	  be	  attracted	  by	  those	   cloud-­‐based	   websites	   that	   provide	   more	   contents.	   One	   side	   need	   more	  contents	   at	  meanwhile	   ignoring	   copyright	   issue,	   the	   other	   side	   attempt	   to	   attract	  more	   users	   to	   gain	   economic	   benefits	   by	   providing	   more	   contents.	   Under	   such	  circumstance,	   there’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   copyright	   infringement	   become	  serious.	  This	  dissertation	  latter	  will	  analyze	  how	  cloud	  computing	  effect	  and	  cause	  copyright	  infringement	  in	  details	  in	  latter	  chapter.	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Chapter 3: Intermediaries’ Direct Liability of Copyright 
Infringements  
I. Infringe the Right of Reproduction 	   The	   last	   chapter	   had	   already	   provided	   technological	   details	   of	   cloud	  computing	  service.	  An	  analysis	  of	  how	  those	  details	  affect	  the	  ISPs’	  direct	  copyright	  liability	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  	   Under	  the	  traditional	  circumstances,	  people	  need	  to	  get	  tangible	  copies	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  before	  they	  enjoy	  it,	  and	  such	  tangible	  copies	  are	  products	  of	  the	  “printing”	   technology.	   Copyright	   owners	   can	   gain	   reasonable	   interests	   via	  distributing	   the	   tangible	   copies	   of	   their	   copyrighted	   works.	   Copyright	   Law	   is	  enacted	   to	   protect	   copyright	   owners’	   such	   interests.	   However,	   the	   “printing”	  technology	  keeps	  developing,	  that	  causes	  uncertainties	  for	  copyright	  owners	  to	  gain	  interests	  from	  the	  tangible	  copies	  made	  via	  such	  “printing”	  technology.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   to	   protect	   copyright	   owners’	   interests,	   the	   copyright	   law	   enacted	   and	  amended	  because	  of	  the	  development	  of	  “printing”	  technology.	  Therefore,	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  no	  doubt	  is	  the	  core	  of	  any	  copyright	  acts.	  	  With	  the	  development	  of	  technology,	  people	  are	  getting	  used	  to	  reproducing	  a	  work	  on	  a	  computer	  hard	  drive,	  a	  mobile	  hard	  disk	  or	  a	  remote	  hard	  disk	  space	  as	  an	   invisible	  copy.	  Therefore	  no	  more	   tangible	   copies	   are	  needed.	  As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   right	  of	   reproduction	  has	  been	  changed	  to	  adapt	  the	  new	  technology.27	  Then,	  the	  cloud	  computing	  makes	  even	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  White-­‐Smith	  Music	  Pub.	  Co.	  v.	  Apollo	  Co.,	  209	  U.S.	  1	  (1908).	  (The	  Supreme	  court	  of	  U.S.	  concluded	  the	  music	  rolls	  were	  parts	  of	  a	  machine	  which	  can	  produced	  music	  tones	  when	  properly	  operated,	  but	  were	  not	  copies	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  copyright	  act.)	  See	  also	  Apple	  Computer,	  Inc.	  v.	  Franklin	  Computer	  Corp.,	  714	  F.2d	  1240	  (3rd	  Cir.	  1983).(The	  3rd	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the	   invisible	   copies	   stored	   in	   the	   hard	   drive	   or	   portable	   hard	   disk	   in	   computers	  unnecessary.	  People	  are	  able	  to	  have	  a	  giant	  feast	  of	  works	  as	  novels,	  TV	  programs,	  movies,	  music	  and	  others	  online	  without	  downloading	  any	  content	  of	  these	  works.	  All	   they	  need	   is	   high	   speed	   Internet	   and	  a	   simple	   tablet	   or	   cellphone.	  However,	   if	  there’s	  no	   tangible	  or	   invisible	   copy,	  how	  could	   the	   copyright	  owner	   control	   their	  work	  via	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction?	  So,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  cloud	  computing	  technology	  challenged	  the	  core	  status	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  in	  copyright	  law	  area.	  	   In	   each	   country,	   courts	  make	   judgments	   based	   on	   their	   countries’	   relevant	  acts.	  As	  for	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  all	  courts	  have	  to	  explain	  its	  scope	  for	  purpose	  of	  determining	  whether	  there	  are	  infringements	  of	  this	  exclusive	  right	  of	  copyright	  owners.	   This	  makes	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   reproduction	   right	   significant.	   Technology	   is	  challenging	   the	   reproduction	   right,	   this	   situation	   causes	  more	  uncertainties	  of	   the	  scope	  of	  the	  reproduction	  right.	  For	  instance,	  lots	  of	  “temporary	  copies”	  that	  existed	  in	   the	   random	   access	   memory	   of	   computer	   are	   created	   by	   users	   as	   results	   of	  launching	  a	  software	  application,	  browsing	  the	  Internet	  or	  doing	  other	  activities	  on	  a	   computer.	   	   Are	   such	   temporary	   copies	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   right	   of	  reproduction?	  Moreover,	   it’s	   getting	   harder	   to	   tell	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   copy	   exists	  when	  people	   stream	  video	  or	  audio	  directly	   from	   the	   cloud,	  because	   the	   “copy”	   is	  replaced	  by	  new	  data	  in	  a	  very	  short	  time	  or	  even	  do	  not	  include	  the	  whole	  work.	  In	  order	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  contour	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  this	  dissertation	  needs	  to	   analysis	   each	   element	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   reproduction,	   and	   review	   landmark	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Circuit	  of	  U.S.	  concluded	  that	  copyright	  could	  exist	  in	  computer	  programs	  expressed	  in	  object	  code	  –computer	  operating	  system	  and	  ROM—Read-­‐Only	  Memory	  Device.)	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cases	   to	   understand	   the	   basic	   principle	   behind	   them.	   	   We	   can	   only	   solve	   the	  problems	   arising	   with	   the	   cloud	   computing	   in	   such	   method	   only.	   	   By	   analyzing	  different	   countries’	   understanding	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   reproduction	   right	   and	   the	  Chinese	  now	  existing	  acts	  and	  applications,	  this	  section	  will	  provide	  a	  proposal	  for	  China	  in	  lining	  the	  contour	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  
i. THE U.S. PART— From the Case Law Relevant to The Right of 
Reproduction 	   This	   section	  will	   start	  with	   the	   right	  of	   reproduction	   in	   the	  U.S..	   In	   the	  U.S.	  Copyright	   Act,	   the	   reproduction	   right	   is	   an	   exclusive	   right	   granted	   to	   copyright	  owners	  by	   the	  copyright	   law;	   they	  can	  reproduce	  a	  copyrighted	  work	   in	  copies	  or	  phonorecords.28	  	  To	  reproduce	  a	  copyrighted	  work,	  copyright	  owners	  have	  to	  fix	  it	  in	   a	   tangible	  medium	   of	   expression	   –	   a	   copy	   or	   a	   phonorecord—“now	   known	   or	  later	   developed,”	   from	   which	   it	   “can	   be	   perceived,	   reproduced,	   or	   otherwise	  communicated,	  either	  directly	  or	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  machine	  or	  device.”29	  	   As	  mentioned	  above,	  there’s	  no	  doubt	  that	  “copy”	  is	  the	  central	  concept	  in	  the	  copyright	  system,	  it	  remains	  crucial	  to	  both	  the	  establishment	  and	  infringement	  of	  copyright	   interests.30	  Although	  we’ve	   already	  known	   the	  definition	  of	   “copies,”31	  it	  remains	  inevitable	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  reproduction	  right	  and	  a	  review	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  17	  U.S.C.	  §106(1).	  29	  See	  17	  U.S.C.	  §102(a)	  &	  101.	  30	  Aaron	  K.	  Perzanowski,	  Fixing	  RAM	  Copies,	  Faculty	  Publication,	  Paper	  46,	  at	  2	  (2010),	  http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=faculty_publications	  	  31	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  101.(	  “Copies,	  material	  objects,	  …fixed…”;	  “	  a	  work	  is	  fixed	  in	  a	  tangible	  medium	  of	  expression	  when	  its	  embodiment	  in	  a	  copy…	  by	  or	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  author,	  is	  sufficiently	  permanent	  or	  stable	  to	  permit	  it	  to	  be	  perceived,	  reproduced,	  or	  otherwise	  communicated	  for	  a	  period	  of	  more	  than	  transitory	  duration.”)	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the	  case	  law.	  Because	  the	  contours	  of	  these	  elements	  are	  still	  unclear	  that	  need	  to	  be	  defined.	  For	  instance,	  a	  defendant	  does	  not	  infringe	  the	  copyright	  law	  if	  he/she	  has	  not	   reproduced	   the	   copyrighted	  work	   in	   fixed	   form.32	  But	  what	   is	   a	   “fixed	   form”?	  This	   fixation	   requirement	   contains	   two	   elements:	   embodiment	   requirement	   and	  duration	   requirement	   according	   to	   2nd	   circuit	   in	   Cablevision	   II	   case.33	  Between	  these	   two	   elements,	   the	   contour	   of	   duration	   requirement	   stay	   indistinct,	   which	  constantly	   causes	   legal	   uncertainty	   in	   deciding	   whether	   there’s	   a	   copyright	  infringement	  or	  not,	  	  especially	  towards	  identifying	  “temporary	  copies.”	  	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   US	   courts	   deal	   with	   the	   temporary	  reproductions	   issue	   under	   the	   Copyright	   Act,	   we	   shall	   look	   back	   into	   the	   former	  cases	   to	   clarify	   the	   existed	   relevant	   rules	   and	   locate	   the	   relevant	   principles.	   The	  following	  sections	  will	  analyze	  this	  issue	  base	  on	  a	  timeline.	  
A. Before the RAM Copy Doctrine: Elektra v. Gem34, Basic Book v. Kinko’s35 
AND Priceton University v. Michigan Document Service36 	   These	   three	   cases	   happened	   before	   the	   RAM	   copies	   appeared.	   But	   the	  U.S.	  courts’	  attitude	  towards	  the	  issues	  caused	  by	  new	  reproduction	  technology	  could	  be	  implied	  from	  them.	  	  	   In	  the	  Elektra	  case,	  Defendant	  provided	  supplies	  as	  bland	  and	  pre-­‐recorded	  tapes	  and	  cartridges	  but	  also	  a	  new	  electronic	  invention,	  the	  “Make-­‐A-­‐Tape”	  system	  –	   which	   allowed	   users	   to	   duplicate	   tapes	   in	   2	   minutes	   by	   coins.	   Although	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 48 (5th ed. 2010). 	  33	  Cartoon	  Network,	  L.P.	  v.	  CSC	  Holdings,	  Inc.,	  536	  F.3d	  121	  (2d	  Cir.	  2008).	  [hereinafter	  Cablevision	  II]	  34	  Elektra	  v.	  Gem	  360	  F.	  Supp.	  821	  (E.D.N.Y.	  1973).	  35	  Kinko’s	  758	  F.	  Supp.	  1522	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1991).	  36	  Princeton	  Univ.Press	  v.	  Mich.	  Document	  Service.	  99	  F.3d	  1381	  (6th	  Cir.	  1996)	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defendant’s	  employees	  did	  not	  perform	  in	  the	  actual	  copying,	  and	  they	  insisted	  the	  “Make-­‐A-­‐Tape”	  system	  had	  the	  nature	  of	  “individual	  and	  self-­‐service,”	  which	  should	  be	  treated	  same	  as	  photocopiers	  in	  a	  public	  library,37	  the	  court	  disagreed	  with	  this	  comparison	   for	   3	   reasons:	   (1)	   Make-­‐A-­‐Tape	   system	   duplicated	   the	   entire	   tapes	  instead	  of	  “a	  part”	  of	  the	  tape;	  (2)	  Make-­‐A-­‐Tape	  system	  allowed	  users	  to	  duplicate	  the	  entire	  tapes	  in	  less	  time	  and	  less	  cost	  than	  the	  original;(3)	  “The	  duplicated	  tape	  is	  a	  true	  copy	  essentially	  identical	  and	  equally	  desirable.”38	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  court	  ruled	  that	   the	  defendant	  held	  direct	   liability	  because	   it	   gained	   financial	  profits	   from	   the	  infringements.	   The	   development	   of	   “reproduce”	   technology	   began	   to	   affect	   the	  court’s	   judgment.	   Due	   to	   the	   convenience	   and	   quality	   of	   this	   new	   technology,	   the	  court	   completely	   ignore	   the	   “volitional	   conduct,”	   and	   held	   the	   shop	   provide	  equipment	  directly	  liable	  for	  copyright	  infringement.39	  	   Then	   come	   the	   Kinko	   and	   Priceton	   case,	   in	   both	   of	   these	   two	   cases,	   the	  defendants	   reproduced	   the	   copyrighted	   materials	   without	   copyright	   owners’	  permissions,	  then	  they	  bund	  the	  copied	  materials	  up,	  sold	  them	  as	  “coursepacks”	  to	  students	  for	  financial	  profit.	  The	  students	  who	  bought	  the	  coursepacks	  use	  them	  as	  class	  reading	  assignments.	   	   	  Both	   the	  Southern	  District	  court	  of	  New	  York	  and	  the	  6th	  Circuit	  held	  that	  the	  defendants	  directly	  liable	  for	  the	  copyright	  infringements,	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  could	  not	  be	  granted	  because	  the	  defendants	  did	  use	  the	  infringing	  materials	  for	  a	  commercial	  purpose	  and	  would	  effect	  the	  potential	  market.	   	   	  As	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Elektra	  v.	  Gem,	  supra	  note	  34	  ,	  at	  824.	  38	  Id.	  	  39	  Volitional	  Conduct,	  WIKIA,	  http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Volitional_conduct_doctrine	  	  .	  (“To	  be	  liable	  for	  direct	  copyright	  infringement,	  a	  person	  must	  have	  committed	  some	  voluntary	  act	  that	  caused	  the	  infringement	  to	  occur.”	  This	  dissertation	  will	  further	  analyze	  this	  volitional	  conduct	  in	  the	  Netcom	  Case.)	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will	   discuss	   later,	   the	   EU	   directives	   use	   the	   condition	   of	   	   “economic	   benefits”	   in	  deciding	  whether	  temporary	  copies	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  But	  although	  the	  US	  court	  brought	  into	  consideration	  here	  in	  these	  two	  cases,	  they	  further	  ignored	  the	  condition	  of	  economic	  benefits	  totally	  in	  the	  future	  cases.	  	  
B. MAI v. Peak40 --- the RAM Copy Doctrine 	   Unlike	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   precedents,	   cases	   thereafter	   are	   all	   about	   a	  doctrine	   still	  playing	  an	   important	   role	  even	  nowadays.	  That	   is	   the	  RAM	  doctrine.	  RAM	   is	   the	   abbreviation	   for	   Random-­‐access	   memory	   (RAM),	   which	   is	   a	   form	   of	  computer	   data	   storage	   that	   allows	   data	   items	   to	   be	   read	   and	   written	   in	  approximately	   the	   same	   time	   when	   users	   access	   data	   items	   in	   computers.41	  A	  computer	  operates	  by	  reading	  information	  stored	  from	  permanent	  storage	  (as	  hard	  disk),	  then	  translating	  it	   into	  electrical	  pulses	  in	  RAM,	  and	  finally	  transferring	  it	  to	  the	   CPU,	   which	   actually	   performs	   the	   calculations	   and	   answers.	  42	  This	   means	  whenever	  a	  user	  wants	   to	  view	  a	  picture	  or	  read	  a	  PDF	  file	  on	  a	  computer,	  read	  a	  novel	   on	   a	   Kindle	   device	   or	   listen	   to	   a	   song	   on	   an	   iPod,	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   file	  will	   be	  placed	  in	  temporary	  storage—	  RAM.	  But	  the	  RAM	  will	  not	  keep	  the	  copy	  forever,	  the	  former	  copy	  in	  it	  will	  soon	  be	  replaced	  by	  new	  data	  and	  all	  data	  will	  be	  erased	  when	  the	  computer	  is	  turned	  off.43	  Then,	  the	  question	  arises:	  should	  we	  consider	  the	  copy	  temporarily	  stored	  in	  the	  RAM	  as	  an	  ordinary	  copy?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  MAI	  Systems	  Corp.	  v.	  Peak	  Computer	  Inc.	  991	  F.2d	  511	  (9th	  Cir.	  1993)	  [hereinafter	  MAI	  v.	  Peak].	  41	  Random-­‐access	  memory,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random-­‐access_memory	  	  42	  See	  Apply	  computer,	  Inc	  v.	  Franklin	  Computer,	  545	  F.	  Supp.	  812,	  813	  (E.D.	  Pa.	  1982).	  43	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  306.	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   The	  9th	  Circuit	  and	  other	  courts	  gave	  us	  an	  answer:	  yes,	  the	  data	  temporarily	  stored	  in	  RAM	  qualifies	  a	  “copy,”	  because	  the	  data	  is	  “fixed”	  in	  the	  RAM.44	  In	  MAI	  v.	  Peak	  case,	  the	  defendant	  had	  to	  run	  the	  plaintiff’s	  built-­‐in	  operating	  system	  software	  to	  do	  the	  repair	  and	  maintenance	  process.	  According	  to	  the	  9th	  Circuit,	  this	  caused	  a	  “copy”	   automatically	   be	   transferred	   from	   the	   hard	   drive	   to	   the	   RAM.	   The	   9th	  Circuit’s	  ruling	  based	  on	  two	  reasons:	  (1)	  it’s	  a	  general	  rule	  that	  “loading	  of	  software	  into	   a	   computer	   constitute	   the	   creation	   of	   copy;”	   and	   (2)	   the	   copy	   created	   in	   the	  RAM	  can	  be	  “perceived,	  reproduced,	  or	  otherwise	  communicated.”45	  	  	  	   Although	   the	   9th	   Circuit’s	   decision	   (the	   Ram	   Copy	   Doctrine)	   had	   been	  followed	   by	   lower	   courts	   for	   almost	   15	   years	   without	   challenges46	  and	   had	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  MAI	  v.	  Peak,	  supra	  note	  40.	  See	  also	  Stenograph	  v.	  Bassard	  case;	  Sony	  Computer	  v.	  Connectix	  Corp	  case.	  But	  some	  courts	  reject	  the	  rule	  that	  temporary	  storage	  in	  RAM	  qualifies	  a	  reproduction.	  See	  Hogan	  v.	  Cybersource.	  45	  17	  U.S.C.	  §101.	  See	  also	  MAI	  v.	  Peak,	  supra	  note	  40,	  	  at	  520.	  	  46	  Zohar	  Efroni	  ,	  The	  Cartoon	  Network	  v.	  CSC	  Holdings	  &	  Cablevision	  Systems,	  ,	  (2008)	  http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2008/08/cartoon-­‐network-­‐v-­‐csc-­‐holdings-­‐cablevision-­‐systems	  (last	  visited	  March,	  2015);	  See	  generally	  Advanced	  Computer	  Services	  of	  Michigan,	  Inc.	  v.	  MAI	  Sys.	  Corp.,	  845	  F.	  Supp.	  356,	  363	  (E.D.	  Va.	  1994).(observing	  that	  “	  the	  Act	  does	  not	  require	  absolute	  permanence	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  copy”);	  Stenograph	  L.L.C.	  v.	  Bossard	  Assocs.,	  Inc.,	  144	  F.3d	  96,	  101-­‐02	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1998)	  (citing	  MAI	  v.	  Peak	  as	  “RAM	  reproduction	  constitutes	  a	  copy);NLFC,	  INC.	  v.	  Devcom	  Mid-­‐America,	  Inc.,	  45	  F.3d	  23	  231,	  235	  (7th	  Cir.	  1995)(stating	  “the	  act	  of	  loading	  a	  program…	  into	  a	  computer’s	  memory	  creates	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  program”);	  Triad	  Sys.	  Corp.	  v.	  Se.	  Express	  Co.,	  64	  F.3d	  1330,	  1333-­‐34	  (9th	  Cir.	  1995)(reiterating	  Peak’s	  holding	  and	  holding	  that	  electronic	  representations	  of	  digital	  signals	  on	  a	  memory	  component	  that	  lasted	  for	  a	  millisecond	  are	  fixed);	  Tiffany	  Design,	  Inc.	  v.	  Reno-­‐Tahoe	  Specialty,	  Inc.,	  55.	  F.	  Supp	  2d	  1113,	  1120-­‐21	  (D.	  Nev.	  1999)(relying	  on	  Peak	  in	  holding	  that	  the	  scanning	  of	  a	  copyrighted	  image	  into	  RAM	  constituted	  a	  reproduction);	  Sega	  Enters.	  v.	  MAPHIA	  948	  F.	  Supp.	  923	  931	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  1996)(citing	  Peak	  as	  “copying…occur	  when	  a	  computer	  program	  is	  transferred	  from	  a	  permanent	  storage	  device	  to	  a	  computer’s	  random	  access	  memory”);	  Stenograph	  L.L.C.	  v	  Bossard	  Assocs.,	  144	  F	  3d	  96	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1998)(holding	  that	  an	  infringing	  copy	  of	  a	  computer	  was	  make	  when	  that	  program	  was	  loaded	  into	  RAM);	  Lowry’s	  Reports,	  Inc.	  v.	  Legg	  Mason,	  Inc.,	  271	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  737,	  745	  (D.	  Md.	  2003)(	  “Unauthorized	  electronic	  transmission	  of	  copyrighted	  text,	  from	  the	  memory	  of	  one	  computer	  into	  the	  memory	  of	  another,	  creats	  an	  infringing	  ‘copy’	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act.”);	  Ticketmaster	  L.L.C.	  v.	  RMG	  Technologies,	  Inc.,	  507	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1096	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2007)(	  The	  court	  decided	  that	  upon	  viewing	  of	  webpages,	  the	  copies	  of	  webpages	  automatically	  stored	  in	  the	  cache	  or	  RAM	  	  are	  Copies.)	  DocMagic,	  Inc	  v.	  Ellie	  Mae.	  Inc.,	  745	  F.	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endorsed	   by	   the	   Government’s	  NII	  White	   Paper	   Report	   as	   settled	   law,47	  there	   are	  still	  many	   critics.	  As	  mentioned	  by	  Professor	  Leaffer,	   these	   critics	   can	  be	  grouped	  into	  two	  categories:	  (1)	  MAI	  decision	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  both	  the	  prior	  case	  law	  and	  the	   intent	  of	  congress;(2)	  MAI	  decision	  will	  have	  troubling	  policy	   implications	  of	  temporary	  instantiations	  as	  browsing	  the	  Internet,	  reading	  files,	  viewing	  photos	  and	  others.48	  	  	  	   The	   9th	   Circuit	   gave	   its	   ruling	   relied	   on	   CONTU’s	   assertion,49	  Nimmer’s	  statement50	  and	   the	   rule	   of	   Apple	   Computer	   v.	   Formula	   case.51	  But	   all	   these	   three	  authorities	  are	  questionable.	  The	  CONTU	  Reports	  is	  quite	  ambiguous,	  because:	  (1)	  it	  did	  not	  clarify	  whether	  it	  refers	  to	  ROM	  or	  RAM;	  (2)	  it	  lacks	  authoritative	  weight;	  (3)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Supp.	  2d	  1148	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  2010)	  (The	  court	  ruled	  that	  unauthorized	  loading	  of	  software	  into	  RAM	  constitutes	  copying).	  	  47	  See	  Information	  Infrastructure	  Task	  Force,	  Intellectual	  Property	  And	  The	  National	  
Information	  Infrastructure:	  The	  Report	  Of	  The	  Working	  Group	  On	  Intellectrual	  Property	  
Rights	  64	  (1995),	  https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf	  	  (This	  WHITE	  PAPER	  cited	  Peak	  case,	  asserted	  that	  it	  has	  	  “long	  been	  clear	  under	  U.S.	  law”	  that	  RAM	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  works,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  other	  incidental	  copies	  made	  during	  the	  transmission	  of	  suck	  works	  through	  the	  Internet,	  implicated	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	  exclusive	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  It	  then	  further	  suggested	  “minor	  clarifications	  and	  limited	  amendments”	  to	  copyright	  law	  that	  would	  merely	  reinforce	  the	  settled	  view.)	  48	  See	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  302-­‐03;	  see	  also,Perzanowski,	  supra	  note	  11,	  	  	  at	  9-­‐14.	  	  49	  See	  NATIONAL	  COMMISSIONON	  NEW	  TECHNOLOHICAL	  USES	  OF	  COPYRIGHTED	  WORKS,	  FINAL	  REPORT	  49	  (1979)[hereinafter	  CONTO],.	  (The	  introduction	  of	  a	  work	  into	  a	  computer	  memory	  would…,be	  a	  reproduction.”)	  50	  See	  MELVILLE	  B.NIMMER	  &	  DAVID	  NIMMER,	  NIMMER	  ON	  COPYRIGHT	  (1992).§8.08[B][2],	  at	  8-­‐105.	  (“Inputting	  a	  computer	  program	  entails	  the	  preparation	  of	  a	  copy.”	  The	  NIMMER	  was	  relied	  on	  the	  language	  of	  CONTU.)	  51	  Apple	  Computer,	  Inc	  v.	  Formula	  Int’l,	  Inc.,	  594	  F.	  Supp.	  617,	  621	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  1984).(The	  Peak	  Court	  (9th	  circuit)	  insisted	  that	  the	  use	  of	  “copy”	  and	  “fixation”	  in	  Apple	  court’s	  holding	  can	  support	  its	  own	  decision.	  However,	  in	  the	  Apple	  case,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  defendant	  infringe	  copyright	  because	  it	  copy	  and	  sell	  ROM	  chips	  containing	  Plaintiff’s	  software.	  The	  court	  clearly	  announced	  that	  §117	  cannot	  be	  applied,	  since	  copying	  in	  ROM	  was	  not	  “essential”(copying	  into	  RAM	  was	  an	  alternative).	  The	  court	  also	  stated	  that	  “…copy	  into	  RAM.	  This	  would	  only	  be	  a	  temporary	  fixation.”)	  See	  Bradley	  J.	  Nicholson,	  The	  Ghost	  in	  the	  
Machine	  :	  Mai	  Systems	  Corp.	  v.	  Peak	  Computer,	  Inc.	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Copyright	  in	  RAM,	  10	  BERKELEY	  TECH.	  L.J.147	  (1995).	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it	  contradicted	  with	  the	  statements	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  “fixation”	  by	  the	  Congress.52	  Nimmer’s	   statement	   was	   made	   based	   on	   CONTU	   Reports,	   which	   made	   it	  questionable	  either.	  Further,	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  undercut	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Apple	  case.	  Most	   importantly,	  the	  Congress	  had	  already	  concluded	  that	  a	  copy	  in	  RAM	  is	  not	  a	  “copy”	   for	   purposes	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   via	   giving	   definition	   to	   “fixation.”53	  This	  decision	  also	  extended	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  copyright	  owner	  and	  created	  extreme	  limitation	   towards	   the	   public’s	   traditional	   right	   to	   read,	   view,	   and	   listen	   to	  copyrighted	  work.54	  When	  we	  use	  the	  digital	  service	  everyday,	  storing	  data	  in	  RAM	  buffer	  is	  inevitable.	  The	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine	  practically	  makes	  everyone	  a	  copyright	  infringer.	  	  	   The	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine	  still	  plays	  an	  important	  role.	  Due	  to	  its	  transparent	  intrinsic	   logic	  conflicts,	   it	   is	  problematic.	  The	   following	  sections	  demonstrate	   later	  courts’	  attempts	  to	  restrict	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Perzanowski,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  10.	  53	  H.R.	  REP.	  No.	  1476,	  94th	  Cong.,	  2d	  Sess.	  at	  52-­‐53	  (1976).(“The	  definition	  of	  ‘fixation’	  would	  exclude	  from	  the	  concept	  purely	  evanescent	  or	  transient	  reproductions	  such	  as	  those	  projected	  briefly	  on	  a	  screen,	  shown	  electronically	  on	  a	  television	  or	  other	  cathode	  ray	  tube,	  or	  captured	  momentarily	  in	  the	  ‘memory’	  of	  a	  computer.”	  “under	  the	  bill	  it	  makes	  no	  difference	  what	  the	  form,	  manner,	  or	  medium	  of	  fixation	  may	  be—whether	  it	  is	  in	  words…….magnetic,	  or	  any	  other	  stable	  form.”)	  54	  See	  Joseph.	  P.	  Liu,	  Owning	  Digital	  Copies:	  Copyright	  Law	  and	  the	  Incidents	  of	  Copy	  
Ownership,	  42	  WM.	  &	  MARY	  L.	  REV.	  1245,	  1262-­‐63	  (2001).(The	  Ram	  Copy	  Doctrine	  shifts	  the	  existing	  balance	  of	  rights	  in	  copyright	  protected	  works	  from	  users	  to	  copyright	  owners.);	  
see	  also	  Niva	  Elkin-­‐Koren,	  Copyright	  Law	  and	  Social	  Dialogue	  on	  the	  Information	  
Superhighway:	  The	  Case	  Against	  Copyright	  Liability	  of	  Bullentin	  Board	  Operators,	  13	  CARDOZO	  ARTS	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.	  345,	  382	  (1995).(the	  focus	  on	  “copies”	  “naturally	  presupposes	  an	  expanded	  monopoly	  for	  publishers”);	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C. Religious v. Netcom55 -- An Limitation Attempt: “volitional conduct”  	   The	   Netcom	   case	   brought	   the	   “volitional	   conduct”	   to	   limit	   the	   Internet	  Service	   Providers’	   liability.	   	   In	   this	   case,	   RTC,	   owner	   of	   copyrighted	   work	   sued	  against	  a	  bulletin	  board	  service	  operator	  and	  its	  Internet	  service	  provider	  (Netcom)	  for	   direct	   copyright	   infringement.	   When	   a	   subscriber	   posted	   RTC’s	   copyrighted	  work	  on	  the	  online	  forum,	  there	  were	  RAM	  copies	  created	  and	  stored	  in	  the	  BBS’s	  and	   Netcom’s	   storage	   device.	   Because	   the	   9th	   circuit	   decision	   is	   binding	   on	   the	  Netcom	   district	   court,	   it	   quickly	   concluded	   that	   the	   messages	   were	   sufficiently	  “fixed,”	  even	  though	  the	  messages	  remained	  on	  the	  system	  for	  maximally	  11	  days.56	  However,	   the	   Netcom	   court	   created	   a	   volitional	   conduct	   requirement	   to	   limit	   the	  potential	   monopoly	   effect	   of	   the	   RAM	   Copy	   Doctrine.	   The	   court	   decided	   that	   the	  RAM	  copies	  “fixed”	  in	  the	  BBS’s	  and	  Netcom’s	  system	  were	  “incidentally”	  operated	  by	   the	   infringer’s	   activity.57	  So	   Netcom	   itself	   did	   not	   make	   the	   copies.	   Netcom’s	  decision	   of	   direct	   infringement	   been	   further	   strengthened	   by	   the	   House	   Report:	  “Liability	  is	  ruled	  out	  for	  passive,	  automatic	  acts	  engaged	  in	  through	  a	  technological	  process	  initiated	  by	  another.”58	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Religious	  Tech.	  Ctr.	  v.	  Netcom	  On-­‐Line	  Commc’n	  Servs.,	  Inc.,	  907	  F.	  Supp.	  1361(N.D.	  Cal.	  1995).	  56	  Id,	  at	  1368.	  (reasoning	  that	  due	  to	  MAI	  v.	  Peak	  that	  “	  the	  loading	  of	  data	  from	  a	  storage	  device	  into	  RAM	  constitutes	  copying	  because	  that	  data	  stays	  in	  RAM	  long	  enough	  for	  it	  to	  be	  perceived”).	  57	  Id,	  at	  1370.	  (“Although	  copyright	  is	  a	  strict	  liability	  statute,	  there	  should	  still	  be	  some	  element	  of	  volition	  or	  causation	  which	  is	  lacking	  where	  a	  defendant’s	  system	  is	  merely	  used	  to	  create	  a	  copy	  by	  a	  third	  party.”)	  Volitional	  conduct	  is	  an	  element	  in	  deciding	  the	  problem:	  who	  create	  the	  copy?	  58	  H.R.	  Rep.	  105-­‐551,	  Part	  2,	  105th	  Cong.,	  2nd	  Sess.	  1998.	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D. DMCA’s amendments59— exceptions to the RAM Copy Doctrine 	   In	  1998,	  the	  DMCA	  amended	  §117(c)	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  in	  response	  to	  the	  MAI	  v.	  Peak	  case	  by	  creating	  a	  safe	  harbor	  for	  computer	  service	  (maintenance	  and	  repair).	  60	  	  Further,	  it	  also	  adopted	  the	  Netcom’s	  decision	  of	  “volitional	  conduct”	  by	  setting	  out	  §512:	  Internet	  Service	  Providers	  are	  not	  directly	  liable	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  infringer	   uses	   an	   automated	   system	   that	   the	   ISP	   implemented.61	  Both	   §117	   and	  §512	  from	  the	  DMCA	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  exception	  to	   liability	  created	  by	  the	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine.	  	  	   While	   the	   Congress	   did	   not	   explicitly	   approved	   the	   RAM	   Copy	   Doctrine,	   it	  indeed	   implicitly	   endorse	   of	   the	   RAM	   Copy	   Doctrine	   without	   defining	   its	  boundaries.62	  Lots	  of	  scholars	  and	  commentators	  criticized	  the	  DMCA	  as	  a	  result	  of	  it.	  Besides,	  the	  DMCA	  neither	  legislate	  exceptions	  for	  Non-­‐Internet	  Service	  Providers	  and	  Individual	  users.63	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  105-­‐304,	  112	  Stat.	  2860	  (1998).	  60	  Id,	  §117:	  “(c)	  Machine	  Maintenance	  or	  Repair.—	  Notwithstanding	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  106,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  infringement	  for	  the	  owner	  or	  lessee	  of	  a	  machine	  to	  make	  or	  authorize	  the	  making	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  computer	  program	  if	  such	  copy	  is	  made	  solely	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  activation	  of	  a	  machine	  that	  lawfully	  contains	  an	  authorized	  copy	  of	  the	  computer	  program,	  for	  purposes	  only	  of	  maintenance	  or	  repair	  of	  that	  machine,	  if—	  (1)	  such	  new	  copy	  is	  used	  in	  no	  other	  manner	  and	  is	  destroyed	  immediately	  after	  the	  maintenance	  or	  repair	  is	  completed;	  and	  (2)	  with	  respect	  to	  any	  computer	  program	  or	  part	  thereof	  that	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  that	  machine	  to	  be	  activated,	  such	  program	  or	  part	  thereof	  is	  not	  accessed	  or	  used	  other	  than	  to	  make	  such	  new	  copy	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  machine.”	  61	  Id,	  §512.	  62	  JESSICA	  LITMAN,	  DIGITAL	  COPYRIGHT	  176	  (2006).	  (Prof	  Litman	  contends	  that	  the	  DMCA	  “cede	  to	  copyright	  owners	  control	  over	  looking	  at,	  listening	  to,	  learning	  from,	  or	  using	  copyrighted	  work.”)	  63	  Id.	  (The	  DMCA	  “cedes	  to	  copyright	  owners	  control	  over	  looking	  at,	  listening	  to,	  learning	  from	  or	  using	  copyrighted	  works”.)	  see	  also	  U.S.	  COPYRIGHT	  OFFICE,	  DMCA	  SECTION	  104	  REPORT,	  at	  cover	  letter	  (Aug.	  2001).(§512	  doesn’t	  provide	  enough	  protection	  to	  companies	  who	  operate	  on	  a	  network-­‐based	  system	  but	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  ISP	  definition.)	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E. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.64—qualitative/quantitative components of 
fixation’s transitory duration requirement 	   The	   court	   further	   provided	   fixation’s	   transitory	   duration	   requirement	   in	  directly	   limiting	   the	   RAM	   copy	   doctrine.	   The	   defendant	   LoopNet	   allowed	  subscribers	  to	  post	  listing	  of	  commercial	  real	  estate	  on	  its	  website,	  if	  the	  subscriber	  agreed	   its	   “Terms	   and	   Conditions”—prohibit	   post	   infringing	   photos.65	  LoopNet’s	  employers	   will	   manually	   review	   posted	   photos	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   they	   were	  commercial	   real	   estate	   and	   to	   block	   photos	   which	   clearly	   were	   copyrighted	   by	  others.66	  CoStar	  owned	  copyright	  of	  plenty	  of	  commercial	  real	  estate	  photos.	   	  After	  acting	   the	   process	   of	   take-­‐down	   notice	   and	   take-­‐down,	   there	  were	   still	   infringing	  photos.	  CoStar	  sued	  LoopNet	  for	  direct	  and	  contributory	  infringement.67	  	   The	  4th	  Circuit	  rejected	  CoStar’s	  argument	  that	  LoopNet	  directly	  liable	  since	  it	   could	   not	   be	   protected	   by	  DMCA	   §512	   safe	   harbor	   rules.68	  Thus,	   the	   4th	  Circuit	  had	   to	   decide	  whether	   there’s	   an	   ordinary	   copy	   exist.69	  The	   court	   determined	   the	  fixation	  requirement	  of	  an	  ordinary	  copy	  by	  expanding	  analyzing	  two	  components	  of	  “transitory	  duration”:	  (1)qualitative—who	  made	  the	  copies	  and	  for	  what	  purpose;	  (2)quantitative—	  for	  how	  long	  did	  the	  copies	  existed.70	  Under	  this	  theory,	  no	  copy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Costar	  Grp.,	  Inc.	  v.	  LoopNet,	  Inc.,	  373	  F.3d	  544,	  548	  (4th	  Cir.	  2004).	  65	  Id,	  at	  547.	  66	  Id.	  67	  Id.	  68	  Id,	  at	  548.	  69	  Id,	  at	  510.	  (	  “The	  term	  ‘copy’	  refers	  to	  ‘material	  objects…in	  which	  a	  work	  is	  fixed.	  A	  work	  is	  "fixed"	  in	  a	  medium	  when	  it	  is	  embodied	  in	  a	  copy	  "sufficiently	  permanent	  or	  stable	  to	  permit	  it	  to	  be	  perceived,	  reproduced,	  or	  otherwise	  communicated	  for	  a	  period	  of	  more	  than	  ‘transitory	  duration.’")	  70	  Id,	  at	  551.	  (“‘Transitory	  duration’	  is	  thus	  both	  a	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  characterization.	  It	  is	  quantitative	  insofar	  as	  it	  describes	  the	  period	  during	  which	  the	  function	  occurs,	  and	  it	  is	  qualitative	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  describes	  the	  period	  during	  which	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was	  created	  because	  LoopNet’s	  act	  of	  reviewing	  and	  blocking	  photos	  cannot	  qualify	  the	  “fixation”	  of	  infringing	  copies.71	  The	  4th	  Circuit	  did	  make	  a	  huge	  improvement	  in	  analyzing	   the	   fixation	   requirement,	   because	   the	   quantitative/qualitative	   approach	  indeed	   preserve	   the	   fixation’s	   duration	   requirement	   instead	   of	   determining	   how	  long	   qualifies	   the	   duration	   requirement.	   The	   4th	   Circuit	   actually	   analyzed	   the	  volitional	   conduct	   requirement	   together	   with	   the	   fixation	   requirement	   via	   the	  qualitative/quantitative	  components.	  Unfortunately,	  not	  only	  the	  4th	  Circuit	  did	  not	  provide	  analysis	  of	  the	  qualitative/quantitative	  components	  in	  detail,	  but	  also	  other	  courts	   in	   following	   case	   did	   not	   actually	   follow	   the	  4th	   Circuit’s	   improvement—quantitative/qualitative	  approach,	  they	  still	  stuck	  by	  the	  duration	  requirement,	  such	  as	  the	  courts	  in	  Cablevision	  cases	  mentioned	  in	  the	  next	  section.72	  	  
F. Cablevision case—introduced transitory duration requirement besides the RAM 
Copy Doctrine 	   This	   is	   actually	   a	   series	   of	   Cablevision	   cases,	   including	   Cablevision	   I,73	  Cablevision	   II,	  74and	  Cablevision	   III.	  75	  These	  cases	   further	  discussed	   the	   transitory	  duration	  requirement.	  These	  cases’	  background	  remained	  the	  same.	  The	  defendant,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  function	  occurs,	  and	  it	  is	  qualitative	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  describes	  the	  status	  of	  transition.	  Thus,	  when	  the	  copyrighted	  software	  is	  down-­‐loaded	  onto	  the	  computer,	  because	  it	  may	  be	  used	  to	  serve	  the	  computer	  or	  the	  computer	  owner,	  it	  no	  longer	  remains	  transitory.”)	  See	  Melissa	  A.	  Bogden,	  Fixing	  Fixation:	  The	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine,	  43	  ARIZ.	  ST.	  L.J.	  181,201	  (2011). 71	  Id.	  (The	  ISP	  only	  provides	  a	  system	  “that	  automatically	  transmits	  users’	  material….”	  And	  the	  temporary	  electronic	  copies	  may	  only	  exist	  in	  the	  transmission	  process,	  thus	  they	  are	  not	  “fixed”	  in	  the	  sense	  they	  are	  “of	  more	  than	  transitory	  duration.”)	  72	  Cablevision	  cases.	  (The	  2nd	  circuit	  still	  treated	  the	  volitional	  conduct	  and	  the	  fixation	  requirement	  separately.)	  73	  Twentieth	  Century	  Fox	  Film	  Corp.	  v.	  Cablevision	  Sys.	  Corp.,478	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  607	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2007).	  (Cablevision	  I)	  74	  Cablevision	  II,	  supra	  note	  33.	  75	  129	  S.	  Ct.	  985	  (2009)(08-­‐448)(inviting	  Solicitor	  General	  to	  file	  brief);	  On	  Petition	  For	  A	  Writ	  Of	  Certiorari	  To	  The	  United	  States	  Court	  Of	  Appeals	  For	  The	  Second	  Circuit	  No.	  08-­‐448	  (Nov.5.2008)(Cablevision	  III)	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Cablevision,	   a	   traditional	   cable	   TV	   services	   provider,	   provided	   a	   new	   service	   –	  Remote	   Storage	  DVR	   (RS-­‐DVR)	   in	   2006.	   This	   RS-­‐DVR	   is	   different	   from	   traditional	  DVR,	  since	  programs	  recorded	  by	  users	  are	  centrally	   located	   in	  Cablevision’s	  hard	  disk	  instead	  of	  users’	  individual	  set-­‐top	  DVRs.	  After	  Cablevision	  gather	  content	  from	  content	   providers,	   it	   then	   split	   the	   single	   stream	   into	   two.	   The	   first	   directly	   send	  content	   to	   consumers	   as	  before	   and	   the	  other	   routed	   to	  Broadband	  Media	  Router	  (“BMR”)	  which	  uses	  1.2s	  to	  buffer	  data	  stream	  and	  reform	  it.	  Then	  the	  data	  transmit	  into	  Arroyo	  Server,	  which	  has	  two	  buffers	  and	  several	  hard	  disks.	  All	  the	  data	  stay	  in	  the	  first	  primary	  ingest	  buffer	  for	  0.1s	  to	  determine	  whether	  Cablevision	  customers	  requested	   a	   recording.	   If	   customer	   did	   requested	   to	   record,	   the	   data	   transmitted	  into	   the	   second	   buffer	   and	   then	   into	   a	   hard	   disk.	  76	  The	   data	   in	   the	   first	   primary	  ingest	  buffer	  are	  automatically	  erased	  and	  replaced	  every	  tenth	  of	  a	  second.	  	   In	   Cablevision	   I,	   the	  district	   court	   held	   that	   by	   operating	   the	  RS-­‐DVR77	  will	  create	   infringing	  copies	  of	   the	  Plaintiff’s	  programming	   in	   the	  Arroyo	  servers’	  hard	  disks	  and	  in	  buffer	  memory,	  and	  the	  Defendant	  violated	  the	  Plaintiff’s	  reproduction	  right.78	  The	  copies	  of	  Plaintiff’s	  programming	  stored	  in	  the	  hard	  disks	  are	  ready	  to	  be	  play	  back	  by	  the	  customers	  under	  their	  request,	  so	  there	  are	  copies	  fixed	  in	  the	  defendant’s	  hard	  disk	  without	  questions.	  The	  district	  court	  decided	  it’s	  Cablevision	  made	   these	   copies	   by	   considering	   two	   main	   reasons.	   First	   is	   the	   relationship	  between	   Cablevision	   and	   its	   customers.	   Cablevision	   stays	   an	   ongoing	   relationship	  with	  its	  customers,	  for	  instance,	  it	  has	  to	  keep	  operating	  and	  maintaining	  equipment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Cablevision	  II,	  supra	  note	  33,	  at	  124-­‐25.	  77	  RS-­‐DVR,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_DVR	  	  78	  Cablevision	  I,	  supra	  note	  73,	  at	  622.	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that	  makes	  RS-­‐DVR’s	  recording	  process	  available,	  and	  monitoring	  the	  programming	  streams.	  This	  “on-­‐going	  relationship”	  is	  different	  from	  Sony	  case,79	  since	  once	  Sony	  sells	   its	   VCR,	   it	   has	   not	   further	   service	   for	   the	   VCR	   to	   record.	   Second	   is	   that	  Cablevision	   is	   the	  designer	  of	   this	  volitional	  design	  of	   the	   system	   to	   copy	  content,	  and	  it	  has	  “unfettered	  discretion”	  over	  the	  content	  available	  for	  recording.	  80	  	   The	   district	   court	   also	   concluded	   there	   are	   “copies”	   in	   the	   buffer,	  whereas	  even	  if	  a	  very	  small	  portion	  of	  programming	  is	  capable	  of	  being	  read	  or	  reproduced	  from	  the	  buffer,	  by	   following	   the	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine	   from	  the	  MAI	  v.	  Peak	  case.81	  The	   court	   then	   used	   copyright	   office’s	   2001	   report	   on	   the	   Digital	   Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	  to	  support	  itself.82	  	   However,	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  denied	  the	  district	  court’s	  decision	  in	  Cablevision	  II.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  asked	  the	  Solicitor	  General	  to	  file	  a	  brief	  expressing	  the	  opinions	  of	   the	   U.S.	   courts	   concerning	   the	   issues	   in	   this	   case,	   but	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   then	  denied	  the	  writ	  for	  a	  petition	  of	  certiorari.83	  The	  Solicitor	  General	  sided	  with	  the	  2nd	  Circuit’s	  decision.84	  Thus	  the	   following	  part	  will	   focus	  on	  analyzing	  Cablevision	  II’s	  decision.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Sony	  Corp.	  of	  America	  v.	  Universal	  City	  Studios,	  Inc.,	  464	  U.S.	  417	  (1984)	  [hereinafter	  Betamax	  case].	  80	  Cablevision	  I,	  supra	  note	  73,	  at	  619-­‐20.	  81	  Id.	  (Buffering	  copy	  was	  not	  de	  minimis,	  because	  its	  "aggregate	  effect	  of	  the	  buffering"	  was	  to	  reproduce	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  work.)	  82	  See	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office,	  DMCA	  Section	  104	  Report,	  at	  107-­‐17	  (Aug.	  2001),	  available	  at	  http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-­‐104-­‐report-­‐vol-­‐1.pdf	  	  (the	  report	  indicated	  that	  buffer	  copies	  are	  copies	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Copyright	  Act.)	  83	  129	  S	  Ct	  (Took	  no	  part	  in	  the	  consideration	  or	  decision	  of	  this	  petition)	  84	  Steven	  Foley	  ,	  Buffering	  and	  the	  Reproduction	  Right:	  When	  is	  a	  Copy	  a	  Copy?	  	  114	  (2010)	  
available	  at	  	  http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol1/iss1/4/	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   When	   the	   2nd	   Circuit	   decided	   whether	   Cablevision	   did	   make	   copies	   that	  violate	   the	  plaintiff’s	   reproduction	   right,	   it	   also	  needed	   to	   analyze	   two	   issues	   that	  relates	  to	  how	  the	  RS-­‐DVR	  operates:	  1)	  whether	  RAM	  copies	  stored	  in	  BMR	  and	  the	  first	   primary	   ingest	   buffer	  were	   “fixed”;	   2)	  who	   created	   the	   copies	   located	   in	   the	  secondary	  buffer	  and	  hard	  disk.	  85	  	   The	  2nd	  Circuit	  brought	  a	  two	  prongs	  test	  to	  the	  first	  issue	  “fixed.”	  The	  first	  prong	   is	   the	   embodiment	   requirement	   and	   the	   second	   prong	   is	   the	   duration	  requirement.86	  The	  2nd	   Circuit	   noticed	   that	   the	   district	   court	   only	   focused	   on	   the	  embodiment	   requirement	   in	   considering	   “fixed”	   issue. 87 	  For	   its	   duration	  requirement,	   the	   2nd	   Circuit	   came	   up	   with	   three	   steps	   in	   proving	   the	   need	   of	  “transitory	  duration”	  requirement.	  First,	  the	  District	  court	  followed	  the	  9th	  Circuit’s	  decision	   in	   the	   Peak	   case;	   however,	   the	   9th	   Circuit	   referenced	   the	   “transitory	  duration”	   language	  but	  did	  not	  discuss	  or	  analyze	   it.88	  The	  2nd	  Circuit	   thought	   the	  parties	  in	  the	  Peak	  case	  did	  not	  dispute	  the	  duration	  requirement	  simply	  because	  it	  was	  satisfied,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  the	  transitory	  duration	  should	  be	  analyzed	  89	  Further,	  the	  2nd	   Circuit	   found	   that	   the	   Copyright	   Office’s	   2001	   DMCA	   Report	   (which	   the	  district	  court	  relied	  on)	  only	  deserved	  Skidmore	  deference,	  “deference	  based	  on	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Id,	  at	  127.	  86	  Id.	  (“Copyright	  Act	  also	  provides	  that	  a	  work	  is	  ‘fixed’	  in	  a	  tangible	  medium	  of	  expression	  when	  its	  embodiment…	  id	  sufficiently	  permanent	  or	  stable	  to	  permit	  to	  be	  …reproduced…	  for	  a	  period	  of	  more	  than	  transitory	  duration.”)	  87	  Id.	  (“Unless	  both	  requirements	  are	  met,	  the	  work	  is	  not	  ‘fixed’	  in	  the	  buffer,	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  buffer	  data	  is	  not	  a	  ‘copy’	  of	  the	  original	  work	  whose	  data	  is	  buffered.”)	  88	  Id,	  at	  128.	  89	  Id.	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‘power	  to	  persuade.’”90	  Because	  the	   interpretation	  of	   “fixed”	   from	  the	  report	  reads	  the	  “transitory	  duration”	  language	  out	  of	  the	  status.	  At	  last,	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  used	  the	  4th	  Circuit’s	  holding	  in	  CoStar	  case	  to	  backing	  the	  duration	  requirement.	  91	  Thus	  in	  this	   case,	   the	  2nd	  Circuit	   held	   that	   the	  work	  was	   embodied	   in	   the	  buffer,	   but	  1.2s	  could	  not	  qualify	  duration	  requirement,	  so	  the	  copies	  in	  the	  buffer	  were	  not	  “fixed.”	  	   To	   the	   second	   issue:	   who	   create	   the	   copies,	   the	  2nd	   Circuit	   believed	   that	  there	   is	  no	  volitional	   conduct,	   since	   the	  RS-­‐DVR	  system	  automatically	   response	   to	  users’	  recording	  requests.	  Though	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  did	  not	  draw	  lines	  “between	  direct	  infringement,	   contributory	   infringement,	   and	  vicarious	   liability,”	   it	   clearly	  notified	  that	  “copies	  produced	  by	  the	  RS-­‐DVR	  system	  are	  made	  by	  the	  RS-­‐DVR	  customer.”92	  However,	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  did	  allow	  that	  “a	  case	  may	  exist	  ‘one’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  infringing	  copy	  is	  so	  great	  that	  it	  warrants	  holding	  that	  party	  directly	  liable	   for	   the	   infringement,	   even	   though	   another	   party	   has	   actually	   made	   the	  copy.”93	  	   The	   2nd	   circuit	   in	   Cablevision	   II	   case	   precisely	   demonstrated	   that	   copies	  “fixed”	   in	   buffer	   need	   to	  meet	   the	   “transitory	   duration”	   requirement	   by	   analyzing	  from	  DMCA	  reports	  to	  precedent	  cases.	  This	  transitory	  duration	  requirement	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Skidmore	  v.	  Swift	  &	  Co.,	  323	  U.S.	  134,	  140,	  65	  S.	  Ct.	  161.	  89	  L.	  Ed.	  124	  (1944)(Rulings,	  interpretations	  and	  opinions	  of	  the	  Administrator	  do	  not	  control	  judicial	  judgment,	  they	  indeed	  constitute	  a	  body	  of	  experience	  and	  informed	  judgment	  to	  which	  courts	  and	  litigants	  may	  resort	  for	  guidance.)	  91	  Cablevision	  II	  case,	  supra	  note	  33,	  at	  129.(“while	  temporary	  reproductions	  may	  be	  made	  in	  this	  transmission	  process,	  they	  would	  appear	  not	  to	  be	  ‘fixed’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  aren’t	  more	  than	  transitory	  duration.”)	  See	  also	  Costar	  v.	  LoopNet,	  supra	  note	  64,	  at	  551.	  92	  Id,	  at	  133.	  93	  Id,	  at	  133.	  	  Capitol	  Records,	  LLC	  v.	  ReDigi	  Inc.	  934	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  640	  657	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2013).	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been	   recognized	   by	   the	   Copyright	   Office	   in	   2008.94 	  The	   2nd	   circuit	   did	   have	  deficiency	  in	  its	  logic	  of	  that	  1.2s	  does	  not	  fulfill	  transitory	  duration	  requirement.	  It	  construed	  the	  duration	  requirement	  strictly	  on	  a	  time	  line,	  however	  it	  did	  not	  give	  further	   pragmatic	   guidance	   for	   future	   courts,	   developers	   or	   copyright	   owners	   in	  settling	   the	   duration	   problem,95	  since	   it	   simply	   announced	   copies	   in	   Cablevision’s	  RS-­‐DVR	   buffers	   are	   not	   fixed	   rather	   than	   providing	   the	   exact	   legitimate	   duration	  metric.	   	   This	   deficiency	   also	   generated	   that	   the	   duration	   requirement	   could	   not	  break	  the	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine	  entirely,	  since	  copies	  in	  the	  RAM	  in	  MAI	  v.	  Peak	  case	  stayed	   there	   for	   hours	   compare	   to	   1.2s	   in	   Cablevision.	   However,	   somehow	   the	  2nd	  Circuit	  did	  free	  courts	  from	  bounded	  by	  the	  MAI	  v.	  Peak’s	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine,	  by	  bringing	  the	  duration	  requirement	  into	  discussion	  of	  temporary	  copies.	  	  
G. Flava Works. Inc. v. Gunter.96— Implicitly reject the RAM Copy Doctrine 	   After	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  provided	  a	  more	  flexible	  judgment	  in	  Cablevision	  II	  case,	  the	   7th	   Circuit	   implicitly	   rejected	   the	   RAM	   Copy	   Doctrine	   in	   its	   decision.	   The	  Plaintiff	  Flava	  maintains	  a	  website	  that	  provides	  videos	  across	  a	  pay	  wall	  –	  access	  to	  those	  videos	  are	  limited	  without	  proper	  payments.	  The	  Defendant	  Gunter,	  operated	  a	   website	   called	   myVidster,	   which	   enable	   users	   to	   post	   “bookmarks”	   (which	   is	  actually	   the	   link)	   of	   online	   resources	   that	  make	   them	   available	   for	   other	   users	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office,	  PUBLIC	  HEARING:	  SECTION	  115	  NOTICE	  OF	  PROPOSED	  RULEMAKING,	  transcript	  at	  6	  (Sept,	  19,	  2008)	  http://www.copyright.gov/docs/section115/2008/rm_2000-­‐7_hearing_transcript_9.19.08.pdf	  (“The	  fixation	  requirement	  does	  require	  an	  element	  of	  duration.”)	  95	  See	  SimplexGrinnell	  LP	  V.	  Intergrated	  Sys.	  &	  Power,	  Inc.	  642	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  189	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2009).	  (	  The	  district	  court	  directly	  bypassed	  analysis	  of	  RAM	  copy	  question,	  and	  concluded	  that	  copies	  which	  lasting	  from	  several	  minutes	  to	  several	  hours	  were	  fixed.)	  96	  Flava	  Works,	  Inc.	  v.	  Gunter,	  689	  F.	  3d	  754	  (7th	  Cir.	  2012).	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myVidster.	   	   MyVidster	   automatically	   required	   the	   video’s	   “embed	   code”	   from	   the	  server	  it	  stored,	  and	  then	  embed	  the	  video	  into	  its	  website.	  Users	  could	  easily	  click	  the	   video	   embedded	   and	   begin	   to	   enjoy.	   Although	   it	   seems	   the	   video	   is	   from	  myVidster	   website,	   actually	   the	   transmission	   of	   the	   video	   is	   between	   the	   user’s	  computer	  and	  the	  server	  which	  the	  video	  originally	  stored	  in.97	  The	  user	  makes	  no	  copies	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  video	  that	  he	  is	  watching,	  so	  he	  does	  not	  violate	  copyright	  owner’s	  exclusive	  right.98	  Further,	  although	  the	  defendant	  provides	   the	  connection	  between	  the	  video	  and	  the	  computer,	  it	  does	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  contributory	  infringer.	  Because	  the	  user	  does	  not	  copy	  the	  video	  from	  its	  website.99	  	   The	  7th	  Circuit	  seemed	  implicitly	  reject	  the	  MAI	  v.	  Peak’s	  RAM	  Copy	  Doctrine	  by	  deciding	  that	  the	  end-­‐users	  are	  not	  liable	  for	  down-­‐streaming	  videos.	  There’s	  no	  doubt	   that	  down-­‐streaming	  will	   create	  RAM	  copies	  either	   in	  users	  computer	  or	   in	  server.	  However,	   the	  7th	   Circuit	   determined	   that	   users	   do	   not	   copy,	  which	  means	  there	  are	  no	  copies	  exist.	  	  
H. Capital Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.100 	   The	  ReDigi	  case	  explicitly	  provided	  the	  court’s	  judgment	  towards	  the	  copies	  stored	   in	   the	   cloud.	   This	   decision	   is	   important	   because	   it’s	   guidance	   for	   applying	  the“volitional	   conduct,”	   but	   it	   is	   not	   include	   the	   scenario	   where	   the	   copies	   are	  temporary.	   The	   defendant	   ReDigi	   permits	   its	   users	   to	   re-­‐value	   on	   some	   of	   their	  unwanted	   music—by	   reselling	   them,	   their	   “Media	   Manager”	   analyzes	   uses’	  computer	   and	   makes	   a	   list	   of	   digital	   music	   that	   are	   ready	   to	   sell	   (only	   files	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Id,	  at	  756.	  98	  Id,	  at	  757.	  99	  Id.	  100	  Capitol	  Records	  v.	  ReDigi	  934	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  640	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2013).	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purchased	  from	  iTunes	  or	  from	  other	  ReDigi	  users’	  are	  eligible).	  A	  user	  may	  upload	  any	   eligible	  music	   file	   to	  ReDigi’s	   “Cloud	   Locker”	   based	   on	   this	   list,	   and	   after	   this	  process,	  the	  uploaded	  music	  file	  is	  no	  longer	  on	  the	  user’	  personal	  computer.	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  ReDigi	  system,	  there’s	  only	  one	  file	  exists	  before	  and	  after	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  digital	  music	  file	  via	  upload	  to	  the	  cloud	  or	  download	  to	  personal	  computer	  hard	  disk.101	  Although	   ReDigi	   try	   to	   use	   “migration”	   of	   the	  music	   file	   as	   defense,102	  the	  Court	  brought	  in	  the	  “material	  object”	  requirement	  when	  analyze	  the	  reproduction	  right,103	  and	   the	   court	   held	   the	   same:	  no	  matter	   the	  original	   digital	  music	   file	   still	  existed	  or	  not,	  when	  	  “a	  file	  has	  moved	  from	  one	  material	  object	  to	  another,	  means	  that	   a	   reproduction	   has	   occurred.”104	  Therefore	   the	   court	   ruled	   ReDigi	   infringe	  plaintiff’s	  reproduction	  right.	  	  	   Further,	   to	   establish	  direct	   liability	  under	   the	  Copyright	  Act,	   there	  must	  be	  “actual	   infringing	   conduct”	   rather	   than	   conduct	   as	   “passive	   conduit.”105	  The	   court	  found	  ReDigi’s	  conduct	  of	  building	  a	  software—which	  scan	  users’	  computer	  and	  list	  only	   copyrighted	   music	   could	   be	   sold—is	   such	   a	   great	   contribution	   to	   create	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Id,	  at	  648.	  102	  Id,	  at	  650	  103	  See	  Id,	  at	  648-­‐49.	  (The	  court	  distinguished	  	  “sound	  recordings”	  	  from	  “phonorecords,	  which	  are	  the	  "material	  objects	  in	  which	  sounds	  .	  .	  .	  are	  fixed	  by	  any	  method	  now	  known	  or	  later	  developed,	  and	  from	  which	  the	  sounds	  can	  be	  perceived,	  reproduced,	  or	  otherwise	  communicated,	  either	  directly	  or	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  machine	  or	  device."	  Then	  the	  court	  proved	  that	  copies	  of	  sound	  recordings	  also	  need	  to	  be	  fixed	  on	  material	  object	  :"in	  order	  to	  infringe	  the	  reproduction	  right,	  the	  defendant	  must	  embody	  the	  plaintiff's	  work	  in	  a	  'material	  object.'"	  Third,	  when	  deal	  with	  P2P	  file	  sharing	  system,	  “when	  a	  user	  downloads	  a	  digital	  music	  file	  or	  ‘digital	  sequence’	  to	  his	  ‘hard	  disk,’	  the	  file	  is	  ‘reproduce[d]’	  on	  a	  new	  phonorecord	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act.”	  )	  104	  Id.	  105	  See	  Cablevision	  II,	  supra	  note	  33,	  at	  130.(“There	  must	  be	  actual	  infringing	  conduct	  with	  a	  nexus	  sufficiently	  close	  and	  causal	  to	  the	  illegal	  copying	  that	  one	  could	  conclude	  that	  the	  machine	  owner	  himself	  trespassed	  on	  the	  exclusive	  domain	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner.”	  Quoting	  CoStar	  v.	  Loopnet,	  at	  550;	  citing	  Netcom	  case,	  at	  1370)	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infringing	  copy.	  106	  Thus	  the	  court	  ruled	  that	  ReDigi’s	  conduct	  satisfied	  the	  volitional	  conduct	   requirement,	   it	   should	   bare	   direct	   liability	   even	   for	   user’s	   act.	   What	   if	  ReDigi	  is	  only	  an	  online	  music	  locker	  without	  its	  questionable	  resale	  function;	  does	  it	   still	   violate	   the	   reproduction	  right?	  ReDigi	   simply	  build	  software	   that	   can	  solely	  store	   and	   stream	   copyrighted	   music,	   it	   seems	   not	   a	   particular	   volitional	   conduct	  lead	  to	  direct	  infringement	  of	  reproduction	  right.	  	  	   	  	   As	   we	   know,	   there	   are	   so	   many	   different	   types	   and	   forms	   of	   temporary	  copies	   stored	   in	   RAM—no	   matter	   whose	   and	   where	   the	   RAM	   is.	   And	   so	   far,	  transmission	  of	  information	  or	  other	  works	  over	  the	  Internet	  is	  only	  made	  possible	  through	   the	   automatic	   creation	   of	   RAM	   copies.107	  	   It	   is	   so	   arbitrary	   and	   unfair	   to	  clearly	  make	  a	  bright	   line	   ruling	   that	   all	  RAM	  copies	   are	   fixed	  or	  not	  without	   any	  exemptions.	  For	  instance,	  if	  all	  RAM	  copies	  are	  fixed,	  ISPs	  who	  made	  RAM	  copies	  of	  web	  pages	  are	  liable	  for	  infringement.108	  The	  copyright	  owners	  of	  website	  would	  be	  granted	  expanded	  exclusive	   right	  –	   control	   access	   to	  data,	  which	   is	   far	  exceed	   the	  Copyright	  Act	   afford.109	  Some	  scholars	   suggest	   it’s	   time	   to	   shift	   the	   copyright	  act’s	  focus	   from	   copy	   to	   access.110	  However,	   with	   this	   shift,	   copyright	   law	   will	   lose	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  See	  Cablevision	  II,	  supra	  note	  33,	  at	  133.	  107	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office,	  A	  REPORT	  OF	  THE	  REGISTER	  OF	  COPYRIGHTS	  PURSUANT	  TO	  §104	  OF	  THE	  DIGITAL	  MILLINIEUM	  ACT,108	  (2001).	  108	  See	  Ticketmaster	  L.L.C.	  v.	  RMG	  Techs.	  Inc.,	  507	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1096,	  1116	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2007).	  (Based	  on	  Peak	  Case	  and	  Cablevision	  I,	  the	  court	  explicitly	  determined	  that	  copies	  of	  webpages	  automatically	  stored	  on	  a	  viewer’s	  computer	  are	  “copies”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act.)	  109See	  Jessica	  Litman,	  The	  Exclusive	  Right	  to	  Read,	  13	  CARDOZO	  ARTS	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.	  29,	  40	  42(1994).	  110	  I.	  Trotter	  Hardy,	  Computer	  RAM	  Copies:	  A	  Hit	  or	  a	  Myth?	  Historical	  Perspectives	  on	  
Caching	  as	  a	  Microcosm	  of	  Current	  Copyright	  Concerns,	  22	  U.	  DAYTON	  L.	  REV.	  425,	  452-­‐453	  (1997).	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original	  goal	  that	  is	  to	  protect	  original	  expression	  but	  not	  ideas.111	  Copyright	  owners	  will	   undertake	   expanded	   exclusive	   right	   to	   control	   everything,	   which	   will	   easily	  cause	  the	  abuse	  of	  copyright.	  Or	  if	  copyright	  owners	  cannot	  regulate	  RAM	  copies	  at	  all,	   users	   or	   ISPs	   could	   reproduce	   copyrighted	   work	   with	   no	   limitation,	   which	  definitely	   is	   contrary	   to	   Copyright	   Act	   intent.	   With	   no	   limitation	   and	   proper	  punishment,	   online	   copyright	   piracy	   will	   run	   rampant,	   that	   will	   cause	   a	   great	  economic	  lose	  for	  copyright	  owners	  and	  devastating	  blow	  their	  incentive	  to	  create.	  Either	   broad	   or	   narrow	   reading	   will	   upset	   the	   delicate	   balance	   between	   the	  copyright	  owners	  and	  users.	  	  After	  analyzing	  cases	  and	  articles,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  U.S.	  experts	  had	  implicitly	  reach	  a	  fundamental	  consensus.	  	  	   In	   general,	   the	   US	   courts,	   scholars	   and	   experts	   basically	   adopted	   the	  conclusion	   of	   “RAM	   copies	   MAY	   be	   fixed,”	   even	   the	   2nd	   Circuit	   that	   draw	   an	  arbitrary	   time-­‐line	   to	   the	  duration	  requirement	  admits	   it.112	  And	   further,	   they	  also	  admitted	  that	  the	  duration	  requirement	  of	  “fixed”	  is	  imperative,113	  but	  using	  a	  strict	  but	   unclear	   timeline	   to	   measure	   the	   duration	   requirement	   will	   easily	   end	   by	  conflicts.	   For	   instance,	   as	   mention	   before,	   RAM	   copies	   that	   existed	   equal	   to	   or	  shorter	  than	  1.2s	  were	  not	  fixed,	  but	  those	  existed	  for	  several	  minutes	  are	  fixed.114	  It	  means	   the	   faster	   you	   copy,	   the	   less	   possibility	   you	  will	   infringe	   the	   reproduction	  right,	  which	  is	  quite	  inconceivable	  and	  ridiculous.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Li-­‐Jen	  Shen,	  Comment:	  A	  Duration	  No	  More	  than	  Necessary:	  A	  Proposed	  Test	  for	  the	  
Duration	  Requirement	  of	  RAM-­‐Copy	  Fixation,	  51	  Jurimetrics	  J.	  217-­‐243,	  239	  (2011)	  112	  Cablevision	  II,	  supra	  note	  14.	  113	  See	  SimplexGrinnell	  LP	  V.	  Intergrated	  Sys.	  &	  Power,	  Inc.	  642	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  (S.D.	  N.Y.	  2009);	  
see	  also	  Bogden,	  supra	  note	  70;	  see	  also	  Foley,	  supra	  note	  84;	  see	  also	  Perzanowski,	  supra	  note	  30.	  114	  See	  Cablevision	  II,	  supra	  note	  33;	  see	  also	  id,	  	  SimplexGrinnell	  LP	  V.	  Intergrated	  Sys.	  &	  Power,	  Inc..	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   The	   controversial	   issue	   is	   how	   to	   delineate	   a	   delicate	   contour	   for	   this	  conception—	  How	  a	  RAM	  copy	  is	  fixed—regardless	  the	  2nd	  circuit	  unclear	  time-­‐line.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  contour	  has	  to	  fulfill	  the	  constitutional	  purpose	  of	  Copyright	  —“to	  promote	   the	   Progress	   of	   Science	   and	   useful	   Arts”.115	  This	   contour	   should	   also	  balance	   the	   copyright	   owners’	   incentive	   of	   creation	   and	   economic	   interests	   and	  public	  users’	   interests	   to	  use	  and	  access	   to	   the	   ideas.116	  Finally,	  which	   is	   the	  most	  concrete	  one,	  as	  most	  scholars	  suggested,	  the	  purpose	  underlying	  the	  embodiment	  of	  data	  in	  RAM	  should	  be	  considered.117	  RAM	  copies	  have	  several	  functions	  same	  as	  the	  physical	  copies,	  which	  includes	  use,	  access,	  distribution	  and	  reproduction.118	  But	  the	  reproduction	  right	  is	  not	  equally	  concerned	  with	  each	  function.	  So,	  the	  contour	  has	   to	   distinguish	   what	   the	   RAM	   copy	   at	   issue	   serves	   for—whether	   it	   is	   created	  incidentally	   for	   non-­‐infringing	   use	   like	   access	   and	   use,	   or	   it	   is	   created	   primarily	  targets	  to	  further	  infringing	  distribution	  or	  reproduction.	  The	  purpose	  requirement	  is	   actually	   first	   indicated	   by	   the	   4th	   Circuit	   in	   the	   CoStar	   case—qualitative	   and	  quantitative	   test	   to	   the	   fixation.119 	  For	   now,	   4th	   Circuit’s	   measure	   of	   fixation	  controversy	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   most	   reasonable	   and	   rationale	   one.120	  	   Beyond	   the	  purpose-­‐based	   analysis,	   there’s	   one	   more	   problem—volitional	   conduct	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §8,	  cl.	  8.	  116	  See	  id,	  at	  430,	  n	  12.	  117	  See	  London-­‐Sire	  Records,	  Inc.	  v.	  Doe	  1,	  542	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  153,	  175	  (D.	  Mass.	  2008).(the	  court	  clearly	  indicated	  that	  RAM	  copies	  “can	  be	  varying	  performance…	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  all	  of	  them	  should	  be	  treated	  equally	  under	  the	  copyright	  statutes.”)	  See	  Christopher	  Vidiksis,	  
How	  to	  Buffer	  Your	  Way	  Out	  of	  A	  Scrape,	  4	  BROOK.	  J.	  CORP.	  FIN.	  &	  COM.	  L.	  139	  (2009-­‐2010);	  See	  
also	  Daniel	  J.	  Buller,	  Copyright	  Infringement	  in	  the	  Ether:	  RAM	  Buffering	  and	  the	  Copyright	  Act’s	  Duration	  Requirement,	  59	  U.	  KAN.	  L.	  REV.	  659	  (2010-­‐2011);	  See	  also	  Perzanowski,	  
supra	  note	  30..	  118	  See	  Perzanowski,	  supra	  note	  30	  at	  34-­‐40.	  119	  See	  CoStar	  case,	  supra	  note	  64.	  120	  See	  Perzanowski,	  supra	  note	  30.	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requirement—which	   is	   considerable	   in	   deciding,	   “who	  makes	   the	   copies”	   if	   there	  are	  copies.	  Currently,	  from	  the	  ReDigi	  case,	  we	  could	  tell	  the	  U.S.	  courts	  are	  adopting	  the	   theory	   that	   ISPs	   provide	   online	   music	   locker	   services	   could	   be	   held	   directly	  infringe	  copyright	  owner’s	  copyright.	  However,	  U.S.	  courts	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  on	  the	   volitional	   conduct	   issue,	   since	   they	   already	   stopped	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   “whether	  there	  are	  reproductions	  in	  RAM.”	  This	  issue	  of	  “who	  makes	  the	  copies”	  is	  relevant	  to	  analyzing	   of	   contributory	   infringement	   and	   vicarious	   infringement—which	   are	  belonging	   to	   the	   aspect	   of	   secondary	   infringement.	  This	  dissertation	  here	  will	   not	  further	  analyze	  this	  issue.	  	   There	   is	   still	   controversy	   about	   whether	   the	   Congress	   officially	   made	   the	  amendment	   to	   the	   RAM	   copy	   Doctrine	   or	   left	   it	   to	   the	   front	   line	   of	   settling	   new	  challenges	   –	   the	   courts.	   I	   agree,	   since	   the	   U.S.	   is	   a	   common	   law	   country,	   left	   the	  delicate	  issue	  to	  the	  courts	  is	  the	  best	  solution.	  Some	  scholars	  indicate	  that	  the	  “all-­‐or-­‐nothing”	  bright	   line	  rule	  will	   result	   in	  conflicts	   in	  practice,	  but	   the	  courts	  could	  provide	  nuanced	  solution	  to	  RAM	  copy.121	  We	  will	  discuss	  how	  other	  countries	  deal	  with	  the	  temporary	  copies	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  	  
ii. The EU part 
A. EU Copyright Law’s revolution 	   Unlike	   the	   U.S.,	   the	   statutes	   of	   copyright	   law	   in	   EU	   appear	   in	   different	  directives.	  Before	  this	  dissertation	  going	  further	  in	  discussing	  the	  EU’s	  regulation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  See	  Bogden,	  supra	  note	  70,	  at	  209-­‐215.	  (She	  also	  argues	  that	  since	  there	  are	  political	  influences	  towards	  the	  Congress’s	  amendment,	  but	  the	  courts	  are	  less	  biases	  to	  users	  than	  legislator.)	  See	  also	  Litman,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  174	  &177.	  (There	  are	  critics	  against	  DMCA,	  legistlator	  biased	  in	  favor	  of	  copyright	  owner—large	  companies.)	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reproduction	   right,	   communication	   right	   to	   the	   public	   and	   others,	   we	   need	   to	  understand	   EU	   copyright	   law’s	   revolution	   and	   the	   directive’s	   implementation	  impact	  to	  EU	  Member	  States.	  	   There	   are	   generally	   three	   parts	   in	   EU	   copyright	   law’s	   revolution.	   The	   first	  one	   lasted	   from	  1957	  to	  1987,	   focused	  on	   the	  relationship	  between	  copyright	  and	  European	  Community	  Law	  	  	   Second	   is	   from	   1987-­‐2004,	   process	   of	   harmonization	   was	   placed	   (for	  instance,	   Directive	   91/250	   on	   computer	   program	   –which	   is	   the	   first	   adopted	  directive	   in	  EU—	  was	   a	   result	   of	   conflicts	   between	  new	   technology	   and	  Treaty	   of	  Rome.122)	  	  Thirty-­‐one	  member	  states	  joined	  European	  Economic	  Area	  (EEA),	  and	  in	  EEA,	   European	   Union	   Directives	   are	   used	   in	   harmonizing	   the	   copyright	   law.123	  Further,	  all	  European	  Member	  States	  are	  required	  to	  implement	  the	  Directives	  into	  their	   national	   laws.	   Thus	   in	   understanding	   the	   copyright	   law	   in	   EU,	   before	   we	  analyzing	  Copyright	  law	  in	  Member	  States	  and	  particular	  cases	  judged	  by	  courts	  in	  Member	  States,	  it’s	  logical	  to	  do	  research	  about	  the	  Directives.	  	   Third	  one	   is	   since	  2004	   till	  nowadays,	  European	  Court	  of	   Justice	   (hereafter	  ECJ)	  played	  a	  growing	  significant	  role	  in	  answering	  questions	  arising	  (or	  not)	  from	  the	   legal	   loophole	   in	   copyright	   law	   era	   caused	   by	   new	   technology. 124 ECJ’s	  interpretation	   is	   binding	   to	   all	   Member	   States,	   and	   it	   has	   to	   provide	   specific	  guidance	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  secondary	  legislation	  (the	  Directives).125	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Directive	  96/250/EC	  on	  the	  Legal	  Protection	  Of	  Computer	  Program	  1991	  O.J.	  (L	  I22)	  [hereinafter	  Software	  Directive].	  123	  There	  are	  28	  EU	  Member	  States	  plus	  Norway,	  Iceland	  and	  Liechtenstein	  in	  EEA.	  124	  See	  EU	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW,	  A	  COMMENTARY,	  	  7-­‐13	  (Irini	  Stamatoudi	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  2014).	  125	  See	  Id,	  at	  12	  &	  1098-­‐1102.	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   The	  Directives	  are	  the	  resolutions	  provided	  by	  the	  European	  Council	  in	  order	  to	   increase	  protection	   for	  copyright	  and	  neighboring	  rights,	  and	  they	  are	  the	  most	  relevant	  parts	  in	  analyzing	  the	  reproduction	  right	  under	  EU	  copyright	  law.	  Four	  of	  these	  Directives	  are	  relevant	  to	  this	  dissertation.126	  There	  maybe	  some	  overlaps	  and	  contradictions	   between	   these	  Directives,	   since	   they	   stipulate	   the	   same	   rights	   that	  fall	  into	  different	  categories—computer	  programs,	  rental	  and	  lending,	  database	  and	  a	  general	  category	  of	  information	  society	  that	  even	  includes	  the	  front	  three	  parts.	  So,	  at	   first,	   we	   need	   to	   understand	   the	   interrelationship	   among	   these	   directives.	  According	  to	  the	  recital	  20	  of	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  127	  the	  Directive	  “is	  based	  on	  principles	  and	  rules	  already	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Directives	  currently	  in	  force	  in	  this	  area”	  –	  the	  software,	  rental	  right	  and	  others—and	  “develops	  those	  principles	  and	  rules	  and	  places	  them	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  information	  society.	  The	  provisions	  of	   this	  Directive	  should	  be	  without	  prejudice	   to	   the	  provisions	  of	   those	  Directives,	  unless	  otherwise	  provided	  in	  this	  Directive.”128	  Further,	  Art	  1(2)	  indicates	  that	  “this	  Directive	  shall	  leave	  intact	  and	  shall	  in	  no	  way	  affect	  existing	  Community	  provisions	  relating	  to”	  software,	  rental	  and	   lending.129	  Thus,	  when	  deciding	  a	  specific	   issue,	   if	  there	  are	  provisions	  in	  an	  earlier	  Directive,	  the	  earlier	  Directive	  should	  be	  applied;	  if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  See	  TREVOR	  COOK,	  EU	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  LAW	  77	  (2010).(We	  could	  easily	  learn	  that	  only	  Computer	  Program	  Directive,	  Rental	  Lending	  and	  Related	  Rights	  Directive,	  Database	  Directive	  and	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  provide	  statutes	  for	  the	  reproduction	  right	  relevant	  to	  new	  technology(cloud	  computing)	  from	  the	  distinct	  summarized	  form.)	  127	  Directive	  2001/29/EC	  on	  the	  harmonization	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  in	  the	  information	  society	  2001	  O.J.	  (L	  167	  22	  June)	  [hereinafter	  Information	  Society	  Diretive].	  (Adopted	  on	  22	  May	  2001,	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  22	  June	  2001	  and	  the	  deadline	  for	  implementation	  was	  22	  December	  2002.)	  128	  Id,	  recital	  20.	  129	  Id,	  art	  1(2).	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there	  are	  not	  such	  provisions,	   the	   Information	  Society	  Directive	  should	  be	  applied	  directly.	  
B. EU Directives and ECJ’s judgments 	   Follow	   the	   trend	   of	   these	   relevant	  Directives,	  we	   could	   easily	   realized	   that	  the	  EU	  Council	  had	  already	  adopted	  the	  perspective	  that	  “RAM	  copies”	  are	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  works	   and	   need	   to	   be	   restricted	   by	   the	   copyright	   owner,	  meanwhile,	  the	  EU	  council	  also	  provided	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  towards	  this	  exclusive	  right	  of	  copyright	  owner.	  
a. Computer Program Directive (Software Directive) 	   Being	  strongly	   influenced	  by	  the	  consultation	  of	  “Green	  Paper	  on	  Copyright	  and	   Challenge	   of	   Technology,” 130 the	   Commission	   proposed	   and	   amended	   its	  proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  in	  2	  years	  and	  finally	  got	  it	  adopted	  on	  14	  May,	  1991.131	  This	  Software	  Directive	  was	   adopted	   to	   balance	   the	   interests	   between	   the	   copyrighted	  works’	   copyright	   owners,	   their	   competitors	   and.	   Art	   4(1)(a)	   regulates	   the	  reproduction	   right,	   provides	   copyright	   owners	   exclusive	   right	   to	   control	   “the	  permanent	  or	  temporary	  reproduction	  of	  a	  computer	  program	  by	  any	  means	  and	  in	  any	  form,	  in	  part	  or	  in	  whole;	  in	  so	  far	  as	  loading,	  displaying,	  running,	  transmission	  or	  storage	  of	  the	  computer	  program	  necessitate	  such	  reproduction,	  such	  acts…”	  It’s	  clear	   that	   this	   statute	   provides	   the	   contour	   of	   reproduction:	   “permanent	   or	  temporary,	   by	   any	   means	   and	   in	   any	   form,	   in	   part	   or	   in	   whole.”	   The	   word	  “temporary”	   means	   copying	   lasts	   very	   short	   time	   that	   caused	   by	   the	   acts	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Green	  Paper	  on	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Technology	  –	  Copyright	  Issues	  Requiring	  Immediate	  Action,	  COM	  (1988)	  172	  final	  (Jun.	  7,	  1988).	  131	  Software	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  122.	  
	   40	  
browsing	  and	  caching	  on	  the	  computer.132	  This	  may	  indicates	  that	  generating	  RAM	  copies	  are	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  reproduction.	  Further,	  the	  description	  of	   	  “by	  any	  means	  and	  in	  any	  form”	  means	  the	  reproduction	  could	  be	  made	  even	  in	  a	  different	  media	  and	  in	  object	  code133	  –	  for	  instance,	  download	  a	  copy	  from	  an	  website,134	  or	   load	  a	  program	   into	   machine	   memory.	   “In	   part	   or	   in	   whole”	   is	   also	   relevant	   to	   the	  reproduction	   relevant	   to	   cloud	   computing,	   which	   does	   not	   mentioned	   in	   the	   U.S.	  copyright	   law.	   Therefore,	   it’s	   unnecessary	   to	   reproduce	   the	   whole	   computer	  program	  to	  cause	  a	  copyright	  infringement.	  Even	  the	  part	  of	  the	  source	  code	  of	  the	  computer	  program	   itself	  does	  not	  qualify	   for	  a	  protection,	  once	   it	   get	   reproduced,	  the	   reproducer	   infringed	   the	   copyright	   law.135Although	   there	   are	   critics	   towards	  these	  interpretations	  of	  “reproduction,”	  in	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  and	  the	  important	  Infopaq	  case,	  this	  statue	  will	  be	  further	  illustrated.	  
b. Rental and Lending Directive 	   The	   Rental	   and	   Lending	   Directive	   pursues	   two	   goals:	   (1)	   “to	   harmonize	  copyright	   law”	   and,	   (2)	   “to	   found	   this	   harmonization	   on	   a	   high	   level	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  See	  RESEARCH	  HANDBOOK	  ON	  THE	  FUTURE	  OF	  EU	  COPYRIGHT	  413	  (Estelle	  Derclaye	  ed.	  2009)	  (The	  author	  provides	  various	  instances	  of	  temporary	  reproductions	  that	  may	  take	  place	  on	  computer.)	  133	  See	  Software	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  122,	  recital	  15.	  (“Transformation	  of	  the	  form	  of	  the	  code”,	  it’s	  clear	  converting	  a	  computer	  program	  from	  on	  language	  to	  another	  is	  restricted	  by	  this	  act.)	  134	  See	  EU	  Copyright	  Law,	  A	  Commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  112-­‐114.	  135	  Case	  C-­‐406/10,	  SAS	  Institute	  v.	  World	  Programming	  Ltd.,2012,	  para.	  70.	  (The	  ECJ	  replied	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  England	  and	  Wales:“the	  reproduction,	  in	  a	  computer	  program	  or	  a	  user	  manual	  for	  that	  program,	  of	  certain	  elements	  described	  in	  the	  user	  manual	  for	  another	  computer	  program	  protected	  by	  copyright	  is	  capable	  of	  constituting	  an	  infringement	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  the	  latter	  manual	  if	  …	  that	  reproduction	  constitutes	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  intellectual	  creation	  of	  the	  author	  of	  the	  user	  manual	  for	  the	  computer	  program	  protected	  by	  copyright.”	  )	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protection.”136 	  After	   several	   amendments	   to	   the	   original	   Directive	   released	   in	  1992,137the	   Directive	   2006/115/EC	   are	   being	   implemented	   instead	   now.138	  This	  Directive	   needs	   to	   be	   mentioned	   here	   because	   some	   scholars	   think	   it	   should	   be	  extended	   and	   applied	   to	   the	   digital	   world.139	  For	   instance,	   a	   video	   on	   demand,	  where	  a	  user	  can	  choose	  particular	  program	  from	  digital	  storage	  and	  then	  enjoy	  it	  by	   paying.	   Users	   are	   getting	   used	   to	   streaming	   videos	   instead	   of	   getting	   tangible	  copies	   or	   downloading	   them.	   Extending	   this	   Directive	   to	   digital	   world	   is	   a	   good	  option	  for	  regulating	  the	  copyright	  issues;	  it’s	  a	  fantastic	  way	  in	  freeing	  people	  from	  being	   stuck	   by	   considering	   whether	   streaming	   videos	   is	   a	   violation	   of	   the	  reproduction	  right.	  
c. Database Directive140 	   According	   to	   the	   Berne	   Convention,	   WCT	   and	   TRIPS,	   ECJ	   adopted	   that	  database	   will	   be	   protected	   no	   matter	   in	   what	   kind	   of	   medium	   they	   exist.141	  And	  further,	  ECJ	  also	  required	  that	   the	  database	  have	  to	  be	  “fixed”	  to	  get	  protection.142	  Art	   5(a)	   of	   the	   Database	   Directive	   ensures	   the	   author	   of	   a	   database	   have	   the	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  See	  EU	  copyright,	  a	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  151;	  see	  also	  the	  Green	  Paper,	  supra	  note	  130,	  1.4	  :”the	  Commission	  will	  be	  guided	  by	  two	  principle	  here:	  first,	  the	  protection	  of	  copyright	  and	  neighbouring	  rights	  must	  be	  strengthened;	  secondly,	  the	  approach	  taken	  must	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  be	  a	  comprehensive	  one.”	  137	  Council	  Directive	  92/100/EEC	  of	  19	  November	  1992	  On	  Rental	  Right	  And	  Lending	  Right	  And	  On	  Certain	  Rights	  Related	  To	  Copyright	  In	  The	  Field	  Of	  Intellectual	  Property.	  138	  Directive	  2006/115/EC	  Of	  The	  European	  Parliament	  And	  Of	  The	  Council	  Of	  12	  December	  2006	  On	  Rental	  Right	  And	  Lending	  Right	  And	  On	  Certain	  Rights	  Related	  To	  Copyright	  In	  The	  Field	  Of	  Intellectual	  Property	  [Hereinafter	  Rental	  and	  Lending	  Directive].	  139	  See	  REINBOTHE,	  J.	  &	  S.	  VON	  LEWINSKI,	  The	  E.C.	  DIRECTIVE	  ON	  RENTAL	  AND	  LENDING	  RIGHTS	  AND	  ON	  PIRACY,	  at	  41-­‐42	  (1st	  ed.,	  1993).;	  see	  also	  EU	  copyright	  law,	  A	  Commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  153.	  140	  Directive	  96/9/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  council	  of	  11	  March	  1996	  on	  the	  legal	  protection	  of	  database	  1996	  O.J.	  (L	  77/20)	  [hereinafter	  Database	  Directive].	  141	  Case	  C-­‐444/02	  Fixtures	  Marketing	  Ltd	  v	  Organismos	  Pronostikon	  Agonon	  Podosfairou	  (OPAP)	  2004	  E.C.R.I-­‐10365,	  para.	  20.	  142	  Id,	  para.	  30.	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exclusive	  right	  of	  performing	  or	  authorizing	  “temporary	  or	  permanent	  reproduction	  by	   any	  means	   and	   in	   any	   form,	   in	   whole	   or	   in	   part,”	   which	   follows	   the	   Software	  Directive	  Art	  4(1)(a).	  According	  to	  Tritton,	  “in	  part”	  in	  this	  act	  means	  no	  matter	  how	  nuisance	   or	   inconsequential	   the	   reproduction	   is	   related	   to	   the	   original	   database,	  subject	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  de	  minimis	  no	  curat	  lex,	  143one	  infringes	  the	  reproduction	  right	  here.	  But	  there	  is	  still	  the	  originality	  threshold	  to	  limit	  this	  principle.	  And,	  with	  the	   requirement	   of	   “fixed”	   database,	   will	   the	   infringing	   reproduction	   need	   to	   be	  “fixed”	  either?	  This	  question	  left	  open	  without	  answer	  now,	  since	  there	  are	  not	  such	  “fixation”	  requirements	  among	  the	  Member	  states.	  Thus,	  based	  on	  the	  articles	  from	  the	  Software	  Directive	  and	  the	  Database	  Directive,	  they	  clearly	  show	  the	  EU’s	  trend	  to	  treat	  temporary	  copy	  as	  common	  copy.	   In	  order	  to	  confirm	  this	  conclusion,	   this	  dissertation	   will	   further	   examine	   the	   Information	   Society	   Directive,	   and	   related	  ECJ’s	  judgments.	  
d. Information Society Directive 	   To	   implement	   the	   WIPO	   Copyright	   Treaty	   (WCT)	   and	   the	   WIPO	  Performances	  and	  Phonograms	  Treaty	  (WPPT),	  and	  answer	  the	  challenges	  brought	  by	  digital	  technology,144	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  finally	  was	  adopted	  on	  22	  May,	   2001.	   This	   Directive	   and	   the	   Enforcement	   Directive	   are	   also	   known	   as	   the	  “second	   generation	   Directives”	   which	   will	   provide	   general	   harmonization	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  See	  G	  TRITTON,	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  IN	  EUROPE,	  	  para	  4-­‐104,	  (2nd	  ed.,2002).	  	  See	  also	  TANYA	  APLIN,	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW	  IN	  THE	  DIGITAL	  SOCIETY,	  THE	  CHALLLENGES	  OF	  MULTIMEDIA,	  100	  (1st	  ed.,	  2005).	  	  144	  See	  Information	  Socirty	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  15.(“While	  no	  new	  concepts	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property	  are	  needed	  the	  current	  law	  on	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  should	  be	  adapted	  and	  supplemented	  to	  respond	  adequately	  to	  economic	  realities	  such	  as	  new	  forms	  of	  exploitation.”)	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copyright	   and	   related	   rights,	   and	   with	   no	   prejudice	   to	   former	   Directives	   as	   I	  mentioned	   above.	   Art	   2	   regulates	   the	   reproduction	   right;	   it	   applies	   to	   works,	  fixations	  of	  performances,	  phonograms,	  first	  fixation	  of	  films	  and	  fixation	  of	  wire	  or	  wireless	  broadcast,	  all	  Member	  States	  are	  obligated	  to	  provide	  exclusive	  rights	  “to	  authorize	   or	   prohibit	   direct	   or	   indirect	   temporary	   or	   permanent	   reproduction	   by	  any	  means	  and	  in	  any	  forms,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part.”145	  According	  to	  recital	  21,	  the	  Art	  2	  of	  reproduction	  right	  needs	  to	  be	  construed	  broadly	  in	  EU	  Member	  States.146	  	  	   “Indirect	   reproduction”	   here	   always	   means	   there	   are	   third	   party	   or	   third	  medium	  get	   involved	   in	   the	  process	  of	  reproduction.	   If	  a	   third	  party	   facilitates	   the	  reproduction,	  for	  instance,	  a	  hypertext	  link	  or	  search	  engine,	  it	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  baring	   contributory	   liability	   but	   not	   as	   undertaking	   direct	   infringement.	   Many	  Member	   States	   courts	   in	   EU	   supported	   this	   induction. 147 	  Lately,	   different	  approaches	  have	  shown	  in	  several	  cases,	  which	  Google	  got	  involved,	  in	  those	  cases,	  the	   courts	   clearly	   ruled	   that	   Google	   could	   not	   provide	   deep	   link	   to	   newspaper	  without	  paying	  royalties.148	  	   “In	   whole	   or	   in	   part”	   can	   have	   an	   analogous	   explanation	   as	   Database	  Directive’s	   requirement.	   Partial	   reproductions	   of	   work	   can	   constitute	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  art	  2.	  146	  See	  id,	  recital	  21.	  (“	  This	  Directive	  should	  define	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  acts	  covered	  by	  the	  reproduction	  right	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  different	  beneficiaries.	  This	  should	  be	  done	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  acquis	  communautaire.	  A	  broad	  definition	  of	  these	  acts	  is	  needed	  to	  ensure	  legal	  certainty	  within	  the	  internal	  market.”)	  147	  See	  Verlagsgruppe	  Handelsblatt	  GmbH	  v.	  Paperboy,	  Bundesgerichtshof	  No	  1	  ZR	  259/00,	  17	  July	  2003,	  [2005]	  ECDR	  7.(The	  German	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  list	  of	  links—which	  are	  deep	  links—	  to	  articles	  on	  the	  Plaintiff’s	  newspaper	  site	  did	  not	  infringe,	  because	  it	  did	  not	  provide	  content	  access.)	  148	  See	  Newspaper	  Publishers	  Association	  v	  Newsbooster.com	  ApS	  (7	  May	  2002)(Denmark);	  
See	  also	  DNPA	  v	  Google	  (Nov	  2008)(Denmark);See	  also	  Belgian	  Association	  of	  Newspaper	  Editors	  v	  Google	  (5	  May	  2011)	  (Belgium);	  See	  also	  Decision	  I-­‐20	  U	  42/11	  Dusseldorf	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  8	  October	  2011	  (Germany).	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reproduction.149	  	  The	  case	  Infopaq’s	  court	  first	  affirmed	  this	  theory	  by	  holding	  that	  reproduction	   of	   elements	   of	   an	   author’s	   creative	   work	   at	   anytime	   causes	   acts	   of	  reproduction.150	  And	   further,	   based	   on	   the	   judgments	   of	   several	   other	   courts,	   the	  reproduction	  right	  of	   the	  author	  has	  been	  extended	   to	   “transient	   fragments	  of	   the	  works	  within	  the	  memory	  of	  a	  satellite	  decoder	  and	  on	  a	   television	  screen.”151	  For	  instance,	   the	   FAPL	   court	   confirmed	   this	   conclusion,	   if	   the	   fragments	   contains	  elements	  of	  the	  author’s	  own	  intellectual	  creation.	  Further	  in	  UseSoft	  case,	  the	  court	  concluded:	  base	  on	  the	  particular	  facts,	  if	  a	  third	  party	  made	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  work	  under	  the	   direction	   of	   a	   user,	   then	   delete	   the	   original	   copy,	   no	   reproduction	   is	  made.152	  Thus	   with	   these	   broad	   interpretations	   of	   reproduction,	   the	   limitations	   towards	  copyright	  owner’s	  reproduction	  rights	  are	  necessary	  to	  protect	  public	  interests	  and	  ISPs’	  interest.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  See	  Case	  406/10,	  supra	  note	  135.	  (The	  ECJ	  ruled	  that	  “	  the	  reproduction,	  in	  a	  computer	  program	  or	  user	  manual	  for	  that	  program,	  of	  certain	  elements	  described	  on	  the	  user	  manual	  for	  another	  computer	  program	  protected	  by	  copyright	  is	  capable	  of	  constituting	  an	  infringement	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  the	  latter	  manual	  if	  –	  this	  being	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  national	  court	  to	  ascertain	  –	  that	  reproduction	  constitutes	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  intellectual	  creation	  of	  the	  author	  of	  the	  user	  manual	  for	  the	  computer	  program	  protected	  by	  copyright.”)	  150	  See	  Case	  C-­‐5/08	  Infopaq	  International	  A/S	  v	  Danske	  Dagblades	  Forening,	  2009	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐6569.	  [hereinafter	  Infopaq	  I].	  (The	  Court	  held	  that	  “	  an	  act	  occurring	  during	  a	  data	  capture	  process,	  which	  consists	  of	  storing	  an	  extract	  of	  a	  protected	  work	  comprising	  11	  words	  and	  printing	  out	  that	  extract,	  is	  such	  as	  to	  come	  within	  the	  concept	  of	  reproduction	  in	  part	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  2	  of	  Directive	  2001/29,	  if	  the	  elements	  thus	  reproduced	  are	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  intellectual	  creation	  of	  their	  author[…]”).	  151	  See	  C-­‐403/08	  Football	  Association	  Premier	  League	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  v	  QC	  Leisure	  and	  Others,	  2011	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐09083.;	  See	  also	  C-­‐429/08,	  Karen	  Murphy	  v	  Media	  Protection	  Services	  Ltd.,2011	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐09083.	  (“…	  provided	  that	  those	  fragments	  contain	  elements	  which	  are	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  authors’	  own	  intellectual	  creation,	  and	  the	  unit	  composed	  of	  the	  fragments	  reproduced	  simultaneously	  must	  be	  examined	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  it	  contains	  such	  elements.”)	  152	  See	  C-­‐128/11	  UsedSoft	  GmbH	  v	  Oracle	  International	  Corp.,2012,	  para.	  70.	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   Interpreting	   the	   reproduction	   right	   broadly	   also	   means	   Art	   2	   cover	   both	  permanent	   and	   temporary	   copies.153	  However,	   Art	   5(1)	   provides	   exemptions	   to	  temporary	   reproductions	   and	  Art	  5(5)	  provides	   a	   three-­‐step	   test	   to	   limit	  Member	  State’s	  discretion	  called	  EU	  three-­‐step	  test.	  	   All	   the	   exemptions	   and	   limitations	   should	   comply	   with	   the	   three-­‐step	   test	  stated	   in	   Art	   5(5),	   which	   means,	   when	   the	   courts	   apply	   mandatory	   exceptions	  mentioned	  in	  Art	  5(1)	  for	  particular	  temporary	  reproduction	  acts,	   they	  should	  use	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  to	  interpret	  the	  exception	  strictly	  at	  the	  first	  place	  According	  to	  Art	  5(5),	  limitations	  should	  be	  read	  strictly:	  they	  shall	  apply	  in	  “certain	  special	  cases	  which	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  or	  other	  subject-­‐matter	  and	  do	  not	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  right	  holder.”	  And	  these	   limitations	   should	   be	   “even	   more	   limited”	   when	   relates	   to	   the	   electronic	  environment.154	  However,	   according	   to	   Recital	   44,	   the	   limitations	   in	   the	   Directive	  shall	  “be	  exercised	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  obligations.”	  As	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  the	   international	   three-­‐step	   test,	  which	  mentions	   in	  Act	   10	   of	   the	  WCT155	  permits	  Contracting	   Parties	   to	   “carry	   forward	   and	   approximately	   extend	   into	   the	   digital	  environment	  limitation.”	  	  This	  left	  a	  question	  here	  whether	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  in	  EU	  should	  be	  extended	   to	   the	  digital	  world.	   It	   should	  be	  answered	  by	   the	  FAPL	  court	  that	  “	  the	  interpretation	  of	  [Art	  5(1)]	  must	  enable	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  exception	  thereby	   established	   to	   be	   safeguarded	   and	   permit	   observance	   of	   the	   exception’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  See	  Infopaq	  case,	  supra	  note	  150.	  154	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  112,	  recital	  44.	  (	  “The	  scope	  of	  certain	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  may	  have	  to	  be	  even	  more	  limited	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  certain	  new	  uses	  of	  copyright	  works	  and	  other	  subject-­‐matter.”)	  155	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty,	  adopted	  Dec.	  20,	  1996,	  WIPO	  Doc.	  CRNRIDC/94	  [hereinafter	  WCT].	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purpose…	  that	  exception	  must	  allow	  and	  ensure	  the	  development	  and	  operation	  of	  new	  technologies	  and	  safeguard	  a	  fair	  balance…”156	  This	  means	  three-­‐step	  test	  has	  not	  been	  applied	  consistently	  in	  the	  Member	  States.157	  	   Art	  5(1)	  is	  the	  only	  mandatory	  provision	  and	  it	  has	  been	  explained	  in	  recital	  33	   in	   details.158Recital	   33	   also	   indicates	   that	   the	   exemption	   appears	   to	   permit	  temporary	  acts	  of	  reproduction	  that	  occur	  when	  a	  user	  is	  “browsing”	  online	  works	  or	  acts	  of	  “caching,”	  including	  those	  which	  enable	  transmission	  systems	  to	  function	  efficiently	   as	   created	   and	   deleted	   automatically	   without	   human	  intervention.159According	  to	  the	  ECJ	   in	  Infopaq	  case,	   the	  conditions	   in	  Art	  5(1)	  are	  cumulative,	  which	  means	  each	  of	  the	  five	  conditions	  in	  Art	  5(1)	  needs	  to	  be	  satisfied	  in	   order	   to	   get	   exception.160	  The	   five	   conditions	   from	   Art	   5(1)	   are:	   (1)	   the	   act	   is	  temporary;	  (2)	  it	  is	  transient	  or	  incidental;(3)	  it	  is	  an	  integral	  and	  essential	  part	  of	  a	  technological	  process;	  (4)	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  the	  process	  is	  enable	  transmission	  in	  network	  of	  a	   lawful	  use	  of	   it;	   (5)	   it	  has	  no	   independent	  economic	  significance.	  ECJ	  specifically	  explained	  the	  second	  condition	  that	  an	  act	  could	  be	  held	  as	  “transient”	  only	  if	  the	  duration	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  period	  necessary	  for	  the	  proper	  completion	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  See	  Case	  C-­‐403/08	  and	  429/08	  Football	  Association	  Premier	  League,	  supra	  note	  151,	  paras	  163-­‐64.	  157	  See	  EU	  Copyright	  Law,	  A	  Commentary;	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  1115.	  158	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  33.	  (“This	  exception	  should	  include	  acts	  which	  enable	  browsing	  as	  well	  as	  acts	  of	  caching	  to	  take	  place,	  including	  those	  which	  enable	  transmission	  system	  to	  function	  efficiently,	  provided	  that	  the	  intermediary	  does	  not	  modify	  the	  information	  and	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  lawful	  use	  of	  technology,	  widely	  recognized	  and	  used	  by	  industry,	  to	  obtain	  data	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  information.	  A	  use	  should	  be	  considered	  lawful	  where	  it	  is	  authorized	  by	  the	  right	  holder	  or	  not	  restricted	  by	  law.”)	  159	  See	  TANYA	  APLIN,	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW	  IN	  THE	  DIGITAL	  SOCIETY:	  THE	  CHALLENGES	  OF	  MULTIMEDIA,	  103-­‐106	  (2005).(	  This	  part	  explains	  the	  reason	  of	  providing	  exemption	  to	  the	  act	  of	  “browsing”	  the	  internet	  and	  analyzing	  the	  implied	  licenses	  system.	  Further	  it	  also	  provides	  analysis	  of	  the	  local	  and	  proxy	  caching,	  indicates	  how	  they	  could	  get	  exemption	  from	  Art	  5.)	  160	  Infopaq	  I	  case,	  supra	  note	  150,	  para.	  56-­‐58.	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the	  technological	  process	  at	  issue.	  	  Further	  in	  Infopaq	  II	  case,	  the	  Danish	  Court	  held	  the	   third	   condition	   required	   temporary	   acts	   of	   reproduction	   to	   be	   carried	   out	  entirely	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  technological	  process.	  The	  temporary	   reproduction	   act	   also	  need	   to	  be	  necessary	   to	   the	   correct	   and	  efficient	  functioning	   of	   the	   process	   in	   question.161	  The	   Court	   implied	   that	   the	   exemption	  could	  cover	  acts	  that	  initiated	  or	  terminated	  the	  process,	  and	  may	  also	  cover	  human	  intervention,	   since	   there’s	   no	   explicit	   indication.	   When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   forth	  condition,	  the	  FAPL	  court	  gave	  its	  interpretation:	  since	  the	  temporary	  reproductions	  in	   this	  case	  enabled	   the	  broadcasts	   to	  be	  received,	  and	  copyright	  does	  not	  restrict	  the	   reception	   of	   those	   broadcasts	   in	   private,	   they	   are	   lawful.162Then	   in	   Infopaq	   II	  case,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  technological	  process	  at	  issue	  was	  intended	  to	  enable	  a	  more	   efficient	   drafting	   of	   summaries	   of	   newspaper	   articles,	   which	   was	   not	  restricted	  by	  law,	  so	  it	  is	  lawful.	  For	  the	  fifth	  condition,	  we	  still	  need	  the	  two	  above-­‐mentioned	  cases	   to	  clarify	   the	  meaning	  of	   independent	  economic	  significance.	  The	  FAPL	  court	   stated	   that	   “significance	  must	  also	  be	   independent	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	  goes	  beyond	   the	  economic	  advantage	  derived	   from	  mere	   reception	  of	   a	  broadcast	  containing	   protected	  works…”163	  The	   Infopaq	   II	   court	   followed	   and	   supported	   the	  FAPL	   court’s	   decision:	   “…	   an	   advantage	   derived	   from	   an	   act	   of	   temporary	  reproduction	   is	   distinct	   and	   separable	   if	   the	   author	   of	   that	   act	   is	   likely	   to	  make	   a	  profit	   due	   to	   the	   economic	   exploitation	   of	   the	   temporary	   reproductions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Case	  C-­‐302/10	  Infopaq	  International	  A/S	  v	  Danske	  Dagblades	  Forening,	  2012,	  paras.31-­‐35.	  [hereinafter	  Infopaq	  II].	  162	  FAPL	  case,	  supra	  note	  151,	  paras.167-­‐173.	  163	  Id,	  para.175.	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themselves.” 164 	  Further,	   Recital	   33	   also	   states	   that	   “the	   act	   of	   reproduction	  concerned	   should	   have	   no	   separate	   economic	   value	   on	   their	   own”	   which	   could	  support	  the	  view	  of	  these	  courts.	  
e. Satellite and Cable Directive165	  	   Although	  this	  Directive	  seems	  relevant	  to	  the	  temporary	  reproduction	  right,	  but	  Art	  1(3)	  of	  this	  directive	  explicitly	  states	  that	  cable	  transmission	  covered	  by	  this	  rule	  must	   be	   “simultaneous,	   unaltered	   and	   unabridged,”166	  which	  means	   delay	   or	  on-­‐demanded	  retransmission	  will	  not	  be	  regulated	  by	  this	  Directive.	  	   	  	   With	  the	  clear	  statement	  in	  Art	  2	  of	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  the	  works	  can	  be	  protected	  by	  copyright	  law	  in	  any	  forms,	  (broadcasting	  works	  need	  “fixation”)	  	  thus	   there’s	  no	   such	   “fixation”	   requirement	   in	  EU	  copyright	   laws.	  This	   idea	  of	   “no	  fixation	   requirement”	   is	   quite	   reasonable	   in	   the	   EU	   authors’	   right	   system.	   The	  system	   of	   the	   right	   of	   the	   author	   complies	   with	   the	   theory	   from	   natural	   law	  philosophy—improvisation,	   impromptu	  or	  extemporaneous	  should	  be	  copyrighted	  ever	  since	  they	  were	  created.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  without	  such	  fixation	  requirement,	  there’s	   no	   need	   to	   consider	   further	   requirements	   derived	   from	   fixation.	   EU	  directives	  simply	  and	  explicitly	  adopted	  the	  idea	  that	  temporary	  copies	  are	  copies,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  Infopaq	  II,	  supra	  note	  161,	  para.52	  
165 Council	  Directive	  93/83/EEC	  of	  27	  September	  1993	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	  certain	  rules	  concerning	  copyright	  and	  rights	  related	  to	  copyright	  applicable	  to	  satellite	  broadcasting	  and	  cable	  retransmission,[hereinafter	  Satellite	  and	  Cable	  Directive].	  166	  Id,	  art	  1(3).	  (“For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Directive,	  cable	  retransmission	  means	  the	  simultaneous,	  unaltered	  and	  unabridged	  retransmission	  by	  a	  cable	  or	  microwave	  system	  for	  reception	  by	  the	  public	  of	  an	  initial	  transmission	  from	  another	  Member	  State,	  by	  wire	  or	  over	  the	  air,….”)	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but	  then	  use	  lots	  of	  exemptions	  in	  limiting	  authors’	  right	  expansion.	  EU	  model	  seems	  to	  be	  rational;	  however	  the	  way	  it	  grants	  exemptions	  could	  still	  be	  improved.	  	   What’s	  interesting	  here	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  from	  the	  EU	   Copyright	   Code	   by	   Wittem	   project	   in	   2010.167	  Art	   4.2	   states	   that	   the	   right	   of	  reproduction	   includes	   temporary	   reproduction	   insofar	   as	   it	   has	   independent	  economic	  significance.	   	  Although	   in	   the	   footnote	  43,	   it	   states	   that	   this	  definition	   is	  carved-­‐out	  absorbs	  the	  rule	  of	  Art.	  5(1)	  of	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  we	  can	  still	  see	  the	  differences	  here.	  The	  EU	  Copyright	  Code	  delivers	  its	  opinion	  that	  only	  those	  temporary	   copies	   with	   independent	   economic	   significance	   can	   be	   treated	   as	  reproductions	  under	  EU	  Copyright	  Code.	   	   EU	  Copyright	  Code	   also	  provides	   a	  new	  thought:	  value	  the	  economic	  significance	  of	  temporary	  copy	  when	  try	  to	  determine	  whether	  it’s	  an	  infringing	  copy	  or	  not.	  	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   how	   EU	   Member	   States	   apply	   the	   directives	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  following	  section	  will	  take	  UK	  as	  an	  example.	  	  
C. UK 	   UK’s	  copyright	  law	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  EU	  Directives,	  so	  this	  dissertation	  will	  use	  UK’s	  Copyright,	  Designs	  and	  Patent	  Act	  (hereafter	  CDPA)	  as	  an	  example	  in	  understanding	   how	   EU	   members	   implement	   EU	   directives	   or	   other	   international	  Conventions,	  Treaties	  and	  Agreements	  to	  their	  own	  law	  system.168	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Wittem	  Project,	  EU	  Copyright	  Code,	  (2010)	  available	  at:	  http://www.copyrightcode.eu/Wittem_European_copyright_code_21%20april%202010.pdf	  Intro	  of	  EU	  Copyright	  Code	  is	  available	  at:	  http://www.copyrightcode.eu/	  	  168	  Copyright,	  Designs	  and	  Patents	  Act,	  1988,	  	  c.	  48	  (U.K.)	  available	  at:	  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents	  [hereinafter	  CDPA	  1988].	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   Section	   17	   from	   CDPA	   regulates	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction.	   Section	   17(2)	  mentions:	  “copying	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  literary,	  dramatic,	  musical	  or	  artistic	  work	  means	  reproducing	  the	  work	  in	  any	  material	  form,”	  and	  which	  means	  including	  “storing	  the	  work	   by	   electronic	   means.”	   Further,	   Section	   17(6)	   also	   mentions	   that	   copying	  includes	  “the	  making	  of	  copies	  which	  are	  transient	  or	  are	  incidental	  to	  some	  other	  use	   of	   the	   work.”	   Several	   cases	   in	   UK	   clearly	   showed	   that	   a	   transient	   copy	   in	  computer	  RAM	  was	  a	  reproduction	  in	  material	  form,	  and	  the	  RAM	  chip	  itself	  was	  an	  “infringing	   copy.”169	  Under	   this	   circumstance,	   there’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   multimedia	  stream	   via	   cloud	   computing	   will	   amount	   to	   make	   unlawful	   copy	   of	   these	  copyrighted	  works,	  unless	  a	  license	  exist	  or	  exceptions	  can	  be	  applied.	  	   Indeed	  UK	  does	  have	  exceptions	  for	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  “temporary	  copy”	  by	   following	   the	   EU	   Directives	   (the	   Information	   Society	   Directive)	   requirements.	  Section	  28A	  mentions	  that	  if	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  temporary	  copy,	  which	  is	  transient	  or	  incidental,	   is	  an	   integral	  and	  essential	  part	  of	  a	   technological	  process	  and	   the	  sole	  purpose	   of	   the	   process	   is	   to	   enable	   (a)	   a	   transmission	   of	   the	   work	   in	   a	   network	  between	  third	  parties	  by	  an	  intermediary;	  or	  (b)	  a	  lawful	  use	  of	  the	  work;	  and	  has	  no	   independent	   economic	   significance,	   then	   the	   temporary	   copy	  will	   not	   infringe	  copyright.	  170	  After	   the	  Meltwater	  case	  which	   is	  decided	  by	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court,	  this	   exception	   should	   be	   apply	   to	   on	   screen	   and	   “cached”	   copies	   of	   copyright	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Kabushiki	  Kaisha	  Sony	  Computer	  Entertainment	  Inc	  	  v	  Ball,	  [2004]	  EWHC	  1738	  (Ch)	  at	  paras	  15&17.	  See	  also	  R	  v	  Higgs.,	  [2008]	  EWCA	  1324,para.	  9.	  (	  Since	  a	  transient	  copies	  of	  the	  game	  were	  made	  in	  RAM,	  the	  act	  of	  playing	  a	  pirate	  game	  on	  a	  console	  was	  considered	  as	  infringe	  s	  17(6).)	  See	  also	  H	  LADDIE,	  ET	  AL,	  THE	  MODERN	  LAW	  OF	  COPYRIGHT	  AND	  DESIGNS	  (3rd	  ed.	  2000),	  para	  14.8.	  170	  CDPA	  1988,	  supra	  note	  168,	  s	  28A.	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protected	  works	  generated	   in	  the	  course	  of	  ordinary	  browsing.	  171	  This	  guarantees	  that	   everyday	   end-­‐users	   of	   the	   Internet	   will	   not	   infringe	   copyright	   through	  browsing	  websites.	  
iii. Other Countries- Singapore, Australia, Japan 
A. Singapore 	   Like	  the	  EU,	  it	  seems	  quite	  clear	  that	  Singapore	  has	  already	  adopted	  the	  idea	  that	   “RAM”	  copies	  are	  reproductions,	  because	  SS15(1)	  states:	   “for	   the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Act,	  reproduction,	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  work,	  includes	  the	  making	  of	  a	  copy	  which	  is	  transient	  or	   is	   incidental	  to	  some	  other	  use	  of	  the	  work.”172	  Both	  the	  High	  Court	  and	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   held	   that	   there	   are	   reproductions	   of	   copyright	   owners’	  program	   in	   the	   Record	   TV	   v.	   MediaCorp	   TV	   case.	   However,	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	  overturned	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  High	  court,	  that	  it’s	  the	  registered	  users	  who	  make	  the	  reproduction	  of	  copyright	  owners’	  (plaintiffs’)	  program,	  but	  not	  the	  defendant	  who	  make	  the	  reproduction	  under	  its	  subscribers’	  direction.173	  	  	   RecordTV	   provides	   Internet	   complimentary	   recording	   service	   to	   pre-­‐registered	   users,	   which	   allows	   them	   to	   record	   programs	   for	   later	   viewing.	   The	  RecordTV	   works	   as	   the	   following：first,	   the	   RecordTV	   will	   identify	   the	   relevant	  program	  (which	  requested	  by	  its	  registered	  users)	  and	  make	  a	  reproduction	  while	  it	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  Public	  Relations	  Consultants	  Association	  Ltd	  v	  The	  Newspaper	  Licensing	  Agency	  Ltd.,[2013]	  UKSC	  18.	  The	  High	  Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  held	  that	  end-­‐users	  need	  licenses	  from	  NLA	  since	  the	  temporary	  copies	  exceptions	  were	  not	  reliable	  for	  them.	  172	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act	  1987,	  SS	  15(1).	  (”	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  Act,	  reproduction,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  literary,	  dramatic	  or	  musical	  work,	  includes	  a	  reproduction	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  sound	  recording	  or	  cinematograph	  film	  of	  the	  work,	  and	  any	  record	  embodying	  such	  a	  recording	  and	  any	  copy	  of	  such	  a	  film	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  reproduction	  of	  the	  work.”)	  173	  RecordTV	  Pte	  Ltd	  v	  MediaCorp	  TV	  Singapore	  Pte	  Ltd	  [2011]	  1	  SLR	  830	  [hereinafter	  RecordTV	  case].	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broadcast	   through	   its	   Internet-­‐based	   Digital	   Video	   Recorder	   (iDVR)	   at	   a	   remote	  location;	  then	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  program	  will	  be	  stored	  in	  RecordTV’s	  online	  server	   for	  15	  days;	   further,	   the	   registered	  user	   could	   log	   in	  his	  account	  and	  enjoy	  this	   program	   anytime	  within	   this	   15	   days	   period;	   at	   last,	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	  program	  will	  be	  deleted	  after	  this	  period	  	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   there’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   courts	   in	   Singapore	   already	  adopted	  the	  idea	  that	  temporary	  copy	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  reproduction,	  the	  issue	  here	  is	  who	  actually	  make	  the	  temporary	  reproduction.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  used	  the	  U.S.	  Cablevision	   case	   as	   an	   example,	   and	   agreed	   its	   decision.	  The	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   also	  provides	   its	   own	   reason	   for	   holding	   registered	   users	   are	   the	   copier:	   the	   court	  focused	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  end-­‐result	  of	  the	  recording	  and	  was	  persuaded	  by	  the	  “tangible	   benefits”	   of	   a	   “more	   convenient	   and	   user-­‐friendly”	   online	   time-­‐shifting	  service.174	  	   The	   Court	   of	   Appeal’s	   decision	   had	   been	   criticized	   by	   lots	   of	   scholars	   in	  Singapore;	  most	   of	   them	   indicate	   that	   it’s	  wrong	   to	   cite	   the	  U.S.	   Cablevision	   case,	  since	   the	   Cablevision	   case	   itself	   is	  wrongfully	   decided.	   They	   criticized	   against	   the	  Cablevision	   case	   and	   the	   RecordTV	   case	   based	   on	   three	   reasons.	   Those	   three	  reasons	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   U.S.	   scholars’	   opinions:	   (1)	   Neither	   RS-­‐DVR	   nor	   iDVR	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  “digital	  version”	  of	   traditional	  VCR;	  (2)	  There’s	  no	  continuing	  relationship	   between	   the	   VCR	   seller	   and	   customers,	   but	   there’s	   on-­‐going	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  See	  Id,	  [21]	  -­‐[22].	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relationship	   between	   users	   and	   RS-­‐DVR	   &	   iDVR	   providers;	   (3)	   the	   act	   of	  reproduction	  is	  not	  “passive	  conduit”	  but	  “active	  participant.”175	  
B. Australia 	   For	  a	  very	  long	  time,	  as	  a	  developed	  country,	  Australia	  refused	  to	  adopt	  the	  idea	   that	   temporary	   copy	   is	   reproduction	   under	   its	   copyright	   law.	   	   For	   instance,	  High	   Court	   of	   Australia	   rejected	   that	   there	   are	   reproductions	   in	   RAM	   under	   the	  copyright	   law.176	  This	   decision	   of	   High	   Court	   of	   Australia	  was	   based	   on	   the	   2000	  Australia	   Copyright	   Law.	   	   However,	   the	   United	   States-­‐Australia	   Free	   Trade	  Agreements	   (FTA)	   states	   clearly	   “Each	  party	   shall	  provide	   that	   the	   following	  have	  the	   right	   to	   authorize	   or	   prohibit	   all	   reproductions,	   in	   any	   manner	   or	   form,	  permanent	   or	   temporary	   (including	   temporary	   storage	   in	   material	   form).”177	  In	  order	   to	   implement	   the	   US-­‐Australia	   FTA	   in	   2005,	   Australia	   had	   to	   revise	   its	  copyright	  law.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  like	  most	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  Australia	  adopts	  the	   concept	   that	   temporary	   copy	   is	   reproduction	   in	   2005,	   which	   is	   directly	   from	  section	  10	  	  (the	  definition	  of	  “material	  form”).178	  Thus	  the	  reproduction	  right	  “looms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  See	  Saw	  Cheng	  Lim	  &	  Warren	  B.	  Chik,	  Whither	  The	  Future	  Of	  Internet	  Streaming	  &	  Time-­‐
Shifting?	  Revisiting	  The	  Rights	  Of	  Reproduction	  And	  Communication	  To	  The	  Public	  In	  
Copyright	  Law	  After	  Aereo	  ,	  23(1)	  INT	  J.	  L.	  INFO.	  TECH.	  53	  (2015).	  See	  also	  Saw	  Cheng	  Lim,	  
Where	  Copyright	  Law	  and	  Technology	  Once	  Again	  Cross	  Paths:	  RecordTV	  Pte	  Ltd	  v	  MediaCorp	  
TV	  Singapore	  Pte	  Ltd	  [2011]	  2	  SLR	  152,	  Singapore	  Law	  Gazette	  (December	  2010).	  	  See	  also	  C	  L	  Saw	  &	  Warren	  B	  Chik,	  Where	  Copyright	  Law	  and	  Technology	  Once	  Again	  Cross	  Paths:	  
RecordTV	  Pte	  Ltd	  v	  MediaCorp	  TV	  Singapore	  Pte	  Ltd	  [2011]	  1	  SLR	  830,	  23	  SAcLJ	  (2011).	  176	  Kabushiki	  Kaisha	  Sony	  Computer	  Entertainment	  v.	  Stevens,	  [2005]	  HCA	  58,	  (2005)	  221	  ALR	  448;	  (2005)	  79	  ALJR	  1850	  (Oct.	  6,	  2005)	  para.	  62-­‐79.	  (“However,	  in	  the	  ordinary	  course,	  temporary	  storage	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  computer	  program	  in	  the	  RAM	  of	  a	  DVD	  player	  will	  not	  involve	  a	  reproduction	  of	  the	  computer	  program	  in	  a	  material	  form.”)	  177	  The	  United	  States-­‐Australia	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  2005,	  Article	  17.4	  (1),	  available	  at:	  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file469_5141.pdf	  	  178	  Copyright	  Act	  1968	  (Cth)	  (revised	  2005)	  s	  10	  (“	  In	  relation	  to	  a	  work	  or	  an	  adaptation	  of	  a	  work,	  includes	  any	  form	  (whether	  visible	  or	  not)	  of	  storage	  of	  the	  work	  or	  adaptation,	  or	  a	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large	  as	  the	  ultimate	  leverage	  of	  right	  holders	  to	  control	  virtually	  all	  aspects	  of	  how	  [Internet	  intermediaries]	  run	  their	  businesses.”179	  According	  to	  Australian	  scholars,	  Internet	   intermediaries	   will	   face	   higher	   risks	   of	   direct	   liability	   of	   copyright	  infringement	  when	   comparing	   to	   other	   countries.180	  Although	   Australia	   Copyright	  Act	   provides	   several	   exemptions	   for	   temporary	   copy	   just	   like	   EU	   directives,	   the	  conditions	  of	  exemptions	  are	  so	  strict	  that	  is	  hard	  to	  meet.	  According	  to	  s43A,	  ss43B,	  s111A	  and	  s111B	   the	  exemptions	   to	   temporary	   reproductions	  could	  be	  applied	   in	  two	   courses:	   (1)	   communication;	   and	   (2)	   use	   of	   a	   digital	   copy.	   The	   exemptions	  required	  that	  the	  temporary	  reproductions	  should	  be	  used	  as	  part	  of	   the	  technical	  process	  of	  making	  or	  receiving	  a	  communication	  or	  using	  a	  copy.	  However,	  there	  are	  still	   limitations	   toward	   these	   exemptions.	   In	   the	   first	   course—communication,	  exemption	  will	   not	   be	   applied	  when	   communication	   itself	   is	   infringement.	   And	   in	  the	  second	  course,	  exemption	  will	  not	  be	  applicable	  if:	  (1)	  source	  copy	  infringes;	  (2)	  source	   copy	   is	   parallel	   imported;	   (3)	   use	   infringes. 181 	  With	   the	   exemptions’	  limitation,	  it’s	  more	  difficult	  for	  ISPs	  to	  survive	  from	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  copyright	  owner.	  For	  instance,	  under	  this	  limited	  exemptions,	  when	  a	  user	  browsing	  a	  website	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  work	  or	  adaptation,	  (whether	  or	  not	  the	  work	  or	  adaptation,	  or	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  work	  or	  adaptation,	  can	  be	  reproduced).)	  179	  Lucie	  Guilbault	  et	  al,	  Institute	  for	  Information	  Law	  (IviR),	  Study	  on	  the	  Implementation	  
and	  Effect	  in	  Member	  States’	  Laws	  of	  Directive	  2001/29/EC	  on	  the	  Harmonisation	  of	  Certain	  
Aspects	  of	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights	  in	  the	  Information	  Society,	  February	  2007,	  at	  61.	  180	  Kimberlee	  Weatherall,	  Internet	  Intermediaries	  and	  Copyright	  :	  An	  Australian	  Agenda	  for	  
Reform	  	  (2011),	  available	  at:	  http://digital.org.au/sites/digital.org.au/files/documents/Weatherall-­‐InternetIntermediariesandCopyright.pdf	  	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  28,	  2016).	  181	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178.	  (S	  43A	  was	  introduced	  in	  2000	  via	  Copyright	  Amendment	  (Digital	  Agenda)	  Act	  2000	  (Cth).	  S	  43A	  and	  s	  111A	  provide	  exemption	  in	  the	  first	  courses.	  Then	  ss	  43B	  was	  introduced	  in	  2004	  via	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  US	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  Implementation	  Bill	  2004	  [671],	  it	  together	  with	  s	  111B	  provide	  exemptions	  to	  the	  second	  course.)	  See	  Id,	  at	  16-­‐43.	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which	   includes	   an	   infringing	   photo,	   if	   this	  website	   is	   automatically	   cached	   by	   the	  browser,	  the	  former	  exemption	  will	  not	  be	  applied.	  	   When	  the	  issue	  comes	  to	  who	  makes	  the	  temporary	  reproduction,	  the	  Optus	  case	  concluded:182	  	   it	   is	  the	  service	  provider	  (Optus)	  who	  makes	  the	  copies.	   	  Optus	  provides	   its	   subscribers	   a	   service	   named	   “TV	   Now”	   which	   allows	   subscribers	   to	  record	  air	  football	  or	  rugby	  games	  for	  later	  viewing.	  TV	  Now	  system	  will	  reproduce	  four	   copies	  of	   the	  programs	  requested	  by	   its	   subscribers	   in	   four	  different	   formats	  (PCs,	   Apple,	   Andriod	   and	   3G	   devices).	   Subscribers	   could	   visit	   their	   requested	  programs	   in	   30	   days	   via	   the	   video	   streaming	   service	   provided	   by	   Optus.	   The	  National	  Rugby	  League	   is	   the	   copyright	  owner	  of	   those	  TV-­‐air	   game	  programs.	   	   It	  alleged	  that	  Optus	  infringed	  its	  copyright	  by	  reproducing	  the	  TV	  programs.	  Although	  Optus	   argued	   that	   it	   just	   made	   the	   reproductions	   under	   the	   direction	   of	   the	  subscribers,	  the	  Federal	  Court	  still	  held	  that	  it’s	  Optus	  (together	  with	  its	  subscribers)	  who	  made	  the	  copies	  after	  analyzing	  this	  case	  in	  details.	  	  	   The	  trial	  court	  stood	  on	  Optus	  side,	  decided	  it	  was	  the	  subscriber	  who	  made	  the	   reproductions	  based	  on	   the	   comparison	  between	  Optus’s	  TV	  Now	  system	  and	  VCR/DVR.	  It	  further	  stated	  that	  Optus	  was	  in	  an	  analogous	  position	  to	  the	  university	  in	  Moorhouse	  case.183	  It	  also	  mentioned	  the	  U.S.	  Cablevision	  case	  and	  the	  Singapore	  RecordTV	  case	  as	  references.	  184	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  National	  Rugby	  League	  v.	  Singtel	  Optus	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2012]	  FCAFC	  59.	  183	  University	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  v	  Moorhouse	  [1975]	  133	  CLR	  1	  (In	  this	  case,	  the	  university	  is	  not	  liable	  for	  the	  students’	  copying	  acts	  via	  its	  supplies	  –	  photocopier	  in	  a	  liabrary.)	  184	  Singtel	  Optus	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  National	  Rugby	  League	  No	  2	  [2012]	  FCA	  34.	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   However,	  the	  Federal	  Court	  overturned	  the	  trial	  court’s	  decision	  by	  analyzing	  the	   definition	   of	   “make”	   from	   “make	   copies,”	   rejecting	   the	   argument	   of	   “last	  volitional	  act,”	  and	  resolving	  the	  problem	  of	  “who	  makes	  copies”	  via	  classifying	  four	  potential	   “makers.”	   Since	   the	   conclusion	   is	   Optus	   is	   the	   “maker”	   of	   copies,	   this	  dissertation	  will	  classify	  the	  four	  kinds	  of	  “makers”	  into	  three.	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  made	   by	   the	   Federal	   Court	   is	   that	   the	   copies	   are	   made	   by	   Optus,	   as	   agent	   for	  subscribers.	   This	   possibility	   was	   dismissed	   immediately	   because	   there’s	   no	   such	  principal-­‐and-­‐agent	   relationship	  between	  Optus	  and	   its	   subscribers.185	  The	  second	  one	  is	  “the	  subscriber	  as	  principal.”	  The	  court	  provides	  four	  reasons	  in	  proving	  its	  decision	  that	  subscribers	  themselves	  are	  not	  “makers”:	  (1)	  the	  meaning	  of	  “make”	  is	  contrived,	   it	   should	   convey	   the	   idea	   of	   “making”	   (ie	   creating	   or	   producing)	   a	  physical	  thing,	  which	  also	  means	  it’s	  reasonable	  that	  there’s	  a	  causative	  agency	  if	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  particular	   thing	   is	   to	  be	  made;	  (2)	   the	  operation	  of	  Optus	  system	  clearly	  show	   that	   the	   reproduction	   acts	   does	   not	   occur	   by	   only	   following	   the	   subscriber	  alone;	  (3)	  the	  analogies	  are	  not	  helpful	  since	  there’s	  ongoing	  relationship	  between	  Optus	   and	   its	   subscribers;	   (4)	   there’s	   different	   legislation	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	  Australia.186	  In	   the	   third	   part,	   the	   Federal	   Court	   clearly	   demonstrates	   that	   Optus	  makes	  the	  copies,	   jointly	  with	   its	  subscribers.187	  The	  court	  recognized	  that	  Optus’s	  system	  had	  actually	  been	  “designed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  [made]	  Optus	  the	  main	  performer	  of	  the	  act	  of	  copying,”	  it	  “captures,	  copies,	  stores	  and	  makes	  available	  for	  reward,	  a	  programme	  for	   later	  viewing	  by	  another”	  rather	  than	  merely	  “making	  available	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  National	  Rugby	  v	  Optus	  case,	  supra	  note	  182,	  at	  54.	  186	  Id,	  at	  55-­‐60.	  187	  Id,	  at	  60-­‐76.	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system	   to	   another	   who	   uses	   it	   to	   copy	   a	   broadcast.”188	  The	   court	   analyzing	   the	  whole	   role	  Optus	  played	  during	   the	   reproduction	  process	  and	  decided	   that	  Optus’	  role	  is	  “pervasive,”	  Optus	  is	  the	  maker	  even	  its	  system	  is	  automatic.	  	   It’s	   obvious	   that	  Australia	   follow	   the	  U.S.	   trend	   in	   adopting	   the	   theory	   that	  temporary	  copies	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  reproductions,	  but	  Australia	  had	  already	  got	  a	   total	   different	   conclusion	   in	   deciding	   the	   issue	   of	   “who	   makes	   the	   temporary	  reproductions.”	   Unlike	   the	   U.S.	   holds	   that	   the	   users	   (subscribers)	   are	   the	   direct	  infringers	   of	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	   right	   of	   reproduction;	   Australia	   draw	   its	   own	  conclusion:	   ISPs	   make	   the	   temporary	   reproduction	   and	   should	   bare	   the	   direct	  liability.	  
C. Japan 	   According	   to	   Japanese	   terminology,	   “copyright”	   only	   refers	   to	   the	  exploitation	   rights,	   such	   as	   the	   reproduction	   right,	   the	   performance	   right,	   the	  presentation	  right	  and	  others,	  whereas	  the	  moral	  rights	  from	  a	  separate	  category	  of	  rights.189	  Section	  2	  (1)	  (xv)	  clearly	  required	  that	  reproductions	  need	  to	  be	  creation	  of	   something	   “in	   tangible	   form”	   in	   the	   copyright	   sense. 190 	  	   This	   tangibility	  requirement	  means	  “a	  copyright-­‐relevant	  reproduction	  must	  be	  durably	  fixed	  so	  as	  to	   enable	   the	   repetitive	   perception	   of	   the	   work.”	   Japanese	   scholars	   and	   courts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Id,	  at	  67.	  189	  JAPANESE	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW:WRITINGS	  IN	  HONOUR	  OF	  GERHARD	  SCHRICKER,	  51	  (Peter	  Ganea	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  2005).	  190	  Chosakukenho	  [Copyright	  Act	  of	  Japan],	  Law	  No.	  48	  of	  1970,	  Sec.	  2(1)(xv).(“Reprodution	  means	  the	  reproduction	  in	  a	  tangible	  form	  by	  means	  of	  printing,	  photography,	  polygraphy,	  sound	  or	  visual	  recording	  or	  otherwise..”)	  The	  unofficial	  translation	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act	  is	  available	  at	  CRIC	  (copyright	  research	  and	  information	  center),	  http://www.cric.or.jp/english/clj/cl1.html	  (last	  visited	  2016).	  It’s	  also	  available	  in	  the	  Appendix	  of	  JANPANESE	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW,	  translated	  by	  Professor	  Yukifusa	  Oyama.	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indicate	   “temporary	  storage”	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	   reproduction	  under	  copyright	  law.191	  Two	   parts	   of	   view	   support	   Japanese	   version	   of	   “temporary	   storage.”	   First,	  theoretically,	  “temporary	  storage”	  will	  not	  constitute	  reproduction	  under	  copyright	  law,	  based	  on	  analyzing	   the	  category	  and	   the	  utilization	  of	   the	  copied	  copyrighted	  work.	   Second,	   legislatively,	   from	   the	   reports	   of	   Copyright	   Act	   Review	   Conference	  held	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education,	  Science	  and	  Culture	  of	  Japan,	  we	  can	  easily	  realize	  that	  Japan	  does	  not	  want	  to	  treat	  temporary	  storage	  the	  same	  as	  reproduction.	  The	  Report	   of	   Copyright	   Review	   Conference	   in	   June,	   1973	   stated:	   “the	   storage	   of	  copyrighted	  work	  inside	  computers’	  memory	  system	  is	  fleeting	  and	  transitional,	  one	  cannot	   explained	   this	   kind	   of	   storage	   as	   “reproduction”	   under	   the	   copyright	   law.”	  Then	   in	   2001,	   after	   discussing	   this	   issue	   of	   “temporary	   storage”	   for	   one	   year,	   the	  Copyright	   Review	   Conference	   still	   insisted	   their	   theory:	   “it’s	   insufficiency	   to	  interpret	   ‘temporary	   storage’	   into	   reproduction.”	   As	   a	   consequence,	   transient	  caching,	  RAM	  storage	  does	  not	  count	  as	  copyright-­‐relevant	  reproduction.	  192	  	   In	  comparing	   to	   the	  reproduction	  right	   issue	   in	  U.S.	  Cablevision	  case,	   Japan	  provided	  its	  Rokuga	  Net	  case	  ,	  Rokuraku	  II	  case	  and	  Yoridori-­‐midori	  Case.	  193	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  Japanese	  regard	  “temporary	  storage”(or	  temporary	  copy)	  as	  “一時的蓄積”.	  They	  further	  state	  that	  although	  the	  temporary	  storage	  appear	  because	  of	  the	  PC	  technology,	  however,	  its	  definition	  cannot	  be	  limited	  as	  PC	  RAM	  copy,	  temporary	  copies	  made	  via	  the	  act	  of	  PlayStation,	  mobile	  phone	  or	  the	  receiver	  of	  air	  broadcasting	  programs	  should	  all	  be	  considered.	  	  192	  Tokyo	  District	  Court	  decision	  of	  16	  May	  2000	  (1057	  Hanrei	  Jiho	  	  221).	  See	  also	  JAPANESE	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW,	  supra	  note	  190,	  at	  52-­‐53.	  (The	  author	  states	  that	  although	  this	  Japanese	  interpretation	  of	  temporary	  is	  lagging	  behind	  international	  trend,	  but	  due	  to	  that	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act	  lacks	  a	  limiting	  rule	  like	  Art	  5	  of	  the	  EU	  infosoc	  Directive	  which	  exempts	  some	  kinds	  of	  temporary	  copies,	  Japan	  has	  to	  keep	  its	  own	  interpretation.)	  193	  Nihon	  Hoso	  Kyokai	  v.	  FA	  Vision,	  1895	  HANREI	  JIHO	  120	  (Tokyo	  D.	  Ct.,	  Oct.	  7,	  2004);	  Nihon	  Hoso	  Kyokai	  v.	  FA	  Vision	  (INTELL.	  HIGH	  Ct.,	  Nov.	  15,	  2005).	  Nihon	  Hoso	  Kyokai	  v.	  Nihon	  Digital	  Kaden	  K.K.,	  2029	  HANREI	  JIHO	  125	  (Tokyo	  D.	  Ct.,	  May	  29,	  2008);	  	  Nihon	  Hoso	  Kyokai	  v.	  Nihon	  Digital	  Kaden	  K.K.,	  (INTELL.	  HIGH	  Ct.,	  Jan.	  27,	  2009);	  Nihon	  Hoso	  Kyokai	  v.	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   In	  Rokuga	  Net	  case,	  FA	  Vision	  provided	  Rakuga	  Net	  service,	  which	  allows	  its	  customers	  who	  lived	  abroad	  to	  view	  Japanese	  TV	  programs.	  This	  service	  does	  so	  by	  allocating	  personal	   computers	   (named	  as	   “TV-­‐personal	   computers”)	   together	  with	  TV	   tuners,	   which	   can	   receive	   and	   record	   TV	   programs	   to	   each	   its	   users.	   All	  equipment	   located	   in	   FA	   Vision’s	   office.	   Both	   the	   Tokyo	   District	   Court	   and	   the	  Intellectual	  Property	  High	  Court	  held	  that	  FA	  Vision	  infringed	  the	  Plaintiff’s	  right	  of	  reproduction.	   The	   court	   provided	   five	   reasons:	   (1)	   FA	   Vision	   provides	   all	   the	  equipment;	  (2)	  FA	  Vision	  controlled	  the	  scope	  of	  broadcast	  TV	  programs	  (which	  can	  be	  transmitted);	  (3)	  a	  customer	  has	  to	  access	  to	  FA	  Vision’s	  website	  each	  time	  to	  use	  the	  transmission	  service;	  (4)	  FA	  Vision	  continuously	  gives	  support	  to	  its	  customers;	  (5)	  FA	  Vision	  advertises	  and	  collects	  profits	  for	  its	  service.194	  	   In	   Rokuraku	   II	   case,	   the	   Defendant	   provides	   service	   of	   recording	   TV	  programs	   by	   leasing	   subscribers	   its	   own	   product	   –	   recording/transmitting	  device(named	  as	  “Parent	  Device	  Rokuraku”,	  which	  located	  in	  the	  Defendant’s	  place,	  plus	   a	   “Child	   Device	   Rokuraku”	   set-­‐top	   device	   which	   locates	   in	   each	   subscriber’s	  home).	  After	  the	  subscribers	  requests	  a	  Japanese	  TV	  programs,	  the	  device	  requests	  programs	  onto	  its	  hard	  drive	  and	  then	  sends	  the	  programs	  to	  subscribers.	  	  	   The	  Tokyo	  District	   court	   ruled	   that	   the	  Defendant,	   but	  not	   the	   subscribers,	  violated	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction	   based	   on	   two	   main	   reasons	   from	   the	   famous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nihon	  Digital	  Kaden	  K.K.,	  (Sup.	  Ct.,	  Jan.	  20,	  2011);	  Mainichi	  Hoso	  K.K.	  v.	  Kuromusaizu	  K.K.	  1911	  HANREI	  JIHO	  65	  (Osaka	  D.	  Ct.,	  Oct.	  24,	  2005);	  Mainichi	  Hoso	  K.K.	  v.	  Kuromusaizu	  K.K.,	  1991	  HANRUI	  JIHO	  122(Osaka	  HIGH	  Ct.,	  June	  14,	  2007).	  194	  See	  Id;	  see	  also	  Naoya	  Isoda,	  Copyright	  Infringement	  Liability	  of	  Placeshifting	  Services	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan,	  7	  WASH	  J.L.	  TECH.	  &	  ART	  149,	  180-­‐82	  (2011).	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Karaoke	  theory195	  :(1)	  the	  benefit	  of	  such	  service	  that	  the	  Defendant	  gained;(2)	  the	  Defendant	   had	   fully	   control	   over	   its	   service,	   since	   the	   device	   located	   in	   the	  Defendant’s	  places,	   the	  defendant	  set	   the	  area	  of	  recordable	  TV	  programs,	  and	  the	  purpose	   of	   such	   service	   remained	   as	   allowing	   subscribers	   to	   obtained	   copied	   TV	  programs	  from	  Japanese	  Broadcasting	  companies.196	  	   The	  Intellectual	  Property	  High	  Court	  reversed	  the	  district	  court’s	  decision	  by	  countering	   each	   reason	   provided	   by	   the	   district	   court.	   	   The	   Intellectual	   Property	  High	  Court	  kept	  reasoning	  that	  there’s	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  subscribers	  setting	  up	   such	   kind	   of	   recording	   TV	   programs	   service	   and	   the	  Defendant	   setting	   up	   the	  same	  service	  for	  subscribers.	  	  The	  purpose	  and	  control	  issue	  remain	  the	  same:	  gain	  recording	   service	   via	   certain	   device,	   no	   matter	   who	   set	   or	   control	   such	   device.	  Further	  the	  court	  also	  mentioned	  that	  the	  economic	  profits	  the	  defendant	  collected	  from	   its	   service	   were	   for	   maintenance	   its	   device.	   The	   Intellectual	   Property	   High	  Court	   ruled	   that	   the	  Defendant	   only	   supported	   its	   subscriber’s	   legal	   private	  use	   –	  record	  air	  programs	  and	  watch	  them	  via	  streaming.	  Subscriber’s	  private	  use	  is	  legal	  under	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Law	  in	  Art	  30(1),	  as	  a	  result,	  there’s	  no	  reason	  to	  punish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  “Karaoke	  Theory”	  is	  a	  concept	  used	  in	  assessing	  the	  subject	  of	  utilization	  while	  it’s	  hard	  to	  decide	  a	  person	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  physical	  utilization,	  it	  focus	  on	  two	  elements	  “management	  (control)	  and	  profit.	  This	  Karaoke	  Theory	  is	  the	  archetype,	  which	  had	  been	  used	  in	  the	  March	  15,	  1988,	  in	  Japanese	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  re	  “Club	  Cat’s	  Eye	  Incident”.	  And	  further	  following	  this,	  “exceeding	  initial	  expectations,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  tendency	  to	  expansively	  apply	  this	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  cases.”	  See	  Tatsuhiro	  Ueno	  &	  Ryu	  Kojima,	  
Keynote	  Report:	  Indirect	  Infringement	  and	  Provisions	  Restricting	  Rights	  in	  Copyright	  Law,	  available	  at	  http://www.zjapanr.de/index.php/zjapanr/article/viewFile/384/405	  	  196	  Tokyo	  Chiho	  Saibansho	  [Tokyo	  Dist.	  Ct.],	  May	  28,2008,2029	  HANREI	  TAIMUZU	  125	  (Japan).	  See	  Naoya	  Isoda,	  supra	  note	  194,	  at	  189	  (2011).	  (The	  author	  listed	  5	  reasons	  for	  the	  Tokyo	  District	  Court	  ruling	  that	  the	  Defendant	  violate	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  these	  5	  reasons	  can	  be	  classified	  into	  two	  main	  parts	  simply	  in	  this	  dissertation:	  purpose	  and	  control.)	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the	  Defendant	  since	  they	  merely	  act	  as	  provide	  the	  environment	  and	  conditions	  to	  ease	  the	  legal	  acts	  of	  reproduction	  by	  the	  subscribers.197	  	   However,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Japan	  reversed	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  High	  Court’s	  decision,	   it	  held	   that	   the	  Defendant	  made	   the	  copies	  of	   copyrighted	  works	  even	  though	  the	  subscribers	  initiated	  the	  reproductions.	  	  After	  considering	  how	  the	  Defendant	  manage	  and	  control	  its	  service,	  the	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  Defendant	  did	  not	  merely	  provide	   the	  “environment	  and	  conditions”	   for	  easing	   the	  reproduction,	  but	  perform	  conduct	  integral	  to	  reproduction	  by	  controlling	  its	  service.	  Further,	  without	  the	  conduct	  of	  Defendant,	  subscribers	  were	  not	  able	  to	  initiate	  the	  recording.	  	   In	  Yoridori-­‐midori	  case,	  the	  Defendant	  provides	  a	  central	  server	  that	  made	  a	  main	  copy	  of	   selected	  programs	  and	   then	   transmitted	   this	  particular	   copy	   to	  each	  room	   in	   a	   specific	   apartment	   building.	   The	   Defendant	   gains	   fees	   for	   providing	  maintenance	   service.	   The	   Osaka	   District	   Court	   ruled	   that	   the	   Defendant	   did	   not	  violate	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction	   under	   the	   Karaoke	   Theory.	   However,	   the	   Osaka	  High	   Court	   reversed	   the	   district	   court’s	   decision.	   The	   Osaka	   High	   Court	   held	   the	  Defendant	   directly	   infringed	   the	   copyright	   by	   reasoning	   as	   follows:	   (1)	   the	  Defendant’s	   unique	   system	   allowed	   all	   residents	   in	   the	   building	   to	   view	   one	  particular	   copy	  of	  TV	  programs;(2)	   the	  Defendant	  kept	  maintaining	   its	   service	  via	  remote	  control;(3)	  the	  Defendant	  gained	  economic	  benefits	  from	  its	  service.	  Based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  See	  Shigenori	  Matsui,	  Don’	  t	  you	  Want	  to	  Watch	  Television	  Programs	  Aired	  in	  your	  Country	  
while	  you	  are	  Abroad?:	  Broadcasting,	  Reproduction,	  Public	  Transmission	  and	  Copyright,	  	  2015	  U.	  ILL.	  J.L.	  TECH.	  &	  POL’Y	  1,	  18	  (2015).	  (“	  The	  IPHC	  found	  that	  this	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  increased	  demand	  from	  viewers	  abroad	  for	  television	  programs	  aired	  in	  Japan	  and	  by	  technological	  developments	  in	  digitalization	  and	  Internet	  transmission.”	  Such	  service	  will	  be	  gradually	  accepted	  because	  of	  the	  increased	  benefits	  they	  offer	  and	  eventually	  attain	  the	  status	  of	  standard	  electronic	  devices.)	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on	   these	   reason,	   although	   the	   Defendant	   did	   not	   reproduce	   TV	   programs	   in	   a	  physical	  sense,	  he	  actually	  technically	  controlled	  its	  users’	  reproduction	  act.	  What’s	  more,	   the	  defendant	  continuously	  assisted	   in	   the	  users’	   illegal	  reproduction	  act	  by	  providing	   a	   support	   service	   and	   the	   Electric	   Program	  Guide	   data	   to	   users.	   So	   the	  Defendant	  indeed	  infringed	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  	   These	   cases,	   especially	   the	   first	   two	   cases	   determined	   by	   the	   Japanese	  Supreme	  Court	  clearly	  show	  that	  the	  Japanese	  way	  in	  locating	  the	  copier	  is	  simple:	  the	  service	  provider	  (time-­‐shifting,	  recording,	  transmitting	  service)	   is	  the	  one	  who	  make	  the	  copy.	  The	  courts	  in	  Japan	  will	  consider	  two	  main	  issues	  that	  the	  Karaoke	  theory	   focused:	  control	  and	  profit.	  After	  such	  detailed	  analysis,	   it’s	  hard	  to	  tell	   the	  service	  providers	  do	  not	  control	  its	  service	  or	  gain	  profit.	  It’s	  a	  common	  sense	  that	  service	  providers	  have	  to	  “control”	  their	  service	  and	  gain	  economic	  benefits.	  What	  is	  interesting	   here	   is	   that	   temporary	   copies	   are	   still	   being	   differed	   from	   normal	  reproductions	  under	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Law.	  Without	  a	  solid	  copy	  which	  meets	  the	  concept	   of	   reproduction	  under	   Japanese	  Copyright	   Law,	   there’s	   no	  way	   in	   further	  deciding	  who	  makes	  the	  copy.	  	  So	  when	  the	  ISPs	  provide	  stream	  video/audio	  service	  in	  Japan,	  once	  there	  are	  no	  conceptional	  reproductions,	  there	  are	  no	  infringements.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  conclusion	  that	  Japan	  rejects	  the	  idea	  of	  adopting	  the	  temporary	  copy	  as	  reproduction.	  	  
iv. How Cloud Computing Affect the Reproduction Right? – A 
proposal for China 
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 When dealing with how cloud computing affect the reproduction right, above 
sections show major countries’ two main considerations: Is there a “copy?” and who 
makes the copy. The following section will discuss these two considerations together 
with the new technology brought by the cloud computing. Furthermore, it will also 
analyze the reproduction right in China and provide a proposal for China. 
A. How Cloud Computing Affect the Reproduction Right? 	   To	   normal	   people,	   they	   basically	   just	   use	   two	   main	   functions	   of	   cloud	  computing,	  under	  the	  model	  of	  SaaS.	  The	  first	   function	  is	  storing	  files	   into	  cloud—	  use	  cloud	  computing	  as	  invisible	  portable	  disk;	  and	  the	  other	  one	  is	  streaming	  video	  and	   audio	   online	   —	   use	   cloud	   computing	   as	   on-­‐demand	   channels.	   Due	   to	   the	  architecture	   of	   Cloud	   Storage, 198 —which	   means	   it	   is	   constituted	   by	   many	  distinguished	   resources,	   but	   still	   acts	   as	   one—the	   data	   of	   the	  works	   uploaded	   by	  users	   may	   be	   stored	   separately	   in	   different	   memory.	   	   When	   the	   data	   are	   stored	  separately,	   could	   it	   still	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   copyrighted	   work?	   The	  answer	  is	  obvious:	  of	  course	  yes.	  No	  matter	  how	  the	  works	  are	  stored	  in	  remote	  and	  invisible	  cloud	  memory,	  the	  stored	  works	  will	  be	  transmitted	  to	  users	  as	  the	  exact	  same	   whole	   works	   without	   extra	   process.	   Users	   are	   still	   able	   to	   use	   the	   “copy”	  successfully.	   So	   there’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   a	   copy	   is	   made	   when	   users	   upload	   files	   to	  cloud	  storage.	  199	  However,	  as	  we	  all	  know,	  nowadays	  the	  function	  of	  cloud	  storage	  is	   not	   limiting	   to	   store	   data	   or	   share	   with	   others	   anymore.	   Most	   cloud	   storage	  servers	   can	   provide	   a	   “play	   online”	   function,	   which	   is	   similar	   as	   streaming.	   After	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  Cloud	  Storage,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_storage	  	  199	  See	  In	  re	  Aimster	  Copyright	  Litig.,	  252	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  634,	  648	  (N.D.	  Ill.	  2002)	  (citing	  NLFC,	  Inc.	  v.	  Devcom	  Mid-­‐Am.,	  Inc.,	  45	  F.	  3d	  231,	  235(7th	  Cir.	  1995)).	  (This	  case	  clearly	  states	  that	  there’s	  no	  question	  that	  when	  a	  user	  uploads	  a	  song	  to	  an	  ISP’s	  servers,	  a	  copy	  is	  made.)	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locating	  audio/video	  files	  from	  others’	  sharing	  cloud	  space,	  users	  could	  directly	  save	  those	   files	   to	   their	  own	  cloud	  storage	  space	  via	  a	  simple	  click,	  and	  then	  play	  them	  without	  downloading.	  Under	   this	   circumstance,	   is	   there	  a	  copy	  being	  made	  before	  users	  enjoying	  the	  audio/video	  file?	  And	  who	  makes	  the	  copy?	   	  So	  far,	  before	  play	  works	  online,	   a	  user	  has	   to	   save	   the	  particular	  work	   to	  his	   cloud	  storage	   space	  at	  least.	  This	  action	  of	  “save”	  is	  just	  a	  simple	  click,	  but	  the	  data	  have	  been	  transferred	  from	  others’	  cloud	  storage	  space	  to	  a	  new	  space.	  It	  seems	  that	  a	  copy	  has	  been	  made.	  Further,	   the	   user	   is	   the	   one	  who	  makes	   the	   decision	   of	   “saving”	   a	   file	   to	   his	   own	  cloud	  storage	  space,	  and	  he’s	  also	  the	  one	  who	  clicks	  the	  button.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  user	  is	  the	  copier.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  ISPs	  are	  irrelevant	  in	  such	  storing	  and	  playing	  online	   activities;	   they	   simply	   provide	   basic	   useful	   services.	  Nevertheless,	  with	   the	  development	  of	  deduplication	  technology,	  when	  a	  user	  uploads	  a	  file	  to	  his	  space	  in	  the	   cloud	   server,	   it’s	   hard	   to	   tell	   that	   the	   copy	   of	   the	   file	   is	   exactly	  made	   by	   the	  specific	  user	  who	  uploads	  it.	  	  Moreover,	  when	  a	  user	  try	  to	  “save”	  files	  from	  others’	  cloud	   storage	   space	   to	   his	   space,	   are	   data	   really	   transmitted	  between	   these	   cloud	  storage	  spaces	  due	  to	  the	  deduplication	  technology?	  	   Further,	  the	  issue	  of	  streaming	  audio/video	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  analyzed.	  Thus,	  when	  we	  try	  to	  analyze	  how	  cloud	  computing	  effect	  the	  reproduction	  right,	  we	  need	  to	  discuss	  this	  issue	  based	  on	  former	  analysis	  in	  two	  parts	  as	  follow.	  
a. When there’s a deduplication process, who makes the copy? 	   Data	   deduplication	   is	   also	   known	   as	   “Intelligent	   Compression”	   or	   “Single-­‐Instance	  Storage”.	  It	  is	  a	  technical	  process	  that	  compares	  the	  new	  data	  planned	  to	  be	  stored	  in	  the	  server	  with	  the	  data	  already	  stored	  there.	  After	  an	  analysis,	  redundant	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data	  will	  be	  eliminated.200	  This	  technology	  helps	  saving	  storage	  space	  and	  reducing	  the	   bandwidth	   and	   total	   costs.	   Additionally,	   deduplication	   system	   also	   use	  “cryptographic	  hash	  function”,	  to	  recreate	  the	  input	  data	  from	  its	  hash	  value	  alone.	  By	   using	   this	   hash	   function,	   uploaded	   data	   will	   be	   indexed	   into	   hash	   tables	   (or	  digital	  fingerprint),	  and	  then	  it	  will	  detect	  duplicate	  data	  simply	  based	  on	  the	  hash	  tables.201	  For	  instance,	  when	  a	  user	  tries	  to	  upload	  a	  song	  to	  a	  music	  locker’s	  server,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  hash	  function,	  the	  server	  decides	  that	  this	  song	  has	  the	  same	  hash	  table	  as	  a	  song	  which	  already	  on	  the	  server,	  it	  will	  give	  the	  user	  access	  to	  the	  file	  that	  already	  on	  the	  server	  instead	  of	  uploading	  the	  duplicate	  copy.	  	   There	  are	  mainly	  two	  methods	  of	  deduplication.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  ISP	  himself	  makes	   a	   single	   master	   copy	   for	   users	   who	   have	   right	   to	   access	   that	   file.202For	  instance,	  Apple	  use	  licensed	  master	  copy	  for	  users	  to	  download.	  The	  other	  method	  is	  used	  commonly	  in	  the	  music	  locker’s	  service:	  deduplication	  system	  runs	  to	  analyze	  each	   individual	   bits	   of	   data	   from	   each	   file	   to	   determine	   whether	   any	   data	   chunk	  from	  the	  song	  is	  already	  on	  the	  server.	  If	  the	  song’s	  data	  is	  already	  there,	  the	  server	  will	  provide	  users	  a	  link	  to	  that	  song	  other	  than	  uploading	  the	  song.	  	  	   It’s	  easy	  to	  understand	  that	   if	   the	  ISP	  does	  not	  use	  deduplication,	   its	  server	  makes	  a	  copy	  of	   the	   file	   from	  the	  user’s	  device	  and	  stores	   that	  copy	  on	   the	  server	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Data	  Deduplication,	  SEARCHSTORAGE	  &	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/data-­‐deduplication	  ;	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_deduplication	  	  201	  Cryptographic	  Hash	  Function,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function	  	  202	  See	  ITUNES	  IN	  THE	  CLOUD,	  https://support.apple.com/kb/PH19610?viewlocale=en_US&locale=en_US	  (last	  visited	  Dec.	  22,	  2015).	  (This	  shows	  before	  users	  download	  files	  from	  Apple	  store	  via	  iTunes,	  they	  have	  to	  purchase	  the	  individual	  file	  first	  to	  get	  right	  to	  access.)	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when	  a	  user	  try	  to	  upload	  a	  song.	  This	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Cablevision	  II	  case,	  the	  ISP	  becomes	  a	  “passive	  conduit”	  which	  allows	  a	  user	  directing	  the	  upload	  and	   copy	   act.	   Therefore	   this	   process	   creates	   an	   infringing	   copy	   following	   a	   user’s	  direction	  indeed.	  So,	  ISP	  should	  not	  be	  directly	  liable	  for	  its	  users’	  actions	  of	  copy.	  	   When	   a	   user	   upload	   a	   file	   into	   his	   cloud	   storage	   space	   that	   has	   the	  deduplication	  function,	  does	  he	  really	  make	  a	  copy?	  	  First,	  under	  the	  first	  method	  of	  deduplication	  process—when	  the	  cloud	  service	  provider	  maintains	  a	  master	  copy,	  if	  the	  file	   is	  already	  in	  the	  cloud,	  the	  specific	  copy	  of	  the	  file	  will	  be	  deleted	  before	  it	  stores	  in	  the	  cloud	  server.	  The	  user	  will	  be	  direct	  to	  the	  existing	  master	  copy	  of	  the	  particular	   file	  without	  notice.	  203	  It’s	  clear	  to	  us	  there’s	  no	  such	  specific	  copy	  being	  made	   in	   the	  user’s	  private	  cloud	  storage	  space.	  But	   to	   the	  user,	   there’s	  no	  distinct	  difference	  between	  the	  master	  copy	  provides	  by	  the	  ISP	  and	  the	  particular	  copy	  he	  makes	  himself	  due	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  digital	  technology.	  So,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  a	  copy	  indeed	  has	  been	  made	  in	  the	  cloud	  storage	  space.	  And	  since	  the	  user	  directs	  the	  act	  of	  uploading	  a	  file,	  which	  means	  he	  uses	  the	  ISP’s	  service	  as	  a	  “passive	  conduit,”	  the	  user	   is	   the	  copier.	  However,	   if	  an	   ISP	  remains	  master	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  without	   any	   licenses,	   the	   ISP	   also	   infringes	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction	   under	  copyright	   law.	   	   Second,	   when	   ISPs	   do	   not	   provide	   master	   copies,	   no	   matter	   ISP	  operates	   post-­‐process	   deduplication	   or	   in-­‐line	   deduplication,	   if	   there’s	   an	   existing	  copy	  of	  the	  specific	  file	  uploaded	  by	  the	  user,	  the	  user	  will	  get	  the	  existing	  link	  to	  it;	  otherwise,	  his	  file	  will	  be	  stored	  in	  the	  cloud.	  	  There’s	  a	  copy	  being	  made	  no	  matter	  the	  file	  uploaded	  by	  the	  user	  is	  stored	  in	  the	  cloud	  or	  not	  in	  my	  personal	  view.	  	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  In-­‐line	  Deduplication,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_deduplication	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user	  is	  able	  to	  play	  back	  his	  file	  anyway.	  And	  no	  matter	  the	  stored	  file	  is	  infringing	  copyright	  law	  or	  not,	  the	  copier	  is	  the	  user	  who	  uploads	  it.	   ISPs	  literally	   just	  serve	  automatically	  under	  the	  direction	  of	   the	  user,	  and	  their	  deduplication	  process	  also	  operates	  automatically.	  Moreover,	  there’s	  still	  left	  a	  question	  here,	  when	  the	  user	  is	  the	  copier	  of	  illegal	  reproduction,	  will	  ISP	  bear	  secondary	  liability	  for	  infringing	  the	  right	   of	   reproduction?	   This	   question	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   “knowledge”(red-­‐flag	  awareness)	  of	  ISPs	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  their	  secondary	  liability,	  but	  not	  direct	  liability.	  	  	   The	  operation	  of	  deduplication	  process	  seems	  not	  necessary	  to	  be	  discussed	  a	  lot	  under	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  but	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  analyzed	  when	  consider	  about	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  
b. Is there a “copy” being created?—When “streaming” a video or audio from the 
cloud.  	   “Streaming”	   is	   now	   very	   popular	   technology	   for	   enabling	   consumers	   to	  access	   audio	   or	   video	   content	   via	   Internet.	  204	  The	   content	   will	   be	   received	   and	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  end	  user	  while	  still	  being	  delivered	  by	  a	  provider.	  This	  Stream	  Media	  technology	   came	   true	   by	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	   computer	   program	   (software	   or	  hardware)	   called	   “codec,”	   which	   is	   a	   portmanteau	   of	   Coder	   and	   DECoder.	   Many	  multimedia	   data	   streams	   contain	   both	   audio	   and	   video.	   Further,	   some	   metadata	  often	  contains	  synchronization	  of	  audio	  and	  video.	  Different	  programs,	  processes	  or	  hardware	  may	  manage	  every	  of	  the	  three	  kinds.	  While	  the	  multimedia	  data	  being	  in	  stored	  or	  in	  transmission,	  they	  must	  by	  encapsulated	  together	  in	  a	  container	  format,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	  Streaming,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streaming_media	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which	   including	   “.mpg”,”.avi”,”.mov”,”.mp4”	   or”.tta.”	   205 In	   most	   situations,	   these	  specific	   container	   formats	   would	   only	   allow	   certain	   right	   decoder/player	   in	  accessing	   the	   stream	   data.	   Codec	   could	   help	   not	   only	   in	   compressing	   the	   initial	  digital	   video/audio	   data,	  which	  would	   allow	  more	   efficient	   transmission	   over	   the	  Internet,	   but	   also	   leave	   no	   trace	   of	   the	   compressed	   file	   on	   the	   users’	   computers	  (unless	  the	  content	  owner	  allowed	  users	  to	  download	  the	  file).206	  By	  understanding	  how	  the	  codec	  works,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  there	  will	  be	  no	  copies	  of	  stream	  audio/video	  stored	  in	  the	  hard	  drives	  of	  users’	  computers.	  	  	   Further,	   online	  media	   stream	   have	   two	   kinds:	   live	   or	   on	   demand.	   For	   live	  streaming,	  which	  also	  known	  as	  true	  streaming,	  it	  can	  be	  analogous	  to	  broadcast	  TV	  programs	  or	  radios.	  It	  sends	  data	  straight	  to	  the	  device	  without	  saving	  the	  file	  to	  a	  hard	  disk	  by	  using	  the	  user	  datagram	  protocol	  (UDP),	  which	  will	  ignore	  lost	  packets	  and	  accepts	  erroneous	  packets.	  207	  We	  still	  have	  to	  realize,	  even	  there’s	  no	  copy	  save	  in	   a	   hard	   disk,	   there’re	   still	   lots	   of	   video/audio	   frame	   in	   the	   memory	   buffer.	   On	  demand	   streaming	   usually	   uses	   a	   method	   called	   progressive	   streaming	   (or	  progressive	  download),	  it	  saves	  the	  file	  to	  hard	  disks	  for	  longer	  period	  and	  then	  play	  the	   stream	   from	   this	   specific	   location.	   This	   method	   allows	   users	   to	   enjoy	  audio/video	  immediately	  (when	  a	  very	  small	  amount	  of	  data	  is	  received).	  Most	  web	  sites	  (Youtube)	  use	  progressive	  streaming,	  and	  they	  also	  use	  “free,	  open	  source	  Web	  server	   software”	   other	   than	   particular	   streaming	   server	   (for	   instance,	   Windows	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Codec,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codec	  206	  See	  SIMON	  STOKES,	  DIGITAL	  COPYRIGHT,	  LAW	  AND	  PRACTICE	  (4th	  ed.	  2014).	  207	  UDP,	  THE	  FREE	  DICTIONARY,	  available	  at	  http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/UDP	  	  (For	  true,	  live	  streaming,	  there’s	  no	  time	  for	  retransmission	  of	  errors	  or	  dropped	  packets.)	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Media	  Services).208	  As	  also,	  temporary	  storage	  of	  segments	  of	  the	  on-­‐demanded	  file	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  RAM	  of	  the	  end	  user’s	  computer	  or	  streaming	  server.	  	   In	  order	  to	  answering	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  there’s	  reproduction	  exists	  when	  streaming	   audio/video,	   the	   only	   way	   is	   to	   understand	   whether	   temporary	   copy	  (RAM	  copy)	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  reproduction	  under	  copyright	  law	  or	  not.	  	  	   	  Different	  countries’	  different	  attitudes	  towards	  temporary	  copy	  were	  clearly	  stated	  in	  the	  Basic	  Proposal	  for	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty	  in	  1996.	  Proposed	  Article	  7	  provided	  that	  Article	  9(1)	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  should	  grant	  the	  author	  the	  right	  of	   authorizing	   reproduction	   of	   their	   works	   that	   shall	   include	   permanent	   or	  temporary	   reproduction.209	  Those	  notes	  which	   interpret	  Article	  7	   first	   analyze	   the	  importance	  of	  making	  a	  uniform	  definition	  of	  the	  reproduction	  by	  illuminating	  how	  technology	   effected,	   then	   the	  notes	   confirmed	  with	   certainty	   that	   temporary	   copy	  shall	   fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  and	  indicate	  this	   is	  the	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  Progressive	  Download,	  THE	  FREE	  DICTIONARY,	  available	  at	  http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/true+streaming	  	  209	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  on	  Certain	  Copyright	  and	  Neighboring	  Rights	  Questions,	  Basic	  Proposal	  for	  the	  Substantive	  Provisions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  Certain	  Questions	  Concerning	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works	  to	  Be	  Considered	  by	  the	  Conference,	  prepared	  by	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Experts	  on	  a	  Possible	  Protocol	  to	  the	  Berne	  Convention,	  Article	  7,	  WIPO	  Document	  CRNR/DC/4	  (Aug.	  30,	  1996).(Article	  7：Scope	  of	  the	  Right	  of	  Reproduction	  (1)	  The	  exclusive	  right	  accorded	  to	  authors	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  works	  in	  Article	  9(1)	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  of	  authorizing	  the	  reproduction	  of	  their	  works	  shall	  include	  direct	  and	  indirect	  reproduction	  of	  their	  works,	  whether	  permanent	  or	  temporary,	  in	  any	  manner	  or	  form.	  (2)	  Subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  9(2)	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention,	  it	  shall	  be	  a	  matter	  for	  legislation	  in	  Contracting	  Parties	  to	  limit	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  in	  cases	  where	  a	  temporary	  reproduction	  has	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  making	  the	  work	  perceptible	  or	  where	  the	  reproduction	  is	  of	  a	  transient	  or	  incidental	  nature,	  provided	  that	  such	  reproduction	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  course	  of	  use	  of	  the	  work	  that	  is	  authorized	  by	  the	  author	  or	  permitted	  by	  law.)	  Available	  at	  :	  http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_dc/crnr_dc_4.pdf	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way	   to	   harmonize	   effectively.210 	  Basically,	   US,	   EU,	   Canada,	   Australia	   agreed	   to	  adopted	   this	   Article	   7	   from	   the	   Basic	   Proposal.211	  Japan,	   China,	   Thailand,	   Africa	  Group	  and	  Caribbean	  Group	  refused	  to	  adopt	  it.212	  Since	  there	  was	  no	  consensus	  on	  the	   proposed	   Article	   7,	   it	   had	   been	   removed	   from	   the	   Basic	   Proposal	   in	   1996.	  However,	   in	   the	  Agree	  Statement	  which	  proposed	  by	   the	  US	  and	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	   Diplomatic	   Conference	   later,	   the	   Concerning	   Article	   1(4)	   provided:	   “…the 
storage of a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a 
reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.” The 
meaning of “storage” from Agreed Statement led serious discussion and a wide 
gap among countries. Because of many reasons, lots of countries questioned that 
whether this Agreed Statement has the legal effect in interpreting the Basic 
Proposal.213Basic Proposal for Diplomatic Conference of 2000 did not bring 
temporary copy into discussion; instead the conference mentioned that the 
reproduction right fully applies in the digital environment in its note 7.04.214	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  Id,	  Notes	  7.10-­‐7.17.	  (Note	  7.17	  also	  mentions	  design	  limitations	  clauses	  to	  restrict	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  to	  avoid	  problematic	  effects.)	  211	  WIPO	  Doc.	  CRNR/DC/102,	  Summary	  Minutes,	  Main	  Committee	  I,	  para	  285.	  (Australia,	  Singapore	  required	  specific	  and	  detailed	  limitations	  towards	  the	  temporary	  copy	  before	  they	  adopted	  Article	  7.)	  212	  Id,	  para	  295	  (	  Japan	  thought	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  should	  be	  determine	  by	  national	  copyright	  law;	  China	  proposed	  that	  the	  reproduction	  right	  should	  include	  direct	  and	  indirect	  permanent	  reproduction	  in	  any	  manner	  or	  form,	  which	  use	  “permanent”	  to	  limit	  reproduction.)	  Available	  at:	  
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr.../crnr_dc_64.doc  213	  Agreed	  Statement	  Concerning	  the	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty,	  adopted	  by	  the	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  on	  Dec	  20,	  1996.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295456	  	  According	  to	  Prof.	  Samuelson,	  the	  second	  sentence	  from	  Concerning	  Article	  1(4)	  was	  passed	  by	  majority	  vote,	  however,	  lots	  of	  delegations	  were	  even	  not	  there	  for	  voting,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  issue	  that	  was	  adopted	  via	  majority	  vote	  instead	  of	  unanimous	  consent.	  US	  fully	  supported	  this	  Agreed	  Statements,	  but	  lots	  of	  countries	  gave	  their	  dissenting	  opinions.	  214	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Audiovisual	  Performances:	  Basic	  Proposal	  For	  the	  Substantive	  Provisions	  of	  and	  Instrument	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Audiovisual	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   Further,	   as	   mentioned	   in	   this	   part	   earlier:	   US,	   EU	  member	   States,	   Canada,	  Australia	  and	  other	  developed	  countries	  mostly	  agree	   that	   temporary	  copy	  should	  be	   treated	   as	   reproduction	   under	   the	   copyright	   law	   in	   recent	   years,	   all	   their	  attitudes	   could	   be	   told	   from	   their	   decisions	   in	   numerous	   cases.	   The	   differences	  among	  these	  countries	  are	  their	  specific	  requirements	  of	   the	  scope	  of	  definition	  of	  reproduction,	  exemptions	  of	  being	  regulated	  as	  copies	  and	  the	  issue:	  who	  makes	  the	  temporary	   copy.	   Japan,	   South	   Korea,	   China	   and	   most	   developing	   countries	   still	  rejected	   the	   idea	   that	   bringing	   temporary	   copy	   into	   the	   scope	   of	   right	   of	  reproduction.	   Developing	   countries	   make	   such	   decision	   is	   because	   the	   need	   of	  economic	  benefit	  from	  protecting	  national	  copyright	  industries.	  215	  Once	  temporary	  copy	   is	   considered	   as	   reproduction	   under	   copyright	   law,	   users	   from	   developing	  countries	   may	   face	   huge	   risks	   and	   have	   to	   pay	   “royalty”	   in	   accessing	   data	   from	  developed	  countries.	  As	  we	  all	  know,	  developed	  countries	  maintain	  their	  leadership	  in	   the	   network	   market	   by	   taking	   advantage	   of	   their	   advanced	   technologies	   and	  competitive	   culture.	   They	   are	   already	   the	   origin	   regions	   of	   useful	   data	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Performances	  To	  Be	  Considered	  By	  The	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  WIPO	  Document	  IAVP/DC/3	  (Aug	  1,2000).	  Available	  at:	  http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/iavp_dc/iavp_dc_3.pdf	  	  215	  See	  Connection	  Community	  Content:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  the	  Information	  Hightway,	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Information	  Highway	  Advirosy	  Council	  (Sep,	  1995)	  available	  at:	  http://archive.ifla.org/documents/infopol/canada/ihacfnl.txt	  	  	  (Canada	  insisted	  the	  copyright	  owner	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  determine	  whether	  and	  when	  browsing	  should	  be	  permitted	  on	  the	  Information	  Highway	  in	  order	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  creators	  and	  users.	  This	  clearly	  indicated	  that	  Canada’s	  attitude	  is	  protecting	  the	  copyright	  owners’	  economic	  interests)	  ;	  See	  also	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities:	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission,	  Follow-­‐up	  to	  the	  Green	  Paper	  on	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights	  in	  the	  Information	  Society,	  Brussels,	  p.11	  (1996)	  (According	  to	  the	  Follow-­‐up	  Green	  Paper,	  if	  the	  specific	  reproduction	  damage	  the	  legal	  interests	  of	  copyright	  owners,	  they	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  control	  such	  reproductions);	  
See	  also	  Pamela	  Samuelson,	  The	  Copyright	  Grab,	  Wired	  Vol.	  4	  Iss.	  1	  (1996)	  available	  at:	  http://www.wired.com/1996/01/white-­‐paper/	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network	   world.	   They	   will	   gain	   numerous	   economic	   benefits	   from	   developing	  countries’	  act	  of	   “access	  date.”	   	  As	  a	   consequence,	  developing	  countries	  will	   suffer	  from	  this	  “data	  monopoly”	  under	  such	  regulation.	  	   However,	  with	  the	  development	  of	  technology,	  such	  as	  streaming	  online,	  it’s	  time	  to	  make	  a	  change.	  After	  clarifying	  these	  main	  viewpoints	  from	  the	  world,	  I	  will	  propose	  a	  proposal	  for	  China	  in	  deciding	  such	  issue	  by	  considering	  specific	  Chinese	  situations.	  
B. The	  Right	  of	  Reproduction	  and	  a	  Proposal	  for	  China	  	   Article	   9	   (5)	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Copyright	   Law	  does	   not	   bring	   temporary	   copy	  into	   consideration,	   it	   simply	   states	   that:”	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction	   is	   the	   right	   to	  reproduce	   one	   or	   more	   copies	   of	   the	   work	   by	   means	   of	   printing	   …”216	  China’s	  copyright	   law	   did	   not	   consider	   works	   in	   digital	   format	   until	   Dec,	   1999.	   National	  Copyright	   Administration	   of	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China	   published	   “Copyright	  Provisions	   about	   Produce	   Digital	   Products”	   in	   1999,	   which	   clearly	   stated	   that	   no	  matter	   in	   what	   form	   the	   original	   work	   is	   fixed,	   when	   it	   being	   transformed	   into	  digital	   format,	   the	   original	   work	   is	   being	   reproduced	   within	   the	   definition	   of	  Copyright	   law	   Article	   9	   (5).217	  However,	   based	   on	   an	   announcement	   in	   the	   Basic	  Proposal	   for	  WCT,	  we	   can	   easily	   find	   that	   China	  did	  not	  want	   to	   bring	   temporary	  copy	   into	   the	   scope	   of	   definition	   of	   reproduction.	   Several	   years	   later	   in	   2006,	  although	  temporary	  copy	  issue	  had	  been	  discussed	  for	  many	  times,	  and	  even	  been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gongheguo	  Zhuzuo	  Quanfa	  (中华人民共和国著作权法)[Copyright	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China]	  (promulgated	  by	  the	  Standing	  Comm.	  Nat’l	  People’s	  Cong.,	  Feb	  26,	  2010,	  effective	  Apr	  1,	  2010).	  217	  Guanyu	  Zhizuo	  Shuzihua	  Zhipin	  Dezhu	  Zuoquan	  Guiding(关于制作数字化制品的著作权
规定)(	  State	  Copyright	  Bureau,	  effected	  at	  Mar.	  1	  2000)	  available	  at:	  http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2000/content_60152.htm	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proposed	  in	  the	  draft	  of	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Communicate	  Works	   to	   the	   Public	   over	   Information	  Networks,	   temporary	   copy	   still	   did	   not	   fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  in	  China.	  The	  Spokesman	  of	  Legislative	  Affairs	  Office	  stated:	  “the	  action	  of	  forbid	  temporary	  copy	  will	  stop	  end-­‐users	  from	  enjoying	   works	   directly	   online.	   But	   there’s	   no	   feasibility	   to	   stop	   end-­‐users’	  nonoperating	  use	  of	  online	  works.	  Further,	  the	  issue	  of	  temporary	  copy	  is	  still	  under	  discussion	   and	   has	   not	   yet	   reached	   a	   reasonable	   conclusion.	   China	   has	   already	  indicated	  that	  it	  does	  not	  support	  regulating	  temporary	  copy	  same	  as	  reproduction	  under	  copyright	  law.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it’s	  impropriate	  to	  use	  this	  regulation,	  which	  is	  a	  delegated	  legislation,	  to	  regulate	  temporary	  copy,	  which	  has	  not	  been	  admitted	  by	  the	  copyright	  law	  in	  China.”218	  	  	   	  Chinese	   scholars	   also	   discussed	   a	   lot	   about	   the	   issue	   of	   temporary	   copy.	  Professor	  Wang	  Qian	  rejected	  the	  idea	  that	  temporary	  copy	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  He	  provided	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  temporary	  copy	  in	  RAM	  is	  incidental	  and	  objective	  products	  (phenomenon)	  of	  technology.	  Temporary	  copy	  will	   exist	   once	   users	   try	   to	   browse	   the	   Internet,	   and	   it	   is	   unavoidable.	   However,	  users	   usually	   do	   not	   realize	   there	   are	   such	   acts	   of	   copy	   happened,	   they	   don’t	  intentionally	  make	  the	  act	  of	  “copy.”	  Second,	  temporary	  copy	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  in	  RAM	  does	  not	  have	   independent	   economic	   value.	  Once	   traditional	   copies	  being	  made,	   copyright	   owners	   could	   distribute	   them	   to	   the	   public	   for	   financial	   benefits.	  But	   temporary	   copy	   could	   not	   be	   used	   and	   distribute	   for	   financial	   benefits.	   It’s	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  Zhang	  Jianhua(张建华)	  Xinxi	  Wangluo	  Chuanboquan	  Baohu	  Tiaoli	  Shiyi(信息网络传播权
保护条例释义)[Explaination on Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Network 
Dissemination of Information](2006),	  at	  107-­‐08.	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important	  to	  differ	  independent	  economic	  value	  from	  economic	  value.	  Users	  indeed	  could	  enjoy	  works	  by	  browsing	  website	  that	  will	  use	  temporary	  copy	  such	  as	  RAM	  and	  such	  browse	  action	  has	  economic	  value	  literally.	  However,	  access	  to	  temporary	  copy	   is	   just	   an	   incidental	   act	   and	   technical	   side	   effect	   caused	   by	   act	   of	   browsing,	  users	  has	  no	   intent	   to	  access	   temporary	  copy	  solely.	   	   So	   temporary	  copy	  does	  not	  have	   independent	   economic	   value.	   Third,	   it’s	   unable	   to	   control	   users’	   act	   of	  browsing	   via	   legal	   regulations.	   Numerous	   users	   browse,	   it’s	   impossible	   to	   pursue	  each	  user’s	  liability.219	  	  	   However,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   with	   the	   development	   of	   technology,	   Professor	  Wang	  Qian’s	  viewpoint	  seems	  unreliable.	  First,	  browse	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  cause	  temporary	   copy,	   they	   are	   being	   made	   everywhere	   at	   any	   time.	   As	   I	   mentioned	  earlier,	   we	   are	   facing	   the	   challenges	   derived	   from	   cloud	   computing—	   online	  streaming.	   	  This	  technology	  of	  online	  streaming	  itself	   is	  a	  huge	  threat	  to	  copyright	  owners.	  Without	  act	  of	  download,	   it’s	  harder	  for	  copyright	  owners	  to	  protect	  their	  right	  of	  reproduction	  and	  their	  financial	  benefits	  accordingly.	  Second,	  users	  are	  now	  able	  to	  access	  temporary	  copies	  in	  RAM	  and	  store	  them	  in	  tangible	  medium	  for	  later	  use.	   Norton	   had	   already	   developed	   such	   software	   named	   as	   “Norton	   Diskedit.”220	  Third,	   nowadays,	   lots	   of	   temporary	   copies	   are	   stored	   on	   ISPs’	   servers.	   ISPs	   had	  already	  gained	  financial	  benefits	  by	  providing	  streaming	  service	  under	  SaaS	  model.	  Further,	   ISPs	  are	  getting	  more	  capable	  of	  controlling	  the	  contents	  on	  their	  servers	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  Wang	  Qian(王迁),	  Wangluo	  Huanjingzhong	  Zhuzuoquande	  Baohu	  Yanjiu(网络环	  
境	  中	  著	  作	  权	  的	  保	  护	  研	  究)[	  Copyright	  Protection	  in	  the	  Network	  Environment	  ](1st	  ed.	  2011),at	  50-­‐67.	  220	  Norton	  Diskedit,	  OSDEV.ORG,	  available	  at	  http://wiki.osdev.org/Norton_Diskedit	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via	  new	  technology.221	  So,	  it’s	  time	  to	  get	  temporary	  copies	  involved	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	   of	   reproduction.	  Whereas	   if	   copyright	   owners	   were	   granted	   such	   unlimited	  right	   of	   reproduction,	   it	   would	   result	   in	   abuse	   of	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction	   and	  restrict	  the	  public	  right’s	  to	  know.	  So,	  specific	  limitations	  need	  to	  be	  legislated	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	   There	  are	  usually	  three	  kinds	  of	  resolutions	  in	  solving	  the	  challenges	  brought	  by	  new	  technology.	  First	  is	  to	  create	  a	  new	  category	  of	  right;	  second	  is	  to	  make	  an	  expended	  interpretation	  to	  the	  existing	  right;	  third	  is	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  in	  non-­‐copyright	  ways.222	  Some	   scholars	   in	   China	   suggested	   extending	   the	   right	   of	   rental	  because	   under	   the	  model	   of	   SaaS,	  when	   users	   use	   software	   or	   streaming	   service,	  temporary	   copies	   of	   such	  data	   are	   under	   control	   of	   users.	  When	  users	   stop	   using	  them	   and	   turn	   off	   browsers,	   those	   temporary	   copies	  will	   be	   rewrote	   and	   deleted	  from	  users’	   devices	   and	   the	   ISPs’	   servers.	   Then	  users	   have	   to	   ask	   ISPs	   to	   provide	  such	  data	  again	  when	  they	  try	  to	  use	  the	  service	  again.	  This	  type	  of	  extension	  of	  the	  right	   of	   rental	   seems	   quite	   reasonable,	   but	   there	   are	   legal	   uncertainties	   in	   this	  theory.	  The	  object	  of	  the	  right	  of	  rental	  includes	  two	  parts:	  works	  and	  the	  medium	  of	  works.	  Based	  on	  the	  feature	  of	  SaaS’s	  process,	  the	  carrier	  of	  works	  here	  is	  the	  data	  provided	  by	  ISPs	  and	  RAM	  provided	  by	  the	  users	  (or	  together	  with	  the	  ISPs,	  or	  only	  by	   the	   ISPs).	  Further,	   the	  rental	  object	   that	  used	  by	  users	  are	  created	   temporarily	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  For	  instance,	  the	  deduplication	  process,	  which	  uses	  “hash	  tag,”	  is	  able	  to	  help	  ISPs	  in	  identifying	  lots	  of	  contents.	  222	  Chen	  Ende(陈恩德),	  Yunjisuan	  Huanjingxia	  Linshi	  Fuzhide	  Dingwei(云计算环境下临时复
制的定位)	  [The	  role	  of	  Temporary	  Copy	  Under	  the	  Cloud	  Computing],	  Vol.	  18,	  No.9	  Changchun	  Jiaoyu	  Xueyuan	  Xuebao(长春教育学院学报)[J. of Changchun Educ. 
Inst.](2015)(China).	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and	  additionally,	  the	  basic	  number	  of	  such	  object	  owned	  by	  ISPs	  does	  not	  change.	  223	  Some	  scholars	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  right	  of	  access	  should	  be	  created,	  which	  means	  users	  should	  pay	  fees	  for	  accessing	  data	  every	  time.	  224	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  US	  part,	  such	  access	  right	  would	  not	  work	  out	  in	  the	  US	  or	  China	  because	  of	  several	  reasons:	  (1)	   copyright	  owners’	   right	  will	  be	  overprotected,	  under	   the	   right	  of	   access,	  users	  will	   face	   charges	   or	   lawsuits	   even	   they	   simply	   browse	   the	   Internet	   via	   their	  devices;(2)	   once	   the	   access	   right	   been	   adopted	   by	   the	   whole	   world,	   developed	  countries	  will	   gain	   innumerable	  monopoly	   interests.	  Developing	   countries	   such	  as	  China,	   who	   are	   weak	   in	   independent	   technological	   innovations	   and	  most	   of	   time	  users	  of	  technology,	  will	  face	  heavy	  payment.	  (3)	  Chinese	  people	  have	  a	  tradition	  of	  “sharing,”	  with	  Cloud	  computing,	   the	  process	  of	   “sharing”	   is	   simple	  and	  quick.	  We	  can	  limit	  that	  only	  copyrighted	  works	  with	  authorization	  can	  be	  shared.	  But,	  if	  even	  access	  data	  is	   illegal,	  that’s	  totally	  not	  going	  to	  work	  out	  in	  China.	  So,	  adopting	  the	  right	  of	  access	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  China’s	  actual	  conditions.	  	   After	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  draft	   of	  new	  Copyright	  Law	   in	  China,	  we	  know	  that	   China	   is	   really	   considering	   an	   expanded	   interpretation	   of	   the	   right	   of	  reproduction	   in	   order	   to	   solve	   the	   temporary	   copy	   issue.	   Article	   13	   (2)(1)	   states:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  Bao	  Zhengye(鲍征烨), Yunjisuan Zhuzuoquan Wenti Tanxi— Yi SaaS Moshi Weili(云计算
著作权问题探析—以 SaaS模式为例)[Analyzing	  Copyright	  Issues	  Under	  Cloud	  Computing—	  SaaS	  as	  Example],	  No.4	  Jinan	  Xuebao(暨南学报)[ Jinan	  J.	  of	  Philosophy	  &	  Soc.	  Sci.]	  (2013)(China).	  See	  also	  Liang	  Zhiwen(梁志文),	  Yunjisuan	  Jishu	  Zhongliyu	  Banquan	  Zeren(云计算、技术中立与版权责任)[Cloud	  Computing，Techbologically	  Neutral	  and	  Copyright	  Liability],	  No.3	  	  Faxue(法学)[Legal	  Sci.](2011)(China).	  224	  Xiong	  Qi(熊琪)，	  Lun	  Jiechuquan—Zhuzuo	  Caichanquan	  Leixing	  Huade	  Buzuyu	  Kefu(论
接触权—著作财产权类型化的不足与克服)[Analyzing	  the	  Access	  Right—	  the	  insufficient	  and	  Conquer	  of	  the	  Categorization	  of	  the	  Copyrights],	  No.5	  Falv	  Kexue(法律科学)[Sci.	  of	  Law](2008)(China).	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“the	  right	  of	   reproduction,	   that	   is,	   the	  right	   to	   fix	   the	  work	   in	   tangible	  medium	  by	  means	  of	  printing,	  Xeroxing,	  recording,	  re-­‐shooting	  or	  digitizing.”	  	  For	  the	  very	  first	  time,	   China	   brings	   digitizing	   issue	   into	   copyright	   law.	   Although	   there	   are	   no	   such	  specific	   limitations	  within	  the	  draft,	  China	  has	  already	  changed	  its	  attitude	  toward	  the	  issue	  of	  temporary	  copy.	  From	  my	  point	  of	  view,	  there	  are	  three	  reasons	  for	  such	  change.	   First,	   most	   other	   countries	   had	   already	   adopted	   such	   idea	   of	   “temporary	  copy	   is	   reproduction	  under	   the	   copyright	   law.”	  Cloud	   computing	   service	  has	  been	  used	   globally	   (and	   cloud	   servers	   are	   located	   separately	   all	   over	   the	   world),	   and	  more	  copyright	  infringements	  are	  happening	  between	  different	  countries	  nowadays.	  To	  cope	  with	  lawsuits	  relevant	  to	  temporary	  copies	  around	  the	  corner,	  China	  has	  to	  prepare	   for	   it.	   Second,	   streaming	   service	   or	   cloud	   storage	   service	   indeed	   harm	  copyright	   owners’	   deserved	   benefits.	   One	   of	   the	   goals	   of	   copyright	   law	   is	  encouraging	  authors	  to	  create	  and	  distribute	  new	  works.	  If	  copyright	  owners	  could	  not	   gain	   their	   deserved	   benefits,	   why	   should	   they	   keep	   creating?	   Third,	   current	  copyright	   law	   truthfully	   could	   not	   balance	   the	   interests	   among	   users,	   ISPs	   and	  copyright	  owners	  anymore	  on	  this	  issue.	  Users	  pay	  fees	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  service	  or	  copyrighted	   works	   from	   ISPs,	   but	   in	   China,	   copyright	   owners	   would	   get	   nothing.	  This	   situation	   has	   to	   be	   changed	   in	   China.	   Unlike	   the	   U.S.	   can	   leave	   this	   issue	  unsolved	   to	   the	   courts	   rather	   than	   amend	   the	   copyright	   law,	   China	   as	   a	   civil	   law	  country	  has	  to	  regulate	  it	  by	  reasonable	  and	  predictable	  legislation.	  	   In	  my	  opinion,	   it’s	  absolutely	  correct	   for	  China	  to	  take	  temporary	  copy	   into	  the	   scope	   of	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction.	   However,	   temporary	   copy	   caused	   by	  reasonable	   access	   to	   copyrighted	   work	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   reasonable	   and	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lawful.	   	  According	  to	  the	  US	  and	  EU’s	  regulations,	  we	  can	  see	  they	  both	  mentioned	  two	  kinds	  of	  exceptions	  of	  temporary	  copy:	  (1)	  it’s	  an	  incidental	  temporary	  copy;	  (2)	  it’s	   sole	   purpose	   is	   to	   enable	   non-­‐infringing	   use.	   Although	   ECJ	   still	   have	   many	  detailed	  conflicts	  in	  understanding	  these	  two	  exceptions,	  but	  the	  basic	  trend	  is	  clear	  and	   correct.	  What’s	   non-­‐infringing	  use?	  What’s	   the	   definition	   of	   incidental?	  These	  are	   the	  questions,	  which	  cannot	  be	  answered	  once	  as	  a	   rule.	  We	  need	   to	   consider	  more	  and	  more	  cases	  brought	  to	  the	  courts,	  and	  find	  a	  reasonable	  discipline.	  	  Then,	  to	  me,	  EU’s	  other	  two	  exemptions	  seem	  also	  reasonable	  in	  China:	  (1)	  the	  temporary	  is	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   technical	   process;(2)	   the	   temporary	   has	   no	   independent	  economic	   value.	   	   If	   a	   temporary	   copy	   is	   avoidable	   in	   the	   technical	   process	   that	  means	   it’s	   optional.	   There’s	   no	   need	   of	   exemptions	   for	   optional	   temporary	   copy.	  Next,	   if	  temporary	  copy	  has	  independent	  economic	  value,	  and	  can	  be	  accessed	  and	  used	   with	   current	   technology,	   it	   should	   not	   have	   exemptions	   either.	   Its	  characteristic	  has	  already	  harmed	  the	  market	  value	  of	  the	  copyright	  owners’	  works.	  Third,	   if	   China	   adopted	   the	   view	   of	   “temporary	   copy	   are	   reproduction	   under	  copyright	   law,”	   then	  who’s	   the	  copier?	  The	  US	  courts,	  EU	  courts	  did	  not	  give	   their	  explicit	  answer	  so	  far.	  225	  Australia	  had	  already	  made	  its	  conclusion	  that	  ISPs	  should	  be	   responsible	   for	   infringing	   the	   reproduction	   right,	   so	   did	   Japan.	   In	  my	   opinion,	  although	   it’s	   users	  who	  directly	   direct	   the	   act	   of	   store,	   streaming	   or	   browse,	   ISPs	  whose	   technology	   are	   highly	   developed,	   can	   still	   be	   liable	   for	   such	   infringement.	  ISPs	   already	   have	   deduplicated	   technology	   in	   saving	   space	   in	   the	   cloud;	   they	   can	  also	   develop	   technology	   in	   detecting	   and	   deleting	   infringing	   materials	   on	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  US	  court	  ruled	  that	  Redigi	  should	  bear	  liability	  of	  infringing	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  But	  that’s	  only	  one	  example,	  and	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  by	  New	  York	  District	  Court.	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server	   either	   for	   sure.	   Moreover,	   ISPs	   could	   gain	   financial	   profits	   from	  infringements,	   no	   matter	   who	   initiate	   them.	   ISPs	   indeed	   affect	   the	   commercial	  market	  of	   copyrighted	  works	  by	  providing	   such	   service.	   Further,	   ISPs	  who	   simply	  provide	   music	   locker	   service	   or	   on-­‐demand	   video	   service,	   they	   fully	   understand	  their	   service	   could	   cause	   numerous	   infringements,	   there’s	   no	   excuse	   for	   them	   to	  reject	  protecting	  copyright	  owners’	   interests	  anymore.	  However,	  ISPs	  could	  not	  do	  these	  all	  by	  themselves.	  Copyright	  owners,	  who	  have	  or	  will	  gain	  benefits	  from	  ISPs’	  service,	   should	   cooperate	  with	   ISPs.	   As	   a	   result,	   there	   can	   still	   be	   exemptions	   for	  ISPs	   to	   bear	   such	   responsibility:	   (1)	   If	   ISPs	   have	   such	   detecting	   and	   deleting	  software;	   it’s	   the	  copyright	  owners’	  responsibility	   to	  provide	  “hash	  tag.”	   (2)	  There	  should	  be	  a	  reasonable	  minimum	  number	  of	  infringing	  materials,	  once	  the	  number	  met	  this	  minimum	  limits,	  ISPs	  then	  infringe	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  	  
II. Infringe	  the	  Right	  of	  Communication	  to	  the	  Public	  Like	  the	  reproduction	  right,	   the	  next	  copyright	  owners’	   important	  exclusive	  right	   is	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public.	   There’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   cloud	  computing	  will	  also	  put	  the	  ISPs	  under	  risk	  of	  potential	  infringement	  of	  such	  right.	  For	   the	   first	   time,	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   is	   regulated	   in	   Berne	  Convention.	  But	  it	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  general	  right.	  Instead	  it	  provides	  a	  collection	  of	  scattered	   rights	   and	   different	   types	   of	   protections	   to	   different	   types	   of	   works.226	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works,	  Sept.	  9,	  1886,	  as	  revised	  at	  Paris	  on	  July	  24,	  1971	  and	  amended	  on	  September	  28,	  1979,	  S.	  Treaty	  Doc.	  No.	  99-­‐27	  (1986)	  [hereinafter	  Berne	  Convention],	  Article	  11,	  Article	  11ter,	  14,	  14bis,	  Article	  11bis.	  (The	  Berne	  Convention	  distinguishes	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  and	  recitation,	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Every	   country	   followed	   the	   Berne	   Conventions	   regulated	   the	   right	   of	   broadcast,	  which	  is	  a	  right	  to	  publicly	  disseminate	  works	  by	  wireless	  or	  wired	  means.227	  	  From	  these	   provisions,	   two	   main	   characteristics	   can	   be	   identified	   from	   the	   traditional	  broadcast	   via	   wired	   or	   wireless	   means.	   First	   is	   that	   the	   broadcasters	   remain	   in	  leading	   role.	   A	   broadcaster	   can	   entirely	   control	   the	   content	   and	   the	   timing	   of	  broadcasting;	  audiences	  could	  merely	  follow	  a	  broadcaster’s	  schedule.	  Second	  is	  the	  only	   point	   to	   multi-­‐point	   transmission	   model	   of	   broadcasting.	   This	   makes	   its	  audiences	   unspecified.	   All	   audiences	   who	   are	   in	   the	   area	   be	   covered	   by	   the	  broadcast	   signal	   can	   receive	   the	   specific	   broadcasting	   at	   specified	   time.	   It’s	   clear	  that	   the	   Internet	   “interactive	   communication” 228 service	   is	   different	   from	   the	  traditional	   broadcast.	   Because	   comparing	   to	   the	   traditional	   broadcast,	   the	  interactive	  communication	  has	  a	  distinct	  characteristic:	  an	  audience’s	  self-­‐choice	  of	  the	   content,	   the	   time	   and	   the	   place	   of	   the	   communication.	  Once	  works	   have	   been	  uploaded	   to	   the	   Internet,	   copyright	   owner	   of	   those	   works	   can	   no	   longer	   control	  access	   to	   them.	   	  Audiences	   can	   “communicate	  on	  demand.”	   	  Therefore,	   interactive	  communication	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  protection	  of	   the	  rights	  regulated	  by	  Berne	  Convention	   (especially	   the	   right	   of	   broadcast).	   	   However,	   Article	   8	   of	   WCT	   was	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  of	  works,	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  other	  rights	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.)	  227	  For	  instance,	  German	  Copyright	  Law,	  Article	  20	  regulates:	  “The	  right	  of	  broadcasting	  is	  the	  right	  to	  make	  a	  work	  accessible	  to	  the	  public	  by	  broadcasting,	  such	  as	  radio	  or	  television	  transmission,	  satellite	  broadcasting,	  cable	  broadcasting	  or	  by	  other	  similar	  technical	  devices.”	  Available	  at:	  http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126255	  	  228	  Interactive	  Communication,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_communication	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framed	  to	  specify	  the	  act	  of	  interactive	  communication.229	  	  It	  also	  provides	  a	  general	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  which	  offers	  protection	  to	  authors	  of	  all	  types	  of	   work.	  230	  Article	   8	   did	   not	   include	   language	   states	   that	   this	   article	   attempts	   to	  regulate	  interactive	  communication,	  but	  there	  evidence	  could	  still	  be	  found	  from	  the	  WCT’s	   Basic	   Proposal.	   Language	   in	   Basic	   Proposal	   clarified	   “communication”	   as	  “making	   a	   work	   available	   to	   the	   public	   by	   any	   means	   or	   process	   other	   than	   by	  distributing	   copies,”231	  and	   “communication”	   could	   be	   treated	   as	   a	   synonym	   for	  “transmission.”232	  In	   order	   to	   enforce	   Article	   8	   which	   indicates	   copyright	   owners	  have	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   when	   there’s	   interactive	  communication,	  member	  states	  of	  WCT	  have	  two	  ways:	  first	  is	  extending	  the	  scope	  of	   existing	   right;	   second	   is	   creating	   a	   new	   category	   of	   exclusive	   right.	   	   The	   U.S.	  extends	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  distribution	  right,	  the	  performance	  and	  display	  rights,	  and	  makes	  judges	  use	  their	  discretion	  in	  practice.	  The	  EU	  countries	  (such	  as	  UK),	  created	  the	  right	  to	  make	  available	  to	  the	  public,	  Australia	  added	  “making	  a	  work	  available	  online”	   to	   “the	   right	   to	   communicate	   to	   public,”	   Japan	   uses	   “rights	   of	   public	  transmission,”	   and	   China	   also	   add	   “the	   right	   of	   disseminate	  works	   to	   public	   over	  information	  networks”	  to	  its	  copyright	  law.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  Sari	  Depreeuw,	  THE	  VARIABLE	  SCOPE	  OF	  THE	  EXCLUSIVE	  ECONOMIC	  RIGHTS	  IN	  COPYRIGHT,	  (2014),	  at	  355-­‐358.	  230	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty,	  adopted	  in	  Geneva	  on	  Dec	  20,1996.	  Article	  9	  Right	  of	  Communication	  to	  the	  Public:”	  …	  authors	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  works	  shall	  enjoy	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  authorizing	  any	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works,	  by	  wire	  or	  wireless	  means,	  including	  the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  members	  of	  the	  public	  may	  access	  these	  works	  from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them.”	  231	  Basic	  Proposal	  for	  the	  substantive	  provisions	  of	  the	  treaty	  on	  certain	  questions	  concerning	  the	  protection	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  works	  to	  be	  considered	  by	  the	  diplomatic	  conference	  on	  certain	  copyright	  and	  neighboring	  rights	  questions,	  Geneva,	  December	  2-­‐20,	  1996,44,	  note	  nr.	  10.14.	  232	  Id,	  46,	  note	  nr.	  10.15.	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It’s	  obvious	   that	   cloud	  computing	  affect	   the	   right	  of	   communicate	   to	  public	  seriously.	   For	   instance,	   live	   streaming	   is	   not	   a	   kind	   of	   “interactive	  communication” 233 	  regulated	   by	   exclusive	   right	   of	   authors,	   but	   it	   indeed	   is	  communication	  via	  information	  network.	  How	  could	  the	  right	  of	  communicate	  to	  the	  public	   be	   applied	   to	   it?	   Further,	   with	   the	   technology	   of	   deduplication	   that	  mentioned	  in	  last	  section,	  when	  there’s	  a	  master	  copy	  or	  an	  individual	  copy	  stay	  in	  ISPs’	   storage	  space,	   is	   there	  a	   communication	   to	   “public?”	  What’s	   the	  definition	  of	  “public?”	  In	  order	  to	  answers	  these	  unresolved	  questions,	  an	  observation	  on	  major	  countries’	  current	  solutions	  is	  needed.	  	  
i. The U.S. Part As	   I	   already	   mentioned,	   U.S.	   attempts	   to	   interactive	   use	   it’s	   the	   right	   of	  distribution	   and	   the	   right	   of	   public	   performance	   and	   display	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	  requirement	   of	   applying	   the	   right	   of	   communicate	   to	   public	   by	  WCT.	  This	   section	  will	  discuss	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  mainly,	  because	  it’s	  much	  more	  relevant	  here	  and	  we	  will	  save	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	   for	  next	  section.	  To	  understand	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  it’s	  important	  to	  examine	  its	  law	  developing	  trend	  and	  related	  precedents.	  Under	  the	  U.S.	  copyright	  law,	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  is	  an	  exclusive	  right,	   which	   allows	   copyright	   owner	   to	   control	   when	   the	   copyrighted	   works	   is	  performed	  publicly.	  And	  a	  performance	  is	  “public”	  if	  it	  is	  performed	  in	  “a	  place	  open	  to	   the	   public	   or	   at	   a	   place	   where	   a	   substantial	   number	   of	   persons	   outside	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  Live	  Streaming，URBAN	  DICTIONAY,	  	  available	  at	  http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=live+streaming	  (To	  explain	  this	  notion	  easily,	  it’s	  a	  live	  broadcast	  of	  a	  TV	  program	  on	  the	  Internet.	  Thus	  users	  could	  not	  choose	  when	  to	  enjoy	  the	  work,	  but	  only	  the	  place.)	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normal	   circle	   of	   a	   family	   and	   its	   social	   acquaintances	   are	   gathered,”	   or	   if	   it	   is	  transmitted	   to	   multiple	   locations	   through	   TV	   or	   radio.	   This	   shows	   that	   at	   the	  beginning,	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  does	  not	  cover	  transmission	  technology	  that	  has	  not	  appeared	  such	  as	  cable	  TV.	  Therefore,	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  attempt	  to	  decide	   whether	   companies	   provide	   community	   antenna	   (cable	   providers)	   violate	  the	  author’s	   right	  of	  performance	   in	   two	  cases	   is	   then	  crucial.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  sided	  with	  the	  cable	  providers,	  held	  that	  unauthorized	  retransmission	  of	  television	  broadcast,	   received	   by	   antenna	   then	   retransmitted	   to	   end-­‐users	   through	   coaxial	  cable,	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	  right	  of	  performance,	  because	  the	  cable	  providers	  merely	  provide	  end-­‐users	  a	  way	  to	  capture	  content	  that	  they	  could	  legally	  capture	  through	  the	  use	  of	  their	  own	  antennas.234	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  even	  explicitly	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Congress’s	  job	  to	  “accommodate	  [the]	  various	  competing	  considerations	   of	   copyright	   law…”235 	  Later	   in	   1976,	   the	   Congress	   revised	   the	  Copyright	  Act,	  specifically	  added	  “Transit	  Clause”	  to	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance,	  the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   still	   illustrated	   courts’	   tendencies	   on	   this	   issue	   –	   to	  interpret	   law	   in	   a	   “technology-­‐sympathetic”	   way.236	  Later	   case	   Cablevision	   II	   and	  Aereo	  I	  &	  II	  are	  clearly	  followed	  such	  trend:	  allow	  a	  new	  way	  of	  public	  performance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  See	  Fortnightly	  Corp.	  v.	  United	  Artists	  Television,	  Inc.,	  392	  U.S.	  390	  (1968);	  see	  also	  Teleprompter	  Corp.	  v.	  Columbia	  Broad.	  Sys.	  Inc.,	  415	  U.S.	  394	  (1974).	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  concluded	  that	  CATV	  “falls	  on	  the	  viewer’s	  side	  of	  the	  line”,”	  if	  an	  individual	  erected	  an	  antenna	  on	  a	  hill,	  strung	  a	  cable	  to	  his	  house,	  and	  installed	  the	  necessary	  amplifying	  equipment,	  he	  would	  not	  be	  ‘performing’	  the	  programs	  he	  received	  on	  his	  television	  set.”	  According	  to	  the	  court,	  “the	  only	  difference	  in	  the	  case	  of	  CATV	  is	  that	  the	  antenna	  system	  is	  erected	  and	  owned	  not	  by	  its	  users	  but	  by	  an	  entrepreneur.”	  Fortnightly	  Corp,	  at	  399-­‐400.	  235	  Fortnightly	  Corp	  case,	  supra	  note	  234,	  at	  402.	  236	  See	  Daniel	  L.	  Brenner	  &	  Stephen	  H.	  Kay,	  ABC	  V.	  Aereo,	  Inc:	  When	  is	  Internet	  Distribution	  a	  
“Public	  Performance”	  Under	  Copyright	  Law?,	  24	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  &	  TECH.	  L.J.	  12,	  15	  (2012)(“Policy-­‐wise,…	  decisions	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  technology-­‐sympathetic—allowing	  new	  distribution	  systems	  to	  develop	  without	  	  being	  blocked	  by	  copyright.”)	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to	  develop	  without	   limitation	   from	   judicial	   review	  until	   Congress	  directly	   address	  this	   issue.	  Before	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   final	   judgment	  of	  Aereo	   III	   case	   came	  out	   in	  2014,	  most	  scholars	  and	  professors	  relied	  on	  these	  two	  cases	  and	  the	  Cablevision	  II	  case,	  made	  a	  forecast	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  still	  will	  leave	  the	  contour	  of	  the	  right	  of	   public	   performance	   to	   the	   Congress.237	  However,	   this	   time,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	  made	  their	  conclusion	  based	  on	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  Congress	  intention.	  We	  will	   track	   the	   development	   of	   literature’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   right	   of	   public	  performance	  by	  an	  important	  chronological	  case	  analysis.	  
A. In	  	  1976	  Revised	  Copyright	  Act	  Briefly	   speaking,	   the	   Congress	   explicitly	   rejected	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	  decisions	   in	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   cases	   by	   adding	   the	   “Transit	   Clause.”	   The	  Congress	  had	  to	  make	  such	  changes	  to	  adapt	  changes	  in	  technology	  area.	  Basically,	  the	   1976	   Copyright	   Act	   provide	   copyright	   owners	   exclusive	   right	   to	   perform	  publicly	  –	   limited	  to	  public	  performance.	  238	  §101	  explicitly	  defined	  “publicly”	  as	   :	  “(1)	   to	  perform	  or	  display	   it	  at	  a	  place	  open	   to	   the	  public	  or	  at	  any	  place	  where	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  persons	  outside	  of	  a	  normal	  circle	  of	  a	   family	  and	   its	   social	  acquaintances	   is	   gathered;	   or	   (2)	   to	   transmit	   or	   otherwise	   communicate	   a	  performance	  or	  display	  of	  the	  work	  to	  a	  place	  specified	  by	  clause(1)	  or	  to	  the	  public,	  by	  means	  of	  any	  device	  or	  process,	  whether	   the	  members	  of	   the	  public	  capable	  of	  receiving	   the	   performance	   or	   display	   receive	   it	   in	   the	   same	   place	   or	   in	   separate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  See	  Andrew	  Fraser,	  Television	  A	  La	  Carte:	  American	  Broadcasting	  Cos.	  V.	  Aereo	  and	  How	  
Federal	  Courts’	  Interpretations	  of	  Copyright	  Law	  are	  Impacting	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  Medium,	  20	  B.U.	  J.	  SCI.	  &	  TECH.	  L.	  132	  (2014);	  see	  also	  Glynn	  S.	  Lunney,	  JR,	  Aereo	  and	  Copyright’s	  Private-­‐
Public	  Performance	  Line,	  612	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  ONLINE	  205	  (2013-­‐2014).	  238	  17	  U.S.C.	  §106(4)	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places	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  or	  at	  different	  times.”239	  The	  second	  part	  is	  the	  “Transit	  Clause,”	  which	  means	  a	  public	  performance	  will	  happen	  when	  a	  work	  is	  transmitted	  to	   the	   public	   that	   regulated	   in	   the	   first	   clause.	   The	  most	   important	   word	   here	   is	  “transmit.”	  This	  word	  is	  not	  only	  significant	  here	  but	  also	  in	  our	  further	  analyzing	  of	  live	   streaming	   or	   on-­‐demand	   streaming.	   Here,	   the	   Congress	   defined	   it	   as	   a	  “communication	  by	  any	  device	  or	  process	  whereby	   images	  or	  sounds	  are	  received	  beyond	  the	  place	  from	  which	  they	  are	  sent.”240	  After	  considering	  the	  background	  of	  such	  changes	  by	   the	  Congress,	  a	  clear	  conclusion	   is	  drawn:	   transmit	  or	  retransmit	  broadcast	   signals	   that	   contained	   copyrighted	   works	   constitute	   a	   public	  performance.241	  Further	   the	   Congress	   also	   showed	   its	   intention	   to	   extend	   this	  definition	  by	  stating	  “to	  include	  all	  conceivable	  forms	  and	  combination	  of	  wired	  or	  wireless	   communications	   media,	   including	   but	   by	   no	  means	   limited	   to	   radio	   and	  television	   broadcasting	   as	  we	   know	   them.”242	  	   From	  here,	   it	   seems	   that	   copyright	  owners	  should	  use	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  to	  control	  video/audio	  streaming	  service	  via	  the	  Internet	  because	  of	  the	  Congress’s	   intention.	  However,	  with	  further	  explanations	   by	   several	   courts	   in	   several	   landmark	   cases,	   it’s	   still	   hard	   to	   draw	   a	  concrete	   contour	   of	   the	   right	   of	   public	   performance.	   The	   following	   sections	   will	  address	  this	  issue	  in	  details.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  17	  U.S.C.	  §101.	  240	  Id.	  241	  H.R.	  Rep.	  No.	  94-­‐1476,	  at	  63	  (1976).	  (“A	  cable	  television	  system	  is	  performing	  when	  it	  retransmits	  the	  broadcast	  to	  its	  subscribers.”)	  242	  Id,	  at	  64.	  
	   86	  
B. Single	  Copy	  requirement	  of	  Transmit	  Clause—Redd	  Horne	  case,	  On	  Command	  
case,	  Nimmer’s	  suggestion	  and	  Cablevision	  II	  	   An	   important	   requirement	  had	  been	  added	  and	  been	  adopted	  widely	  when	  applying	  the	  Transmit	  Clause	  from	  1976	  Copyright	  Act	  –	  single	  copy	  requirement.	  It	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  decades	  in	  pre-­‐Internet	  era.	  Professor	  Nimmer	  made	  a	  hypothesis:	  whether	  every	  consumer	  has	  to	  obtain	  a	  public	  performance	  license	  to	  play	   their	   legally	   purchased	  works	   in	   “theaters	   in	  which	   patrons	   occupy	   separate	  screening	  rooms?”243	  The	  answer	  is	  obvious:	  no.	  It’s	  ridiculous	  for	  a	  consumer	  to	  do	  so	   simply	   because	   this	   same	   copyrighted	   work	   had	   been	   played	   at	   other	   times.	  Professor	   Nimmer	   then	   came	   up	   with	   a	   solution—which	   worked	   well	   in	   pre-­‐Internet	   era,	   to	   solve	   such	   issue:	   “what	  must	   have	   been	   intended	  was	   that	   if	   the	  same	  copy	  (or	  phonorecord)	  of	  a	  given	  work	  is	  repeatedly	  played	  (i.e.	  ‘performed’)	  by	   different	   members	   of	   the	   public,	   albeit	   at	   difference	   times,	   this	   constitutes	   a	  ‘public’	   performance.”244	  Redd	   Horne	   case	   and	   On	   Command	   case’s	   holding	   then	  reflected	   Professor	   Nimmer’s	   single	   copy	   requirement,	   and	   these	   rules	   further	  affected	  following	  cases.	  	   In	   Redd	   Horne	   case,	   the	   defendant	   operated	   a	   “in-­‐store	   rental”	   business	  which	   allow	   consumers	   to	   enjoy	   video	   cassette	   in	   small,	   private	   booths	   with	  televisions.245	  After	  a	  consumer	  selects	  a	   film	   to	  watch,	  a	   store	  employee	  will	  play	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  2	  MELVILLE	  B.	  NIMMER	  &	  DAVID	  NIMMER,	  NIMMER	  ON	  COPYRIGHT,	  (rev.ed.,2013),	  at	  
§	  8.14(C)(3).	  244	  Id.	  (By	  limiting	  the	  potential	  audience	  to	  those	  seeing	  a	  particular	  copy	  of	  a	  work,	  one	  could	  avoid	  the	  dilemma	  of	  defining	  a	  public	  performance	  under	  the	  transmit	  clause	  in	  too	  broad	  a	  sense.	  This	  theory	  of	  “limiting	  the	  potential	  audience	  further	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  Cablevision	  case.)	  245	  Columbia	  Pictures	  Indus.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Redd	  Horne,	  Inc.,	  849	  F.	  2d	  154,	  156-­‐57	  (3d.	  Cir.	  1984).	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the	  video	  cassette	  with	  a	  VCR	  and	  then	  transmit	  the	  signal	  to	  the	  customer’s	  booth.	  Citing	  Professor	  Nimmer,	  the	  3rd	  Circuit	  held	  that	  “	  this	  was	  a	  public	  performance	  because	   the	   same	   copy	   of	   the	   work,	   namely	   the	   individual	   video	   cassette,	   was	  repeatedly	  ‘performed’	  to	  different	  members	  of	  the	  public	  at	  different	  times.”246	  And	  the	   facts	   are	   similar	   in	   the	  On	  Command	  case,	   the	  defendant	  had	  a	   system,	  which	  consisted	  a	  bank	  of	  VCDs	  centrally	  located	  in	  the	  hotel’s	  equipment	  room,	  and	  then	  transmit	   signal	   of	   on-­‐demanded	   film	   video	   to	   hotel	   rooms.247	  It’s	   obvious	   there’s	  only	   one	   videotape	   per	   film,	   and	   it	   fits	   the	   single	   copy	   requirement	   mentioned	  above.248	  	  	   This	   single	   copy	   requirement	   works	   well	   at	   that	   time,	   because	   of	   the	  technology	  limitation	  —	  cost	  of	  making	  copies,	  but	  it	  also	  create	  a	  big	  legal	  loophole.	  For	   instance,	   with	   the	   development	   of	   technology,	   smart	   cable	   TV	   providers	   and	  online-­‐streaming	   service	   providers	   create	   a	   type	   of	   one-­‐to-­‐one	   interaction	   with	  their	   customers,	  which	  means	   there	   are	   numerous	   copies	   of	   a	  work.	   In	   doing	   so,	  they	   can	   ensure	   their	   performance	   are	   “private.”	   It’s	   not	   a	   hypothesis	   any	   longer,	  since	   they	   had	   already	   take	   advantage	   of	   such	   loophole	   in	   Cablevision	   II	   case—	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  Id,	  at	  159.	  (Actually	  it	  was	  the	  District	  court	  who	  cited	  Professor	  Nimmer:	  “	  The	  two	  Maxwell’s	  facilities	  each	  have	  only	  one	  copy	  of	  a	  given	  work	  repeatedly.	  We	  find	  that	  Congress	  intended	  that	  this	  portion	  of	  the	  definition	  also	  serve	  as	  protection	  for	  copyright	  owners	  from	  infringing	  performances	  such	  as	  those	  accomplished	  by	  Maxwell’s	  showcasing.”	  Columbia	  Pictures	  Indus.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Redd	  Horne,	  Inc.,	  568	  F.	  Supp.	  494,	  501	  (1983)	  )	  247	  On	  Command	  Video	  Corp.	  v.	  Columbia	  Pictures	  Indus,	  777	  F.	  Supp.	  787,	  788-­‐790	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  1991).	  248	  See	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  342.(“The	  definition	  of	  ‘perform	  a	  work	  publicly’	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  would	  cover	  these	  multiple,	  sequential	  performances	  of	  single	  copy	  of	  a	  motion	  picture	  to	  different	  members	  of	  the	  public	  even	  though	  they	  may	  be	  to	  individual	  rooms	  in	  the	  same	  hotel.”)	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unique	  copy	  of	  works	  transmitted	  to	  one	  specific	  customer.	  There’re	  several	  existing	  cases	  affected	  by	  this	  single	  copy	  requirement.	  	   The	   next	   significant	   case	   –	   Cablevision	   II,	   which	   was	   viewed	   by	   the	   2nd	  Circuit	  arose	  in	  nearly	  a	  quarter–century	  later.	  	  The	  2nd	  Circuit	  also	  considered	  the	  single	  copy	  requirement,	  but	  finally	  made	  a	  very	  different	  decision	  compares	  to	  the	  Redd	   Horne	   and	   On	   Command	   case.	   The	   basic	   facts	   of	   Cablevision	   case	   we	   had	  already	  mentioned	  in	  former	  part	  when	  discuss	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  what	  we	  need	   to	  know	  here	   is	   that	  Cablevision	   transmits	   the	  program	   from	   the	   company’s	  hard	  drives	  to	  the	  subscriber’s	  home	  once	  he	  requests	  what	  he	  has	  recorded.249	  The	  District	   court	   in	   Cablevision	   I	   held	   that	   there	   was	   public	   performance	   because	  Cablevision	   was	   transmitting	   the	   same	   program	   to	   public	   members	   who	   were	  simply	  receiving	  the	  same	  performance	  at	  different	  times	  in	  different	  places.250	  But,	  the	   2nd	   Circuit	   explicitly	   rejected	   those	   conclusions	   that	   seemed	   affected	   by	   the	  single	   copy	   requirement.	   The	   2nd	   Circuit	   stated	   that	   the	   District	   court’s	   decision	  was	  based	  on	  “potential	  audience	  of	  the	  underlying	  work,	  rather	  than	  the	  potential	  audience	  of	  a	  particular	   transmission.”251	  Nonetheless,	  Cablevision	   indeed	  stored	  a	  unique	   copy	   of	   each	   customer’s	   recorded	   programming. 252 	  	   The	   2nd	   Circuit	  concluded	  there	  was	  no	  public	  performance,	  because	  such	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  relationship,	  which	  means	  only	  one	  copy	  being	  made	  by	  and	  sent	  to	  one	  specific	  customer,	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  Cablevision	  II,	  	  supra	  note	  33,	  at	  125.	  250	  Id,	  at	  135.	  251	  Id.	  252	  Id,	  at	  137.	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more	   like	   a	   private	   performance. 253 	  The	   2nd	   Circuit’s	   using	   of	   single	   copy	  requirement	   is	   far	   out	   of	   line,	   and	   it	   also	   realized	   such	   decision	   will	   led	   to	  technological	  loophole.254	  But	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  smart	  providers	  are	  already	  able	  to	   take	   advantage	   of	   such	   decision.255	  That’s	  why	   so	  many	   scholars	   criticized	   this	  decision:	   they	   realized	   that	   this	   decision	   “appear	   to	   exclude	   every	   instance	   of	   on-­‐demand	  performances,	  a	  result	  at	  odds	  with	  congressional	  intent	  and	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	   vital	   economic	   interests.”256	  According	   to	   Professor	   Goldstein,	   the	   2nd	  Circuit	  wrongfully	   treated	   “transmissions”	   equal	   to	   “performance”	   in	   applying	   the	  transmit	  clause.	  The	  2nd	  Circuit	  again	  made	  this	  mistake	  in	  further	  case—Aereo	  II.	  
257	  
C. Zediva,	  FilmOn	  X	  and	  Aereo	  Case	  	   These	   cases	   actually	   reflected	   how	   on-­‐demand	   performance	   service	  providers	  tried	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  decision	  of	  Cablevision	  II	  case	  as	  mentioned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  Id.	  (“Because	  the	  RS-­‐DVR	  system,	  as	  designed,	  only	  makes	  transmissions	  to	  one	  subscriber	  using	  a	  copy	  made	  by	  that	  subscriber,	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  universe	  of	  people	  capable	  of	  receiving	  an	  RS-­‐DVR	  transmission	  is	  the	  single	  subscriber	  whose	  self-­‐made	  copy	  is	  used	  to	  create	  that	  transmission.”)	  254	  Id,	  at	  139-­‐40.	  (“This	  holding…	  does	  not	  permit	  content	  delivery	  networks	  to	  avoid	  all	  copyright	  liability	  by	  making	  copies	  of	  each	  item	  of	  content	  and	  associating	  one	  unique	  copy	  with	  each	  subscriber.”)	  255	  For	  instance,	  the	  Defendant	  in	  Warner	  v.	  WTV	  case	  argued	  that	  their	  “remote	  DVD	  playback	  transmissions”	  were	  not	  “to	  the	  public”	  because	  only	  one	  person	  was	  capable	  of	  receiving	  that	  transmission.	  Warner	  Brothers	  Entertainment,	  Inc.	  v.	  WTV	  Systems,	  Inc.,	  824	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1003,	  1011	  n.7	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2011)[hereinafter	  Zediva	  case].	  256	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  344.	  257	  PAUL	  GOLDSTEIN,	  GOLDSTEIN	  ON	  COPYRIGHT	  (3rd	  ed.	  2005),	  at	  7.7.2.	  (Professor	  Goldstein	  firstly	  pointed	  that	  in§101:	  “to	  transmit	  …	  a	  performance…	  by	  means	  of	  any	  device	  or	  process	  whether	  the	  members	  of	  the	  public	  capable	  of	  receiving	  the	  performance	  or	  display,	  receive	  it	  in	  the	  same	  place	  …,”	  the	  world	  “it”	  should	  refer	  to	  “performance	  or	  display,”	  but	  not	  transmission.	  Then	  such	  misreading	  of	  “performance”	  and	  “transmission”	  also	  undermine	  Congress’s	  intention	  in	  bringing	  individual	  on-­‐demand	  performances	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right	  by	  stating	  same	  or	  different	  place	  and	  time.	  However,	  by	  treating	  transmission	  equal	  to	  performance,	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  effectively	  excluded	  the	  individual	  on-­‐demand	  performance	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  right.	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above,	  and	  how	  courts,	  especially	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  interpret	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  in	  modern	  technology	  era.	  	  	   In	  Zediva	  Case,	   the	  defendant	  provided	  an	  online	  “DVD	  Rental”	  service.	  The	  defendant	  used	  hundreds	  of	  DVD	  players	  to	  play	  copyrighted	  but	  legally	  purchased	  DVDs,	   and	   converted	   the	   analog	   video	   signal	   from	   the	   DVD	   player	   into	   a	   digital	  signal,	  then	  transferred	  such	  signal	  to	  the	  requested	  customer	  via	  streaming	  service	  online.258	  The	   defendant	   tried	   to	   cite	   the	   Cablevision	   II	   in	   its	   argument,	   but	   the	  district	  court	  clearly	  pointed	  out	  “defendant’s	  customers	  do	  not	  produce	  their	  own	  unique	   copy	   …”259	  The	   district	   court	   compared	   Zediva	   system	   to	   On	   Command	  system,	  and	  found	  these	  two	  systems	  were	  analogous.	  	  The	  district	  court’s	  decision	  is	  quite	  reasonable,	  because	  no	  matter	  how	  the	  defendant	  converted	  the	  signals,	  the	  works	  numerous	  end-­‐users	  enjoyed	  at	  different	  places	  in	  different	  time	  were	  from	  the	  same	  DVD.	  	   Then,	  here’s	   the	  series	  of	  Aereo	  case.	  This	  case	  went	  through	  district	  court,	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  and	  finally	  made	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2014.	  This	  dissertation	  will	  name	  the	  case	  sequence	  as	  Aereo	  I,	  Aereo	  II	  and	  Aereo	  III.	  The	  basic	  background	  of	  this	   case	   was	   the	   same:	   Aereo	   provided	   a	   service	   which	   allows	   its	   customers	   to	  watch	  TV	  programs	  on	  the	  Internet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  programs	  are	  broadcast	  on	  air.	  It	  uses	  small	  antennas	  for	  the	  retransmission,	  and	  once	  a	  customer	  selected	  a	  show,	   an	   antenna	   will	   dedicate	   to	   this	   customer	   alone.	  260 	  Aereo	   tried	   to	   use	  Cablevision	   II’s	  rule	   in	  defense:	  each	  performance	   is	   “capable	  of	  being	  received	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  258	  Zediva	  Case,	  supra	  note	  255,	  at	  1007.	  259	  Id,	  1011	  n.7.	  260	  ABC	  V.	  Aereo,	  134	  S.Ct.	  2498,2503-­‐04	  (2014)[hereinafter	  Aereo	  III].	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one	  and	  only	  one	  subscriber.”261	  The	  District	  court	  in	  Aereo	  I	  rejected	  the	  plaintiffs’	  claim—	   Aereo	   violated	   their	   right	   of	   public	   performance	   by	   reliance	   on	   the	  Cablevision	  II’s	  rule—unique	  copy	  transmit	  solely	  to	  only	  one	  customer.262	  Then,	  in	  Aereo	   II	   case,	   the	  2nd	  Circuit	   affirmed	   the	  district	   court’s	   decision	   relied	  upon	   its	  own	   decision	   in	   Cablevision	   II. 263 	  The	   2nd	   Circuit	   stated	   that	   the	   Plaintiffs’	  interpretation	  of	  the	  transmit	  clause	  is	  incorrect.264	  The	  2nd	  Circuit	  held	  that	  there’s	  no	  public	  performance	  at	  issue	  based	  on	  two	  reasons:	  (1)	  the	  performance	  here	  was	  the	  particular	  transmission	  created	  by	  Aereo	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  specific	  user;	  (2)	  the	  “members	  of	  the	  public”	  who’s	  capable	  of	  receiving	  the	  performance	  is	  only	  one	  subscriber	  who	  directed	  the	  solely	  transmission.	  265	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  261	  Aereo	  III,	  supra	  note	  269,	  at	  2508.	  Such	  defense	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  Cablevision	  II	  case	  decision:	  one-­‐to	  one	  relationship,	  one	  performance	  sent	  to	  only	  one	  customer,	  this	  situation	  makes	  the	  performance	  private.	  262	  American	  Broadcasting	  Companies	  v.	  Aereo,	  874	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  373	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2012)[hereinafter	  Aereo	  I].	  263	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  according	  to	  Professor	  Goldstein,	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  concluded	  a	  wrong	  decision	  based	  on	  it	  wrongfully	  treat	  “transmission”	  equal	  to	  “performance.”	  Thus,	  here,	  the	  2nd	  Circuit	  made	  a	  wrong	  decision	  again	  in	  the	  Aereo	  II	  case	  based	  on	  the	  same	  wrong	  reasons.	  264	  WNET	  v.	  Aereo,	  712	  F.3d	  676	  690-­‐91(2d.	  Cir.	  2013)[hereinafter	  Aereo	  II].	  (The	  plaintiff	  argued	  that	  the	  court	  should	  consider	  each	  of	  Aereo’s	  transmissions	  via	  its	  small	  antenna	  in	  the	  aggregate	  in	  deciding	  whether	  they	  are	  public	  performances,	  because	  the	  transmissions	  are	  of	  the	  same	  underlying	  programed	  and	  received	  by	  the	  public	  members.)	  265	  Id.	  See	  also	  Goldstein,	  supra	  note	  257,	  paras	  7.168-­‐	  168.1.	  (	  The	  2nd	  Circuit	  used	  “four	  guideposts”	  in	  reasoning	  its	  conlusion.	  First,	  under	  the	  Transmit	  Clause,	  the	  courts	  have	  to	  consider	  the	  potential	  audience	  of	  the	  individual	  transmission.	  “if	  that	  transmission	  is	  ‘capable	  of	  being	  received	  by	  the	  public’	  the	  transmission	  is	  a	  public	  performance…”	  Second,	  private	  transmission	  means	  the	  transmissions	  that	  cannot	  be	  received	  by	  the	  public.	  Private	  transmission	  should	  not	  be	  aggregated.	  Thus	  it’s	  “irrelevant	  to	  the	  Transmit	  Clause	  analysis	  whether	  the	  public	  is	  capable	  of	  receiving	  the	  same	  underlying	  work	  or	  original	  performance	  of	  the	  work	  by	  means	  of	  many	  transmissions.”	  Third,	  no-­‐aggregation	  rule	  has	  an	  exception,	  which	  is	  under	  a	  situation	  of	  private	  transmissions	  are	  generated	  from	  the	  same	  copy	  of	  the	  work.	  Under	  this	  circumstance,	  the	  private	  transmissions	  “should	  be	  aggregated.”	  Fourth,	  “any	  factor	  that	  limits	  the	  potential	  audience	  of	  a	  transmission	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  Transmit	  Clause	  analysis.”)	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   In	  2014,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   reversed	   the	  2nd	  Circuit’s	   rule	  on	   this	   issue	   in	  Aereo	   III.266	  Joined	  by	  other	  4	   Justices,	   Justice	  Breyer	  held	   that	  Aereo	  did	  publicly	  perform	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  based	  on	  two	  reasons.	  (1)	  the	  Congress	  intended	  “to	  bring	   the	   activities	   of	   cable	   systems	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act,”	   and	  Aereo’s	  services	  are	  “substantially	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  CATV	  companies,”267	  Aereo	  “performs.”	  (2)	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  rejected	  Cablevision’s	  “no-­‐aggregation”	  rule	  by	  stating	   that	   the	   transmit	   clause	   suggested	   “one	   can	   transmit	   or	   communicate	  something	   through	   a	   set	   of	   actions.”	   “Thus,	   one	   can	   transmit	   a	   message	   to	   one’s	  friends	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  one	  sends	  separate	  identical	  emails	  to	  each	  friend	  or	  a	  single	  e-­‐mail	  all	  at	  once.”268	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  the	  Aereo	  case,	  Aereo	  perform	  the	  same	  work	  no	  matter	   it	   transmits	   from	   the	   same	  or	   separate	   copies.269	  And	   further	   the	  underlying	  work	  was	  sent	  to	  subscribers	  who	  have	  no	  prior	  relationship	  with	  each	  other.270	  	  Therefore,	  Aereo	  performs	  “publicly.”	  Here,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  explicitly	  rejected	   “a	   single	   copy	   requirement”	   by	   stating	   that	   “the	   Clause	   suggests	   that	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  266	  Aereo	  III,	  supra	  note	  260.(The	  Supreme	  Court	  reversed	  the	  2nd	  Circuit’s	  “first	  and	  most	  important”	  guidepost	  that	  “if	  the	  potential	  audience	  of	  the	  transmission	  is	  only	  one	  subscriber,	  the	  transmission	  is	  not	  a	  public	  performance.”)	  267	  Id,	  at	  2056.	  (Although	  “the	  language	  of	  the	  Act	  does	  not	  clearly	  indicate	  when	  an	  entity	  ‘perform’…and	  when	  it	  merely	  supplies	  equipment	  that	  allows	  others	  to	  do	  so”,	  if	  looked	  backed	  into	  the	  legislative	  history,	  we	  can	  find	  that	  the	  Congress	  amended	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  because	  its	  disagreement	  of	  two	  Supreme	  Court	  cases—Fortnightly	  Corp	  and	  Teleprompter	  Corp	  case	  which	  we	  mentioned	  above.	  The	  Congress	  enacted	  new	  language	  in	  clarifying	  that	  to	  “’perform’	  an	  audiovisual	  work	  means	  ‘to	  show	  its	  images	  in	  any	  sequence	  or	  to	  make	  the	  sounds	  accompanying	  it	  audible”	  and	  added	  transmit	  clause	  that	  made	  cable	  TV	  providers	  as	  performers.	  And	  there	  are	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  Aereo	  and	  Cable	  TV	  because:(1)there’s	  no	  important	  difference	  between	  their	  system;(2)their	  “commercial	  objective”	  are	  the	  same;(3)the	  users’”viewing	  experience”	  is	  not	  “significantly	  altered”.)	  268	  Id,	  at	  2509.	  269	  Id.	  (“…it	  shows	  the	  same	  images	  and	  makes	  audible	  the	  same	  sound.	  Therefore,	  when	  Aereo	  streams	  the	  same	  television	  program	  to	  multiple	  subscribers,	  it	  ‘transmits….	  a	  performance’	  to	  all	  of	  them.”)	  270	  Id,	  at	  2509-­‐10.	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entity	   may	   transmit	   a	   performance	   through	   multiple,	   discrete	   transmissions.”271	  Justice	  Scalia	  and	  2	  other	  Justices	  dissented;	  they	  accused	  the	  majorities	  of	  adopting	  “an	  improvised	  standard	  (‘looks-­‐like-­‐cable-­‐TV’)	  that	  will	  sow	  confusion	  for	  years	  to	  come.”272	  	  	   The	  Supreme	  Court	  indeed	  limited	  its	  holding	  to	  “cable	  companies	  and	  their	  equivalents,”273	  which	  means	  it	  left	  the	  issues	  open	  under	  cloud	  computing	  context.	  According	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   here,	   the	   technology	   developers	   just	  need	  to	  avoid	  developing	  “Cable-­‐TV-­‐alike-­‐system.”	  Then	  they	  can	  avoid	  violation	  of	  the	  copyright	  owners’	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance.274	  Aereo	  now	  is	  taking	  such	  actions	   to	   avoid	   infringements.275	  Scholars	   criticized	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   rule	   for	  three	   reasons:	   (1)	   This	   decision	   relied	   largely	   on	   legislative	   history	   and	  congressional	   intent,	   so	   it	   ignored	  key	  doctrinal	  concerns	  –	  volitional	  conduct—as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  271	  Id.	  272	  Id,	  at	  2512-­‐17.	  (Scalia,	  J.	  ,	  dissenting).	  (	  Justice	  Scalia	  mainly	  gave	  three	  opinions:	  (1)	  the	  majorities	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  “volitional	  conduct”,	  it	  was	  Aereo’s	  customer	  who	  selected	  the	  copyrighted	  content,	  Aereo	  simply	  “offers	  access	  to	  an	  automated	  system…	  lies	  dormant	  until	  a	  subscriber	  activates	  it.”	  (2)	  The	  majorities’	  “guilt-­‐by-­‐resemblance”	  approach	  reliance	  on	  no	  grounding	  in	  the	  statute;	  (3)	  The	  majorities	  “distort	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  to	  forbid”	  what	  Aereo	  is	  doing.	  It’s	  the	  Congress’s	  job	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  needs	  an	  upgrade.)	  273	  Id,	  at	  2510.	  274	  Lee,	  The	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Aereo	  Decision	  Could	  Endanger	  Cloud	  Storage	  Services.	  Vox	  (Jun.	  25,2014)	  http://www.vox.com/2014/6/25/5841820/the-­‐supreme-­‐courts-­‐aereo-­‐decision-­‐could-­‐endanger-­‐cloud-­‐storage	  (Grimmelmann	  states:”	  the	  Court	  is	  sending	  a	  very	  clear	  signal	  that	  you	  can’t	  design	  a	  system	  to	  be	  the	  functional	  equivalent	  of	  cable.	  The	  Court	  also	  emphasizes	  very	  strongly	  that	  cloud	  services	  are	  different.	  But	  when	  asked	  how,	  it	  says	  ‘they’re	  just	  different,	  trust	  us’”.)	  275	  Emily	  Steel,	  Aereo	  Concedes	  Defeat	  and	  Files	  for	  Bankruptcy,	  N.Y.TIMES	  (Nov.	  21,	  2014)	  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-­‐files-­‐for-­‐bankruptcy.html?_r=0;	  
see	  also	  Aereo,	  “A	  Letter	  to	  Our	  Consumers:	  The	  Next	  Chapter.”(	  Although	  Aereo	  suspended	  its	  service	  and	  filed	  for	  bankruptcy	  in	  November	  2014;	  it	  still	  reconsidered	  other	  business	  and	  technology	  options	  in	  making	  a	  comeback.	  And	  it	  indeed	  came	  back,	  but	  in	  support	  of	  an	  another	  stuff—	  TiVo	  Bolt.)	  
	   94	  
Justice	   Scalia	  mentioned276	  Further	   the	   “looks	   like	   cable”	   analysis	   does	   not	   neatly	  comport	  with	   the	   statutory	   text.277	  (2)	  The	  Supreme	  Court	   cannot	  provide	   further	  guidance	   to	   lower	   courts	   by	   its	   “reason	   by	   analogy”	   approach,	   since	   it	   did	   not	  articulate	   what	   level	   of	   similarity	   is	   sufficient. 278 	  And	   what’s	   more,	   since	   the	  Supreme	   Court	   provided	   a	   “limited	   ruling,”	   which	   only	   applied	   to	   “Cable	   TV	   and	  equivalents.”	   It	   caused	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   under	   other	  technologies’—	  cloud	  computing,	  remote	  storage,	  deduplication—context	  unsolved.	  The	   Supreme	   Court	   stepped	   back	   on	   this	   issue	   made	   the	   Aereo	   III	   case	   less	  important.	  What’s	  interesting	  here	  is	  that	  these	  criticisms	  had	  already	  been	  echoed	  in	   cases	   judged	  by	   lower	   courts	   in	  2015.279	  (3)	  The	   former	  unclear	   contour	  of	   the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	   is	   “unpredictability	  which	   is	  particularly	  dangerous	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  276	  See	  Aereo	  III,	  supra	  note	  260,	  at	  2515	  n.5	  (Scalia	  J.	  ,	  dissenting);	  see	  also	  Mitch	  Stoltz,	  
Symposium:	  Aereo	  Decision	  Injects	  Uncertainty	  into	  Copyright,	  SCOTUSblog	  (Jun.	  27,	  2014,	  2:18	  PM)	  http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-­‐aereo-­‐decision-­‐injects-­‐uncertainty-­‐into-­‐copyright/	  	  (Justice	  Breyer’s	  majority	  opinion…	  was	  driven	  by	  legislative	  history	  and	  first	  principles,	  with	  analysis	  of	  the	  statutory	  text	  an	  afterthought.	  That	  approach	  turned	  a	  pure	  question	  of	  statutory	  interpretation	  into	  something	  more	  like	  common	  law	  adjudication.”);	  see	  also	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1976—	  Transmit	  Clause—	  ABC,	  INC.	  v.	  Aereo,	  Inc,	  The	  Supreme	  Court—	  Leading	  Cases,	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  (2014).	  277	  See	  Matthew	  Schruers,	  “Aereo	  Copyright	  Decision	  Creates	  Uncertainty	  For	  The	  Cloud,”	  
SCOTUSblog	  (June	  26,	  2014,	  12:55	  PM)	  http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-­‐aereo-­‐copyright-­‐decision-­‐creates-­‐uncertainty-­‐for-­‐the-­‐cloud/	  (	  Because	  substaintially	  similar	  services,	  including	  terrestrial,	  statellite	  and	  Internet	  radio,	  which	  are	  treated	  quite	  differently	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act.)	  278	  See	  Mark	  P.	  Mckenna,	  The	  Limits	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Technological	  Analogies,	  SLATE	  (Jun.	  26,	  2014,	  12:07	  PM)	  http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/abc_v_aereo_ruling_the_supreme_court_s_terrible_technological_analogies.html	  (	  For	  instance,	  under	  this	  reason	  by	  analogy	  approach,	  a	  court	  may	  treat	  VCRs,	  RS-­‐DVRs	  and	  others	  identically,	  regardless	  of	  technical	  distinction,	  since	  the	  users’	  viewing	  experience	  remain	  the	  same	  and	  providers’	  commercial	  objects	  are	  the	  same.	  Further,	  as	  mentioned	  by	  a	  commentator:”	  Defining	  the	  bounds	  of	  ‘similarity’	  to	  a	  cable	  system	  will	  require	  much	  litigation,	  and	  cases	  comparing	  	  cloud	  storage	  systems	  and	  other	  new	  technologies	  against	  cable	  systems	  will	  be	  complex	  and	  expensive”.)	  279	  Fox	  TV	  Stations,	  Inc.	  v.	  AereoKiller,	  115	  F.	  Supp.	  3d	  1152	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2015).	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the	  technology	  sphere,	   in	  which	  predictability	  breeds	  innovation.”280	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  new	  technology	  providers	  are	  running	  their	  industry	  by	  using	  existing	  legal	  loopholes;	  for	  instance,	  Aereo	  itself	  was	  built	  on	  loophole	  created	  by	  Cablevision	  II	  case.	  	  Without	  a	  clear	  holding	  as	  guidance,	  it’s	  harder	  for	  innovators	  to	  start	  up	  new	  business	  with	  their	  new	  innovations	  without	  violate	  copyright	  law.281	  	   There	  are	  also	  scholars	  supported	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  the	  Aereo	  III	  case.	  Professor	  Goldstein	  stated	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  did	  not	  disregard	  Aereo’s	  technological	   arrangement—which	   “pivoted	   on	   transmission	   from	   individual,	  dedicated	   copies.”282	  The	   Supreme	   Court	   emphasized	   the	   inquiry	   of	   ownership	   or	  possession:	  “an	  entity	  that	  transmits	  a	  performance	  to	  individuals	  in	  their	  capacities	  as	   owners	   or	   possessors	   does	   not	   perform	   to	   ‘the	   public.’”283	  Professor	   Goldstein	  stated	  that	  “the	  line	  at	  the	  recipient’s	  ownership	  or	  possession	  the	  source	  copy	  will	  presumably	   exclude	   personal	   cloud	   lockers	   from	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   public	  performance	   right,”	   he	   also	   pointed	   out	   “more	   complex	   technologies	  may	   require	  more	  nuanced	  distinctions.”284	  Thus,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  the	  Aereo	  III	  still	  cannot	  be	  deemed	  as	  a	  clear	  guideline	  in	  deciding	  cases	  relevant	  to	  “on-­‐demand”	  service	  relevant	  to	  cloud	  computing.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  280Aereo	  Case	  Review,	  supra	  note	  276,	  at	  380.	  See	  Fogerty	  v.	  Fantasy,	  Inc.,	  510	  U.S.	  517,	  527	  (1994)(“Because	  copyright	  law	  ultimately	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  enriching	  the	  general	  public	  through	  access	  to	  creative	  works,	  it	  is	  peculiarly	  important	  that	  the	  boundaries	  of	  copyright	  law	  be	  demarcated	  as	  clearly	  as	  possible.”)	  281	  Cf.	  Antonin	  Scalia,	  Essay:	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  as	  a	  Law	  of	  Rules,	  56	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  1175	  (1989).	  (“Reliable	  rules	  with	  clearly	  delineated	  lines	  enable	  innovators	  to	  know	  where	  the	  law	  ends	  and	  where	  there	  is	  room	  to	  disrupt	  the	  status	  quo.”)	  282	  Goldstein,	  supra	  note	  257,	  at	  §7.7.2.	  283	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2510.	  See	  also	  id.	  284	  Id.	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   Then	   come	   the	   two	   FilmOn	   X	   cases.	   The	   FilmOn	   X	   provided	   a	   service	  “technologically	   analogous”	   to	   Aereo,285	  which	   “captures	   the	   signals	   of	   multiple	  television	   channels	   that	   are	   broadcast	   over-­‐the-­‐air	   and	   streams	   them	   over	   the	  Internet	   to	   the	  public,”286	  and	   further	  one	  of	   them	  was	  decided	  after	   the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Aereo.	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  two	  cases	  separately	  as	  FilmOn	  X	  I	  and	  FilmOn	  X	  II	   in	   later	  discussion.	   	   In	  the	  FilmOn	  X	  I,	   the	  district	  court	  for	  the	  central	  disctrict	   of	   California	   clearly	   rejected	   the	   2nd	   Circuit’s	   rule	   that	   the	   transmission	  itself	  must	  be	  public	  in	  Cablevision	  II	  case.	  Further	  the	  district	  court	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	   single	   copy	   requirement,	   which	   the	   2nd	   Circuit	   relied	   on	   was	   not	   expressly	  required	  by	  the	  statutes	  or	  the	  House	  Report.287	  The	  district	  court	  here	  showed	  its	  suspect	   to	   the	   single	   copy	   requirement,	   which	   had	   dominated	   analysis	   for	   years.	  And	   such	   suspect	   later	   had	   been	   supported	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Aereo	   III	  case.288	  It	   seems	   that	  because	  of	   the	  new	   technology,	   a	   single	   copy	   requirement	   is	  needed	  to	  be	  amended.	  	   In	  FilmOn	  X	  II	  case,	  the	  district	  court	  noticed	  a	  new	  thing:	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  only	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   “nearly-­‐simultaneous	   retransmissions	   constitute	   public	  performance”,289	  but	   it	   did	   not	   addressed	   the	   “time-­‐delayed	   retransmission.”290	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  285	  Fox	  TV	  Stations	  v.	  BarryDriller	  Content	  Sys.,	  	  915	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1138,	  1141	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2012)[hereinafter	  FilmOn	  X	  I].	  286	  Fox	  TV	  Stations.	  Inc.	  v.	  Filmon	  X	  LLC.	  2015	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  161304,	  	  (D.D.C.	  Dec.	  2,	  2015).	  At	  *	  16.[hereinafter	  FilmOn	  X	  II}.	  287	  FilmOn	  X	  I,	  supra	  note	  285.	  at	  1144-­‐45.	  (“…	  the	  House	  Report	  did	  not	  discuss	  which	  copy	  of	  a	  work	  a	  transmission	  was	  made	  from.	  The	  statute	  provides	  an	  exclusive	  right	  to	  transmit	  a	  performance	  publicly,	  but	  does	  not	  by	  its	  express	  terms	  require	  that	  two	  members	  of	  the	  public	  receive	  the	  performance	  from	  the	  same	  transmission.”	  288	  Aereo	  III,	  supra	  note	  260,	  at	  2549.	  289	  FilmOn	  X	  II,	  supra	  note	  286,	  at	  *83.	  290	  Id,	  at	  *24,	  n.6.	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the	   district	   court’s	   opinion,	   “Aereo	   III’s	   reasoning	   should	   be	   extended	   to	   time-­‐delayed	   retransmission.”291	  The	   court	   gave	   two	   reason:	   (1)	   FilmOn	   X’s	   function	  enabled	  customers	  “capable	  of	  receiving”	  the	  same	  “perceptible	  images	  and	  sounds”	  of	  over-­‐the-­‐air	  program,	  292	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  its	  nearly-­‐simultaneous	  transmission	  service.	  (2)	  The	  defendant	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  equipment	  supplier	  that	  operates	  under	  its	   customers’	   directions.293	  As	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Aereo	   III	  case	   avoided	   judging	   whether	   cloud	   storage	   of	   content,	   this	   FilmOn	   X	   II	   case	  followed	   such	   trend	   by	   stating	   that	   FilmOn	   X’s	   technology	   is	  more	   similar	   to	   the	  counter-­‐part	   of	   nearly-­‐simultaneous	   retransmissions	   than	   cloud	   storage	   service.	  Another	   lower	   court	   also	   decided	   a	   case	   after	   Aereo	   III.294	  The	   defendant	   Dish	  Anywhere	   allow	   users	   to	   watch	   network	   programming	   from	   devices	   with	   an	  Internet	   connection	   by	   transmitting	   from	   their	   own	   home	   STB(Sling)/DVR	   or	  authorized	   recorded	   content	   on	   that	   Sling.295	  The	  District	   court	   refused	   to	   extend	  Aereo	   III’s	   rule	   that	   “technology	   bearing	   on	   overwhelming	   likeness	   to	   cable	  companies	   publicly	   perform	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   transmit	   clause”	   to	   Dish	  Anywhere.296	  	  	   As	   a	   consequence,	   courts’	   reaction	   to	   cases	   relevant	   to	   the	   right	   of	   public	  performance	  under	   cloud	   computing	   technology	   context	   is	  not	  predictable.	   	  But	   it	  seems	   that	   cloud	   streaming	   or	   cloud	   storage	   service	   providers	   could	   still	   take	   a	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  Id,	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  *88.	  292	  Aereo	  III,	  supra	  note	  260,	  at	  2509-­‐510.	  293	  FilmOnX	  II,	  supra	  note	  286,	  at	  *88.	  294	  Fox	  Broadcasting	  Company	  v.	  Dish	  Network,	  LLC,	  No.	  CV	  12-­‐04529	  DMG	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2015).	  295	  Id,	  at	  *20-­‐22.	  296	  Emily	  M.	  Lanza,	  Aereo	  and	  FilmOn	  X:	  Internet	  Television	  Streaming	  and	  Copyright	  Law,	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  7-­‐5700,	  R	  43359,	  at	  13	  (Jan.	  22,	  2015).	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breathe,	  since	  lower	  courts	  follow	  Aereo	  III’s	  limited	  ruling	  and	  refused	  to	  extend	  it	  to	  their	  service	  now.	  
D. MP3tunes	  Case	  	   Since	   whether	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   Aereo	   III	   case	   could	   be	  extended	   to	   the	   cloud	   computing	   area	   is	   still	   being	   questionable,	   this	   section	  will	  discuss	   the	   only	   one	   famous	   case	   really	   involved	   cloud	   storage	   service	   and	  deduplication	   technology—MP3tunes	   case.	   	   Although	   this	   case	  was	   judged	   before	  the	  Aereo	  III	  case,	   in	  my	  opinion,	   its	  decision	  about	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  did	  not	  go	  against	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision.	  	  	   The	  defendant’s	  website	  mp3tunes	  provided	  personal	  online	   storage	  music	  locker,	   which	   allowed	   users	   to	   upload	   music	   to	   their	   private	   lockers	   from	   their	  personal	   computers	   or	   from	   a	   third	   party’s	  website	   by	   providing	   a	   useful	  URL.297	  The	   plaintiff	   claimed	   that	   the	   defendant’s	   utilize	   of	   “master	   copy”	   to	   rebroadcast	  songs	   from	   the	   central	   “lockers”	   to	   its	   customers	   infringe	   the	   copyright	   owners’	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  based	  on	   the	  Cablevision	   II	   rule.	  However,	   the	  district	  court	  rejected	  such	  claim	  by	  stating	   two	  reasons:	   (1)	   there’s	  no	  such	  master	  copy,	  it’s	   just	  the	  compression	  algorithm	  to	  determine	  which	  music	  files	  were	  composed	  of	  the	  same	  coding	  and	  eliminate	  redundant	  digital	  data.298	  There	  are	  still	  numerous	  variously-­‐coded	   copies	   of	   the	   same	   song	   remained	   on	   the	   defendant’s	   cloud	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  Capital	  Records,	  Inc.	  v.	  MP3tunes,	  LLC,	  821	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  627,	  634-­‐35	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2011).	  298	  Id,	  at	  634.	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server.299(2)	   The	   defendant	   is	   an	   ISP,	   which	   is	   different	   from	   cable	   provider	   in	  Cablevision	  II	  case.	  Thus	  it’s	  “inapposite”	  to	  rely	  on	  Cablevision	  II	  case’s	  decision.300	  	   	  	   By	   analyzing	   these	   cases	   and	   reading	   the	   statute	   of	   the	   right	   of	   public	  performance,	  we	   can	   easily	   understand	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   the	   transmit	   clause	   is	   the	   key	  point	   in	   considering	   issues	   relevant	   to	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public.	  Because	  the	  transmit	  clause	  covers	  not	  only	   the	  “initial	  rendition	  or	  showing”	  of	  a	  work,	  but	  also	  all	  further	  acts	  by	  which	  such	  “rendition	  or	  showing	  is	  transmitted	  or	  communicated	   to	   the	   public.”301	  It	   can	   regulate	   live	   streaming	   or	   on-­‐demanded	  video/audio	   online.	   But,	   the	   transmit	   clause	   itself	   is	   unclear.	   According	   to	   these	  cases,	  we	  know	   that	   there	  are	  actually	   four	  elements	   that	  altogether	   can	   trigger	  a	  public	   performance.302 	  But	   what’s	   under	   dispute	   are	   two	   of	   them:	   (1)	   what’s	  performance?—who	  performs?	  (2)	  how	  to	  define	  “publicly”?	  For	  the	  first	  question,	  the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   Aereo	   III	   has	   logic	   defect.	   It	   proved	   that	   Aereo	  performed	  by	  its	  “looks	  like	  cable”	  analogy:	  because	  Cable	  TV	  is	  allowed	  to	  perform	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Law,	  Aereo’	  system	  is	  similar	  to	  Cable	  TV’s	  and	  they	  probably	  share	  the	  same	  result.	   	  The	  missing	  key	  concern	  here	   is	  volitional	  conduct.	   It’s	   the	  key	   in	   deciding	   whether	   Aereo	   directly	   infringe	   the	   right	   of	   public	   performance.	  Without	   such	   analysis,	   one	   cannot	   tell	   Aereo	   violate	   such	   right.	   And	   there’s	   no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  299	  Id,	  at	  650.	  300	  Id.	  301	  See	  H.R.	  REP.	  No.	  94-­‐1476,	  at	  63	  (1976).	  302	  See	  Emily	  M.	  Lanza,	  supra	  note	  296,	  at	  4.	  (Four	  elements	  are	  (1)	  a	  transmission	  or	  other	  communication,	  (2)	  of	  a	  performance	  of	  the	  work,	  (3)	  to	  members	  of	  the	  public	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  receiving	  the	  performance,and	  (4)	  where	  the	  transmission	  either	  is	  to	  a	  public	  or	  semi-­‐public	  place,	  or	  is	  to	  members	  of	  the	  public	  who	  may	  be	  separated	  geographically	  or	  temporally	  or	  both.)	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specific	   detail	   in	   its	   “looks	   like	   cable”	   analogy.	   The	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	  became	  less	  reliable	  to	  me	  because	  of	  these	  issues	  on	  this	  question.	  Then	  comes	  the	  definition	  of	  “public”.	  As	  we	  mentioned	  in	  the	  former	  part,	  almost	  all	  courts	   in	  the	  U.S.	  had	  adopted	  “a	  single	  copy	  requirement”	  for	  years.	  And	  now	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  made	   a	   change	   to	   it:	   when	   an	   entity	   transmits	   the	   same	   contemporaneously	  perceptible	  images	  and	  sounds,	  no	  matter	  from	  same	  or	  separate	  copies,	  it	  performs	  the	  same	  work.303	  This	  change	  seems	  reasonable	  for	  now	  because	  of	  the	  technology	  development—deduplication.	   But,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   clearly	   mentioned	   its	   rule	  limited	  to	  “Cable	  TV	  and	  equivalence”,	  could	  it	  be	  extended	  to	  cloud	  storage	  service	  with	  deduplication	  process?304	  	  This	  issue	  will	  be	  analyzed	  this	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  	   What	  we	  know	  now	  is	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  attitude	  in	  deciding	  such	  issues—rely	   on	   the	   legislative	   history	   and	   the	   Congress	   intent.	   Such	   attitude	   led	   to	   its	  unpredictable	   judgment	   of	   future	   cases	   that	   relevant	   to	   cloud	   computing,	   this	  situation	   is	   particularly	   dangerous	   in	   the	   technology	   sphere	   as	   I	   mentioned	   in	  former	  part.305	  	  This	  question	  is	  not	  like	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  temporary	  copy	  should	  fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   right	   of	   reproduction.	   Because	   most	   kind	   of	   temporary	  copies	   are	   essential	   in	   process,	   which	   cannot	   be,	   avoid.	   So,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	  there	   should	   be	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   analysis	   undertaken.	   It’s	   better	   for	   the	   courts	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  303	  Aereo	  III,	  supra	  note	  260,	  at	  2509.	  304	  Joan	  E,	  Solsman,	  How	  Supreme	  Court	  Ruling	  Affects	  Aereo,	  The	  Cloud	  and	  You,	  CNET	  (Jun.	  26,	  2014)	  http://www.cnet.com/news/how-­‐the-­‐supreme-­‐court-­‐ruling-­‐affects-­‐aereo-­‐the-­‐cloud-­‐and-­‐you/	  (Prof.	  Litman:	  “We	  know	  what	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  intends	  to	  do,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  Aereo	  is	  illegal	  and	  nothing	  else…but	  there’s	  a	  bunch	  of	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  attempted	  carve-­‐out	  of	  cloud	  storage	  services.	  What	  now	  happens	  to	  all	  of	  my	  Kindle	  books	  in	  Amazon’s	  cloud?	  Am	  I	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  book?	  Am	  I	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  digital	  copy?	  Am	  I	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  license?	  Whether	  one	  is	  the	  owner	  or	  possessor	  of	  content	  is	  pretty	  much	  up	  in	  the	  air.	  There	  will	  be	  a	  lot	  to	  litigate.”)	  305Aereo	  Case	  Review,	  supra	  note	  276,	  at	  380.	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decide	  by	  analyzing	  specific	   facts	  of	  each	  case.	  But	  whether	  cloud	  service	  provider	  “perform”	  or	  not,	  is	  decided	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  contour	  of	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance.	   If	   there’s	   bright	   line	   for	   it,	   cloud	   service	   provider	   could	   use	   their	  technical	   innovation	   in	   avoiding	   such	   kind	   of	   violations.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   in	  my	  opinion,	  as	   Justice	  Scalia	   stated,	   it’s	   the	   job	  of	   the	  Congress	   to	  decide	  whether	   the	  Copyright	  Act	  needs	  an	  upgrade,	  and	  it’s	  about	  the	  right	  time.	  	  
ii. The EU Part 	   Although	   EU	   has	   several	   directives	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	   authors’	   right	   of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  they	  are	  not	  enough	  in	  solving	  the	  existing	  problems	  brought	  by	  new	   types	  of	  online	  dissemination	  of	   copyrighted	  works.	  For	   instance,	  when	  people	  streaming	  video	  online,	  are	  such	  acts	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  actually	  being	  covered	  by	  the	  copyright	  owners’	  exclusive	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public?	  To	  analyze	  such	  issues,	  we	  will	  observe	  how	  amendments	  to	  the	  right	  of	  communication	   to	   the	   public	   develops	   in	   these	   directives,	   and	   focus	   on	   the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  since	  it	  was	  the	  latest	  one	  been	  changed.	  By	  following	  the	   timeline	   of	   these	   amendments,	  we	  will	   have	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	  what’s	  EU’s	   legislators’	   intent	   behind	   such	   amendments	   and	   speculation	   of	   how	   EU	   will	  solve	  current	  legal	  issue	  as	  a	  result	  of	  developing	  technology.	  	  	   Further,	   since	   the	   courts,	   notably	   the	   ECJ	   is	   playing	   a	   more	   and	   more	  important	  role	  in	  interpreting	  and	  drawing	  a	  clear	  contour	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  a	  study	  of	  current	  cases	  in	  understanding	  how	  EU	  countries	  dealing	  with	   such	   issues	  at	   the	   first	  place	   is	   important.	   Lots	  of	  different	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cases	   were	   submitted	   to	   the	   ECJ	   and	   requested	   its	   preliminary	   ruling.	   Based	   on	  several	   decided	   cases	   by	   the	   ECJ,	   four	   main	   complementary	   criteria	   for	   the	  assessment	   of	   whether	   a	   specific	   act	   of	   communication	   constitutes	   a	  ‘communication	   to	   the	   public’	   had	   been	   distilled	   from	   them.	   They	   are:	   (1)	   the	  identity	  of	  the	  “user;”(2)	  definition	  of	  the	  “public”;	  (3)	  The	  profit-­‐making	  nature	  of	  communication	   to	   the	  public;	   (4)	   the	  concept	  of	   “new	  public.”306	  Established	  by	   to	  the	  court,	   these	   four	  criteria	   “are	  not	  autonomous	  and	  are	   interdependent,”307	  and	  “must	  be	  applied	  individually	  and	  in	  the	  light	  of	  their	  interaction	  with	  one	  another,	  given	  that	  in	  different	  specific	  situations,	  they	  may	  be	  met	  to	  varying	  degrees.”308	  In	  my	  opinion,	   “new	  public”	   can	  be	  analyzed	  under	   the	  notion	  of	   “public”,	   since	   they	  are	   both	   notions	   relevant	   to	   the	   audiences.	   The	   following	   parts	   will	   separately	  analyze	  these	  three	  main	  criteria	  under	  different	  directives.	  	   The	  Software	  Directive	  at	  first	  did	  not	  regulate	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  	  	  So	  we	  will	  directly	  start	  with	  the	  1992	  Rental	  and	  Lending	  Directive.	  
A. Rental	  and	  Lending	  Directive	  	   This	   Directive	   is	   the	   first	   one	   deal	   with	   the	   right	   of	   broadcasting	   and	  communication	   to	   the	  public,	   however,	   such	   right	  was	   granted	   to	  performers	   and	  broadcasting	  organizations	   restrictedly.309	  The	  exclusive	   right	  granted	  by	  Article	  8	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  Case	  C-­‐306/05,	  SGAE	  v.	  Rafael	  Hotels,	  2006	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐	  11519.(The	  court	  set	  up	  these	  four	  basic	  criteria	  which	  were	  further	  being	  applied	  in	  FAPL	  case,	  Airfield	  case	  and	  others.	  However,	  these	  are	  just	  four	  main	  criteria,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  discuss	  other	  relevant	  issues,	  for	  instance,	  notion	  of	  communication,	  physical	  equipment	  requirement.)	  307	  Case	  C-­‐135/10,	  Societa	  Consortile	  Fonografici	  (SCF)	  v.	  Marco	  Del	  Corso	  2012.	  308	  Id,	  para.	  79.	  309	  Council	  Directive	  92/100/EEC	  of	  19	  November	  1992	  on	  rental	  right	  and	  lending	  right	  and	  on	  certain	  rights	  related	  to	  copyright	  in	  the	  field	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  O.J.	  L	  346	  27	  November	  1992	  (61),	  replaced	  in	  2006.	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only	   covers	   the	   broadcasting	   and	   communication	   of	   live	   performances	   (the	  communication	  needs	  not	  be	  simultaneous,	  but	  it	  has	  to	  be	  the	  first	  communication	  following	  the	  performance	  itself).310	  	  	   When	  consider	  about	  a	  former	  fixation	  or	  broadcasting	  intervenes,	  Article	  8	  only	  grants	  a	  right	  to	  remuneration.	  Recently,	  only	  Article	  8	  from	  rental	  and	  lending	  directive	  is	  still	  being	  discussed	  together	  with	  Article	  3(1)	  from	  Information	  Society	  Directive	   when	   analyzing	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public.	  	  However,	   since	   the	  right	  of	   communication	   to	   the	  public	   in	   the	  rental	  and	   lending	  directive	   is	   a	   compensatory	   right,	   which	   is	   mainly	   of	   a	   financial	   nature;	   but	   the	  communication	  right	  in	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  is	  a	  right	  of	  preventive	  nature,	  the	  court	  had	  to	  have	  a	  individual	  assessment	  of	  such	  right	  under	  Article	  8	  in	  Rental	  and	  Lending	  Directive.311	  	  	   In	   SCF	   case,	   the	   dentist	  was	   providing	   the	   radio	   signals	   free	   of	   charge	   and	  without	  any	  active	  choice	  on	   the	  part	  of	  his	  patients,	  312	  and	  we	  will	  analyze	   three	  criteria	  mentioned	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  “identity	  of	  user”(the	  user	  is	  a	  person	  using	  a	  means	  of	  communication).	  According	  to	  the	  court,	  the	  users	  make	  an	  act	  of	  communication	  when	   it	   intervenes,	  with	   full	  knowledge	  of	   the	  consequences	  of	   its	  action,	  to	  give	  its	  customers	  access	  to	  a	  broadcast	  containing	  the	  copyrighted	  work.	  Without	   the	  user’s	   intervention,	   although	   its	   customers	  physically	  within	   the	  area	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  187.	  311	  See	  SCF	  case,	  supra	  note	  307.	  C-­‐133/12,	  Stichting	  Woonlinie,	  et.	  v.	  European	  Commssion	  2013	  paras.	  74-­‐77.	  312	  Id.	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covered	  by	  the	  broadcast,	  they	  are	  not	  able	  to	  enjoy	  the	  broadcast	  work.313	  Further	  with	  other	  courts	  applied	  such	  notion,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  notion	  of	   “user”	  has	  been	  defined	  in	  a	  very	  flexible	  way	  without	  further	  question.	  Then,	  the	  court	  determined	  “the	  definition	  of	  public,”	  it	  “refers	  to	  an	  indeterminate	  number	  of	  potential	  listeners	  and	  a	  fairly	  large	  number	  of	  people.”314	  Further,	  based	  on	  the	  profit-­‐making	  nature,	  it	  also	  ruled	  that	  the	  public	  is	  “targeted”	  and	  not	  “merely	  caught	  by	  chance.”315	  But	  in	   this	  case,	   the	  customers	  of	  dentist	  generally	   formed	  “a	  very	  consistent	  group	  of	  persons”	   and	   thus	   constituted	   a	   “determined	   circle”	   of	   potential	   recipients,	   rather	  than	  a	  “public	  of	  persons	  in	  general.”316	  At	  last,	  court	  considered	  the	  “profit-­‐making	  nature”	   criteria,	   consequence	   thereof,	   there’s	   “no	   communication	   to	   public.”317	  According	   to	   the	   court,	   there’s	   no	   impact	   on	   income	   of	   the	   dentist,	   without	   such	  profit-­‐making	  nature,	  this	  criteria	  cannot	  be	  fulfilled.	  What	  we	  need	  to	  notice	  here	  is	  that	  the	  court	  gave	  its	  reason	  of	  considering	  this	  “profit-­‐making	  nature”	  criteria	  here:	  “this	  must	  be	  all	  the	  more	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  right	  to	  equitable	  remuneration…	  given	  its	  essentially	  financial	  nature.”318	  	  	   Some	  other	  cases	  also	  analyzed	  this	  criteria,	  the	  court	  in	  SGAE	  case	  reiterated	  the	  “not	  irrelevant”	  reason.319	  Further	  it	  also	  justified	  its	  reason	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  FAPL	  Case,	  “it	   is	   indisputable	  that	  the	  proprietor	  transmits	  the	  broadcast	  works	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  313	  Id,	  para.	  82.	  Further,	  the	  court	  of	  Case	  C-­‐162/10	  Phonographic	  Performance	  v	  Ireland,	  applied	  this	  criteria	  in	  2011.	  314	  SCF	  case,	  supra	  note	  307,	  para.	  84.	  See	  also	  PPL	  v.	  Ireland	  case,	  supra	  note	  313,	  para.	  33.	  315	  SCF	  case,	  supra	  note	  307,	  para.	  91.	  316	  Id,	  	  paras.	  95-­‐96.	  317	  Id,	  para.	  100.	  318	  Id,	  	  paras.	  89-­‐90.	  Article	  3(1)	  in	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  does	  not	  bring	  the	  “profit-­‐making	  nature”	  into	  consideration,	  but	  the	  court	  of	  FAPL	  case	  held	  that	  it’s	  not	  irrelevant	  that	  a	  communication	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  InfoSoc	  directive	  is	  of	  a	  profit-­‐making	  nature.	  319	  SGAE	  case,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.	  204.	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his	  public	  house	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  therefrom	  and	  that	  that	  transmission	  is	  liable	  to	  attract	  customers	  to	  whom	  the	  works	  transmitted	  are	  of	  interest.	  Consequently,	  the	  transmission	   in	   question	   has	   an	   effect	   upon	   the	   number	   of	   people	   going	   to	   that	  establishment	  and,	  ultimately,	  on	  its	  financial	  results.”320	  As	  mentioned,	  neither	  Art	  3(1)	   of	   Information	   Society	   Directive	   nor	   WCT	   or	   WPPT	   suggested	   that	   the	  communication	  should	  be	  motivated	  by	  profit,	  the	  SGAE	  court	  gave	  an	  explanation:	  “even	  taking	  the	  view,	  as	  does	  the	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	   that	  the	   pursuit	   of	   profit	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  it	  is	  in	  any	  event	  established	  that	  the	  communication	  is	   of	   a	   profit-­‐making	   nature	   in	   circumstances	   such	   as	   those	   in	   the	   main	  proceeding.”321	  	  	   However,	  the	  court	  in	  TVCatChup	  case	  rejected	  to	  take	  “profit-­‐making	  nature”	  into	   consideration:	   “However,	   it	   has	   acknowledged	   that	   a	   profit-­‐making	   nature	   is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  essential	   condition	   for	   the	  existence	  of	   a	   communication	   to	   the	  public.” 322 	  So	   whether	   ECJ	   further	   will	   apply	   this	   criterion	   is	   stilled	   being	  questioned.323	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  Id.	  321	  Id,	  para.44	  322	  Case	  C-­‐607/11	  ITV	  Broadcasting	  Ltd.	  v.	  TVCatchup	  Ltd.	  	  2013.	  323	  Lucie	  Guibault	  &	  Joao	  Pedro	  Quintais,	  Copyright,	  Technology	  and	  the	  Exploitation	  of	  
Audiovisual	  Works	  in	  the	  EU	  (2014),	  at	  8.	  http://www.obs.coe.int/documents/205595/7944996/IRIS+plus+2014-­‐4_EN_LA.pdf	  	  (	  Such	  profit-­‐making	  nature	  interpretation	  was	  retained,	  which	  is	  surprising	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  contradict	  the	  age-­‐old	  licensing	  practice	  of	  collective	  management	  organizations	  in	  the	  area	  of	  public	  performance	  of	  musical	  works.	  Without	  considering	  the	  commercial	  nature	  that	  the	  activity	  pursued,	  CMOs	  grant	  licenses	  to	  users	  of	  musical	  works	  who	  perform	  the	  works	  in	  public.	  As	  a	  result,	  licenses	  are	  granted	  to	  public	  and	  social	  institutions	  as	  hospitals,	  care	  homes	  and	  schools.	  So	  the	  questions	  arise,	  whether	  the	  court’s	  interpretation	  of	  profit-­‐making	  nature	  would	  affect	  this	  traditional	  practice	  of	  CMOs.)	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B. Satellite	  and	  Cable	  Directive	  	   Standing	  by	  the	  authors,	  Satellite	  and	  cable	  directive	  initially	  use	  the	  right	  of	  communication	   to	   the	   public	   in	   regulating	   authors’	   copyrighted	   works	   and	   such	  regulation	   remained	   unchanged	   since	   1993.	   	   Basically,	   Article	   2	   and	   Article	   8	  regulate	  the	  right	  of	  satellite	  broadcast	  and	  retransmission	  via	  cable:	  “Member	  State	  shall	   provide	   an	   exclusive	   right	   for	   the	   author	   to	   authorize	   the	   communication	   to	  the	  public	  by	  satellite	  of	  copyright	  works…”	  and	  “	  …such	  retransmission	  takes	  place	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   individual	   or	   collective	   contractual	   agreements	  …”	  However,	   since	  only	   two	   forms	   of	   transmission	   of	   works	   are	   covered	   in	   this	   directive:	   satellite	  broadcasting	  and	  cable	  retransmission324	  of	  broadcast,	  and	  further	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  provided	  and	  caused	  harmonization	  led	  to	  a	  more	  inclusive	  right	  of	  communication,	   inter	   alia,	   acts	   of	   satellite	   broadcasting	   and	   cable	   retransmission,	  we	  will	  not	  analyze	  this	  article	  in	  details	  here.	  	  
C. Database	  Directive	  	   Database	   Directive	   was	   the	   second	   EU	   directive	   to	   regulate	   the	   right	   of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  325	  Article	  5	  (c)	  (d)(e)	  states	  that	  the	  author	  shall	  have	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  carry	  out	  or	  to	  authorize	  the	  distribution,	  the	  communication,	  display	   or	   performance	   to	   the	  public	   of	   the	   copyright	   protected	   expression	  of	   the	  database	  and	  of	  its	  adaptions.	  Although	  it	  provides	  a	  more	  general	  scope	  (protected	  object,	   authorship)	   than	   satellite	   and	   cable	   directive,	   it	   only	   relevant	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  324	  Cable	  retransmission	  is	  characterized	  as	  “	  the	  simultaneous,	  unaltered	  and	  unabridged	  retransmission	  by	  a	  cable	  or	  microwave	  system	  for	  reception	  by	  the	  public	  of	  an	  initial	  transmission	  from	  another	  Member	  States.”	  Hugenholtz	  P.B.,	  SatCab.	  Revisited:	  The	  Past,	  
Present	  and	  Future	  of	  the	  Satellite	  and	  Cable	  Directive,	  2009	  IRIS	  plus	  7	  (2009).	  325	  Database	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  140.	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expression	  of	  database	  and	  its	  adaptions.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  we	  will	  not	  discuss	  it	  in	  details	  here	  since	  it’s	  not	  relevant	  to	  our	  issue.	  	  
D. Information	  Society	  Directive	  	   Following	   former	   directives,	   it’s	   clear	   that	   EU’s	   intent	   to	   grant	   copyright	  owners	   exclusive	   right	   of	   the	   communication	   to	   the	   public	  when	   new	   technology	  affects	  the	  existing	  copyright.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  right	  to	  make	  works	  publicly	  available	   in	   Information	  Society	  Directive	   is	   the	  most	   recently	   inserted	  statutes	  as	  required	   by	   WCT, 326 	  in	   dealing	   with	   new	   forms	   of	   online	   communication	   of	  copyrighted	  works.327	  But,	   cloud	   computing	   technology,	  here	   especially	   streaming,	  video-­‐on-­‐demand	  or	  webcasting	  are	  in	  doubt	  on	  whether	  they	  could	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  broader	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  under	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  context.	  	   Article	  3(1)	  of	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  grants	  authors	  an	  exclusive	  right	  “to	  authorize	  or	  prohibit	  any	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works,	  by	  wire	  or	  wireless	  means,	  including	  the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works	  in	  such	  a	  way	   that	   members	   of	   the	   public	   may	   access	   them	   from	   a	   place	   and	   at	   a	   time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them.”328	  This	  is	  a	  general	  right	  explicitly	  covers	  interactive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  326	  WCT,	  supra	  note	  230,	  article	  8	  ;	  WIPO	  Performances	  and	  Phonograms	  Treaty,	  Dec.	  20,	  1996,	  36	  I.L.M.	  76	  (1997)[hereinafter	  WPPT],	  art.	  10	  &	  14.	  	  327	  The	  Commission	  was	  urged	  to	  undertake	  actions	  in	  dealing	  with	  digital	  service	  based	  on	  “on	  demand	  transmissions”,	  since	  such	  service	  was	  new	  and	  without	  counterpart	  in	  the	  analogue	  world.	  And	  because	  without	  an	  uniform	  harmonized	  rule,	  Member	  states	  may	  treat	  these	  services	  in	  different	  or	  even	  contradictory	  ways.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  both	  fulfilling	  the	  requirement	  of	  WCT	  and	  filling	  the	  lacunae	  caused	  by	  technology	  revolution,	  Article	  3(1)	  appeared.	  328	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  art	  3(1).	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on-­‐demand	  service	  online,	  which	  is	  the	  main	  objective	  of	  this	  amendment.329	  Based	  on	   several	   cases,	   the	   ECJ	   gave	   its	   general	   principle	   in	   interpreting	   this	   exclusive	  right:	   “A	  provision	  of	   EU	   law	  must	   be	   interpreted	  by	   considering	   its	  wording,	   the	  context	   in	  which	   it	   occurs,	   and	   the	   objectives	   pursued	   by	   the	   rules	   of	  which	   it	   is	  part.”330	  Further	   this	   right	   should	   be	   interpreted	   broadly	   as	   required	   by	   recital	  23,331	  but	  also	  “essential	  to	  achieve	  the	  principal	  objective	  of	  that	  directive.”332	  	   Actually,	   article	   3(1)	   provides	   authors 333 	  two	   rights:	   the	   right	   of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  and	  the	  right	  of	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public.	  We	  will	  discuss	  these	  two	  rights	  separately	  via	  analyzing	  their	  different	  characteristics.	  	  
a. The	  Right	  of	  Communication	  to	  the	  Public	  	   The	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   is	   actually	   an	   “umbrella”	   right,	   it	  almost	   provide	   shelter	   to	   all	   traditional	   forms	   of	   communication:	   “any	   such	  transmission	  or	  retransmission	  of	  a	  work	  to	  the	  public	  by	  wire	  or	  wireless	  means,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  329	  Id,	  recital	  25.	  (“The	  legal	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  nature	  and	  the	  level	  of	  protection	  of	  acts	  of	  on-­‐demand	  transmission	  of	  copyright	  works	  and	  subject-­‐matter	  protected	  by	  related	  rights	  over	  networks	  should	  be	  overcome	  by	  providing	  for	  harmonized	  protection	  at	  Community	  level.	  It	  should	  be	  made	  clear	  that	  all	  right	  holders	  recognized	  by	  this	  Directive	  should	  have	  an	  exclusive	  right	  to	  make	  available	  to	  the	  public	  copyright	  works	  or	  any	  other	  subject-­‐matter	  by	  way	  of	  interactive	  on-­‐demand	  transmissions.	  Such	  interactive	  on-­‐demand	  transmissions	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  members	  of	  the	  public	  may	  access	  them	  from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them.”)	  330	  Sari	  Depreeuw,	  THE	  VARIABLE	  SCOPE	  OF	  THE	  EXCLUSIVE	  ECONOMIC	  RIGHTS	  IN	  COPYRIGHT	  421	  (2014).	  (SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.33-­‐3;	  FAPL,	  supra	  note	  151,	  para.	  185-­‐19;	  SCF,	  supra	  note	  309,	  para.	  7;	  TVCatchup,	  supra	  note	  322,	  para.	  20.)	  331	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  23.(“This	  right	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  covering	  all	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  not	  present	  at	  the	  place	  where	  the	  communication	  originates.”)	  	  332	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.	  36.	  (“which	  …	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  of,	  inter	  alios,	  authors,	  allowing	  them	  to	  obtain	  an	  appropriate	  reward	  for	  the	  use	  of	  their	  works,	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.”)	  333	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  Commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  408,	  para.	  11.15.	  (The	  directive	  does	  not	  define	  the	  “authors,”	  therefor	  “anyone	  who	  is	  considered	  an	  author	  according	  to	  the	  national	  law	  of	  a	  EU	  Member	  State	  is	  covered	  by	  the	  Directive.”	  )	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including	   broadcasting.”334	  However,	   such	   right	   also	   does	   not	   cover	   all	   aspects.	  Despite	   the	   GUI	   and	   act	   of	   merely	   receiving,	   there’re	   two	   other	   limitations	   here.	  First,	   there’s	   a	   distance	   limitation	   here,	   which	   requires	   that	   the	   transmission	  originates	  from	  one	  place	  and	  is	  received	  in	  another.335	  According	  to	  Recital	  27,	  the	  mere	  provision	  of	  physical	  facilities	  for	  enabling	  or	  making	  a	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  constitute	  a	  ‘communication	  to	  the	  public.’336	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  some	   cases,	   the	   court	   also	   distinguished	   an	   act	   of	   communication	   from	   the	  “technical	  means	  of	  reception.”337	  	  In	  SGAE	  case,	  a	  hotel	  owner	  installed	  an	  antenna	  and	   then	   used	   it	   to	   transmit	   the	   captured	   TV	   broadcasts	   to	   televisions	   set	   in	   his	  hotel	  rooms,	  the	  court	  ruled	  that	  such	  act	  was	  not	  just	  technical	  means	  of	  ensure	  or	  improve	   reception.338 	  According	   to	   the	   court’s	   opinion,	   the	   mere	   provision	   of	  physical	   facilities	   “usually,	   besides	   the	  hotel,	   companies	   specializing	   in	   the	   sale	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  334	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  23.	  (However,	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  TV	  broadcasting	  of	  a	  graphic	  user	  interface	  as	  held	  by	  the	  court	  in	  BSA	  case.	  The	  court	  took	  the	  particular	  features	  of	  a	  GUI	  into	  account	  and	  then	  concluded	  that	  the	  public	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  work’s	  essential	  element.	  Further,	  this	  right	  neither	  cover	  the	  act	  of	  merely	  receiving	  the	  privately	  based	  on	  the	  rule	  of	  FAPL	  case:	  “mere	  reception	  as	  such	  o	  those	  broadcasts	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  picking	  up	  of	  the	  broadcasts	  and	  their	  visual	  display	  –	  in	  private	  circle	  does	  not	  reveal	  an	  act	  restricted	  by	  EU	  legislation…	  and	  that	  act	  is	  therefor	  lawful.”)	  Case	  C-­‐393/09	  	  Bezpečnostní	  softwarová	  asociace	  –	  Svaz	  softwarové	  ochrany	  v.	  Ministerstvo	  kultury	  2010	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐13971,	  	  paras.	  52-­‐58.	  See	  FAPL,	  supra	  note	  151,	  para.	  171.	  335	  FAPL	  Case,	  id,	  paras.	  201-­‐203.(	  this	  right	  should	  be	  understand	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  covering	  all	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  not	  present	  at	  the	  place	  where	  the	  communication	  originates…	  and	  the	  court	  also	  held	  that	  Recital	  23	  referred	  only	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  public	  was	  in	  direct	  physical	  contact	  with	  actors	  or	  performers	  of	  works.)	  336	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  27.	  (	  This	  principle	  is	  based	  on	  the	  rule	  set	  out	  in	  the	  agreed	  statement	  concerning	  Article	  8	  WCT:”	  it	  is	  understood	  that	  the	  mere	  provision	  of	  physical	  facilities	  for	  enabling	  or	  making	  a	  communication	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  amount	  to	  communication	  within	  the	  meaning	  this	  Treaty	  or	  the	  Berne	  Convention.”)	  337	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.	  4;	  TVCatChup,	  supra	  note	  322,	  para.	  29.	  338	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.	  42.	  (The	  court	  states:	  “	  the	  hotel	  is	  the	  organization	  which	  intervenes,	  in	  full	  knowledge	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  its	  action,	  to	  give	  access	  to	  the	  protected	  work	  to	  its	  customers.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  that	  intervention,	  its	  customers,	  although	  physically	  within	  that	  area,	  would	  not,	  in	  principle,	  be	  able	  to	  enjoy	  the	  broadcast	  work.”)	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hire	  of	   television	  sets”	  and	  such	  acts	  do	  not	  constitute	  an	  act	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.339	  Then	  in	  OSDD	  case,	  which	  shared	  a	  similar	  background	  with	  the	  SGAE	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  stood	  by	  it	  ruling	  in	  SGAE	  case:	  any	  technical	  intervention	  of	  the	  hotel	  owner	  that	  allows	  its	  customers	  to	  capture	  the	  signal	   in	  their	  rooms	  and	  to	  access	  the	   broadcast	  work,	   regardless	   of	   the	   concrete	   configuration	   of	   the	   installation	   in	  the	  hotel,	  is	  considered	  a	  communication.340	  Also,	  in	  TVCatChup	  case,	  the	  defendant	  offers	   real-­‐time	   streaming	   of	   TV	   broadcasts	   via	   Internet	   to	   UK	   citizens,	   the	   court	  held	  it	  does	  not	  merely	  provide	  technical	  means	  to	  ensure	  or	  improve	  reception,341	  because	   the	   defendant	   intent	   was	   not	   to	   maintain	   or	   improve	   quality	   of	   the	  transmission	   by	   the	   broadcaster	   and	   it	   intervened	   to	   transmit	  works.	   From	   these	  cases,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   “communication”	   is	   extended	   to	   cover	   any	  technical	  intervention	  even	  without	  a	  material	  act	  of	  transmission	  or	  retransmission	  when	  contrasts	  to	  the	  “mere	  provision	  of	  physical	  facilities.”	  	  
b. The	  Right	  of	  Making	  Available	  to	  the	  Public	  	   Then,	  we	  will	  discuss	  “the	  right	  of	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public.”	  As	  noted	  above,	   Article	   3(1)	   grants	   protection	   for	   all	   interactive	   forms	   of	   exploitation—	  where	   a	   work	   is	   transmitted	   to	   a	   user	   who	   is	   member	   of	   public	   on	   his	   own	  demand.342	  Such	  protection	  is	  actually	  provided	  by	  the	  right	  of	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public.	   	  As	  part	  of	   the	   “umbrella	   right”	   (the	  general	   right	  of	   communication	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339	  Id,	  	  paras.	  45-­‐46.	  340	  Case	  C-­‐136/09	  	  Organismos	  Sillogikis	  Diacheirisis	  Dimiourgon	  Theatrikon	  kai	  Optikoakoustikon	  Ergon,	  2010	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐00037,	  para.	  34,	  [hereinafter	  OSDD	  case].	  341	  TVCatchup,	  supra	  note	  322,	  paras.	  28-­‐30.	  (The	  court	  ruled	  that	  technical	  means	  are	  “limited	  to	  maintaining	  or	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  reception	  of	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  transmission	  and	  [are	  not]	  used	  for	  any	  other	  transmission.”	  )	  342	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  25.	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the	  public),	  this	  right	  has	  to	  be	  interpreted	  consistently	  with	  the	  whole	  general	  right,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  limitations	  and	  exceptions.343	  The	  making	  available	  right	   covers	   the	   act	   of	   “providing	   a	   work	   to	   the	   public,”344	  which	   offers	   a	   work	  through	   on	   demand	   services,	   prior	   to	   and	   “as	   opposed	   to	   the	  mere	   transmission	  itself	  ”	  (which	  is	  protected	  by	  the	  right	  of	  communication).345	  	  	   What	   is	   important	   here	   is	   that	  whether	   the	  work	   is	   actually	   transmitted	   is	  not	   relevant,	   which	  means	   the	  mere	   possibility	   to	   access	   the	   work	   is	   enough	   for	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public.346	  For	  instance,	  in	  Svensson	  case,	  which	  followed	  the	  FAPL	  and	  SGAE	  decisions:	  providing	  a	  clickable	  hyperlink	  to	  a	  freely	  accessible	  work	  which	  initially	  published	  on	  another	  website	  constitutes	  an	  act	  of	  making	  the	  work	  available.347	  However,	   the	   Advocate	   General’s	   opinion	   in	   GS	   Media	   BV	   v.	   Sanoma	  case	  stated	  that	  hyperlinks	  “which	  lead	  to	  protected	  works	  do	  not	   ‘make	  available’	  the	  works	   to	   the	  public	  where	   the	  works	  are	  already	   freely	   accessible	  on	  another	  website,	  but	  merely	  facilitate	  the	  finding	  of	  those	  works.”348	  According	  to	  FAPL	  case	  which	   emphasized	   the	   effect	   of	   intervention:	   “without	   his	   intervention	   the	  customers	   cannot	   enjoy	   the	   works	   broadcast,	   even	   though	   they	   are	   physically	  within	  the	  broadcast’s	  catchment	  area.”349	  However,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  innervation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  343	  De	  Wolf.	  Et	  al.,	  STUDY	  ON	  THE	  APPLICATION	  OF	  DIRECTIVE	  2001/29/E	  ON	  COPYRIGHT	  AND	  RELATED	  RIGHTS	  IN	  THE	  INFORMATION	  SOCIETY,	  27-­‐28	  (2013).	  	  344	  EU	  Copyright:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  para.	  11.3.30.	  345	  Id.	  346	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.	  43.	  (Whether	  or	  not	  any	  hotel	  guest	  has	  actually	  used	  the	  antenna	  to	  enjoy	  the	  broadcast	  is	  irrelevant,	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  broadcast	  to	  private	  hotel	  room	  suffices	  an	  act	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.)	  347	  Case	  C-­‐466/12	  Nils	  Svensson	  et	  al.	  v.	  Retriever	  Sverige	  AB	  2014,	  paras.18-­‐19.	  348	  Case	  C-­‐160/15,	  GS	  Media	  BV	  v.	  Sanoma	  Media	  Nwtherlands	  BV,	  Playboy	  Enterprises	  International	  Inc.,	  Britt	  Geertruida	  Dekker,	  Opinion	  of	  Advocate	  General	  Wathelet,	  7	  April	  2016,	  	  paras.	  53-­‐54.	  349	  Id,	  	  paras.	  55-­‐56.	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the	   hyperlinker	   is	   not	   indispensable,	   since	   the	   public	   can	   already	   access	   the	  resources	  being	  hyperlinked.	  Thus,	  the	  advocated	  general	  conclude	  that	  “hyperlinks	  posted	   on	   a	  website	  which	   direct	   to	  works	   protected	   by	   copyright	   that	   are	   freely	  accessible	  on	  another	  website	  cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  an	  ‘act	  of	  communication.’”350	  	   Further,	   since	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   right	   of	   making	   available	   to	   the	   public	  covers	   the	   interactive	   transmission,	   it	   requires	   such	   transmission	   to	   be	   on	  demanded.	  The	  on	  demand	  character	  means	  a	  character	  with	  which	  a	  service	  can	  be	  controlled	   by	   users	   about	   where	   and	   when	   they	   enjoy	   works.	   A	   case	   recently	  decided	  by	  the	  ECJ	  had	  already	  re-­‐emphasized	  this	  “on	  demand”	  character	  of	  “make	  available	   to	   the	   public.”351	  The	   Court	   stated	   that	   “transmission	   broadcast	   live	   on	  Internet”	  could	  not	   fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  “make	  available	  to	  the	  public”,	  because	  the	  subscribers	  could	  not	  choose	  when	  to	  enjoy.352	  	   But	  as	  mentioned	  early,	  digital	  distribution	  technology	  keeps	  developing,	  and	  such	   development	   make	   services	   not	   easily	   classified	   as	   either	   broadcasting,	  interactive	  on	  demand	  transmission	  (making	  available)	  or	  other	  unspecified	  forms	  of	   communication.	   For	   instance,	   ISPs	   provide	   service	   online	   music	   streaming	  platforms	  that	  with	  mixed	  features.	  Users	  could	  not	  only	  pick	  songs	  and	  make	  their	  own	   playlist	   of	   music	   (on	   demand),	   but	   also	   listen	   to	   “featured	   radio	   channels,”	  which	  provides	   prepared	  playlists	   or	   “recommendations”	   based	  on	  users’	   existing	  playlist.353	  It’s	  not	  clear	  that	  all	   forms	  of	  exploitation	  are	  acts	  of	  communication	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  350	  Id,	  	  para.	  60.	  (Whether	  the	  hyperlinker	  know	  the	  initial	  communication	  of	  the	  sources	  had	  been	  authorized	  or	  not	  is	  not	  relevant,	  because	  there’s	  no	  act	  of	  communication.)	  351	  Case	  C‑279/13	  C	  More	  Entertainment	  	  AB	  v	  Linus	  Sandberg,	  2015,	  paras.	  23-­‐26.	  352	  Id,	  para.	  27.	  353	  See	  Wangyiyun	  Yinyue(网易云音乐)[NetEase Music],	  http://music.163.com/	  .	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the	  public,	  but	  the	  copyright	  owners	  willfully	  collect	  all	  remuneration	  by	  restricting	  these	   rights.	   From	   the	   Svensson	   case	   and	   C	  More	   Entertainment	   case,	   we	   clearly	  understand	  the	  ECJ	  would	  regulate	  different	  kinds	  of	  transmission	  online	  strictly	  fall	  within	  the	  contour	  of	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.354	  	  Thus,	  we	  have	  to	  use	   the	   criteria	   mentioned	   above	   to	   clarify	   how	   ECJ	   interprets	   its	   “the	   right	   of	  communication	   to	   the	  public”	  and	  “the	  right	  of	  making	  available	   to	   the	  public.”	  By	  understanding	   the	  explanation	  of	   each	  criterion,	  we	  can	  see	  and	  estimate	  how	  EU	  deal	  with	  the	  issues	  brought	  by	  the	  cloud	  computing.	  
c. The	  Definition	  of	  “Public”	  	   Since	   the	  notion	  of	   “user”	  had	  been	  analyzed	   in	   the	   former	  part	  and	   left	  no	  questions	   and	   the	   profit-­‐making	   nature	   is	   not	   mentioned	   in	   Information	   Society	  Directive,	   this	   section	  will	  directly	  analyze	   the	  definition	  of	  public,	  which	  contains	  two	  part:	  the	  notion	  of	  “public”	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  “new	  public.”	  	  	   The	  definition	  of	  “public”	  is	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  the	  follow-­‐up	  of	  green	  paper	  clearly	  mentioned	  that	  “there	  would	  be	  no	  redefinition	  of	  the	  term	  ‘public’	  for	  the	  new	  digital	  environment.”355	  Although	  legislative	  scholars	  have	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  “public,”	  the	  EU	  legislature	  offers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  354	  See	  Svensson	  case,	  supra	  note	  347,	  para.	  34.	  (The	  court	  gave	  negative	  answer	  to	  the	  preliminary	  question	  of	  	  whether	  Member	  States	  can	  interpret	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Directive	  expansively.	  Because	  allowing	  Member	  States	  to	  “give	  wider	  protection	  to	  copyright	  holders	  by	  laying	  down	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  also	  includes	  activities	  other	  than	  those	  referred	  to	  in	  Arctile	  3(1).,	  would	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  creating	  legislative	  differences	  and	  thus,	  for	  third	  parties,	  legal	  uncertainty.”)See	  also	  C	  More	  Entertainment	  ,	  supra	  note	  351,	  paras.35-­‐37.	  (Although	  the	  EJC	  agreed	  that	  the	  Member	  States	  may	  define	  a	  broadcaster’s	  right	  expandly,	  but	  such	  extension	  must	  respect	  the	  the	  scope	  of	  copyright	  protection	  called	  for	  by	  Union	  Law,	  and	  should	  not	  pass	  the	  bottom	  line	  that	  the	  term	  “communication	  to	  the	  public	  “may	  not	  be	  expanded	  beyond	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive.)	  355	  Follow-­‐up	  to	  the	  green	  paper	  on	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  in	  the	  Information	  Society,	  COM(96)	  586	  final,	  14.	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no	   assistance	   in	   indicating	   how	   many	   people	   constitute	   the	   “public”	   and	   how	   to	  meet	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	   	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  job	   to	   interpret	   the	   “public”	  was	   left	   to	   laws	  and	  courts	  of	   the	  EU	  Member	  States,	  and	  throughout	  all	  Member	  States,	  the	  EU	  indeed	  needs	  a	  uniform	  and	  independent	  interpretation	  of	  this	  notion.356	  We	  will	  try	  to	  find	  the	  rationale	  of	   interpreting	  the	  notion	  of	  “public”	  via	  learning	  the	  EU	  courts’	  decisions	  toward	  this	  issue.	  	  	   First	  of	  all,	  “public”	  means	  “none	  private.”	  This	  view	  of	  “private”	  was	  actually	  brought	   by	   the	   green	   paper:	   a	   communication	   is	   public	   when	   a	   work	   is	   made	  perceptible	   “to	   persons	   in	   general,	   that	   is,	   not	   restricted	   to	   specific	   individuals	  belonging	   to	   a	   private	   group.” 357 	  Thus	   merely	   “private”	   communications	   are	  excluded	  from	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	   the	  public.358	  Then	  a	  question	  arises:	  what’s	  private?	  According	  to	  several	  scholars,	  a	  private	  circle	  means	  a	  narrow	  circle	  of	   family,	   friends	   or	   close	   relatives.359	  In	   several	   cases,	   the	   courts	   adopted	   such	  interpretation.	  In	  SAGE	  case,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  if	  a	  reception	  of	  a	  broadcast	  is	  in	  a	  “personnel,”	   “private”	   or	   “family”	   circle,	   the	   reception	   does	   not	   fall	   within	   the	  category	   of	   the	   protected	   act	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public.360	  Further	   in	   FAPL	  case,	  the	  court	  also	  adopted	  the	  idea	  that	  new	  public	  will	  be	  reached	  if	  the	  recipients	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	  UsedSoft	  case,	  supra	  note	  152,	  para.	  39.	  (	  Joined	  by	  other	  courts	  in	  other	  cases,	  the	  EU’s	  “need	  for	  a	  uniform	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  require	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  provision	  of	  EU	  law	  which	  makes	  no	  express	  reference	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  determining	  its	  meaning	  and	  scope	  must	  normally	  be	  given	  an	  independent	  and	  uniform	  interpretation	  throughout	  the	  EU.”)	  357	  WIPO	  Glossary	  of	  terms	  of	  the	  law	  of	  copyright	  and	  neighboring	  rights,	  Geneva,	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Organization,	  1980,	  4;	  Green	  Paper	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights	  in	  the	  Information	  Society,	  53.	  358	  See	  Basic	  Proposal	  of	  WCT,	  note	  10.12.	  359	  EU	  Copyright	  law,:A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124.	  at	  416,	  para.	  11.31.	  See	  also	  Depreeuw,	  
supra	  note	  330,	  at	  448.	  360	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.	  41.	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broke	  the	  private	  or	  family	  circle.361	  Such	  qualitative	  criterion	  (relationship	  among	  recipients)	  was	   then	   clearly	   stated	   by	   the	   SCF	   court:	   “public”	  means	   that	  make	   a	  work	   received	  by	   “persons	   in	   general,	   that	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	   specific	   individuals	  belonging	   to	   a	   private	   group.”362	  Further,	   the	   EU	   courts	   provide	   a	   quantitative	  requirement:	  broadcast	  received	  by	  large	  number	  of	  people.	  SCF	  court	  clearly	  stated	  that	   “a	   de	  minimis	   threshold”	   should	   be	   encompassed	   by	   “a	   fair	   large	   number	   of	  people”,	  “which	  excludes	  from	  the	  concept	  groups	  of	  persons	  which	  are	  too	  small	  or	  insignificant”.363	  	  The	  Phonographic	  Performance	  court	  also	  endorsed	  this	  criterion,	  and	  it	  further	  provided	  the	  way	  in	  determining	  the	  number	  of	  people:	  ”account	  must	  be	  taken	  of	  the	  cumulative	  effects	  of	  making	  works	  available	  to	  potential	  audiences.	  In	  that	  connection,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  relevant	  to	  know	  how	  many	  people	  have	  the	  same	  access	  to	  the	  same	  work	  at	  the	  same	  time	  but	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  know	  how	  many	  of	  them	  have	  access	  to	  it	  in	  succession.”364	  	   The	   second	   criterion	   in	   analyzing	   the	   notion	   of	   public	   is	   “indeterminate	  number	   of	   potential	   recipients.”	   This	   criterion	  has	   been	   clearly	   defined	   in	   several	  cases365	  and	  fulfilled	  the	  requirement	  of	  “an	  autonomous	  and	  uniform	  interpretation	  throughout	  the	  Community.”366	  By	  referring	  to	  the	  MediaKabel	  case,367	  the	  court	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  361	  FAPL	  Case,	  supra	  note	  151,	  paras.	  171	  &	  198.	  362	  SCF,	  supra	  note	  307,	  para.	  85.	  363	  SCF,	  supra	  note	  307,	  para.	  86.	  364	  Phonographic	  Performance	  Case,	  supra	  note	  313,	  para.35.	  	  365	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306;	  SCF,	  supra	  not	  307;	  TVCatChup,	  supra	  note	  322.	  366	  C-­‐145/00,	  C-­‐245/00,	  Stichting	  ter	  Exploitatie	  van	  Naburige	  Rechten	  (SENA)	  v	  Nederlandse	  Omroep	  Stichting	  (NOS).	  367	  Case	  C-­‐89/04	  Mediakabel	  BV	  v	  Commissariaat	  voor	  de	  Media	  2005	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐4891,	  paras.	  26-­‐33.(	  In	  this	  case,	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  service	  is	  “TV	  broadcasting	  service”,	  the	  court	  considered	  the	  notion	  of	  “public”.	  And	  then	  it	  stated	  the	  service	  would	  be	  qualified	  if	  it	  “consist	  of	  the	  transmission	  of	  television	  programs	  intended	  for	  reception	  by	  the	  public,	  
	   116	  
Lagardère	  case368	  and	  in	  Phonographic	  Performance	  case369	  described	  this	  criterion	  as	  “an	  indeterminate	  number	  of	  potential	  listeners.”	  The	  SGAE	  case	  also	  brought	  in	  this	   criterion:	   “the	   term	   ‘public’	   refers	   to	   an	   indeterminate	   number	   of	   potential	  television	   viewers,”370	  but	   the	   court	   stretched	   its	   application	   by	   taking	   both	   the	  transmission	   to	   the	   private	   rooms	   and	   to	   other	   parts	   of	   hotel	   into	   consideration.	  Then	   in	   TVCatChup	   case,	   the	   court	   also	   applied	   this	   criterion	   to	   decide	   whether	  recipients	   of	   the	   Internet	   television	   broadcasting	   service	   constitute	   “public.”	   The	  court	   not	   only	   repeated	   that	   “public	   …refers	   to	   an	   indeterminate	   number	   of	  potential	   recipients	   and	   implies,	  moreover,	   a	   fairly	   large	   number	   of	   persons”,	   but	  also	  reminded	  some	  relevant	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  making	  works	  available	  to	  potential	  recipients:	   “number	  of	  persons	  who	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  work	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  successively.”371	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  that	  is,	  an	  indeterminate	  number	  of	  potential	  television	  viewers,	  to	  whom	  the	  same	  images	  are	  transmitted	  simultaneously.”)	  368	  Case	  C-­‐192/04	  Lagardère	  Active	  Broadcast	  v	  Société	  pour	  la	  perception	  de	  la	  rémunération	  équitable	  (SPRE)	  and	  Gesellschaft	  zur	  Verwertung	  von	  Leistungsschutzrechten	  mbH	  (GVL)	  2005	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐7199,	  para.	  30.	  (	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  court	  needed	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  satellite	  transmission	  reached	  a	  ‘public’,	  and	  it	  thought	  there’s	  no	  “public”	  because:	  ”that	  a	  limited	  circle	  of	  persons	  who	  can	  receive	  the	  signals	  from	  the	  satellite	  only	  if	  they	  use	  professional	  equipment	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  public,	  given	  that	  the	  latter	  must	  be	  made	  up	  of	  an	  indeterminate	  number	  of	  potential	  listeners.”)	  369	  Phonographic	  Performance	  Case,	  supra	  note	  313.	  370	  SGAE	  case,	  supra	  note	  306,	  paras.	  37-­‐41.	  371	  TVCatChup,	  supra	  note	  322,	  paras..32-­‐35.	  (The	  court	  also	  mentioned	  that	  the	  circumstance	  that	  the	  recipient	  has	  access	  to	  the	  work	  through	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  connection	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  Because	  such	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  connection	  does	  not	  prevent	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  to	  access	  the	  same	  work	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  retransmission	  of	  the	  works	  over	  the	  Internet	  enabled	  all	  persons	  in	  the	  UK	  who	  have	  an	  Internet	  connection	  and	  claimed	  to	  own	  a	  television	  license	  in	  that	  State.	  These	  people	  may	  access	  the	  protected	  works	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ‘live	  streaming’	  of	  television	  programs	  on	  the	  Internet.	  “Thus,	  the	  retransmission	  in	  question	  is	  aimed	  at	  an	  indeterminate	  number	  of	  potential	  recipients	  and	  implies	  a	  large	  number	  of	  persons.”)	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   The	   last	   part	   is	   the	   notion	   of	   “new	   public.”	   The	   court	   of	   SGAE	   case	   firstly	  brought	  this	  criterion	  into	  discussion.	  The	  court	  initially	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  SGAE’s	  communication	  constitutes	  “a	  communication	  made	  by	  a	  broadcasting	  organization	  other	  than	  the	  original	  one.”372	  Based	  on	  such	  conclusion,	  it	  further	  ruled	  that	  “thus,	  such	   a	   transmission	   is	   made	   to	   a	   public	   different	   from	   the	   public	   at	   which	   the	  original	   act	   of	   communication	  of	   the	  work	   is	  directed,	   that	   is,	   to	   a	  new	  public.”373	  The	  court	  also	  found	  support	  for	  its	  rule	  from	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  that	  “when	  the	  author	  authorizes	  the	  broadcast	  of	  his	  work,	  he	  considers	  only	  direct	  users,	  that	  is,	  the	   owners	   of	   reception	   equipment	   who,	   either	   personally	   or	   within	   their	   own	  private	  or	   family	  circles,	  receive	  the	  programme.”	  Thus	  when	  the	  recipients	   larger	  than	   such	   circle	   hear	   or	   see	   the	   program,	   the	   work	   is	   communicated	   to	   a	   “new	  public.”374	  From	  this	  case,	  the	  notion	  of	  “new	  public”	  is	  actually	  being	  contoured	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  public	  reached	  by	  the	  original	  broadcast,	  which	  was	  authorized	  by	  the	   author.	  375	  Lots	   of	   courts	   further	   repeated	   such	   rule	   and	   kept	   interpreting	   the	  “new	  public”	  as	  any	  public	  that	  users	  gains	  access	  to	  the	  work	  and	  that	  has	  not	  been	  taken	   into	   account	  when	   the	   author	   has	   granted	   his	   authorization	   to	   the	   original	  communication	  to	  the	  public.376	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  372	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.	  40.	  373	  Id.	  374	  Id,	  para.	  41.	  375	  But,	  such	  reference	  of	  the	  Guide	  to	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  was	  not	  accurate	  since	  the	  guide	  indeed	  was	  explaining	  the	  additional	  audience	  of	  the	  license	  to	  broadcast	  covered.	  It	  clarified	  the	  provision	  dealing	  with	  the	  listening	  or	  viewing	  of	  a	  broadcast	  in	  public,	  not	  the	  retransmission	  of	  a	  broadcast	  by	  wire	  wireless	  means	  to	  a	  remote	  public	  which	  applied	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  	  376	  	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.40;	  FAPL	  case,	  supra	  note	  151,	  para.197,	  Airfield,	  para.72.	  case.	  See	  also	  Depreeuw,	  supra	  note	  330,	  at	  461.	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   However,	   in	   TVCatchup	   case,	   the	   court	   said	   the	   situation	   here	   is	   clearly	  different	  from	  those	  former	  cases.	  The	  court	  stated	  that	  in	  those	  cases,	  an	  operator’s	  deliberate	   intervention	   made	   the	   broadcast	   which	   containing	   protected	   works	  accessible	  to	  a	  new	  public.	  But	  in	  this	  case,	  there	  were	  two	  main	  transmissions	  that	  are	  a	  terrestrial	  broadcast	  and	  to	  make	  those	  works	  available	  over	  the	  Internet,	  each	  of	   these	   two	   transmissions	   must	   be	   authorized	   individually	   and	   separately.377	  Because	   each	   of	   them	   was	   made	   under	   “specific	   technical	   condition,”	   used	   a	  different	   means	   (specific	   technology)	   and	   was	   intended	   for	   broadcasting	   to	  public.378	  The	   court	   states:	   “in	   those	   circumstances,	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   necessary	   to	  examine	  below	  the	  requirement	  that	  mere	  must	  be	  a	  new	  public,	  which	  is	  relevant	  only	   in	   the	  situations	  on	  which	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  had	   to	  rule	   in	   the	  cases	  giving	  rise	   to	   the	   judgments	   in	   SGAE,	   FAPL	   and	   Airfield.”379	  The	   court	   held	   it	   was	   not	  necessary	   then	   to	   examine	   whether	   a	   “new	   public”	   can	   be	   found.	   Such	   decision	  creates	  uncertainty	  to	  the	  application	  of	  this	  criterion	  in	  identifying	  separate	  act	  of	  communication	   to	   the	   public	   where	   several	   transmissions	   coexist.	   If	   different	  technology	  exists	  in	  a	  case,	  should	  the	  court	  still	  apply	  the	  “new	  public”	  criterion	  in	  deciding	  the	  issue	  of	  “new	  public?”	  Such	  legal	  uncertainty	  will	  cause	  more	  problems.	  	  	   Recently,	  in	  the	  Svensson	  case,	  the	  court	  affirmed	  that	  it	  would	  still	  apply	  the	  “new	   public”	   criterion	   to	   decide	  whether	   hyperlinking	   technology	   addresses	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  377	  TVCatchup,	  supra	  note	  322,	  paras.	  24-­‐25.	  (The	  court	  also	  rule	  that	  if	  there	  are	  multiple	  communications,	  and	  each	  of	  them	  use	  different	  technical	  means,	  each	  of	  them	  require	  a	  separate	  authorization.)	  378	  TvCatChup,	  supra	  note	  322,	  paras.	  37-­‐39.	  379	  Id,	  	  para.39.	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public	  since	  there’s	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  technical	  means	  in	  transmission	  of	  works.	  380	  In	  this	   case,	   the	  defendant	  provided	  hyperlinks	   links	   the	  Plaintiffs’	   articles	   that	  were	  already	  published	  in	  a	  newspaper’s	  freely	  accessible	  website	  to	  its	  own	  website.381	  The	  court	  admitted	   that	   the	  defendant	  did	   the	  act	  of	   communication	  by	  providing	  hyperlinks	  of	   those	  articles	  on	   its	  own	  website,	  but	   it	  did	  not	  communicate	   to	   the	  “public”	   since	   there’s	   no	   “new	   public.”	   That’s	   because	   the	   Plaintiffs’	   works	   were	  already	  being	   communicated	   to	   the	  public	   (all	   Internet	  users)	  without	   limitations,	  the	   defendant’s	   subsequent	   hyperlinking	   did	   not	   change	   the	   public	   to	   whom	   the	  works	   were	   made	   available.	   382 The	   court	   also	   determined	   that	   whether	   the	  hyperlink	  linking	  to	  another	  website	  or	  the	  same	  websites	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  finding	  even	   if	   the	   works	   has	   already	   been	   communicated	   to	   the	   public	   on	   the	   original	  website	   and	   no	   new	   technology	   works	   existed	   in	   the	   retransmission.	  383	  The	   ECJ	  provided	  limitations	  to	  the	  new	  public	  criterion:	  a	  clickable	  link	  that	  enables	  users	  to	   circumvent	   restrictions	   put	   in	   place	   by	   the	   initial	   site	   on	   which	   the	   protected	  work	  appears.	  Those	  users	  who	  access	  to	  the	  protected	  work	  via	  such	  link	  should	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  380	  Svensson	  case,	  supra	  note	  347.(	  This	  is	  a	  case	  of	  two	  communications	  by	  means	  of	  the	  same	  technology.	  The	  court	  pursued	  its	  approach	  in	  TVCatChup	  case	  and	  ruled	  that	  when	  the	  initial	  communication	  and	  the	  subsequent	  communication	  are	  made	  by	  the	  same	  technical	  means,	  it	  should	  be	  verified	  whether	  the	  latter	  communication	  is	  directed	  at	  a	  new	  public	  as	  an	  additional	  requirement.	  But	  if	  the	  same	  works	  is	  communicated	  by	  different	  technological	  means,	  there’s	  no	  need	  to	  verify	  whether	  a	  new	  public	  is	  targetd.	  However,	  the	  court	  did	  not	  confront	  a	  case	  that	  several	  means	  of	  exploitations	  coexist.)	  381	  Id,	  	  para.	  26.The	  court	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  “common	  ground	  between	  the	  parties”	  that	  the	  Plaintiff’s	  works	  were	  freely	  accessible	  on	  the	  newspaper	  website,	  because	  there	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  technical	  access	  restrictions	  such	  as	  a	  paywall.	  382	  Id,	  	  para.	  31.The	  court	  also	  discussed	  the	  situation	  of	  when	  the	  original	  website	  owner	  “restricting	  public	  access”.	  And	  it	  confirmed	  that	  if	  the	  original	  site	  had	  “subscriber	  only	  access”	  and	  a	  hyperlink	  bypassing	  this	  restriction,	  the	  subsequent	  hyperlinking	  would	  address	  to	  “new	  public”	  which	  had	  not	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  the	  copyright	  owners	  when	  they	  authorized	  their	  works	  on	  the	  original	  site.	  383	  Id,	  	  paras.	  29-­‐	  30.	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deemed	   as	   a	   new	   public.384	  Thus,	   a	   new	   public	  may	   arise,	   “where	   the	  work	   is	   no	  longer	  available	  to	  the	  public”	  on	  the	  initial	  site	  or	  “where	  it	  is	  henceforth	  available	  on	  that	  site	  only	  to	  a	  restricted	  public,”	  “while	  being	  accessible	  on	  another	  Internet	  site	  without	  the	  copyright	  holders’	  authorization.”385	  	   Further	   in	   Bestwater	   case,	   the	   court	   had	   to	   decide	   whether	   embed	   a	  copyrighted	  work	  without	  authorizations	  from	  a	  third	  party’s	  website	  as	  Youtube	  on	  one’s	   own	   website	   qualifies	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  Information	  Society	  Directive.	  Applied	  Sevensson	  case’s	  decision,	  the	  court	  conclude	  that	  such	  activity	  of	  embedding	  of	  a	  protected	  work	  which	  is	  freely	  accessible	   on	   a	   third	   party’s	   website	   by	   means	   of	   a	   link	   and	   using	   the	   framing	  technology	  does	  not	  constitute	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  Because	  there’s	  neither	  communication	   to	   a	   “new	   public”	   nor	   communication	   using	   a	   specific	   technical	  means	  which	   is	  different	   from	  that	  of	   the	  original	  communication.386	  What	  we	  can	  assure	   now	   is	   that	   users	   are	   not	   liable	   for	   embedding	   or	   hyperlinking	   a	   video	   or	  image	  from	  a	  third	  party’s	  website,	  if	  the	  latter	  is	  accessible	  to	  the	  general	  public.387	  The	   court	  did	  not	   state	  whether	   there’s	   requirement	   that	   the	   first	   communication	  need	   to	   be	   authorized	   by	   the	   copyright	   owner	   before	   further	   subsequent	   legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  384	  Id,	  para.	  31.	  385	  Id.	  386	  Case	  C-­‐348/13	  BestWater	  International	  GmbH	  v	  Michael	  Mebes	  and	  Stefan	  Potsch	  	  2014	  (not	  yet	  published)	  (there’s	  no	  official	  translation	  for	  this	  case)	  However,	  the	  court	  decided	  not	  to	  consider	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  YouTube	  upload	  as	  relevant	  in	  this	  case	  but	  simply	  considered	  the	  embedding	  (or	  framing)	  act	  at	  stake.	  387	  See	  The	  ECJ	  Continues	  to	  be	  the	  Court	  of	  Common	  Sense:	  The	  BestWater	  Case	  Ruling	  or	  Another	  Good	  Day	  for	  the	  Internet,	  27	  Oct,	  2014,	  available	  at	  http://copyright4creativity.eu/2014/10/27/the-­‐cjeu-­‐continues-­‐to-­‐be-­‐the-­‐court-­‐of-­‐common-­‐sense-­‐the-­‐bestwater-­‐case-­‐ruling-­‐or-­‐another-­‐good-­‐day-­‐for-­‐the-­‐internet/	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communication	   by	   hyperlinking	   or	   embedding.388 	  Later	   the	   advocated	   general	  opinion’s	  of	  Sanoma	  case	  provides	  some	  guidelines.	  	   We	  can	  further	  understand	  how	  EU	  Member	  States	  applied	  the	  “new	  public”	  criterion	  in	  Sanoma	  case	  decided	  by	  the	  Netherland	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2015.389	  The	  Dutch	   Supreme	   Court	   found	   that	   Svensson	   and	   BestWater	   cases	   can	   not	   provide	  enough	   guidance	   in	   deciding	   this	   case.	   Then	   it	   required	   for	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	  from	   the	   ECJ.390	  The	   Netherland	   Supreme	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   ECJ’s	   answer	   in	  Svensson	   was	   based	   on	   that	   the	   work	   was	   already	   available	   online	   without	  specifying	  that	  the	  copyright	  owners	  had	  given	  permissions.	  And	  in	  the	  BestWater	  case,	  it	  was	  also	  unclear	  that	  whether	  the	  copyright	  owner	  had	  given	  consent	  to	  the	  initial	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  Thus,	  the	  Netherland	  Supreme	  Court	  addressed	  its	  first	  preliminary	  question	  to	  the	  ECJ	  by	  analyzing	  all	  the	  foregoing:	  whether	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  388	  BestWater	  case,	  supra	  note	  386.	  See	  That	  BestWater	  order:	  it's	  up	  to	  the	  rightholders	  to	  monitor	  online	  use	  of	  their	  works,Oct	  27,	  2014	  available	  at	  http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2014/10/that-­‐bestwater-­‐order-­‐its-­‐up-­‐to.html	  (The	  author	  of	  this	  comments	  thought	  the	  court	  unaddressed	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  person	  who	  embedded	  or	  hyperlinked	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  from	  third	  party’s	  website	  is	  liable	  for	  copyright	  infringement	  if	  the	  third	  party	  communicate	  such	  work	  to	  the	  public	  without	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	  permission.	  )	  389	  GeenStijl	  v.	  Sanoma	  Dutch	  Supreme	  Court,	  3	  April	  2015,	  14/01158,	  NJ	  2015/83.	  (In	  this	  case,	  the	  defendant	  provided	  hyperlinks	  to	  some	  copyrighted	  photos—that	  were	  meant	  to	  be	  published	  in	  an	  upcoming	  edition	  of	  magazine—on	  a	  third	  party’s	  website.	  The	  copyright	  owner	   forced	   the	   third	   party	   to	   take	   down	   those	   photos.	   Since	   the	   defendant’s	   hyperlink	  were	   no	   longer	   useful,	   it	   found	   a	   second	   hyperlink	   to	   those	   photos	   on	   another	   website	  instead.	  The	  plaintiff	  filed	  a	  claim	  towards	  the	  defendant.	  The	  District	  Court	  of	  Amsterdam	  ruled	  that	  provided	  hyperlinks	  to	  the	  copyrighted	  photos	  violate	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	   the	  public	  because	   the	  photos	   could	  not	  be	  easily	   found	  at	   first—only	   small	   amount	  of	  people	   can	   access	   those	   photos	   on	   the	   two	   third	   parties’	   file	   sharing	   website.	   Then	   the	  Appeal	   Court	   of	   Amsterdam	   disagreed	   with	   the	   district	   court,	   because	   the	   appeal	   court	  thought	   that	   the	   Internet	   in	   its	   current	   form	   is	   an	   open	   communication	   network	   that	   is	  freely	  accessible	  to	  anyone.	  The	  appeal	  court	  found	  no	  difference	  between	  a	  hyperlink	  to	  a	  work	  and	  a	  footnote	  in	  a	  book.	  Further	  it	  also	  found	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  failed	  in	  proving	  that	  the	  photos	  on	  one	  of	  the	  third	  party’s	  website	  were	  completely	  private,	  although	  the	  photos	  there	  were	   hard	   to	   found	   by	   the	   public.	   Thus	   even	   the	   defendant	   extended	   the	   access	   to	  those	  photos,	  there	  was	  no	  new	  public	  at	  all.	  )	  390	  Sanoma	  case,	  supra	  note	  348.	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hyperlinking	   to	   a	   work	   on	   an	   accessible	   third	   party’s	   website	   constitute	   a	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  where	  such	  work	  has	  been	  made	  available	  without	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	  consent.391	  The	  Netherland	  Supreme	  Court	  found	  it’s	  hard	  for	  the	  hyperlinker	   to	  verify	  whether	   the	   initial	   communication	   to	   the	  public	  of	   the	  work	  had	   already	   gain	   consent	   from	   the	   copyright	   owner,	   thus,	   it	   also	   asked	   if	   its	   is	  relevant	   that	   the	  hyperlinker	  knows	  or	   should	  have	  known	   that	   such	   consent	  has	  not	   be	   given.392	  Then,	   if	   the	   first	   preliminary	   question’s	   answer	   is	   negative,	   if	   the	  general	  public	  could	  not	  easily	  find	  the	  work,	  is	  there	  a	  communication	  to	  the	  pubic	  if	   the	   hyperlinker	   facilitates	   the	   locating	   of	   such	  work	   online?393	  The	   ECJ	   has	   not	  answered	   these	   legal	   uncertainties.	  However,	   the	   advocate	   general	   provided	   their	  opinion:	  “the	  criterion	  of	  a	  new	  public	  is	  applicable	  only	  where	  the	  copyright	  holder	  has	  authorized	  the	  initial	  communication	  to	  the	  public.”394	  	  Even	  if	  the	  court	  decided	  to	   apply	   the	   new	   public	   criterion	   where	   the	   initial	   communication	   was	   not	  authorized	  by	  the	  copyright	  owner,	  it	  would	  be	  satisfied	  “only	  if	  the	  intervention	  in	  the	  form	  of	  …hyperlinks…	  was	  indispensable	  to	  the	  works	  being	  made	  available	  to	  a	  new	  public.”395	  	   Lots	  of	  EU	  scholars	  think	  that	  the	  “new	  public”	  criterion	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  international	   law.396	  For	   instance,	   ECJ	  presented	   the	   “new	  public”	   criterion	   as	   if	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  391	  Id,	  1(a).	  392	  Id,	  1(c)	  393	  Id,	  2(a)	  394	  Sanoma	  case,	  supra	  note	  348,	  	  para.	  67.	  395	  Id,	  paras.	  69-­‐70.	  396	  See	  Association	  Litteraire	  Et	  Artistique	  Internationale,	  Opinion	  Proposed	  to	  THE	  
EXECUTIVE	  COMMITTEE	  and	  adopted	  at	  its	  meeting	  (Sep.	  17,	  2014)	  available	  at	  http://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/2014-­‐opinion-­‐new-­‐public.pdf	  	  (The	  authors	  think	  the	  application	  of	  the	  “new	  public”	  in	  the	  Svensson	  decision	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  
	   123	  
followed	  the	  Article	  11bis(1)(ii)	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention,397	  but	  actually	  the	  Berne	  Convention	   only	   grants	   the	   authors	   exclusive	   right	   with	   a	   condition	   “when	   this	  communication	  is	  made	  by	  an	  organization	  other	  than	  the	  original	  one,”	  it	  mentions	  nothing	   about	   the	  public	  who	   receive	   the	  new	   transmission.398	  Then,	   according	   to	  the	  Sevensson	  Court’s	  decision,	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  conclusion	  that	  once	  a	  work	  is	  made	  freely	  accessible	  online	  to	  all	  Internet	  users,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  right	  where	  that	  work	   is	  hyperlinked.	  Because	  the	  criterion	  of	  “new	  public”	  cannot	  be	  satisfied	  by	  such.	  	  Such	  conclusion	  will	  cause	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  on	  the	  Internet,	  which	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  Artcle3(3)	  of	   the	   Information	   Society	   Directive	   2001.	   This	   Article	   states	   that	   the	   right	   of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  is	  not	  to	  be	  exhausted	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  “communication”	  of	  the	  work.	  Although	  the	  advocate	  general	  provided	  a	  neutral	  solution	  that	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  the	  new	  public	  criterion,	  it	  still	  had	  not	  been	  explicitly	  adopted	  by	  the	  ECJ.	   	   Moreover,	   even	   if	   the	   criterion	   of	   “new	   public”	   conforms	   to	   all	   the	  requirements	   and	   principles	   from	   those	   international	   laws,	   the	   Dutch	   Supreme	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Berne	  Convention,	  WCT,	  WPPT,	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  previous	  ECJ	  decisions	  and	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties.)	  397	  SGAE	  case,	  supra	  note	  306,	  para.40.	  398	  Berne	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  226,	  Article	  11bis(1)(ii).	  See	  ALAI,	  at	  13.	  (	  “It	  may	  be	  made	  to	  the	  same	  public;	  it	  may	  be	  made	  to	  a	  part	  of	  the	  same	  public,	  it	  may	  be	  made	  to	  the	  same	  public	  or	  a	  part	  thereof	  along	  with	  a	  public	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  original	  broadcast	  and	  it	  may	  be	  made	  truly	  to	  a	  new	  public.”)	  See	  also	  Justin	  Koo,	  Why	  “New	  Public”	  is	  the	  wrong	  ‘public’	  
for	  the	  Communication	  to	  the	  Public	  Right	  under	  EU	  Copyright	  Law,	  KSLR	  Blog	  (Jun.	  17,	  2015)	  https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?tag=new-­‐public#.V8ZkmZMrLVp	  	  (The	  author	  states	  that	  the	  “new	  public”	  criterion	  was	  rejected	  under	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  when	  it	  was	  first	  discussed	  at	  the	  1948	  Brussels	  Revision	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention.)	  The	  Art	  8	  of	  WCT	  does	  not	  show	  bias	  either,	  it	  provide	  excluded	  right	  of	  “any	  communication	  to	  the	  public”	  without	  distinction	  between	  primary	  and	  secondary	  transmission,	  even	  regardless	  of	  the	  difference	  of	  technology	  of	  transmissions.	  Further	  in	  Vienna	  Convention,	  there’s	  no	  such	  requirement	  that	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  by	  wire	  or	  by	  rebroadcasting	  only	  applies	  when	  the	  communication	  is	  directed	  to	  a	  “new	  public”.	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Court	   had	   already	   pointed	   out	   the	   legal	   uncertainty	   of	   this	   criterion.	   The	   ECJ	   still	  need	  to	  explain	  a	  lot	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  applying	  this	  criterion,	  which,	  from	  my	  point	  of	  view,	   will	   cause	   more	   legal	   loopholes	   when	   applying	   in	   the	   future	   with	   the	  development	  of	  technology.	  	   The	  following	  section	  will	  keep	  discussing	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  in	  other	  countries.	  
iii. Other Countries 
A. Singapore-­‐	  The	  Right	  of	  Communication	  to	  the	  Public	  	   In	   2004,	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   was	   introduced	   to	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act	  1987.399	  It	  is	  also	  an	  implementation	  of	  Art.	  8	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Copyright	   Treaty	   1996.	   It	   enables	   the	   copyright	   owners	   to	   control	   the	  communication	  and	  dissemination	  of	  their	  copyrighted	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  Internet.	  Singapore	  adopted	   the	  Art.	  8	  of	  WCT	   through	  a	   fairly	  broad	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  “communicate”.	  It	  means:	  “	  to	  transmit	  by	  electronic	  means	  (whether	  over	  a	  path,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  paths,	  provided	  by	  a	  material	  substance	  or	  by	  wireless	  mans	   or	   otherwise	   a	   work	   or	   other	   subject-­‐matter,	   whether	   or	   not	   it	   is	   sent	   in	  response	   to	   a	   request,	   and	   includes—	   (1)	   the	   broadcasting	   of	   a	   work	   or	   other	  subject-­‐matter;(2)	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   work	   or	   other	   subject-­‐matter	   in	   a	   cable	  programme;	   (3)	   the	   making	   available	   of	   a	   work	   or	   other	   subject-­‐matter	   (on	   a	  network	   or	   otherwise)	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   work	   or	   subject-­‐matter	   may	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  399	  Copyright	  (Amendment)	  Act,	  No.	  52	  of	  2004.	  It	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1	  Jan,	  2005.	  	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  172.	  The	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  covered	  original	  literary,	  dramatic,	  musical	  and	  artistic	  works,	  cinematographic	  films,	  broadcasts,	  cable	  programmes,	  performances,	  which	  can	  be	  found	  in	  s	  26(1)(a)(vi)&(b)(iii);	  s	  84(1)(d);	  s	  85(1)(d);	  s	  252(1)(g).	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accessed	  by	  any	  person	  from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  chosen	  by	  him.”400	  By	  analyzing	  this	  meaning,	  the	  communication	  right	  has	  been	  separated	  to	  four	  distinct	  parts:	  (1)	  transmission	   of	   a	   work	   by	   electronic	   means;	   (2)	   broadcasting	   right	   based	   on	  paragraph	  (a);	  (3)	  cable-­‐casting	  right	  based	  on	  paragraph	  (b);	  (4)	  making	  available	  formula	  in	  paragraph	  (c).	  	  But	  according	  to	  some	  scholars,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  broad	  categories.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   “transmission	   by	   electronic	   means”	   which	   includes	  broadcasting,	  cable-­‐casting	  and	  some	  kind	  of	  internet	  transmissions.	  They	  are	  “push”	  technologies	  which	  means	  there’s	  an	  active	  communicator	  but	  with	  multiple	  passive	  recipients.	   Such	   right	   (except	   some	   kind	   of	   internet	   transmissions)	   have	   already	  been	  granted	  to	  the	  copyright	  holders	  in	  old	  Copyright	  Act	  in	  Singapore.	  The	  second	  category	   is	  “making	  available”	  of	  a	  work.	   It	   is	   in	  the	  form	  of	  “pull”	   technology	  that	  means	   passive	   communicator	   with	   multiple	   active	   recipients.401	  According	   to	   the	  Minister	  for	  Law	  of	  Singapore,	  this	  formula	  created	  a	  new	  right:	  “the	  right	  to	  control	  the	   dissemination	   of	   works	   on	   the	   Internet”.402	  This	   second	   category	   no	   doubt	   is	  broad	  enough	   to	   cover	   the	   communication	  over	   the	   Internet	   in	  order	   to	   fulfill	   the	  requirement	  of	  WCT	  Art	  8.	  With	  this	  knowledge,	  now	  the	  existing	  question	  is	  how	  to	  understand	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   over	   the	   Internet	   under	  Singapore’s	   law	   system.	   There	   are	   basic	   question	   to	   answer.	   	   The	   first	   one	   is	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  400	  Cap.	  63,	  2006	  Rev.	  Ed.	  Sing.	  [Copyright	  Act],	  s	  7(1).	  401	  See	  Dr	  Mihaly	  Ficsor,	  Guide	  to	  the	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights	  Treaties	  Administered	  by	  
WIPO,	  WIPO	  publication	  (2003),	  at	  208.	  (	  The	  concept	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  “extends	  not	  only	  to	  the	  acts	  that	  are	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  ‘communicators’	  themselves,….	  But	  also	  to	  the	  acts	  which	  only	  consist	  of	  making	  the	  work	  accessible	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  which	  the	  members	  of	  the	  public	  still	  have	  to	  cause	  the	  system	  to	  make	  it	  actually	  available	  to	  them.”	  See	  also	  Susanna	  H	  S	  Leonh	  &	  Yuanyuan	  Chen,	  The	  Right	  of	  
Communication	  in	  Singpore,	  22	  SAcLJ	  602	  (2010).	  402	  Sing.,	  Parliamentary	  Debates,	  vol.	  78,	  col.	  1041	  (16	  November	  2004)	  (Professor	  S.	  Jayakumar).	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whom	  is	  the	  communication	  made	  –	  to	  the	  “public”?	  The	  second	  one	  is	  by	  whom	  is	  the	   communication	   made.	   	   It’s	   obvious	   that	   the	   first	   question	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	  contour	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  “public,”	  if	  there’s	  no	  “public,”	  there’s	  no	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  Then	  the	  second	  question	   is	  deciding	  who	  is	  the	  infringer,	  is	  it	  the	  ISP	  who	  provide	  facilities	  or	  the	  user	  who	  directly	  and	  actually	  required	  the	  copyrighted	  work?	  	   In	   order	   to	   answer	   these	   two	   questions	   under	   Singapore	   Copyright	   Act	  context,	   there	   is	   some	   guidance	   can	   from	   the	   RecordTV	   v.	  MediaCorp	   TV	   case.403	  This	  case	  had	  already	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  of	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  Still,	  some	  facts	  of	  this	  case	  need	  to	  be	  clarified	  again.	  The	  defendant	  RecordTV	  provided	  Internet-­‐based	  digital	  video	  recorder—which	  allowed	  its	  registered	  user	  to	  request	  to	  record	  free-­‐to-­‐air	  broadcasts	  for	  later	  streaming.	  Since	  more	  than	  one	  registered	  user	  may	  make	  a	  request	  to	  record	  the	  same	  show,	  the	  defendant	  also	  provide	  the	  deduplication	   technology	   which	   is	   known	   as	   the	   “Single	   Instance	   Storage”	   mode	  (SIS).	   Under	   this	   SIS	   mode,	   only	   one	   copy	   of	   the	   broadcast	   was	   stored	   on	   the	  defendant’s	  server,	  and	  only	  this	  one	  copy	  was	  made	  available	  to	  multiple	  registered	  users	  who	  required	  it.404	  The	  Plaintiff	  indeed	  claimed	  that	  the	  defendant	  infringe	  his	  right	  of	  communication.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  paragraph,	  this	  issue	  should	  be	  considered	  under	  the	  aspect	  of	  “make	  available”	  to	  the	  public	  over	  the	  Internet.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  403	  RecordTV	  Pte	  Ltd	  v	  MediaCorp	  TV	  Singapore	  Pte	  Ltd	  [2011]	  1	  SLR	  830.	  404	  Id,	  	  para.	  9.	  (There’s	  also	  a	  Mixed	  mode	  of	  storage.	  Under	  this	  mode,	  the	  number	  of	  copies	  of	  the	  required	  show	  stored	  in	  the	  server	  corresponded	  with	  the	  number	  of	  requests	  by	  registered	  users.	  But	  once	  there	  was	  none	  sufficient	  storage	  capacity,	  the	  system	  shifted	  to	  SIS	  mode.	  Even	  in	  this	  Mixed	  mode,	  much	  of	  the	  streaming	  service	  to	  he	  registered	  users	  are	  from	  a	  singly	  digital	  copy.)	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As	   a	   result,	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   issues	   of	   “to	   whom”	   and	   “by	   whom”	   should	   be	  discussed.	  	   First,	   is	   there	  a	  “public?”	  According	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	   those	  registered	  users	  do	  not	  constitute	  “public.”	  V	  K	  Rajah	  JA	  firstly	  explained	  the	  definition	  of	  “the	  public”	   as	   “	   all	   members	   of	   the	   community	   or	   a	   section	   of	   the	   public’’,	   further	   a	  “substantial	   number	   of	   persons	   can	   sometimes	   be	   ‘the	   public’”.405	  Although	   the	  registered	  users	  were	  members	  of	  the	  public,	  the	  judge	  then	  gave	  the	  first	  reason	  for	  his	   judgment:	   the	   registered	   users	   had	   valid	   television	   licenses,	   thus	   they	   had	  existing	   relationship	   with	   MediaCorp.	   To	   extent	   that	   a	   contractual	   relationship	  between	  the	  registered	  users	  and	  MediaCorp	  had	  been	  created	  by	  the	  licenses,	  the	  registered	   users	   were	   “arguably	   not	   members	   of	   ‘the	   public’	   for	   the	   purpose	   of”	  deciding	   whether	   MediaCorp’s	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   had	   been	  infringed.406	  Then,	   the	   judge	  gave	  a	  second	  reason:	  because	  registered	  users	  could	  not	  access	  to	  “all	  (or	  any)	  of	  the	  MediaCorp	  shows	  already	  recorded	  by	  RecordTV”	  but	  only	   to	   those	  specific	   shows	   they	  had	  requested,	   the	  defendant	  did	  not	   “make	  available”	  those	  specific	  shows	  to	  the	  public.407	  	  	   In	  my	  opinion,	  although	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  did	  not	  mention,	  it’s	  obvious	  that	  it	  followed	  the	  “single	  copy	  requirement”	  from	  the	  U.S.	  copyright	  case	  law.	  But	  as	  I	  mentioned	   early	   in	   the	   U.S.	   part,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   had	   already	   rejected	   this	  requirement	   in	   Aereo	   III.	   This	   reasoning	   can	   no	   longer	   stand	   firmly.	   Even	   if	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  405	  Id,	  para	  .24.	  406	  Id,	  para	  .25.	  407	  Id,	  at	  para	  26.	  (“Any	  communications	  made	  by	  RecordTV	  to	  registered	  users	  who	  had	  requested	  the	  recording	  of	  a	  particular	  MediaCorp	  show	  ere	  made	  privately	  and	  individually.”)	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“single	   copy	   requirement”	   is	   still	   applicable,	   the	   defendant	   still	   cannot	   fulfill	   such	  requirement.	   Because	   it	   provided	   a	   deduplication	   technology	   in	   order	   to	   save	  storage	   space.	   There	   was	   only	   one	   single	   copy	   being	   made	   available	   to	   multiple	  registered	  users	  with	  the	  deduplication	  technology.	  Most	  of	  the	  Singapore	  scholars	  also	  criticized	  these	  two	  reasons.	  For	  the	  first	  one,	  the	  criticizers	  stated	  that	  there’s	  no	   reason	   to	   draw	   a	   conclusion	   that	   registered	   member	   are	   not	   “public”	   if	   a	  contractual	   (licensing)	   relationship	   exist.	   	   Then	   for	   the	   second	   one,	   the	   scholars	  stated	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   did	   not	   inform	   how	   the	   conclusion	   of	   “a	   private	  communication”	   is	   reached.	  408And	   further,	   according	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal,	   the	  issue	   of	   “to	   whom”	   also	   entailed	   the	   “precise	   nature	   and	   ambit	   of	   the	   copyright	  ‘subject-­‐matter’	  in	  question.”409	  	   Then,	   is	   it	   by	   ISPs?	   By	   applying	   s	   16(6)	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act,	   the	   Court	   of	  Appeal	   concluded	   that	   the	   registered	   users	   were	   “the	   person	   responsible	   for	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  the	  communication	  at	  the	  time	  the	  communication	  was	  made.”410	  s	  16(6)	  was	   read	   into	   three	  elements	   to	   solve	   this	   issue	  by	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal:	  (1)	  the	  time	  of	  the	  communication;(2)	  the	  content	  of	  the	  communication;	  (3)	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  person	  responsible	  for	  determining	  that	  content.411	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   gave	   its	   answers:	   (1)	   the	   time	  was	   the	  moment	  when	   the	   requested	   show	  was	  available	  for	  streaming	  to	  the	  registered	  users;	  (2)	  the	  content	  was	  the	  specific	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  NG-­‐Loy	  Wee	  Loon,	  The	  Whom	  in	  Online	  Dissemination	  of	  Copyright	  Works:	  To	  Whom	  and	  By	  Whom	  is	  the	  Communication	  Made,	  Sing.	  J.	  Legal	  Stud.	  373	  (2011),	  at	  381.	  409	  where	  copyright	  law	  and	  technology	  once	  again	  cross	  path,	  at	  668.	  410	  RecordTV	  V	  MediaCorp,	  	  supra	  note	  403,	  para.	  36.	  411	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  172,	  S	  16(6).(“For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  act,	  a	  communication	  other	  than	  a	  broadcast	  is	  taken	  to	  have	  been	  made	  by	  the	  person	  responsible	  for	  determining	  the	  content	  the	  communication	  at	  the	  time	  the	  communication	  is	  made.”)	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show	  requested	  by	   the	  registered	  users;	   (3)	  based	  on	  two	   former	  conclusions,	   the	  registered	   user	   was	   the	   person	   responsible	   for	   determining	   the	   content	   of	   the	  communication.412	  Singapore	  scholars	  also	  criticized	  this	  explanation	  from	  the	  Court	  of	   Appeal.	   They	   believed	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   did	   not	   refer	   to	   the	   legislative	  background	  of	   s	  16(6).	  Therefore,	   the	   conclusion	  of	   this	   issue	   is	   inconsistent	  with	  the	   legislative	   intent.	   As	   I	   mentioned,	   Singapore	   also	   implemented	   the	   right	   of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  into	  its	  Copyright	  Act	  as	  a	  response	  to	  requirement	  of	  Art	  8	  of	  WCT.	  However,	  Expert	  Mr.	  Winston	  Chew	  made	  an	  intervention	  to	  the	  Basic	  Proposal	   that	   firstly	   brought	   the	   right	   of	   communicate	   to	   the	   public.	   Mr.	   Chew	  suggested	   that	   “innocent”	   carriers	   who	   merely	   provide	   facilities	   for	   enabling	   or	  making	   any	   communication	   should	   not	   constitute	   an	   infringer.413	  This	   “innocent”	  requirement	   is	   quite	   important.	   In	   order	   to	   clarify	   this	   target,	   when	   Singapore	  brought	  Art	  8	  of	  WCT	  into	  its	  law,	  it	  also	  introduced	  s	  16(6)	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  S	  16(6)	  exists	   to	   ensure	   that	   “innocent	   carriers	   of	   information	   would	   not	   be	   liable	   for	  copyright	  infringements.	  Meanwhile,	  this	  also	  means	  a	  party	  who	  has	  some	  further	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  communication	  that	  goes	  beyond	  merely	  providing	  facilities	  is	  not	  exempted	  from	  being	  liable.	  For	  this	  case,	  Singapore	  scholars	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  the	  defendant	  who	  actually	  determined	  how	  to	  record	  the	  plaintiff’s	  shows,	  how	  those	  specific	   copies	   of	   recordings	  were	   stored	   on	   its	   server,	   and	   how	   to	   communicate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  412	  RecordTV	  v.	  MediaCorp,	  supra	  note	  403,	  para.	  35.	  (	  If	  the	  registered	  user	  did	  not	  made	  those	  specific	  recording	  requests,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  recording	  of	  the	  shows	  stored	  in	  the	  defendant’s	  server,	  nothing	  could	  be	  communicated.)	  413	  “The	  Summary	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Main	  Committee	  I”	  in	  The	  Records	  of	  the	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  on	  Certain	  Copyright	  and	  Neighbouring	  Rights	  Questions	  (Geneva:	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Organisation,	  199)	  vol.	  1	  at	  308.	  Singapore’s	  Proposal	  to	  amend	  Art	  10,	  CRNC/DC/12,	  6	  December	  1996.	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those	  recordings	  to	  the	  registered	  users.414	  Thus,	  it’s	  hard	  to	  say	  that	  the	  defendant	  merely	   provided	   facilities	   in	   this	   case,	   so	   the	   defendant	   should	   be	   liable	   for	   the	  copyright	  infringement.	  	   It’s	  clear	   that	   the	  application	  of	   the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	   the	  public	   in	  Singapore	   being	   affected	   by	   the	   U.S.	   case	   laws.	   But	   nowadays,	   the	   relevant	   legal	  issues	  still	  remain	  unanswered.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	  Japanese	  style	  of	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public—the	  public	  transmission	  right.	  
B. Japan—	  Public	  Transmission	  Right	  During	  the	  period	  from	  1970	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Law	  only	  granted	  the	  copyright	  owners	  the	  broadcasting	  right,	  which	  is	  the	  only	  existing	  right	  for	  transmitting	  copyrighted	  works	  to	  the	  public.	  But	  in	  1986,	  much	  earlier	  than	  the	  establishment	  of	  Art	  8.	  of	  WCT,	  the	  Japanese	  copyright	  law	  included	  a	  new	  right—“the	   right	   of	   interactive	   transmission”,	   in	   response	   to	   the	   developed	   cable	   TV	  technology.	  415	  And	   finally	   in	  1997,	   to	  comply	  with	   the	  WCT	  and	   in	  reaction	   to	   the	  Internet	   technology,	   the	   Japanese	   copyright	   law	   was	   amended.	   	   The	   new	   public	  transmission	  right	  regulated	  by	  Art	  23(1)	  in	  new	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Law	  covers	  all	  forms	  of	  existing	  transmission:	  the	  broadcasting	  right,	  the	  wire	  diffusion	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	   “interactive	   transmission	   right”—	   the	   right	   to	   transmit	   works	   via	   the	  Internet.416	  The	  former	  two	  kinds	  of	  rights	  are	  limited	  to	  simultaneous	  reception	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  414	  Supra	  note	  409,	  at	  675.	  415	  Japan	  Copyright	  Office,	  Copyright	  System	  in	  Japan,	  (2005	  ed	  Copyright	  Research	  and	  Information	  Centre	  (CRIC)).	  Based	  on	  this	  new	  introduced	  right,	  there	  were	  already	  three	  forms	  of	  transmission	  in	  Japanese	  Copyright:	  broadcasting,	  wire	  diffusion	  and	  interactive	  transmission.	  416	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  190,	  art	  2	  (1)	  (viibis),	  (viii),	  (ixbis)	  and	  (ixquater),	  Copyright	  Law	  of	  Japan.	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the	   identical	   content	   by	   the	   public.	   And	   the	   interactive	   transmission	   means	   to	  “transmit	   a	   work	   to	   the	   public	   automatically	   in	   response	   to	   a	   request	   from	   the	  public”.417 	  This	   new	   public	   transmission	   right	   includes	   both	   making	   the	   work	  transmittable	   in	   the	   case	   of	   automatic	   public	   transmission418	  and	   other	   public	  transmission	  (such	  as	  transmit	  by	  the	  request	  of	  user).419	  Public	   transmission	   right	   under	   the	   Japanese	   Copyright	   law	   can	   be	   also	  separate	   into	   two	   factors:	   one	   is	   “making	   transmittable”	   and	   the	  other	   is	   “public.”	  	   Art	  2	  (1)	  (ixquinquies)	  interprets	  the	  act	  of	  “making	  transmittable”	  in	  details:	  (a)	  the	  work	  stored	  in	  the	  internet-­‐	  connected	  medium	  must	  be	  protected	  content;	  (b)	   the	   server	  which	   stored	   copyrighted	  works	  must	   connected	   to	   the	   Internet.420	  For	   example,	   the	   acts	   of	   uploading	   music	   files,	   movie	   files	   or	   aired	   television	  programs	   to	   a	   webpage	   without	   consents	   from	   copyright	   owners	   and	   allow	  individual	  users	  of	   the	   Internet	   to	  request	  access	  and	   transmit	   the	  uploaded	  work	  automatically	   violate	   the	   public	   transmission	   right.	   Based	   on	   the	   former	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  417	  Id.	  (“	  however,	  public	  transmission	  falling	  within	  the	  term	  broadcast	  or	  wire-­‐broadcast”.)	  418	  Id,	  art	  23,	  para	  1.	  See	  also	  THOMSON	  REUTERS,	  COPYRIGHT	  THROUGHOUT	  THE	  WORLD	  (2010),	  at	  §22:19.	  (Automatic	  public	  transmission	  refers	  to	  “	  the	  form	  of	  public	  transmission	  which	  occurs	  automatically	  in	  response	  to	  a	  request	  from	  the	  public,	  excluding,	  however,	  public	  transmissions	  falling	  within	  the	  term	  “broadcast”	  or	  “wire-­‐broadcast”.	  “Internet	  broadcasting,”	  where	  a	  TV	  or	  radio	  program	  is	  transmitted	  simultaneously	  to	  the	  public	  over	  the	  Internet	  is	  regarded	  as	  automatic	  public	  transmission.)	  419	  In	  Japan,	  simulcasting	  and	  webcasting	  are	  regarded	  as	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  rather	  than	  broadcasting	  under	  the	  meaning	  of	  WCT.	  Not	  only	  broadcasting	  organizations	  but	  also	  performers,	  phonogram	  producers	  are	  granted	  the	  right	  of	  making	  transmittable	  to	  the	  public	  in	  Japan.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  Japan	  has	  a	  broader	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  than	  other	  countries.	  420	  Peter	  Ganea,	  Christoher	  Heath	  and	  Hiroshi	  Saito,	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Law	  (2005),	  at	  57.	  
（Other	  scholar	  also	  explained	  that	  there	  are	  three	  key	  elements	  to	  fulfill	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  right	  of	  making	  transmittable:	  (a)	  a	  copyright	  work	  has	  been	  stored	  in	  a	  memory	  by	  direct	  storage	  or	  uploading;	  (b)	  the	  memory	  has	  been	  installed	  in	  a	  computer;	  (c)	  the	  computer	  has	  been	  connected	  to	  the	  Internet.	  	  See	  Hong	  Tao,	  Tansmission	  of	  Copyrighted	  
Works	  over	  the	  Interne,	  Rights	  and	  Exceptions,	  	  40	  http://epublications.bond.edu.au/theses/tao/	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interpretation	  of	  “making	  transmittable”,	  it	  shows	  a	  common	  view	  in	  Japan:	  making	  transmittable	  only	  covers	   the	   factor	  of	  making	   interactive	   transmission	  possible—	  the	  act	  of	  uploading.	  	  All	  the	  other	  subsequent	  actual	  transmissive	  acts	  following	  the	  uploading	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  right	  of	  public	  transmission.421	  	  Then	  comes	   to	   the	  other	   factor—“public.”	   	  According	   to	   Japanese	  copyright	  law	  Art	  2(5)	  and	  Art	  26bis(2)(iv),	  “public”	  is	  unspecified	  person	  or	  a	  large	  number	  of	   persons.	   Therefore,	   a	   small	   number	   or	   specified	   persons	   do	   not	   constitute	  “public”.422	  As	   a	   result,	   even	   only	   one	   person	   could	   constitute	   a	   member	   of	   the	  “public”	   as	   long	   as	   he	   is	   unspecified.	   	   For	   instance,	   in	   Myuta	   case,423	  the	   plaintiff	  provided	  an	  online	  storage	  (music	   locker)	  service,	  which	  allowed	  users	  to	  transfer	  their	   music	   files	   into	   3G2	   files	   in	   their	   computers	   then	   uploaded	   to	   their	   online	  storage	   server,	   and	  download	   the	   uploaded	  music	   files	   to	   their	   cellular	   phones	   at	  any	  time.	  Because	  any	  person	  could	  become	  a	  subscriber	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  service	  by	  certain	  subscription,	  and	  the	  subscriber	  of	  the	  service	  is	  an	  unspecified	  person,	  the	  subscriber	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	   the	   public.	   Japan	   complies	   with	   the	   WCT’s	  requirement	  but	  did	  not	  fully	  copy	  the	  provision	  of	  WCT.	  	  There	   are	   several	   cases	   about	   how	   Japanese	   court	   apply	   the	   new	   public	  transmission	   right.	   First,	   in	   Yoridori-­‐midori	   case,	  which	   I	  mentioned	   above,	   users	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  421	  See	  Tatsuhiro	  Ueno,	  The	  Making	  Available	  Right	  in	  the	  Cloud	  Environment-­‐	  Toward	  the	  
Harmonization	  of	  the	  Substantive	  Scope	  of	  the	  Right,	  available	  at:	  http://www.alai.jp/ALAI2012/program/document/S2%20-­‐%20Tatsuhiro%20UENO%202.pdf	  (last	  visited	  May	  26,	  2016).	  422	  Art	  2(5):	  “the	  public	  includes	  a	  large	  number	  of	  specified	  persons”’.	  See	  also	  supra	  note	  181.	  (According	  to	  most	  Japanese	  scholars,	  unspecified	  means	  a	  person	  is	  not	  within	  the	  normal	  circle	  of	  a	  family	  and	  its	  closest	  social	  acquaintances.)	  423	  Tokyo	  District	  Court,	  25	  May	  2007,	  1979	  Hanrei	  Jiho	  100.	  
	   133	  
were	  allowed	  to	  record	  TV	  programs	  for	  later	  play	  back.	  424	  The	  entire	  system	  was	  designed	   in	   a	  way	   that	   the	   server	   always	  made	  only	  one	   copy	  of	   the	   recorded	  TV	  programs	  even	  when	  several	  users	  wanted	  to	  record	  the	  same	  TV	  program.	  So	  there	  was	  only	  one	  copy	  of	  the	  TV	  program	  saved	  on	  the	  server,	  which	  could	  be	  accessed	  and	  enjoyed	  by	  several	  users	  who	  requested	  to	  record	  it.	  The	  Osaka	  District	  Court	  firstly	   reasoned	   that	   the	  number	  of	   the	  users	  was	   large	  enough	   to	  be	   regarded	  as	  “public”.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  number	  of	  the	  viewers,	  users	  enjoyed	  the	  same	  copy	  of	  a	  specific	   TV	   record	   on	   the	   server,	   therefore,	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   reception	   of	   the	  transmission	  should	  be	  deemed	  as	  public.	  Further	  how	  the	  defendant’s	  system	  work	  made	   it	   a	   system	   that	   can	   “making	   transmittable”	   a	   copyrighted	  work.	   The	  Osaka	  High	  Court	   affirmed.425	  Then,	   in	  deciding	  whether	   the	  defendant	  directly	   infringes	  the	   right	  of	  public	   transmission,	   the	  Osaka	  High	  Court	   reversed	   the	  Osaka	  District	  court’s	  decision.	  It	  held	  that	  even	  the	  defendant	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  entity	  of	   public	   transmission	   in	   a	   physical	   sense;	   he	   still	   should	   be	   considered	   so	   in	   a	  normative	   sense.	   Because	   the	   defendant	   actually	   managed,	   controlled	   and	  maintained	  its	  product,	  it	  infringed	  the	  right	  of	  public	  transmission.	  Second,	   in	   the	   Justonline	   case,	   the	   subscribers	   of	   the	   Video-­‐share	   website	  (which	  operated	  and	  managed	  by	   the	  defendant)	  uploaded	  copyrighted	  video	   files	  without	   the	   Plaintiff’s	   permission.	   Then,	   such	   files	   remained	   in	   the	   defendant’s	  server,	  so	  that	  they	  could	  be	  transmitted	  to	  other	  users	  if	  they	  have	  accesses	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  424	  Osaka	  District	  Court,	  24	  Oct	  2005,	  H.J.	  (1911)	  65	  [2006].	  English	  translate	  available	  at:	  	  http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110817155555.pdf	  	  425	  Yoridori-­‐midori	  case,	  Osaka	  High	  Court,	  14	  Jun	  2007,	  1991	  Hanrei	  Jiho	  122.	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server	  and	  upon	  their	  requests.426	  The	  Tokyo	  District	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  defendant	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  public	  transmission.	  The	  court	  reasoned	  that	  it	  not	  only	  control	  and	   manage	   those	   illegal	   public	   transmission	   but	   also	   gain	   benefit	   attribution	  through	  inducing	  and	  enlarging	  such	  public	  transmission.	  In	  2010,	  the	  IP	  High	  Court	  affirmed	  the	  Tokyo	  District	  court’s	  decision.	  The	   Maneki	   case	   is	   also	   a	   great	   example.427	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   defendant	  provided	  a	   space-­‐shifting	   service	   for	  TV	  programs	  which	   called	   “Maneki	  TV”.	  This	  service	  could	  be	  used	  via	  a	  product	  called	  “LocationFree”,	  which	  has	  a	  component	  device	  called	  “base	  station”.428	  By	  using	  the	  base	  station,	  a	  user	  was	  able	  to	  watch	  TV	  programs	  through	  Internet	  upon	  his	  own	  request	  in	  the	  area	  where	  his	  base	  station	  was	   installed.	  The	  defendant	  would	  get	  31,500	  yen	   for	   the	   first	   admission	   service	  and	  then	  5,040	  yen	  as	  monthly	  fee	  for	  continuing	  service.	   	  Both	  the	  Tokyo	  District	  court	   and	   the	   IP	   High	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   defendant	   did	   not	   infringe	   the	   right	   of	  making	   transmittable.	   Because	   there’s	   no	   “automatic	   public	   transmission	   server”	  exist	  in	  this	  case.	  	  An	  “automatic	  public	  transmission	  server”	  must	  be	  a	  device	  which	  transmit	  programs	  that	  can	  be	  received	  directly	  by	  the	  public.429	  But	  via	  the	  “Maneki	  TV”	  service,	  the	  transmission	  of	  TV	  programs	  through	  the	  base	  station	  is	  conducted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  426	  Justonline	  case,	  Tokyo	  District	  Court	  13	  Nov,	  2009.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.apaaonline.org/pdf/APAA_58th_council_meeting_Korea/3-­‐CopyrightCommitteeReports/2-­‐CopyrightJapanCountryReport2010.pdf	  	  Justonline	  Appeal	  case,	  IP	  High	  Court,	  8	  Sep,	  2010.	  427	  Saiko	  Saibansho	  [Sup.	  Ct.],	  Jan.	  18,	  2011,65	  Saiko	  Saibansho	  minji	  henreishu	  [Minshu]	  121	  (Japan),	  	  English	  translation,	  see	  http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1090	  428	  Id.	  A	  base	  station	  can	  “incorporate	  a	  television	  tuner	  for	  terrestrial	  analog	  broadcasting	  and	  functions	  to	  convert	  the	  received	  broadcasts	  into	  digital	  data	  and	  automatically	  transmit	  such	  data	  upon	  the	  request	  of	  a	  user.”	  The	  defendant	  would	  house	  the	  base	  station	  inside	  its	  data	  center,	  and	  connect	  the	  user’s	  device	  to	  an	  antenna	  through	  booster,	  hook	  up	  with	  a	  router,	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  Internet.	  429	  Id.	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by	  the	  individual	  user,	  and	  the	  reception	  of	  the	  requested	  data	  from	  the	  base	  station	  is	   also	   conducted	   by	   the	   specified	   users.	   The	   base	   station	   is	   just	   a	   sole	  corresponding	   device	   that	   has	   already	   been	   set	   up.	   It	   provides	   function	   of	  transmitting	  “one	  to	  one”	  not	  to	  the	  public.	  Therefore,	  the	  defendant	  did	  not	  infringe	  the	   right	   of	   public	   transmission.	   However,	   in	   2011,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Japan	  reversed	  the	  Tokyo	  District	  court’s	  and	  the	  IP	  High	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Maneki	  case.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	   Japan	  had	   two	  holdings:	   (1)	  any	  device	   connected	  with	   the	  Internet	   open	   to	   the	   public	   that	   is	   capable	   of	   transmitting	   data	   to	   a	   recipient	  automatically	   upon	   request	   from	   that	   recipient,	   could	   be	   an	   automatic	   public	  transmission	  device,	   even	   if	   the	  device	  was	  only	   capable	  of	   transmitting	  data	   to	   a	  single	   recipient.	   As	   far	   as	   the	   transmission	   was	   performed	   by	   said	   device,	   it	  constituted	   automatic	   public	   transmission;	   (2)	   the	   person	   who	   creates	   the	  possibility	   for	   such	   a	   device	   to	   automatically	   transmit	   data	   to	   a	   recipient	   upon	  request	   is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  party	  who	  performs	  transmission.	  430	  The	  Supreme	  Court	   of	   Japan	   explained	   its	   decision:	   the	   legislative	   purpose	   and	   objective	   of	  bringing	  the	  right	  of	  making	  transmittable	  to	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Law	  is	  to	  regulate	  the	   preparatory	   action	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   before	   performing	   an	   actual	   automatic	  public	  transmission.	  Further	  since	  anyone	  could	  subscribe	  to	  the	  defendant’s	  service	  by	  entering	   into	  a	  contract,	  users	  of	   the	  service	  are	  unspecified	  person,	   the	  public	  exists.	   	   Based	   on	   these,	   the	   defendant’s	   base	   station	   must	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	  automatic	  public	  transmission	  server,	  and	  there	  was	  automatic	  public	  transmission.	  Then,	  by	  analyzing	  how	  the	  automatic	  transmission	  server	  work,	  it’s	  reasonable	  for	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the	  court	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  person	  who	  creates	  a	  condition	  in	  said	  server	  is	  acting	  like	  that	  this	  is	  the	  performer	  of	  public	  transmission.	  In	  this	  case,	  it’s	  the	  defendant	  who	  connects	  the	  base	  station	  to	  the	  TV	  antenna	  under	  its	  management	  so	  that	  the	  base	  station	   can	   automatically	   covert	   the	   input	   information	   into	   digital	   data	   and	   then	  transmit	  such	  data	  through	  the	  Internet	  upon	  request	  by	  the	  receiver.	  Accordingly,	  the	  defendant	  performs	  public	  transmission	  even	  though	  the	  users	  are	  the	  owners	  of	  base	  stations.431	  	   Based	  on	  these	  cases,	  it	  clearly	  shows	  that	  Japan	  has	  a	  broader	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  of	  public	  transmission.	  The	  copyright	  owners	  are	  granted	  a	  broader	  right.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  drawn	  based	  on	  three	  holdings	  of	  the	  Japanese	  courts:	  (1)	  the	  right	  of	  making	  transmittable	  is	  broader,	  because	  it	  can	  regulate	  a	  preparatory	  action	  to	  be	  carried	   out	   prior	   to	   an	   actual	   automatic	   public	   transmission;	   (2)	   the	   definition	   of	  “public”	   is	   broader.	   As	   far	   as	   any	   unspecified	   individuals	   can	   subscribe	   the	  transmission	  service,	  the	  public	  exists;	  (3)	  Once	  an	  entity	  actually	  control,	  manage,	  provide	  maintenance	  service	  or	  gain	  financial	  advantages	  from	  its	  service,	  the	  entity	  is	  considered	  as	  the	  infringer	  of	  the	  right	  of	  public	  transmission,	  even	  if	  in	  physical	  it	  does	  not	  transmit	  publicly.	  There	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  courts	  in	  Japan	  interpret	  right	  of	  public	   transmission	  strictly	   in	  protecting	   the	  copyright	  owners’	   right.	   Japan	   is	  a	  big	   culture-­‐export	   country;	   it	   exports	   thousands	   of	   animations,	   TV	   programs,	  movies	  and	  music	  every	  year.	   Japan	  can	  gain	  numerous	   financial	  benefits	   from	   its	  culture	  products.	   	  In	  order	  to	  encourage	  people	  keep	  creating,	  it’s	  so	  reasonable	  to	  protect	  copyright	  owners’	  benefit	  as	  best	  as	  it	  can.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  China	  now	  is	  in	  a	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transitional	   period	   (in	   adopting	   and	   applying	   copyright	   law),	   we	   can	   transplant	  Japan’s	  regulation	  partly	   in	  order	  to	  keep	  balance	  between	  copyright	  owners,	   ISPs	  and	  users.	  	  
C. Australia—	  the	  right	  to	  communicate	  to	  the	  public	  Australia	   implemented	   the	   Art	   8	   of	   WCT	   by	   enacting	   the	   Copyright	  Amendment	   (Digital	   Agenda)	   Act	   2000,	   432which	   amended	   the	   Copyright	   Act	  1968.433	  The	  Digital	  Agenda	  introduced	  a	  new	  exclusive,	  technology-­‐neutral	  right	  –	  the	  right	  to	  communicate	  to	  the	  public.	  This	  new	  communication	  right	  replaced	  both	  the	   broadcasting	   right	   and	   the	   cable	   diffusion	   right.	   Further,	   this	   exclusive	  communication	   right	   is	   separate	   from	   the	   right	   of	   authorization,	   which	   means	  copyright	   owners	   not	   only	   have	   the	   right	   to	   communicate	   to	   the	   public,	   but	   also	  have	  the	  right	  to	  authorize	  other	  people	  to	  communicate	  the	  work	  to	  the	  public.434	  Under	   Section	   10(1)	   of	   Australian	   Copyright	   Act,	   “communicate”	   means	  “make	   available	   online	   or	   electronically	   transmit	   (whether	   over	   a	   path,	   or	   a	  combination	   of	   paths,	   provided	   by	   a	   material	   substance	   or	   otherwise)…”435	  With	  this	   legislative	   interpretation,	   it’s	  known	  that	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  to	  communicate:	  (1)	   make	   available	   via	   the	   Internet,	   and	   (2)	   electronically	   transmit	   material,	  “whether	   through	   material	   substances	   (for	   instance	   telephone	   cables	   and	   optical	  fibres)	   or	   otherwise	   (for	   instance,	   via	   electromagnetic	   waves—	   wireless	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  432	  Copyright	  Amendment	  (Digital	  Agenda)	  Act	  2000	  (Cth).	  available	  at:	  https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004C01235	  	  433	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178.	  	  434	  Id,	  s31(1)(a)(vii).	  435	  Id,	  s10(1).	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telegraphy). 436 	  Therefore,	   the	   Australian	   Copyright	   Act	   actually	   provides	   two	  exclusive	  rights	  of	  communication	  to	  copyright	  owners:	  (1)	  the	  right	  to	  make	  a	  work	  available	  online,	   and	   (2)	   the	   right	   to	  electronically	   transmit	   a	  work.	   Section	  10(1)	  also	  provides	  the	  definition	  of	  “to	  the	  public”,	  which	  means	  “to	  the	  public	  within	  or	  outside	   Australia.”437	  It	  means	   that	   this	   right	   only	   extends	   to	   communicate	   to	   the	  public,	  rather	  than	  to	  particular	  subscribers.438	  	  The	   right	   to	   make	   a	   work	   available	   online	   is	   relevant	   in	   cloud	   computing	  dissertation.	  To	  understanding	  this	  right,	  there	  are	  several	  factors.	  First,	  when	  will	  the	   communication	   happen?	   According	   to	   Australia	   scholars,	   under	   the	  circumstance	   regulation	   of	   making	   a	   work	   available	   online,	   the	   communication	  happens	  once	  a	  work	  has	  been	  uploaded	  to	  the	  Internet	  server	  that	  can	  be	  accessed	  by	   the	   public. 439 	  And	   second,	   who	   makes	   the	   communication?	   According	   to	  Copyright	   Act	   1968	   section	   22(6),	   it’s	   the	   person	   who	   chooses	   the	   content	   to	  communicate	   makes	   the	   communication. 440 	  Based	   on	   the	   Revised	   Explanatory	  Memorandum	  accompanying	  the	  Copyright	  Amendment	  (Digital	  Agenda)	  Bill	  2000,	  carriers	  and	  ISPs	  are	  excluded	  from	  being	  directly	  liable	  for	  communicating	  material	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  436	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Legal	  and	  Constitutional	  Affairs,	  Advisory	  Report	  on	  the	  Copyright	  Amendment	  (Digital	  Agenda)	  Bill	  1999,	  The	  Parliament	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  November	  1999.	  437	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178,	  s10(1).	  438	  WILLIAM	  VAN	  CAENEGEM,	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  LAW	  IN	  AUSTRALIA	  46	  (2010)	  ,	  para	  91.	  (	  Woolworths	  Limited	  v.	  Mark	  Konrad	  Olson	  and	  Anor	  [2004]	  NSWSC	  849,	  where	  the	  sending	  of	  an	  individual	  email	  was	  held	  not	  to	  amount	  to	  a	  communication	  to	  the	  public.)	  439	  Andrew	  Christie	  &	  Eloise	  Dias,	  The	  New	  Right	  of	  Communication	  in	  Australi,	  Sydney	  L.	  Rev.	  	  252	  (2005).	  440	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178,	  s22(6)(“	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  Act,	  a	  communication	  other	  than	  a	  broadcast	  is	  taken	  to	  have	  been	  made	  by	  the	  person	  responsible	  for	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  the	  communication.”)	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to	  the	  public	  via	  their	  service,	  where	  they	  do	  not	  generate	  these	  content.441	  Once	  the	  ISPs	   choose	   the	   content	   of	   communication,	   they	   still	   could	   be	   direct	   infringers.	  Further,	  ISPs	  could	  be	  the	  direct	  infringer	  for	  authorizing	  the	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  as	  far	  as	  they	  do	  not	  merely	  provide	  physical	  facilities.442	  There	  are	  several	  cases	  in	  interpreting	  how	  Australian	  Courts	  apply	  the	  right	  to	  communicate	  to	  the	  public.	  First,	  in	  Universal	  Music	  Australia	  v.	  Sharman	  License	  Holdings	   Ltd	   case,443	  The	   defendants	   provide	   a	   Kazaa	   system	   enabling	   users	   to	  search	  and	  download	  digital	  files	  from	  Altnet	  Inc	  or	  other	  Kazza	  users.	  It’s	  a	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  file	  sharing	  system.	  The	  plaintiffs	  claimed	  that	  defendant	  infringe	  their	  right	  of	  communication	   to	   the	   public.	   The	   defendants	   argued	   that	   it	   did	   not	   communicate	  any	   copyrighted	   works	   to	   the	   public.	   Their	   users	   did.	   The	   court	   found	   that	   the	  defendants	   knew	   the	  predominant	   use	   of	  Kazaa	  was	   for	   the	   sharing	   of	   copyright-­‐infringing	  material,	  and	  it	  did	  not	  prevent	  such	  use.	  Further	  the	  defendants	  also	  gain	  advertising	   revenue	   by	   operating	   Kazaa,	   and	   kept	   Kazaa	   sustaining	   with	   those	  revenue.	  What’s	  more	  important	  here,	  6	  of	  the	  defendants	  indeed	  authorized	  users	  to	   make	   copies	   of	   a	   specific	   recording	   and	   to	   communicate	   the	   recording	   to	   the	  public.	  However,	  the	  court	  didn’t	  ban	  the	  defendants	  from	  continuing	  to	  distribute	  its	   file-­‐sharing	   software,	   as	   long	   as	   they	   adopted	   certain	   measures	   to	   prevent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  441	  Revised	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  accompanying	  the	  Copyright	  Amendment	  (Digital	  Agenda)	  Bill	  2000	  (Cth)	  at	  9.	  available	  at:	  http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r910_ems_426f8e74-­‐8b69-­‐432b-­‐8ebe-­‐87e490e88bb6/upload_pdf/33832rem.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf	  	  (last	  visited	  May	  28,	  2016)	  442	  Id,	  at	  10.	  443	  Universal	  Music	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Sharman	  License	  Holdings	  Ltd,(2005)	  FCA	  1242.	  Available	  at:	  http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/30499/11434693141australia_en.pdf/australia_en.pdf	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copyright	   infringements.	   This	   case	   shows	   that	   the	   Australia	   court	   struggled	   to	  protect	  the	  development	  of	  new	  technology	  from	  being	  destroyed.	  	  Second,	  the	  Universal	  Music	  Australia	  v	  Cooper	  case444	  shows	  the	  difference	  between	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   and	   the	   right	   to	   authorize	  communication	   to	   the	   public.	   The	   defendants	   are	   the	   registered	   owner	   and	  	  operator	  of	   the	  website	  mp34free,	  and	   the	   ISPs	  who	  provide	   free	  web	  hosting.	  All	  the	  defendants	  gain	  financial	  benefits	  from	  the	  website	  mp34free.net.	  Users	  of	  this	  website	   can	   not	   only	   access	   and	   download	   infringing	   copyright	   copies	   of	   MP3	  recordings	   via	   the	   provided	   hyperlinks,	   but	   also	   they	   can	   add	   and	   contribute	  hyperlinks	  to	  MP3	  files	  on	  third	  party	  websites	  to	  this	  website.	  The	  trial	  court	  and	  the	  full	  court	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Australia	  held	  the	  same	  decision.	  The	  trial	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  defendants	  did	  not	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  because	   they	   did	   not	   make	   the	   sound	   recordings	   available	   to	   the	   public	   or	  electronically	  transmitted	  them	  to	  the	  public.445	  Courts	  provided	  three	  main	  reasons	  for	   this	   conclusion:	   (1)	   there	  were	   no	   sound	   recordings	   located	   on	   the	  mp34free	  website,	  they	  cannot	  be	  downloaded	  or	  transmitted	  from	  the	  website.446	  (2)	  It’s	  the	  third	  parties’	  websites	  which	  allow	  users	  to	  download	  sound	  recordings,	  therefore,	  the	   third	  parties’	  websites	  made	   the	   sound	   recordings	   available	   to	   the	  public,	   not	  the	  mp34free	  website.447	  (3)	  The	  electronic	  transmission	  of	  the	  sound	  recordings	  by	  clicking	  on	  the	  hyperlinks	  on	  the	  mp34free	  website	  started	  from	  the	  third	  parties’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  444	  Universal	  Music	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Cooper	  (2005)	  65	  IPR	  409.	  	  445	  Id,	  para.	  67.	  446	  Id,	  para.	  60.	  447	  Id,	  para.	  63.	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websites. 448 	  So	   the	   decision	   means	   that	   a	   website	   could	   not	   be	   said	   to	   be	  communicating	   a	   copyrighted	   work	   to	   the	   public	   by	   simply	   providing	   links	   to	  resources	   on	   third	   parties’	   websites.	   	   Further,	   the	   full	   court	   also	   determined	   the	  issue	  about	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  communication.	  449	  The	  full	  court	  ruled	  that	  a	  person	   who	   is	   the	   proprietor,	   manager	   or	   operator	   of	   a	   website	   which	   provides	  hyperlinks	  to	  the	  third	  parties’	  websites	  (where	  the	  sound	  recordings	  are	   located)	  does	  not	  decide	   the	   content	  of	   the	   communication.	  And	  an	  ability	   to	   remove	   such	  hyperlinks	   from	   his	  website	   is	   not	   a	   behavior	   for	   determining	   the	   content	   of	   the	  communication.450	  However,	   the	   trial	   court	   held	   that	   these	   hyperlinks	   could	   amount	   to	  authorizing	   communication	   to	   the	  public.	  As	   to	   the	  defendant	  Cooper	  who	  owned	  and	  operated	   the	  mp34free	  website,	   he	  not	  only	  had	   the	  power	   to	   take	  down	   the	  infringing	  hyperlinks,	  but	  also	  knew	  that	  these	  hyperlinks	  may	  lead	  to	  infringement.	  He	  nonetheless	  failed	  to	  take	  any	  measures	  to	  prevent	  such	  infringement.	  As	  to	  the	  ISPs	  who	  providing	  web	  hosting	  service,	  they	  could	  have	  taken	  step	  to	  taking	  down	  the	  website,	  but	   they	  did	  nothing	   to	  prevent	  such	   infringements.	  These	   ISPs	  could	  not	  be	  protected	  by	  s	  112E	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,451	  since	  they	  had	  performed	  an	  active	  role	  by	  hosting	   the	  website	  and	  assisting	  with	   its	  operation,	  which	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  448	  Id,	  para.	  66.	  449	  Universal	  Music	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Cooper	  (2005)	  FCA	  972,	  paras.	  72-­‐75.	  available	  at:	  https://jade.io/article/110955/section/140833	  	  450	  Id,	  para.	  75.	  451	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178,	  s112	  E.	  (“A	  person	  (including	  a	  carrier	  or	  carriage	  service	  provider)	  who	  provides	  facilities	  for	  making,	  or	  facilitating	  the	  making	  of,	  a	  communication	  is	  not	  taken	  to	  have	  authorised	  any	  infringement	  of	  copyright	  in	  an	  audio-­‐visual	  item	  merely	  because	  another	  person	  uses	  the	  facilities	  so	  provided	  to	  do	  something	  the	  right	  to	  do	  which	  is	  included	  in	  the	  copyright.”)	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necessary	   steps	   to	   effectively	   trigger	   the	   illegal	   downloading	   of	   the	   copyright	  material.452	  	   Third,	  the	  Roadshow	  Films	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  iiNet	  Ltd	  case	  decided	  whether	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  (one-­‐to-­‐one)	  communication	  of	  a	  film	  through	  the	  Internet	  by	  BitTorrent	  was	  an	  illegal	  communication	  to	  the	  public.453	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  BitTorrent	  is	  a	  file	  sharing	  system	   which	   was	   able	   to	   diffuse	   a	   file	   into	   small	   packets	   (for	   instance,	   a	   film).	  Those	   small	   packets	   then	  were	  downloaded	   to	  many	   computers.	   Eventually	   those	  packets	  were	  sent	   from	  those	  computers	   to	  different	  computers	  by	   the	  BitTorrent	  software.	  Therefore,	  people	  who	  wish	  to	  download	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  movie	  just	  need	  to	  send	  a	  request	  to	  a	  “swarm”	  of	  other	  computers	  which	  used	  BitTorrent	  software	  to	  download	   the	   movie	   before.	   The	   Full	   Federal	   Court	   reversed	   the	   trial	   court’s	  decision,	   it	   held	   that	   iiNet	  users	  were	   repeat	   infringers	   insofar	   as	   they	   repeatedly	  made	   works	   available	   online. 454 	  “BitTorrent	   use	   is	   an	   ongoing	   process	   of	  communication	  for	  as	  long	  as	  one	  wishes	  to	  participate.”455	  Further	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  Full	   Federal	   court	   also	   held	   that	   “a	   communication	  within	   the	  meaning	   of	   s22(6)	  could	  be	  made	  by	  one	  computer	  to	  another	  without	  direct	  human	  intervention	  if	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  452	  Cooper	  case(full	  court),	  para.	  75.	  See	  also	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights	  Cases	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Music	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Region,	  33-­‐35.,	  available	  at:	  http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/1025/wipo_pub_1025.pdf	  	  453Roadshow	  Films	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  iiNet	  Ltd	  	  (2011)	  194	  FCR	  285.	  available	  at	  :	  https://jade.io/article/210173	  	  See	  also	  MARK	  DAVISON,	  ANN	  MONOTTI	  &	  LEANNE	  WISEMAN,	  AUSTRALIAN	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  LAW	  253	  (2nd	  ed.,	  2016).	  454	  Id,	  para.	  158,	  paras.	  322-­‐346.	  	  See	  Roadshow	  Films	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  iiNet	  Ltd	  (2010)	  83	  IPR	  430.	  (The	  trial	  court	  held	  that	  iiNet	  did	  not	  commit	  a	  new	  act	  of	  infringement	  each	  and	  every	  time	  a	  computer	  containing	  an	  infringing	  film	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  film.	  Because	  the	  electronic	  communication	  occurred	  between	  internet	  users	  and	  the	  community	  of	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  users	  as	  a	  whole	  but	  not	  between	  individuals	  per	  se.	  )	  455	  Id,	  para	  601.	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computer	  made	   a	  work	   available	   online.”456	  In	   this	   case,	   as	   a	   conclusion,	   users	   of	  BitTorrent	  make	  films	  communicate	  to	  the	  public.	  	   Following	   this	  opinion,	   the	   trial	   court	   in	  Optus	  case	  also	  draw	  a	  conclusion	  that	  the	  users	  was	  responsible	  for	  making	  any	  communication	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  s	  22(6),	  since	  the	  user	  who	  selected	  the	  program	  to	  be	  recorded	  was	  the	  person	  that	  determines	  the	  content	  to	  be	  played	  back	  to	  him.457	  Therefore	  if	  a	  user	  simply	  communicated	   back	   the	   content	   to	   him,	   there	   was	   no	   communication	   to	   “the	  public.”458	  	  However,	  the	  Full	  Federal	  Court	  reversed	  the	  trial	  court’s	  decision	  of	  the	  right	   of	   reproduction,	   left	   this	   behind	   since	   it’s	   not	   necessary	   to	   solve	   this	   in	   the	  appeal.	   In	   my	   opinion,	   based	   on	   the	   language	   from	   the	   Full	   Federal	   Court’s	  decision,459	  Optus	  system	  was	  designed	  to	  make	  the	  copyrighted	  programs	  available	  for	  subscribers	  online	  by	  their	  requests.	  Optus	  did	  not	  merely	  provide	  facilities	  but	  intentionally	   designed	   and	   maintained	   its	   key	   function—	   capture	   free-­‐to-­‐air	   TV	  programs	   and	   channel	   them	   to	   the	   subscribers’	   online	   device.	   Thus,	   to	  me,	  Optus	  made	  the	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  	   Countries	   are	   still	   struggling	   in	   solving	   the	   legal	   issues	   caused	   by	   new	  technology	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public.	   The	   following	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  456	  Singtel	  Optus	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Naional	  Rugby	  League	  Investments	  Pty	  Ltd	  (No	  2)	  [2012]	  FCA	  34,	  88.	  See	  also	  id,	  paras.	  151-­‐158.	  457	  Id,	  para	  90-­‐92.	  458	  Id,	  para	  106.	  459	  Optus	  appeal,	  supra	  note	  184,	  paras.	  166-­‐167.	  (“Optus	  is	  not	  merely	  making	  available	  its	  system	  to	  another	  who	  uses	  it	  to	  copy	  a	  broadcast.	  Rather	  it	  captures,	  copies,	  stores	  and	  makes	  available	  for	  reward,	  a	  programme	  for	  later	  viewing	  by	  another….	  Optus	  not	  only	  has	  solicited	  subscriber	  utilization	  of	  its	  service,	  it	  has	  also	  designed	  and	  maintained	  a	  sophisticated	  system	  which	  can	  effectuate	  the	  making	  of	  recordings	  wanted	  for	  viewing	  by	  subscribers.”)	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section	   will	   firstly	   analyze	   the	   specific	   issues	   caused	   by	   the	   cloud	   computing	  technology	  and	  then	  analyze	  such	  issues	  under	  the	  Chinese	  situation.	  	  
iv. How Cloud Computing Affect the Right of Communication to the 
Public?— A Proposal for China 
 Based	   on	   the	   former	   discussion	   of	   the	   application	   of	   the	   right	   of	  communication	   to	   the	   public	   in	   different	   countries,	   two	   main	   issues	   arose:	   what	  constitute	   “public?”	   and	   who	   is	   communicating.	   These	   two	   issues	   remain	  unanswered	  and	  get	  unclear	  when	  applying	  to	  the	  cloud	  computing	  technology.	  The	  following	  sections	  will	  analyze	  these	  two	  issues	  and	  provide	  a	  proposal	  ground	  on	  these	  analyzes. 
A. What	  constitute	  “public”?—	  Deduplication	  Technology	  Usually,	  people	  use	  cloud	  computing	  as	  storage,	  video/audio	  streaming,	   file	  sharing,	   email	   and	   Internet	   radio.	  Under	   this	   circumstance,	   this	   streaming	   service	  will	   cause	   communication	   to	   the	   specific	   users,	   or	   to	   the	   public	   if	   the	   works	   are	  accessible	  to	  everyone	  who	  are	  online.	  Once	  there’s	  a	  “public”,	  the	  streaming	  service	  will	   constitute	   the	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   and	   may	   infringe	   the	   copyright	  owners’	   exclusive	   right.	  As	  a	   result,	   it’s	   significant	   to	  determine	  whether	   there’s	   a	  “public”	  or	  not.	  In	  most	  cloud	  storage	  or	  video/audio	  streaming	  service,	  the	  ISPs	  will	  use	   the	   deduplication	   technology	   to	   save	   spaces	   and	   lower	   costs.	  When	  using	   the	  deduplication	  technology,	  there’s	  only	  one	  copy	  for	  the	  same	  file	  stored	  in	  the	  cloud	  server.	  All	  the	  users	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  file	  through	  the	  cloud	  storage	  have	  to	  access	  this	  one	  particular	  copy.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  US	  part,	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	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denied	  “a	  single	  copy	  doctrine”	  in	  the	  field	  of	  “Cable	  TV	  and	  Equivalents,”	  but	  should	  the	   single	   copy	  doctrine	   applied	   here?	   In	  my	   opinion,	   it	   depends.	   If	   the	   user	  who	  upload	  a	  file	  to	  his	  own	  cloud	  storage	  space	  and	  setting	  his	  space	  as	  private	  (which	  means	   only	   the	   user	   or	   person	   with	   the	   user’s	   authorization	   could	   access	   to	   the	  space),	  even	  the	  uploaded	  file	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  stored	  copy	  of	  the	  same	  file	  because	  of	   the	  deduplication	   technology,	   there’s	  no	  public	  here.	  Although	  the	  user	  access	  to	  the	  copy	  which	  others	  can	  also	  access,	  the	  user	  himself	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  “public.”	  From	  the	  user’s	  point	  of	  view,	  he	  just	  accesses	  to	  the	  file	  that	  he	   uploaded	   earlier.	   So,	   if	   users	   set	   their	   uploaded	   files	   as	   accessible	   status	   as	  private,	  to	  them,	  they	  do	  not	  constitute	  public.	  But	  if	  users	  set	  their	  files’	  accessible	  status	  as	  public	  or	  “sharing,”	  then	  people	  access	  that	  file	  will	  constitute	  public.	  The	  users’	  act	  of	  setting	  “sharing”	  status	  of	  copyrighted	  files	  constitute	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	   communication	   to	   the	   public.	   Further,	   if	   the	   user	   re-­‐store	   the	   files	   to	   his	   own	  private	   cloud	   storage	   space	   directly	   from	  others’	   sharing	   cloud	   storage	   space,	   the	  user	  constitute	  “public”	  either.	  Because	  the	  user	  is	  not	  a	  specified	  person,	  he	  belongs	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  user’s	  act	  of	  re-­‐store	  enable	  him	  to	  access	  the	  files,	  and	  he	  has	  the	  intention	  to	  enjoy	  the	  files.	  	  Although	  the	  user	  does	  not	  further	  transmit	  the	  files	  to	  others,	  what	  he	  had	  done	  still	  constitute	  copyright	  infringement.	  
B. Who	  is	  communicating?—	  the	  Users	  or	  ISPs?	  	   In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  two	  mostly	  used	  methods	  from	  deduplication	  technology	  need	  to	  be	  analyzed	  separately	  in	  this	  issue.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  last	  section—	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  the	  first	  method	  is	  that	  the	  ISP	  himself	  makes	  a	  single	  master	  copy	  for	  users	  who	  have	  right	  to	  access	  the	  file.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  ISP	  who	  provides	  the	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single	  master	  copy	  is	  the	  one	  who	  communicates.	  Whether	  the	  user	  who	  uploads	  the	  same	  file	  to	  his	  storage	  space	  has	  the	  authorization	  doesn’t	  matter,	  because	  the	  ISP	  will	  use	  his	  own	  master	  copy	  to	  replace	  the	  user’s	  uploaded	  file.	  The	  ISP	  initially	  has	  the	  master	  copy	  on	  his	  server	  no	  matter	  the	  user	  upload	  the	  same	  file	  or	  not.	  	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  difference	  here	  is	  whether	  the	  ISP	  has	  authorization	  from	  the	  copyright	  owner.	  If	  not,	  he	  may	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  (if	  there’s	  a	  public).	  Otherwise,	  he	  legally	  communicates	  to	  his	  subscribers.	  The	  other	  method	  is	  that	  the	  deduplication	  system	  runs	  to	  analyze	  each	  individual	  bits	  of	  data	  from	  each	  file	  to	  determine	  whether	  any	  data	  chunk	  from	  the	  file	  already	  on	  the	  server.	  In	  this	  situation,	   it’s	   clear	   the	   ISP	   himself	   does	   not	   provide	   any	   files,	   but	   only	   use	   his	  deduplication	  technology	  to	  delete	  the	  repeated	  files	  and	  keep	  the	  new	  one.	   In	  my	  opinion,	   if	   the	   ISP	   merely	   provides	   facilities	   for	   its	   service	   and	   simply	   use	   the	  deduplication	  technology	  to	  release	  room	  for	  his	  storage	  space,	  he	  should	  not	  be	  the	  one	  who	  communicates.	  If	  the	  files	  are	  infringing	  ones,	  he	  may	  be	  secondary	  liable	  for	   the	   infringement	   of	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   which	   base	   on	   how	  much	   he	  knows	   about	   the	   infringing	   files.	   However,	   if	   the	   ISP	   does	   not	   merely	   provide	  facilities	  instead	  he’s	  able	  to	  control	  all	  communications	  on	  his	  server,	  or	  he	  actually	  maintains	  and	  helps	  the	  infringing	  communications,	  he	  also	  gains	  financial	  benefits	  from	   such	   service,	   the	   ISP	   may	   still	   be	   held	   liable	   for	   infringing	   the	   right	   of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  
C. The	  Right	  of	  Dissemination	  on	  Information	  Networks	  and	  a	  Proposal	  in	  China	  	   To	   cope	  with	   the	   copyright	   challenges	   brought	   by	   the	   developing	   Internet	  technology	   and	   strengthen	   copyright	   protection	   in	   the	   Internet	   era	   and	   to	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implement	   Art	   8	   of	   WCT,	   China	   introduced	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	  Information	   Networks.460	  Art	   10(12)	   of	   Chinese	   Copyright	   Law	   grants	   copyright	  owners	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	   information	   networks.	   That	   is,	   “the	   right	   to	  provide	  the	  public	  with	  works	  by	  wired	  or	  wireless	  means,	  so	  as	  to	  make	  the	  public	  able	   to	  respectively	  obtain	   the	  works	  at	   individually	  selected	   time	  and	  place.”	  The	  Supreme	   People’s	   Court	   of	   China	   defined	   the	   “information	   networks”	   as	   “the	  Internet,	   radio	   and	   television	   broadcasting	   networks,	   fixed	   communication	  networks	   and	   mobile	   communication	   networks…	   as	   well	   as	   local	   area	   networks	  open	   to	   the	  public.”461	  Although	  China	  does	  not	  place	   “to	   the	  public”	   in	   the	   title	  of	  this	  right,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  is	  limited	  by	  “to	  the	  public”	  from	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court’s	  interpretation.	  	  	   To	  understand	  Chinese	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks,	  four	  questions	   need	   to	   be	   answered.	   First,	   what’s	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   right	   of	  distribution	  and	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks?	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   in	   the	   Internet	   is	   necessary.	   I	   will	  analyze	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  right	  of	  distribution.	  The	  following	  part	  will	   analyze	   the	   other	   three	   questions:	   (1)does	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  460	  Zhuzuo	  Quanfa(著作权法)[	  Copyright	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  ](2010	  Amendment)](promulgated	  by	  Order	  No.26	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  Feb	  26,2010),	  Article	  10	  (12).	  461	  Zuigao	  Renmin	  Fayuan	  Guanyu	  Shenli	  Qinhai	  Xinxi	  Wangluo	  Chuanboquan	  Minshi	  Jiufen	  Anjian	  Shiyong	  Falv	  Ruogan	  Wenti	  de	  Guiding(最高人民法院关于审理侵害信息网络传播权
民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的规定)Provisions	  of	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  on	  Several	  Issues	  Concerning	  the	  Application	  of	  Law	  in	  Hearing	  Civil	  Dispute	  Cases	  Involving	  Infringement	  of	  the	  Right	  of	  Dissemination	  on	  Information	  Networks(promulgated	  by	  the	  Jud.	  Comm.	  of	  the	  Sup.	  People’s	  Ct.,	  Nov	  26,	  2012,	  effective	  Jan.	  1,	  2013),	  art	  2.	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information	   networks	   regulate	   the	   non-­‐interactive	   communication;	   (2)	   how	   to	  define	  the	  word	  “provide”	  in	  the	  statute;	  and	  (3)	  who	  provides.	  
a. Does	  The	  Right	  of	  Dissemination	  on	  Information	  Networks	  Regulate	  “Non-­‐
Interactive	  Communication?”	  	   	   The	   definition	   of	   the	   “information	   networks”	   also	   clarify	   that	   the	   right	   of	  dissemination	  is	  a	  right	  to	  protect	  copyright	  owners	  in	  the	  Internet	  world,	  it	  fulfilled	  the	  WCT’s	   requirements.	  462	  However,	   there’s	   an	   element	   of	   “individually	   selected	  time	  and	  place,”	  which	  means	  that	  public	  has	  to	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  works	  on	  demand	  on	  a	  point	  to	  point	  basis.	  As	  I	  explained	  before,	  this	  is	  “interactive	  communication”.	  Therefore,	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   indicates	   that	   the	   right	   of	  dissemination	   on	   information	   networks	   in	   China	   can	   only	   regulate	   “interactive	  communication”.	  However,	  network	  application	  technology	  keeps	  developing,	  non-­‐interactive	  communication	  became	  more	  and	  more	  popular.	  For	   instance,	   ISPs	  are	  now	  providing	  webcasting,	  web-­‐TV,	   simulcasting,	  or	   Internet	   radio	  services.	  Users	  cannot	   choose	   the	   time	   they	  want	   to	   enjoy	  works,	   because	   there	   are	   schedule	   of	  online	  live	  webcasting.	  Users	  can	  only	  enjoy	  specific	  works	  by	  following	  the	  specific	  schedules.	  Different	  users	  can	  enjoy	  exactly	  the	  same	  works	  from	  the	  same	  website	  (which	  provides	  live	  webcasting	  service)	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  It’s	  obvious	  that	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	  in	  China	  cannot	  regulate	  the	  act	  of	  non-­‐interactive	   communication.	   	  Therefore,	  how	  should	  China	   regulate	  non-­‐interactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  462	  Legislators	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Law	  in	  China	  explicitly	  indicated	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	  was	  determined	  directly	  based	  on	  the	  statements	  of	  WCT	  Art	  8.	  	  See	  Hu	  Kangsheng(胡康生),	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gongheguo	  Zhuzuo	  Quanfa	  Shiyi	  (中华人民共和国著作权法释义)[	  Definitions	  of	  Copyright	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China](2002),	  at	  56.	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communication	  now?	  Lots	  of	  scholars	  indicate	  that	  courts	  should	  apply	  Art	  10(17)	  in	  this	  issue.	  The	  whole	  Art	  10	  grants	  copyright	  owners’	  moral	  rights	  and	  economic	  rights.	  It	  lists	  sixteen	  kinds	  of	  exclusive	  rights.	  And	  as	  a	  general	  provision,	  Art	  10(17)	  provides	   “other	   rights	   which	   shall	   be	   enjoyed	   by	   the	   copyright	   owners.”463	  Since	  there’s	   no	   accurate	   specific	   provision	   to	   regulate	   non-­‐interactive	   communication,	  it’s	  reasonable	  to	  apply	  the	  general	  provision	  Art	  10(17).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Edko	  Film	  v.	  UUSee.com,464	  the	  defendant	  provided	  “set-­‐time	  broadcasting”	  service.	  It	  provided	  a	  copyrighted	   film	   on	   specific	   time,	   its	   subscribers	   had	   to	   access	   its	  website	   on	   the	  scheduled	  time	  to	  enjoy	  this	  specific	  copyrighted	  film.	  The	  Beijing	  2nd	  Intermediate	  People’s	   Court	   ruled	   that	   the	   defendant	   infringed	   the	   plaintiff’s	   copyright—	   to	  provide	  works	  to	  the	  public	  by	  wired	  or	  wireless	  means	  on	  a	  specific	  schedule.	  Since	  the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	   information	   networks	   only	   regulate	   interactive	  communication,	   and	   in	   this	   case	   subscribers	   cannot	   individually	   choose	   the	   time	  they	  want	   to	   enjoy	   the	   specific	   film,	   the	   court	   held	   that	   the	   defendant	   violate	   the	  catch	   out	   provision—Art	   10(17).	  Moreover,	   Art	   10	   of	   the	   Beijing	   Higher	   People’s	  Court’s	   “the	   Guiding	   Opinions	   (I)	   on	   Several	   Issues	   Concerning	   the	   Trial	   of	   Cases	  Involving	   Copyright	   Disputes	   in	   Cyberspace	   (for	   Trial	   Implementation)”	   also	  expressly	  regulated:	  “ISPs	  who	  provide	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	  Internet	  on	  planned	  schedule,	   such	   acts	   do	   not	   constitute	   the	   dissemination	   on	   information	   network.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  463	  Chinese	  Copyright	  Law,	  supra	  note	  460,	  art	  10(17).	  464	  Anle	  Yingpian	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  Su	  Beijing	  Shiyue	  Wangluo	  Jishu	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  (安乐影
片有限公司诉北京时越网络技术有限公司)[Edko	  Films	  Ltd.	  v.	  UUSee.com	  Ltd.](Beijing	  2nd	  Interm.	  People’s	  Ct.	  Sep	  21,	  2008).	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This	  act	  has	  to	  be	  regulated	  by	  Art	  10(17)	  in	  Copyright	  Law.”465	  And	  further	  in	  the	  new	  draft	  of	  Copyright	  Law,	  Art	  13(6)	  provides	  a	  new	  “broadcasting”	  right,	  which	  means	   to	   broadcast	   or	   re-­‐broadcast	   works	   by	   wire	   or	   wireless	   means,	   or	  disseminates	  works	   to	   the	  public	  by	  using	   technological	   installations.”466	  This	  new	  broadcasting	   right	   extends	   the	   traditional	   broadcasting	   right	   to	   regulate	   non-­‐interactive	  communication.	  	  	   Based	   on	   these	   analyses	   it’s	   reasonable	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   right	   of	  dissemination	   on	   information	   networks	   in	   China	   only	   regulates	   interactive	  communications.	   But	   courts	   can	   still	   use	   general	   provision	  Art	   10(17)	   to	   regulate	  non-­‐interactive	  communication	  for	  now	  in	  China.	  For	   instance,	   in	  cloud	  computing	  area,	   online	  music	   streaming	   (Internet	   Radio)	   service	   cannot	   be	   regulated	   by	   the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	   information	  networks,	  but	   it	   can	  be	   regulated	  by	  Art	  10	  (17)	  for	  now.	  467	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  465	  Beijingshi	  Gaoji	  Renmin	  Fayuan	  Guanyu	  Wangluo	  Zhuzuoquan	  Jiufen	  Anjian	  Ruogan	  Zhidao	  Yijian(北京市高级人民法院关于网络著作权纠纷案件若干问题的指导意见)[The	  Beijing	  Higher	  People’s	  Court	  made	  “the	  Guiding	  Opinions	  (I)	  on	  Several	  Issues	  Concerning	  the	  Trial	  of	  Cases	  Involving	  Copyright	  Disputes	  in	  Cyberspace	  (for	  Trial	  Implementation)”]	  (May,	  2010),	  art	  10.	  466	  Draft	  of	  Copyright	  Law,	  National	  Copyright	  Administration	  of	  China,	  Jun,	  2012.	  This	  draft	  had	  been	  developed	  based	  on	  from	  lots	  of	  scholars	  and	  relative	  practitioners.	  467	  See	  Wei	  Wei(魏巍),	  Yidong	  Wangluo	  Diantaide	  Zhuzuoquan	  Wenti(移动网络电台的著作
权问题)[Copyright Issues of Internet Radio],	  Renmin	  Fayuanbao(人民法院报)[People’s Ct. 
Daily] (2015).	  available	  at:	  http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2015-­‐04/22/content_96976.htm?div=-­‐1	  (In	  this	  article,	  the	  author	  clearly	  pointed	  out	  that	  simulcasting	  via	  Internet	  radio	  cannot	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks,	  because	  subscribers	  are	  not	  able	  to	  obtain	  the	  works	  at	  the	  time	  they	  choose	  individually.	  And	  further	  the	  author	  also	  recommend	  to	  amend	  the	  copyright	  law	  in	  China	  with	  a	  new	  broad	  “broadcasting”	  right	  which	  can	  not	  only	  regulate	  interactive	  communication	  but	  also	  non-­‐interactive	  communication.)	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b. How	  To	  Define	  “Provide?”	  	   The	  third	  question	  is:	  how	  to	  define	  “provide”	  in	  the	  statute?	  According	  to	  the	  Supreme	   People’s	   Court’s	   Provision,	   “if	   the	   work,	   performance,	   audio	   or	   video	  recording	   is	   placed	   on	   an	   information	   network	   by	  means	   such	   as	   uploading	   to	   a	  network	   server,	   file	   sharing	   settings	   or	   using	   file	   sharing	   software	   or	   other	   acts,	  allowing	  the	  general	  public	  to	  download,	  browse	  or	  otherwise	  obtain	  the	  work,	  …at	  the	  time	  and	  place	  chosen	  individually,	   the	  people’s	  court	  shall	  determine	  that	  the	  network	  user	  or	  network	  service	  provider	  has	  committed	  the	  act	  of	  provision….”468	  Although	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  made	  a	  big	  movement	  in	  defining	  the	  unclear	  word	  “provide”	  in	  Art	  10(12)	  of	  Copyright	  Law,	  there	  are	  still	  unclear	  parts	  in	  this	  definition.	   First,	   this	   definition	   still	   does	   not	   clearly	   indicate	   whether	   the	   act	   of	  “provision”	  should	  be	  interactive	  or	  not.	   	  Base	  on	  the	  result	  of	  the	  “provide”	  action	  mentioned	   in	   this	   definition—“obtain	   work	   at	   the	   time	   and	   place	   chosen	  individually”,	  and	  where	  I	  reasoned	  that	   the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	   information	  networks	   should	   only	   regulate	   interactive	   communication,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   the	  “provide”	   action	   should	   be	   interactive.	   It	  means	   that	   providing	   content	   for	   online	  simulcasting,	   cloud-­‐base	   Internet	   Radio	   streaming,	   webcasting	   or	   other	   services	  which	  do	  not	  allow	  subscribers	  to	  choose	  the	  time	  and	  place	  to	  enjoy	  works	  cannot	  be	  deemed	  as	  the	  act	  of	  “provide”	  under	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	  	  	   Then,	  comes	  another	  issue,	  based	  on	  the	  language	  used	  in	  limiting	  the	  scope	  of	  “provision”	  in	  this	  art,	  what	  kind	  of	  act	  is	  really	  within	  the	  scope?	  This	  article	  lists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  468	  2013	  Provisions	  of	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court,	  supra	  note	  461,	  art	  3(2).	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three	  kinds	  of	  act	  of	  provision:	  (1)	  upload	  works	  to	  a	  network	  server;(2)	  set	  files	  to	  share;(3)	  use	  a	   file	   sharing	  software.	  From	  these	  descriptions,	   it’s	   clear	   that	   share	  copyrighted	   files	  directly	  via	  cloud	  storage	  service	  without	  authorization	   infringes	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	  Because	  in	  this	  action,	  a	  person	  has	   to	   upload	   files	   to	   the	   cloud	   server	   or	   sets	   the	   files	   to	   be	   shared	   in	   his	   cloud	  storage	  space,	   in	  either	  way,	   such	  actions	  are	  within	   the	  scope	  of	   “provide.”	  Then,	  using	  a	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  sharing	  software	  to	  share	  copyrighted	  works	  without	  consent	  also	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks,	  since	  it’s	  an	  action	  of	  “using	  file	  sharing	  software.”	  	  	   What	   indistinct	   here	   is	   whether	   provide	   deep	   linking,	   video	   aggregator	  websites/apps	  and	  links	  to	  online	  storage	  space	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  act	  of	  “provision”	   under	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	   information	   networks.	  When	   use	  usual	   linking	   service	   (which	   links	   to	   third	   party’s	   homepage	   or	   other	   websites),	  after	  clicking	   the	   link,	  users	  will	   leave	   the	  website	  which	  provides	   the	   link	  and	  be	  directed	   to	   the	   third	  party’s	   linked	  website.	  However,	   deep	   linking469	  directly	   link	  the	  files	  stored	  on	  the	  third	  party’s	  website,	  and	  provide	  the	  users	  who	  click	  the	  link	  works	  without	  leaving	  the	  visited	  website.	  So	  users	  will	  not	  realize	  the	  works	  they	  accessed	  are	  from	  a	  third	  party’s	  website,	  they	  will	  assume	  the	  works	  are	  provided	  by	  the	  service	  provider	  of	  the	  visited	  website.	  Therefore,	  it’s	  unclear	  whether	  deep	  linking	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  act	  of	  provision	  under	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	   information	   networks.	   Further,	   it’s	   reasonable	   to	   take	   deep	   linking	   and	   video	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  469	  Deep	  Linking,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_linking	  (“Deep	  linking	  is	  the	  use	  of	  a	  hyperlink	  that	  links	  to	  a	  specific,	  generally	  searchable	  or	  indexed,	  piece	  of	  web	  content	  on	  a	  website(e.g.,	  "http://example.com/path/page"),	  rather	  than	  the	  website's	  home	  page	  (e.g.,	  "http://example.com/").)	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aggregator	   together	   to	   consideration,	   because	   the	   technology	   used	   in	   video	  aggregator	   is	   deep	   linking	   technology	   actually. 470 	  Based	   on	   how	   the	   video	  aggregator	  functions,	  it	  seems	  only	  the	  deep	  linking	  process	  is	  relevant	  in	  the	  act	  of	  “provision.”	  Because	  of	  the	  deep	  linking	  and	  further	  embed	  coding	  technology,	  users	  can	   directly	   access	   video	   files	   without	   noticing	   the	   files	   are	   indeed	   from	   other	  websites.	   	  As	  a	   result,	   users	  will	   assume	   the	  video	  aggregator	  apps/websites	   they	  visited	  provide	  the	  video	  files.	  So	  does	  provide	  deep	  linking	  is	  an	  act	  of	  “provision”	  under	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks?	  There	  are	  two	  standards	  among	  Chinese	   scholars.	  First,	   according	   to	  Professor	  Wang	  Qian,	  he	  does	  not	   see	  deep	   linking	  as	  “provision”	  under	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	   in	  China.	  He	  supports	  the	  “server	  standard.”	  The	  server	  standard	  means:	  whether	  an	  infringed	  works	  were	  uploaded	  to	  a	  server	  that	  opens	  to	  the	  public	   is	  the	  standard	  for	  deciding	  whether	  there’s	  an	  act	  of	  provision	  under	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	  By	   this	   standard,	   provide	   deep	   linking	   cannot	   be	   deemed	   as	   “provide.”	   There	   are	  reasons	  for	  this	  standard:	  (1)	  WCT	  Art	  8	  and	  Art	  10(12)	  of	  Chinese	  Copyright	  Law	  both	   limits	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   dissemination	   right	   when	   dealing	   with	   “provide	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  470	  Video	  Aggregator,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_aggregator	  .	  See	  also	  Kimberley	  Isbell,	  What’s	  the	  law	  
around	  arrogating	  news	  online?	  A	  Harvard	  Law	  Report	  on	  the	  Risks	  and	  the	  Best	  Practices,	  (Sep.	  8,2010)	  available	  at:	  http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/09/whats-­‐the-­‐law-­‐around-­‐aggregating-­‐news-­‐online-­‐a-­‐harvard-­‐law-­‐report-­‐on-­‐the-­‐risks-­‐and-­‐the-­‐best-­‐practices/	  	  See	  
also	  Zhu	  Jianjun(祝建军), Shipin Juhe Xingweide Qinquan Rending(视频聚合行为的侵权认
定)[The	  Identification	  of	  Infringements	  of	  the	  Video	  Aggregator](Apr.	  27,	  2016),	  available	  at:	  http://tgxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=15452	  （Video	  aggregator	  plat	  service	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  technique	  of	  	  application	  software.	  By	  using	  the	  web	  search	  engine,	  transcoding,	  deep	  linking,	  embed	  code	  and	  other	  relevant	  technologies,	  video	  aggregator	  plat	  analysis	  numerous	  video	  files	  online,	  then	  choose	  from	  them,	  accurately	  locate	  them,	  and	  finally	  aggregate	  all	  resources	  (located	  on	  third	  parties’	  websites)	  on	  its	  own	  plat.	  In	  case,	  users	  will	  directly	  get	  all	  video	  files	  from	  the	  video	  aggregator	  plat	  instead	  of	  linking	  to	  other	  websites.)	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public	  with	  works”.	  “Provide	  works”	  is	  an	  objective	  action.	  And	  no	  matter	  who	  does	  the	  provision	  action,	   this	  “provide”	   is	  an	  established	  fact.	  Under	  this	  circumstance,	  even	   users	  misunderstand	  who	   actually	   provide	   works	   online;	   the	   court	   still	   can	  identify	   the	   real	   provider	   based	   on	   the	   known	   established	   fact.	   (2)	   The	   act	   of	  “provide”	   works	   results	   in	   public	   being	   capable	   of	   obtaining	   the	   works	   at	   the	  individually	   selected	   time	   and	   place.	   This	   result	   is	   a	   status	   that	   the	   works	   are	  “making	  available”	  to	  the	  public.	  So	  upload	  works	  to	  a	  server	  which	  can	  be	  accessed	  by	  the	  public	  can	  issue	  in	  this	  status.	  And	  this	  status	  will	  sustain	  until	  the	  works	  are	  deleted	   from	   the	   server	  or	   the	   server	   is	   shutdown	   (offline).	   In	   consequence,	   deep	  linking	   these	   already	   available	   works	   will	   not	   cause	   them	   to	   be	   available	   to	   the	  public	   for	   a	   second	   time.	   The	   act	   of	   deep	   linking	   will	   merely	   strengthen	   the	  communication	  extent	  of	  the	  works,	  since	  there	  will	  be	  more	  users	  obtain	  the	  works	  via	   clicking	   the	   deep	   links	   to	   access	   the	   works	   they	   already	   able	   to	   access	   via	  directly	   visiting	   the	   server.	  471(3)	   According	   to	   the	   WCT	   basic	   proposal,	   “making	  available	   of	   the	   work	   by	   providing	   access	   to	   it”	   should	   counts	   the	   “initial	   act	   of	  making	   the	   work	   available,	   not	   mere	   provision	   of	   server	   space,	   communication	  connections,	  or	  facilities	  for	  the	  carriage	  or	  routing	  of	  signals.”472473	  Professor	  Wang	  Qian’s	  theory	  had	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  Beijing	  Higher	  People’s	  Court	  and	  Beijing	  IP	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  471	  This	  reason	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  EU’s	  “new	  public”	  standard.	  However,	  the	  author	  of	  this	  dissertation	  reach	  a	  total	  different	  by	  reading	  “allowing	  the	  public	  to…obtain	  the	  work…”	  in	  Art	  3	  of	  the	  provision.	  And	  the	  author	  will	  analyze	  it	  later	  in	  this	  part.	  472	  WIPO,	  Basic	  proposal	  1996,	  para	  10.10	  473	  Wang	  Qian(王迁),Wangluo	  Huanjingzhong	  Zhuzuoquande	  Baohu	  Yanjiu(网络环境中的著
作权保护研究)	  	  Copyright	  Protection	  in	  the	  Network	  Environment	  (1st	  ed.	  2011),	  at	  336-­‐344.	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Court.	  474	  In	   2010,	   the	   Beijing	   Higher	   Court	   stated:	   “whether	   ISPs’	   act	   constitutes	  dissemination	   on	   information	   networks,	   the	   standard	   of	   this	   issue	   is	  whether	   the	  ISPs	  upload	  or	  act	  in	  other	  ways	  the	  works	  to	  an	  Internet	  server	  which	  open	  to	  the	  public.	   If	   the	   plaintiff	   claimed	   that	   the	   users	   erroneously	   identify	   the	   ISPs	   for	  providing	  the	  works	  because	  of	  the	  ISPs’	  service	  type,	  if	  ISPs	  could	  prove	  that	  they	  merely	  provide	   service	   as	   automatic	   connect,	   automatic	   transmission,	   file	  hosting,	  search,	  liking	  or	  P2P,	  the	  ISPs’	  act	  does	  not	  constitute	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	  ”475	  Then	  in	  Apr	  21,	  2016,	  Beijing	  IP	  Court	  adopted	  the	  server	  standard	  in	  deciding	   whether	   ISPs	   infringe	   copyright	   owners’	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	  information	  networks.	  There	  are	  just	  two	  exceptions	  where	  ISPs	  could	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  via	  providing	  deep	  linking	  service:	  (1)	  Copyright	  owners	  have	  already	  set	  up	  technical	  protection	  measures	  to	  protect	  their	   files;(2)	  ISPs	  provide	  any	   works	   jointly	   with	   others	   by	   means	   such	   as	   cooperation.476	  Beijing	   IP	   court	  brought	  three	  cases	  (where	  issues	  are	  whether	  links	  of	  the	  works	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks)	  to	  support	  its	  determination.477	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  474	  Beijing	  Intellectual	  Property	  Court	  (Beijing	  IP	  Court),	  available	  at:	  http://www.spruson.com/china-­‐new-­‐ip-­‐court-­‐system-­‐starts-­‐first-­‐ip-­‐court-­‐beijing-­‐3/	  (“IP	  Courts	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  all	  first	  instance	  cases	  related	  to	  technical	  matters	  including	  invention,	  utility	  and	  design	  patents,	  plant	  variety	  protection	  rights,	  layout	  designs	  of	  integrated	  circuits,	  ownership	  of	  technical	  secrets	  and	  copyrights	  for	  computer	  software.	  The	  first	  instance	  jurisdiction	  of	  technical	  matter	  cases	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  IP	  enforcement	  route	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  filing	  of	  the	  case	  and	  applies	  to	  both	  civil	  and	  administrative	  cases.	  “)	  475	  Beijing	  Higher	  Court’s	  Guiding	  Options,	  supra	  note	  465,	  art	  4.	  476	  Wangluo	  Chuanbo	  Qinquan	  Rending	  Qiyong	  Fuwuqi	  Biaozhun(网络传播侵权认定启
用服务器标准)[The	  Sever	  Standard	  being	  Applied	  in	  Determining	  Online	  Infringements],	  Beijing	  Ribao(北京日报)[Beijing	  Daily]	  (Apr.	  22,	  2016)	  	  http://bjrb.bjd.com.cn/html/2016-­‐04/22/content_27525.htm	  The	  Second	  exception	  was	  also	  stated	  in	  Art	  4,	  Provision	  of	  the	  …infringement	  of	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination.	  Supra	  note	  223.	  477	  Three	  noted	  cases	  relevant	  to	  whether	  deep	  linking	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination,	  published	  by	  Beijing	  IP	  Court	  (Apr.	  28,	  2016),available	  at	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   However,	   there	   are	   still	   many	   scholars	   adopted	   the	   standard	   of	   “users’	  perception”	  to	  analyze	  whether	  ISPs	  “provide”	  copyrighted	  works.478	  The	  standard	  of	   “users	   perception”	   means	   users	   are	   able	   to	   continually	   access	   works	   from	   a	  website/plat,	  but	  actually	  the	  server	  of	  this	  website/plat	  did	  not	  store	  such	  files	  and	  the	   files	   were	   not	   uploaded	   from	   this	   website/plat.	   The	   basic	   principle	   of	   this	  standard	  is	  “substitute	  in	  substance	  principle”.	  The	  substitute	  in	  substance	  principle	  means	  the	  works	  provided	  by	  the	  suable	  ISPs	  had	  already	  substituted	  the	  access	  of	  the	   users	   to	   the	   same	   works	   on	   the	   original	   website	   in	   substance.	   Deep	   linking	  enable	   the	  suable	   ISPs	  directly	  provide	  contents	  of	  video/audio	   files	   to	  users,	  as	  a	  result,	   the	  copyright	  owners	  cannot	  control	   the	  dissemination	  of	  their	  copyrighted	  works,	  and	  result	   in	  substitution	   in	   the	  market	  which	  cause	  benefit	   lose.479	  	  These	  scholars	   believe	   that	   the	   Art	   3	   of	   the	   2013	   provision	   of	   Supreme	   People’s	   Court	  extend	   the	   used	   “server	   standard”.	   Because	   Art	   3	   lists	   two	   new	   kinds	   of	   provide	  action	  (instead	  of	  only	  “uploading	  to	  a	  network	  server”):	  (1)	  file	  sharing	  settings;	  or	  (2)	  using	  file	  sharing	  software.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  above,	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  provision	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://www.cnipr.com/sfsj/pljx/201604/t20160425_196459.htm	  (In	  one	  of	  the	  cases,	  the	  defendant	  produced	  TV	  set	  top	  boxes	  which	  preset	  a	  software	  named	  with	  “Rabbit”.	  By	  using	  Rabbit,	  which	  is	  a	  video	  aggregator	  software,	  users	  could	  enjoy	  the	  plaintiff’s	  copyrighted	  works.	  The	  Beijing	  IP	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  defendant	  did	  not	  act	  a	  “provision”	  action,	  but	  only	  an	  act	  of	  link.	  By	  analyzing	  the	  WCT	  basic	  proposal,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  act	  of	  “provision”	  in	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	  only	  refers	  to	  the	  primary	  act	  when	  upload	  files	  to	  a	  public	  Internet	  server.	  The	  defendant	  did	  not	  “provide”	  works	  as	  a	  result.	  The	  Beijing	  IP	  Court	  expressly	  suggested	  all	  the	  plaintiffs	  to	  claim	  all	  their	  rights	  –especially	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks,	  when	  they	  cannot	  decide	  whether	  the	  defendant	  “provide”	  copyrighted	  works.	  The	  courts	  will	  analyze	  based	  on	  facts,	  if	  the	  defendant’s	  act	  did	  not	  constitute	  “provide”,	  the	  court	  then	  will	  discuss	  whether	  the	  act	  of	  link	  infringe	  copyright.)	  478	  Han	  Zhiyu(韩志宇).	  Yonghu	  Ganzhi	  Biaozhu	  Qianxi(用户感知标准浅析)[Analyzing	  the	  
Standard	  of	  Users’	  Perception].(Apr.	  28,	  2016)	  	  available	  at	  http://www.sdbq.org/detail.html?id=5000082	  .	  479	  See	  Zhu	  Jianjun,	  supra	  note	  470..	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action	  indeed	  extend	  the	  “server	  standard.”	  And	  further,	  scholars	  also	  noticed	  that	  the	   Supreme	  People’s	   Court	   use	   “place”	   the	  work	   on	   an	   information	   network,	   the	  word	  “place”	  does	  not	  simply	  mean	  “upload.”	  So	  by	  extending	  the	  server	  standard,	  “users’	   perception	   standard”	   will	   be	   applied	   instead.	   There’s	   a	   case	   to	   prove	   the	  “substitute	  in	  substance	  principle”	  of	  “users’	  perception	  standard.”480	  The	  defendant	  provides	  a	  video	  aggregator	  app	  which	  enable	  users	  to	  enjoy	  TV	  programs,	  movies	  and	  others	  from	  their	  cell-­‐phones.	  The	  defendant’s	  app	  use	  deep	  linking	  technology,	  directly	   enable	   users	   to	   enjoy	   works	   from	   the	   third	   parties’	   website	   without	  showing	  the	  sources	  of	  those	  works.	  Further,	   the	  defendant	  classified	  lots	  of	  video	  files	  into	  different	  categories.	  The	  court	  realized	  that	  the	  defendant’s	  server	  did	  not	  stored	  the	  infringing	  works,	  but	  provide	  unauthorized	  linking	  services	  by	  cracking	  the	   plaintiff’s	   protective	   technical	   measures.	   The	   court	   held	   that	   the	   defendant	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons:	  (1)	   hot-­‐linking	   service	   extend	   the	   scope	   of	   dissemination	   of	   the	   infringing	  works,	  which	   should	  be	   controlled	  by	   the	  plaintiff,	   and	  also	   change	   the	   scope	  of	   targeted	  users	   of	   the	   plaintiff,	   further	   break	   the	   plaintiff’s	   control	   effect	   of	   the	   infringing	  works,	  and	  finally	  result	  in	  damaging	  the	  plaintiff’s	  interests	  of	  the	  infringing	  works.	  The	   defendant’s	   act	   cannot	   be	   deemed	   as	   fair	   use.	   (2)	   The	   defendant	   not	  merely	  provides	  deep	  linking	  service,	  but	  choose,	  collect,	  edit	  and	  classify	  those	  video	  files.	  The	  defendant	  actively	  and	  subjectively	  destroyed	  the	  plaintiff’s	  protective	  technical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  480	  Shenzhenshi	  Tengxun	  Jisuanji	  Xitong	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  Su	  Beijing	  Yilian	  Weida	  Keji	  Youxian	  Gongsi(深圳市腾讯计算机系统有限公司诉北京易联伟达科技有限公司)[Shenzhen	  Tencent	  Co.	  Ltd.	  v.	  Beijing	  Yilianweida	  Tech.	  Co.	  Ltd.],	  (Beijing	  Haidian	  Dist.	  People’s	  Ct.	  Feb.	  15,	  2016),	  avalilable	  at:	  http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pal_21110623265271470.html?keywords=%E5%BF%AB%E7%9C%8B%E5%BD%B1%E8%A7%86&match=Exact&tiao=1	  	  
	   158	  
measures,	  so	  he	  had	  liability	  for	  fault.	  And	  further	  the	  defendant’s	  app	  enable	  users	  to	  enjoy	  works	  without	  showing	  the	  sources	  of	  the	  works	  and	  the	  defendant	  also	  has	  certain	  level	  of	  control	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  dissemination	  of	  the	  infringing	  works,	  so	  the	  defendant’s	  deep	  linking	  service	  constitutes	  “substitute	  in	  substance.”	  In	  the	  first	  case	   of	   video	   aggregator	   relevant	   to	   deep	   linking	   service,	   the	   Beijing	   Haidian	  People’s	  District	  Court	  clearly	  pointed	  the	  “substitute	  in	  substance	  principle.”481	  	   I	  agree	  with	   the	   “users’	  perception”	  standard	  because	  of	   two	  main	  reasons.	  First,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   server	   standard	   is	   too	   narrow.	   With	   the	   development	   of	  technology,	   cloud	   storage	   and	   its	   online	   streaming	   service,482	  video	   aggregator	  service,	   deep	   linking	   service	   and	   others	   had	   been	   fully	   accepted	   and	   used	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  481	  Some	  Chinese	  scholars	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  court	  should	  apply	  to the anti-unfair 
competition law. Because there are market competitions between video aggregator websites/apps 
and copyrighted video websites. The video aggregator service providers do not need to pay 
licensing fees or purchase servers or broadband or other basic facilities. They could enable users 
to enjoy those copyrighted works simply by creating deep-links. They could even block ads from 
those original copyrighted works by setting technical measures. These unfair actions of the video 
aggregator service providers break the copyright market competition orders, and also damage the 
copyright owners’ interests.  Professor Feng Xiaoqing from CUPL and Mr. Pang Zhongzheng 
(vice chairman of Beijing Lawyers Association) also indicated that the court could apply the anti-
unfair competition law in solving the case of unauthorized online real-time rebroadcast. See Zhu 
Jianjun, supra note 470. see also Liu Qing & Tian Xiaojun(刘青&田小军),(Dec. 28,2015),  
China IP News, available at http://www.cipnews.com.cn/showArticle.asp?Articleid=39044  
There are also cases support this theory. The plaintiff iQiyi.com provide copyrighted videos to 
users, the defendant VST video aggregator plat break the plaintiff’s “Key” and avoid the ads 
before playing the video (if users access the works on the plaintiff’s website). The defendant also 
use the deep linking technology. The Shanghai IP Court ruled that the defendant’s service 
constitute unfair competition. Because of three reasons. (1) Only the plaintiff paid the license fees 
of providing the copyrighted works. (2) Users prefer free videos without ads, they will access the 
defendant’s plat for the same videos. As a result, the plaintiff not only faces the decrease of the 
users amount, but also the decrease of the click rate of the ads. In consequence, the plaintiff will 
lose benefits. (3) the defendant knows exactly its action will cause others’ lose in benefit, it 
intentionally provide its service. Beijing Aiqiyi Keji Youxian Gongsi Su Shenzhen Juwangshi 
Keji Youxian Gongsi(北京爱奇艺科技有限公司诉深圳聚网视科技有限公司)[Beijing 
iQiyi.com Co. Ltd. v. Shenzhen Juwangshi Tech. Co. Ltd.],(Shanghai IP Ct.  May. 7, 2016). 
available at: http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/05/id/1852061.shtml 	  482	  Cloud	  storage	  service	  providers	  could	  also	  provide	  linking	  service.	  Since	  they	  are	  not	  the	  uploader	  of	  the	  infringing	  files,	  they	  could	  barely	  be	  directly	  liable	  of	  the	  infringement	  of	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  under	  the	  “server	  standard”.	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Internet	  users.	  The	  ISPs	  of	  such	  service	  do	  not	  need	  store	  files	  or	  individually	  upload	  files	  to	  their	  servers	  any	  longer.	  If	  the	  Chinese	  courts	  still	  apply	  the	  server	  standard,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	  cannot	  regulate	  the	  former	  services.	  So	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  cannot	  protect	  the	  copyright	  owners’	  interests	   online,	   that	  would	  make	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	  meaningless.	   Second,	  Chinese	  scholars	  mention	   it	  above.	  Art	  3	  of	   the	  Provision	  does	  not	   limit	   the	  act	  of	  “provide”	  within	   the	   scope	   of	   “upload	   to	   a	   network	   server”,	   but	   instead	   lists	   two	  more	  actions.	  Further,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  support	  the	  “users’	  perception”	   standard,	   because	   it	   used	   “allowing	   the	   general	   public	   to…obtain	   the	  work…”	   to	   indicate	   the	   result	   of	   the	   act	   of	   “provide.”	   It’s	   clear	   that	   the	   Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  pays	  more	  attention	   to	   the	   final	   result—users	  obtain	   the	  works,	   in	  interpreting	  “provide.”483	  Further,	  when	  apply	  the	  users’	  perception	  standard,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  Australian	  trend	  should	  be	  adopted	  here,	  which	  means	  the	  court	  should	  consider	  the	  ISPs’	  ability	  to	  prevent	  unauthorized	  links,	  or	  other	  measures	  to	  assist	  hot-­‐linking.	  The	  court	  has	  to	  consider	  all	  the	  ISPs’	  actions	  as	  a	  whole	  instead	  of	  just	  analyzing	  only	  one	  act.	  
c. Who	  Provides	  the	  Works?	  	   The	   forth	   issue	   in	   analyzing	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	   information	  networks	   is:	   who	   provides	   the	   works?	   	   A	   representative	   case	   published	   by	   the	  Supreme	   People’s	   Court	   in	   2014	   may	   give	   a	   way	   in	   answering	   this	   issue.	  484	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4832013	  Provisions	  of	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Ct.,	  supra	  note	  470,,	  art	  3.	  484	  Yangshi	  Guoji	  Wangluo	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  Su	  Shanghai	  Quantudou	  Wenhua	  Chuanbo	  Youxian	  Gongsi(央视国际网络有限公司诉上海全土豆文化传播有限公司)[CCTV	  Int’l	  Co.	  Ltd.	  v.	  Shanghai	  Quantudou	  Co.	  Ltd.],(Shanghai	  Minhang	  Dist.	  People’s	  Ct.	  Oct.	  22,	  2013),	  (Shanghai	  1st	  Interm.	  People’s	  	  Ct.	  Dec.	  23,	  2013).	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plaintiff	  CCTV	  International	  has	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	  of	  a	   food	  documentary	  “A	  Bite	  of	  China.”	  The	  defendant	  provided	  online	  demand	  service	  of	  this	  popular	  food	  documentary	  without	  authorizations.	  	  Although	  the	   defendant	   claimed	   it	   just	   provide	   online	   storage	   service,	   the	   infringing	   food	  documentary	  were	  uploaded	  by	   its	  subscribers,	   the	  defendant	   failed	   in	  proving	   its	  claim	  and	  also	   failed	   in	   identifying	  the	  real	   infringer	  (who	  uploaded	  the	   infringing	  works).485	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   Shanghai	  Minhang	  District	   People’s	   Court	   held	   that	   the	  defendant	  was	  liable	  for	  this	  infringement.	  The	  Shanghai	  No.1	  Intermediate	  People’s	  Court	   affirmed	   the	   Minhang	   District	   People’s	   Court’s	   decision.	   Although	   it’s	   all	  known	  that	  all	  subscribers	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  website	  can	  upload	  files,	  the	  court	  held	  the	  defendant	  infringed	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  without	  detailed	  proofs.	  Based	  on	  the	  court’s	  decision,	  the	  ISPs	  should	  provide	  detailed	  proofs	  that	  they	  only	  provide	  storage	   service	   or	   else.	   It	   seems	   the	   ISPs	  will	   not	   bare	   direct	   liability	   if	   they	   can	  provide	  proofs.	  	  But	  in	  my	  opinion,	  based	  on	  the	  background	  of	  this	  case,	  the	  court	  actually	  knew	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  subscribers	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  website	  upload	  those	  infringing	  files,	  the	  court	  still	  held	  the	  defendant	  liable.	  That’s	  because	  the	  court	  take	  the	   defendant’s	   ability	   of	   control	   of	   the	   files	   on	   its	   server,	   its	   business	   model,	  business	  scale	  and	  its	  profit	  model	  into	  consideration.	  The	  basic	  nature	  of	  the	  ISPs	  is	  important	  in	  deciding	  “who”	  provide	  the	  works.	  	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Japanese	  part	  in	   this	   section,	  China	   should	  adopt	   the	   Japanese	  approach	   in	  deciding	   the	   issue	  of	  who	  provides	  the	  infringing	  works.	  It	  means	  Chinese	  court	  should	  consider	  the	  ISPs’	  ability	   to	   control	   its	  website,	   software	  or	  plat.	   Further,	   in	   those	  providing	   links	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  485	  The	  defendant	  deleted	  the	  infringing	  videos	  as	  well	  as	  the	  original	  data,	  which	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  find	  out	  the	  real	  uploader.	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works	   case,	   if	   deep	   linking	   service,	   share	   via	   cloud	   storage	   service,	   links	   to	   cloud	  storage,	  video	  aggregator	  service	  and	  other	  services	  could	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  right	  of	   dissemination,	   who	   provides	   the	   infringing	   works?	   In	   my	   opinion,	   whoever	  provides	  the	  links	  of	  the	  works	  or	  sets	  files	  to	  be	  shared,	  provides.	  If	  an	  ISP	  provides	  links	  to	  a	  private	  cloud	  storage	  space	  without	  authorization,	  the	  ISP	  directly	  violates	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination.486	  
d. A	  Proposal	  for	  China	  	   Chinese	  scholars	  have	  not	  analyzed	  the	  definition	  of	   “public”	  so	   far.	  The	  US	  “one	   copy	  doctrine”	  or	   the	  EU	   “public”	  definition	   is	   irrelevant	  here	   in	  China.	  487	  In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  reason	  of	  China	  does	  not	  face	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  “public”	  is	  that	  there’s	  barely	  no	  “Cablevision”-­‐alike	  service	  in	  China.	  Once	  a	  TV	  program	  was	  broadcasted,	   the	   copyright	   owner	  will	   place	   this	   particular	  TV	  program	  online	   on	  the	  authorized	  video	  streaming	  websites	  or	  his	  own	  website.	  Users	  can	  access	  to	  the	  TV	   program	   exactly	   whenever	   they	   want	   online.	   Under	   this	   circumstance,	   those	  works	  are	  already	  legally	  being	  placed	  online	  and	  accessible	  to	  the	  public.	  So	  there’s	  no	  need	  to	  analyze	  the	  definition	  of	  “public”	  in	  China	  for	  now.	  However,	  the	  author	  cannot	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  new	  technology	  may	  result	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  486	  Zhang	  Geng	  &	  Huang	  Xijiang(张庚，黄细江),	  Yunjisuan	  Huanjingxia	  Zhuzuoquan	  Weihude	  Jieshi(云计算环境下著作权维护的解释)[Interpretating	  Copyright	  Protection	  in	  Cloud	  Computing]	  (2013).	  (Most	  video	  websites	  stored	  their	  video	  files	  in	  their	  own	  cloud	  storage	  space.	  And	  recently,	  only	  paying	  subscribers	  could	  access	  to	  some	  of	  the	  videos.	  The	  ISPs	  of	  these	  video	  websites	  will	  use	  technical	  measures	  to	  block	  normal	  users	  access	  to	  the	  specific	  videos.	  But	  some	  video	  aggregators	  or	  deep	  links	  could	  evade	  the	  technical	  measures	  and	  enable	  normal	  users	  to	  access	  to	  the	  specific	  videos	  without	  paying.	  It’s	  clearly	  the	  ISPs	  who	  provide	  such	  service	  actually	  “provide”	  the	  works	  to	  the	  public	  and	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination.)	  487	  The	  EU’s	  “new	  public”	  is	  not	  fully	  irrelevant	  since	  Chinese	  scholars	  state	  similar	  analysis	  in	  supporting	  the	  server	  standard.	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in	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  “public”	  in	  China.	  So,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  China	  may	  follow	   the	   Japanese	   trend	   to	   define	   the	   “public”	   as	   “unspecified	   person	   or	   a	   large	  number	  of	  persons.”	  This	  Japanese	  trend	  is	  more	  strict	  than	  the	  US	  or	  EU,	  and	  since	  China	  has	  not	  face	  such	  issue	  yet,	  it’s	  better	  for	  us	  to	  adopted	  a	  strict	  standard	  at	  the	  first	  time	  in	  order	  to	  face	  potential	  claims	  in	  the	  future.	  	   All	  in	  all,	  for	  the	  draft	  of	  new	  copyright	  law	  in	  China,	  I	  will	  suggest	  four	  points:	  (1)	   Extend	   the	   current	   scope	   of	   broadcasting	   right	   in	   order	   to	   regulate	   the	   non-­‐interactive	   online	   communication,	   for	   instance,	   real-­‐time	   re-­‐broadcasting	   service,	  Internet	   Radio	   service	   and	   other	   non-­‐interactive	   services.488 	  (2)when	   deciding	  whether	  the	  ISP	  “provides”	  the	  work,	  the	  copyright	  law	  should	  adopted	  the	  “users’	  perception”	   standard.	   By	   adopting	   such	   standard,	   the	   courts	   should	   consider	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  ISP’s	  service	  and	  other	  relevant	  conditions	  by	  following	  the	  Australian	  trend.	   (3)	  When	   deciding	  whether	   ISP	   is	   the	   provider	   of	   the	  works,	   China	   should	  follow	   the	   Japanese	   trend—	  bring	   the	   ISP’s	  business	  model,	   control	  of	  his	   service,	  financial	  benefits	  and	  other	  relevant	  conditions	  into	  consideration.	  (4)	  China	  should	  adopt	   the	   Japanese	   approach	   in	   defining	   “public”—“unspecified	   person	   or	   a	   large	  number	  of	  persons.”	  	  
III. Infringe	  the	  Right	  of	  Distribution	  	   After	  analyzing	  the	  reproduction	  right	  and	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	   in	   the	   last	   two	   sections,	   the	   third	  kind	  of	   copyright	  owners’	   exclusive	   right	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  488	  Since	  China	  is	  a	  civil	  law	  country,	  the	  law	  has	  to	  be	  stated	  in	  details	  to	  be	  strictly	  applied	  by	  the	  courts	  instead	  of	  in	  general	  provisions	  without	  detail	  interpretations.	  The	  author	  here	  support	  the	  new	  draft	  of	  copyright	  law	  in	  China,	  introduced	  a	  new	  “broadcasting”	  right	  is	  the	  best	  way	  in	  resolving	  non-­‐interactive	  communication	  online.	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relevant	  to	  the	  cloud	  computing	  technology—the	  distribution	  right	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  section.	  	   As	   a	   response	   to	   the	   development	   of	   cinematography,	   Article	   14(1)	   of	   the	  Berne	  Convention	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  distribution.	  The	  Berne	  Convention	  at	  first	   only	   applied	   the	   right	   of	   distribution	   to	   cinematographic	  works.489	  WCT	   then	  extended	   the	   right	   of	   distribution	   to	   all	   categories.	   Article	   6	   of	  WCT	   indicates	   the	  right	  of	  distribution	   is	  a	   right	   to	  authorize	  copyright	  owner’s	   “making	  available	   to	  the	  public	  of	  the	  original	  and	  copies	  of	  their	  works	  through	  sale	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership.”490	  The	   copyright	   owner	   and	   the	   other	   party	   have	   the	   freedom	   to	  determine	  the	  conditions	  or	  exceptions	  of	  the	  distribution	  contract,	  for	  instance,	  the	  exhaustion	   of	   the	   right	   after	   the	   first	   sale	   and	   other	   terms	   such	   as	   transfer	   of	  ownership	  of	   the	  work.491	  Accompanying	  with	   the	  concept	  of	  distribution,	   there	   is	  also	  another	  significant	  doctrine—	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  (or	  exhaustion	  principle).	  This	  dissertation	  will	  analyze	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  in	  next	  chapter.	  	   With	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Internet	   and	   cloud	   computing,	   the	   traditional	  right	  of	  distribution	  has	  also	  been	  affected.	  After	  a	  traditional	  distribution	  activity,	  a	  copyright	  owner	  will	  lose	  his	  right	  of	  possessing	  the	  copies	  and	  ownerships.	  But	  via	  the	  Internet,	  he	  will	  still	  possess	  the	  original	  copy	  after	  the	  transmission	  of	  the	  work.	  And	  further,	  when	  people	  upload	  music	  files	  to	  cloud	  storage	  space	  for	  sharing,	  do	  they	  violate	  the	  right	  of	  distribution?	  	  If	  people	  further	  sold	  the	  “used”	  digital	  music	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  489	  Berne	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  226,	  art	  14	  (1).(Authors	  of	  literary	  or	  artistic	  works	  shall	  have	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  authorizing	  (i)	  the	  cinematographic	  adaption	  and	  reproduction	  of	  these	  works,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  works	  thus	  adapted	  or	  reproduced.”)	  490	  WCT,	  supra	  note	  230,	  art	  6(1).	  491	  Id,	  art	  6(2)	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files	   to	   others	   via	   a	   music	   locker	   service,	   would	   such	   act	   infringe	   the	   right	   of	  distribution?	   It’s	   noted	   that	   some	   nations	   extend	   the	   distribution	   right	   to	   digital	  copies,	   such	   as	   the	   U.S.492 	  The	   following	   section	   will	   start	   with	   analyzing	   the	  distribution	  right	  under	  the	  U.S.	  copyright	  act.	  	  
i. The U.S. Part 	   §106(3)	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   provides	   the	   copyright	   owner	   an	   exclusive	  right	  “to	  distribute	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  to	  the	  public	  by	  sale	   or	   other	   transfer	   of	   ownership,	   or	   by	   rental,	   lease,	   or	   lending.” 493 	  The	  distribution	   right	   gives	   the	   copyright	   owner	   “the	   right	   to	   control	   the	   first	   public	  distribution	  of	  the	  work,”494	  by	  means	  of	  sale,	  rental,	  lease	  or	  lending.	  	  Thus	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  only	  covers	  “copies	  or	  phonorecords”	  since	  they	  are	  material	  objects	  in	  which	  works	  are	  fixed.	  Therefore,	  it	  will	  not	  cover	  performances	  since	  nothing	  is	  fixed	   in	   a	   material	   object	   when	   a	   work	   is	   performed.495	  And	   further,	   the	   act	   of	  distribution	  also	  required	  to	  be	  made	  to	  the	  public—“a	  public	  distribution	  can	  occur	  when	  only	  one	  member	  of	  the	  public	  receives	  a	  copyrighted	  work.”496	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  492	  See	  JANE	  C.	  GINSBURG	  &	  EDOUARD	  TREPPOZ,	  INTERNATIONAL	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW:	  U.S.	  AND	  E.U.	  PERSPECTIVES:	  TEXT	  AND	  CASES,	  345	  (2015).	  493	  17	  U.S.C.	  §106(3).	  494	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  326.	  495	  See	  id.	  (The	  distribution	  right	  will	  not	  cover	  a	  public	  performance.	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  that	  a	  performance	  is	  not	  a	  publication;	  and	  the	  second	  reason	  is	  that	  “a	  public	  distribution	  can	  occur	  when	  only	  one	  member	  of	  the	  public	  receives	  a	  copyrighted	  work.”)	  496	  Id,	  at	  326.	  (Citing	  Ford	  Motor	  Co.	  v.	  Summit	  Motor	  Prods.,	  Inc.,	  930	  F.	  2d	  277	  (3rd	  Cir.	  1991)	  (The	  3rd	  Circuit	  held	  that	  gratuitous	  transfer	  of	  a	  single	  copy	  may	  be	  enough	  to	  violate	  the	  right,	  because	  the	  liability	  for	  infringement	  will	  remain	  even	  if	  the	  damage	  is	  limited	  or	  non-­‐existent.)	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   The	   distribution	   right	   been	   added	   into	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   of	   1976	   by	   the	  Congress.	  But	  during	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  after	  the	  enactment,	  there	  were	  no	  cases	  solely	   claimed	   violation	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   without	   violation	   of	   the	  reproduction	  right.497	  It	  is	  because	  in	  this	  era,	  people	  cannot	  merely	  distribute	  their	  work	   without	   tangible	   copies	   or	   phonorecords.	   For	   instance,	   a	   copyright	   owner	  could	  sue	  a	  vendor	  for	  a	  violation	  of	  his	  reproduction	  right	  since	  the	  vendor	  had	  to	  make	  copies	  of	  the	  unauthorized	  copyrighted	  copies	  before	  he	  distributes	  them.	  As	  a	  result,	  once	  the	  court	  usually	  reached	  a	  conclusion	  that	  the	  reproduction	  right	  had	  been	   violated	  without	   delineating	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   distribution	   right.	   However,	   as	  mentioned	   repeatedly,	   copyright	   is	   affected	   by	   the	   developing	   technology.	   Cases	  solely	   sued	   that	   infringe	   the	   distribution	   right	   arouse.	   The	   upcoming	   section	  will	  discuss	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  adopted	  the	  concept	  of	  “digital	  distribution.”	  
A. Digital	  Distribution	  	   With	   the	  development	  of	   the	   Internet,	   the	   first	  question	  arouse	  as	  whether	  it’s	   correct	   to	   adapt	   the	   right	   of	   distribution	   of§106(3)	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   to	  digital	   distribution.	  A	   small	   number	   of	   commenters	   rejected	   to	   adapt	  §106(3)	   to	  digital	   transmissions,	   such	   as	   downloads	   or	   uploads.	   They	   provided	   three	   basic	  reasons.	   First,	   the	  objects	   of	   the	  distribution	   regulated	   in	  §106(3)	   are	   “copies	   or	  phonorecords.”	   Refers	   to	  §101,	   “copies	   or	   phonorecords”	   are	   “material	   objects,”	  and	   in	   which	   a	   work/sounds	   are	   “fixed	   by	   any	   method	   now	   known	   or	   later	  developed,	   and	   from	  which	   the	   work	   can	   be	   perceived,	   reproduced	   or	   otherwise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  497	  2	  Nimmer	  on	  Copyright,	  supra	  note	  50,	  §8.11[C][1](2015).	  (“…few	  plaintiffs	  alleged	  violation	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  apart	  from	  violation	  of	  the	  reproduction	  right.”)	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communicated,	   either	   directly	   or	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   a	   machine	   or	   device.”498	  These	  commenters	  indicated	  that	  “transmission	  of	  bits”	  over	  the	  Internet	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  material	  object.499	  Second,	   these	  commenters	  believed	  that	  §106(3)	   requires	   the	   change	   of	   ownership	   or	   possession	   of	   a	  material	   object	   from	  transferor	   to	   transferee	   by	   stating	   “by	   sale	   or	   other	   transfer	   of	   ownership,	   or	   by	  rental,	   lease,	  or	   lending.”	  But	  a	  digital	   transmission	  cannot	   fulfill	   this	  requirement.	  Because	  Internet	  transmission	  such	  as	  P2P	  transmission,	  cloud	  streaming,	  email	  or	  others	  does	  not	  eliminate	  the	  transferor’s	  copy	  of	  the	  file.	  Often	  a	  copy	  or	  a	  “RAM”	  copy	   is	   created	   at	   the	   transferee’s	   computer.	   So	   there’s	   no	   transfer	   of	   material	  objects	   or	   ownership	   between	   transferor	   and	   transferee.	   	   And	   the	   third	   reason	   is	  relevant	  to	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine.	  These	  commenters	  believe	  the	  first	  doctrine	  adds	  a	  limitation	  on	  the	  distribution	  right.	  They	  argued	  that	  once	  the	  digital	  distribution	  been	   legally	   regulated	   by	  §106(3),	   a	   digital	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   must	   be	   adopted	  logically.	  The	  recipients	  should	  automatically	  acquire	  the	  right	  to	  transmit	  the	  file	  to	  another	   party	   without	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	   permission	   once	   the	   file	   had	   been	  transferred	  as	  digital	  distribution.	  	  	   However,	  in	  order	  to	  implicate	  the	  “making	  available”	  right	  brought	  by	  WCT	  Article	  8,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	   the	  U.S.	  extended	   the	  scope	  of	  not	  only	   the	  right	  of	  public	   performance	   and	   display,	   but	   also	   the	   right	   of	   distribution.	   Under	   this	  circumstance,	   no	   courts	   in	   the	   U.S.	   adopted	   the	   narrow	   version	   of	   the	   right	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  498	  17	  U.S.C.	  §101.	  499	  United	  States	  Copyright	  Office,	  The	  Making	  Available	  Right	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  A	  Report	  
of	  the	  Register	  of	  Copyrights	  	  (Feb	  2016)	  19.	  available	  at	  http://www.copyright.gov/docs/making_available/making-­‐available-­‐right.pdf	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distribution—no	   digital	   distribution.	   All	   courts	   concluded	   that	   the	   digital	  transmission	   are	  within	   the	   scope	   of	  §106(3)—	  copyright	   owners	   shall	   have	   the	  right	  to	  control	   the	  transmission	  of	   their	  works	  to	  the	  public	   in	  the	  form	  of	  digital	  downloads.500	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Arista	  Records	  v.	  Usenet,	  the	  district	  court	  held	   that	   “the	   delivery	   of	   articles	   and/or	   content	   to	   download	   at	   the	   request	   of	  subscribers	  can	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  direct	  infringement	  of	  distribution	  right.”501	  And	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  copies	  can	  be	  distributed	  electronically	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  v.	  Tasini	  case.502	  	  Further,	  the	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office	  also	  concluded	  that	  the	  §106(3)	  cover	  the	  digital	  transfer	  of	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  in	  electronic	  formats.503	  There	  are	  reasons	   for	   the	  courts	   to	  adopt	   the	  digital	  distribution.	  First,	  Language	  of	  other	  provisions	  stated	  by	  the	  Congress	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  indicated	  that	   the	  Congress	   intended	   that	   the	  right	  of	  distribution	  cover	   the	   transmission	  of	  digital	   files.	   §115(a)(1),	   which	   regulates	   the	   compulsory	   license,	   refers	   to	   a	  distribution	   “by	  means	   of	   a	   digital	   phonorecord	   delivery.”504	  And	   according	   to	  §115(d),	   “a	   digital	   phonorecord	   delivery”	   means	   “each	   individual	   delivery	   of	   a	  phonorecord	   by	   digital	   transmission	   of	   a	   sound	   recoding	   which	   results	   in	   a	  specifically	   identifiable	   reproduction	   by	   or	   for	   any	   transmission	   recipient	   of	   a	  phonorecord	   of	   that	   sound	   recording…”505	  Second,	   according	   to	   U.S.	   Copyright	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  See	  id.	  501	  Arista	  Records	  LLC	  v.	  Usenet.com,Inc.,	  633	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  124,	  147	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2009).	  502	  See	  New	  York	  Times	  Co.	  v.	  Tasini,	  533	  U.S.	  483,	  498(2001).	  503	  See	  US	  Copyright	  office’s	  report,	  supra	  note	  499,	  at	  22.	  504	  17	  U.S.C.	  §115(a)(1).(“A	  person	  may	  obtain	  a	  compulsory	  license	  only	  if	  his	  or	  her	  primary	  purpose	  in	  making	  phonorecords	  is	  to	  distribute	  them	  to	  the	  public	  for	  private	  use,	  including	  by	  means	  of	  a	  digital	  phonorecord	  delivery.”)	  505	  Id,§115(d).	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office’s	   opinion,	   the	   district	   court’s	   decision	   in	   London-­‐Sire	   Records	   v.	   Doe	   1	  provides	   a	   thorough	   analysis. 506 	  The	   court	   held	   that	   the	   transmission	   of	   an	  electronic	  file	  constitutes	  a	  “distribution”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  §106(3).	  The	  court	  provided	   two	   reasons	   in	   its	   decision:	   (1)	   Electronic	   files	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	  “material	  objects.”	  The	  purpose	  for	  using	  the	  term	  of	  “material	  object”	  is	  to	  provide	  “a	  reference	  point	  for	  the	  terms	  ‘phonorecords’	  and	  ‘fixed’,”	  and	  “any	  object	  in	  which	  a	  sound	  recording	  can	  be	  fixed	  is	  a	  ‘material	  object’.”	  So	  as	  a	  result,	  “the	  appropriate	  segment	   of	   the	   hard	   disk”	   qualified	   a	   “material	   object,”	   and	   there’s	   “no	   reason	   to	  limit	   ‘distribution’	   to	   processes	   in	   which	   a	   material	   object	   exists	   throughout	   the	  entire	   transaction.”507 	  (2)	   Electronic	   transmission	   can	   constitute	   a	   “transfer	   of	  ownership.”	   The	   sort	   of	   transaction	   regulated	   by	  §106(3)	   	   is	   intended	   	   by	   the	  Congress	  to	  	  be	  reached,	  so	  “while	  the	  statute	  addresses	  ownership,	  it	  is	  the	  newly	  minted	   ownership	   rights	   held	   by	   the	   transferee	   that	   concern	   it,	   no	   matter	   the	  transferor	  gives	  up	  his	  own.”	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  concept	  of	  “digital	  distribution”	  had	  been	  adopted	  by	  all	  courts	  in	  the	  U.S..	  	  
B. Distributive	  Principle—Evidence	  Required	  to	  Establish	  Distribution	  	   Although	   all	   the	   U.S.	   courts	   consent	   that	  §106(3)	   should	   extend	   to	   the	  digital	   transfer	   of	   copies	   or	   phonorecords	   in	   electronic	   formats,	   they	   still	   have	  disagreement	   in	   the	   evidence	   required	   to	   establish	   distribution.	   	  When	   the	   court	  decides	   whether	   a	   party	   infringes	   the	   distribution	   right,	   should	   it	   hinge	   on	   an	  evidence	  of	  an	  “actual	  dissemination”	  such	  as	  actual	  download	  or	  merely	  an	  act	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  506	  See	  US	  Copyright	  office’s	  Report,	  supra	  note	  499,	  at	  21.	  See	  also	  London-­‐Sire	  Records,	  Inc	  v.	  Doe	  1,	  542	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  153	  (D.	  Mass.	  2008).	  507	  Id,	  at	  171-­‐173.	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making	  a	  work	  “available”	  to	  the	  public	  (offering	  a	  work	  to	  the	  public)?508	  The	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  not	  yet	  clarified	  which	  principle	  should	  be	  applied.	  Some	  courts	  ruled	   that	   there’s	  no	   infringement	  of	   the	  distribution	  right	  without	  an	  evidence	  of	  actual	   downloading	   act.	   Other	   courts	   support	   that	   making	   copyrighted	   works	  available	  online	  without	  actual	  evidence	  of	  downloading	  activity	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	   infringement	   of	   the	   distribution.	   Whether	   the	   distribution	   right	  encompasses	   the	   “making	   available”	   of	   works	   is	   significant	   under	   the	   cloud	  computing	  technology	  now.	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  user	  uploads	  a	  movie	  file	  to	  his	  cloud	  storage	   space	   the	   public	   can	   access,	   is	   there	   an	   act	   of	   distribution	   here?	   In	  understanding	  how	  the	  U.S.	  deal	  with	  this	  issue,	  this	  section	  has	  to	  review	  relevant	  cases	  and	  theories.	  	  
a. The	  “Actual	  Distribution”	  Requirement	  	   Under	   this	   requirement,	   the	   courts	   adopted	   a	   narrower	   scope	   of	   the	  distribution	  right,	  which	  means	   the	   infringement	  of	   the	  distribution	  right	  requires	  an	  “actual	  dissemination”	  (for	  instance,	  an	  actual	  act	  of	  downloading	  a	  file	  from	  the	  Internet).	   The	   courts	   support	   this	   requirement	   held	   that	   merely	   making	   a	   work	  available	  was	  not	  sufficient	  for	  infringing	  the	  distribution	  right.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  508	  See	  The	  Scope	  of	  Copyright	  Protection:	  Hearing	  Before	  the	  Subcomm.	  on	  Courts,	  Intellectual	  Prop.,	  &	  the	  Internet	  of	  the	  H.	  Comm.	  on	  the	  Judiciary,	  113th	  Cong.	  13	  (2014).	  (Professor	  David	  Nimmer	  stated:	  “Both	  sides	  of	  the	  ‘making	  available’	  issue	  recognize	  that	  copyright	  owners	  enjoy	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  control	  distribution	  of	  their	  works;	  their	  only	  point	  of	  disagreement	  concerns	  the	  quantum	  of	  proof	  needed	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  distribution	  took	  place	  (simple	  uploading	  for	  proponents	  of	  the	  right,	  uploading	  plus	  proven	  downloading	  for	  its	  opponents).”).	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   The	  fundamental	  case	  relied	  by	  these	  courts	  is	  National	  Car	  Rental	  System	  v.	  Computer	  Associates	  International,	  Inc.509	  This	  is	  a	  case	  decided	  by	  the	  8th	  Circuit	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Internet	  era.	  In	  this	  case,	  National	  Car	  Rental	  and	  its	  vendor	  were	  permitted	  to	   use	   a	   computer	   program	   solely	   for	   processing	   its	   own	   data	   by	   the	   Computer	  Associate	   Inc’s	   software	   license.	   However,	   Computer	   Associate	   Inc	   claimed	   that	  National	  Car	  Rental	  breached	  the	  license	  by	  “using	  the	  programs	  to	  process	  the	  data	  of	   third	   parties.”510	  The	  8th	   Circuit	   reversed	   the	   district	   court’s	   decision	   and	   held	  that	   the	   claim	  was	   not	   preempted	   by	   the	   Copyright	   Act—	   the	   breach	   of	   contract	  cause	  of	  action	  was	  not	  “equivalent”	  to	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  of	  copies	  of	  the	  work.	  The	  8th	   Circuit	   held	   that	   “the	   copyright	   holder’s	   distribution	   right	   is	   the	   right	   to	  distribute	   copies,”	   and	   thus	   “cannot	   conclude	   that	   an	   allegation	   that	   National	   Car	  Rental	   ‘permitted	   the	   use’	   necessarily	   amounts	   to	   an	   allegation	   of	   the	   actual	  distribution	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  program.”511	  The	  8th	  Circuit	  cited	  Nimmer	  on	  Copyright	  Treatise	  to	  indicate	  that	  §106(3)	  requires	  an	  actual	  distribution	  of	  copies.512	  Other	  courts	  who	  support	  the	  “actual	  distribution”	  requirement	  later	  relied	  on	  this	  case	  to	  show	  that	  §106(3)	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  “making	  available.”	  	   After	   the	  9th	  Circuit	   ruled	   that	  Napster,	  a	  P2P	   file	   sharing	  service	  provider,	  should	   be	   liable	   for	   contributory	   infringement	   and	   vicarious	   infringement	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  509	  National	  Car	  Rental	  Sys.	  v.	  Computer	  Assocs.	  Int’l,	  Inc.,	  991	  F.	  2d	  426	  (8th	  Cir.	  1993).	  510	  Id,	  at	  428.	  511	  Id,	  at	  430.	  512	  Id,	  at	  434.	  (“the	  distribution	  right	  is	  only	  the	  right	  to	  distribute	  copies	  of	  the	  work.	  As	  Professor	  Nimmer	  has	  stated,	  "infringement	  of	  [the	  distribution	  right]	  requires	  an	  actual	  dissemination	  of	  either	  copies	  or	  phonorecords."	  2	  Nimmer	  on	  Copyright,	  supra	  note	  33,	  §	  8.11[A],	  at	  8-­‐124.1.)	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plaintiff’s	   copyright,513	  the	   district	   court	   had	   to	   consider	   whether	   “Napster	   itself	  directly	  infringed	  plaintiff’s	  distribution	  right	  by	  maintaining	  a	  centralized	  indexing	  system	   listing	   the	   file	   names	   of	   all	   MP3-­‐formatted	   music	   files	   available	   on	   the	  Napster	  network.”514	  The	  court	  held	  for	  Napster.	  By	  citing	  the	  8th	  Circuit’s	  decision	  in	   National	   Car	   Rental	   case,	   and	   analyzing	   the	   text	   and	   legislative	   history	   of	   the	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1976,	  the	  court	  concluded	  that	  the	  decision	  of	  Hotaling	  case	  that	  “a	  mere	  offer	  to	  distribute	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  gives	  rise	  to	  liability	  under	  §106(3)”	  is	  inconsistent	   with	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   of	   1976.515	  The	   court	   ruled	   that	   in	   order	   to	  establish	  an	  infringement	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  of	  §106(3),	  the	  copyright	  owner	  must	   prove	   that	   the	   accused	   infringer	   either	   actually	   distribute	   the	   work	   to	   the	  public	  or	  offer	  to	  distribute	  of	  the	  work	  for	  “further	  distribution.”516	  The	  court	  fully	  supported	  the	  actual	  distribution	  requirement	  and	  added	  a	  purpose	  requirement	  to	  the	  making	  available	  requirement—offer	  to	  distribute.	  	  	   Courts	   of	   several	   cases	   happened	   in	   2008	   held	   that	  making	   a	   copyrighted	  work	   available	   alone	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   violate	   the	  distribution	   right.	   First,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  London-­‐Sire	  Records,	  Inc.	  v.	  Doe,	  the	  defendant	  use	  P2P	  file	  sharing	  software	  for	  downloading	  and	  transmitting	  copyrighted	  recordings.517	  The	  district	  court	  held	  that	   “the	   defendant	   cannot	   be	   liable	   for	   violating	   the	   plaintiffs’	   distribution	   right	  unless	   a	   ‘distribution’	   actually	   occurred.”518	  The	   court	   gave	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  513	  A	  &	  M	  Records,	  Inc.	  v.	  Napster,	  Inc.,	  239	  F.	  3d	  1004	  (9th	  Cir.	  2001).	  (This	  case	  support	  the	  making	  available	  requirement.)	  514	  In	  re	  Napster,	  Inc.	  Copyright	  Litigation,	  377	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  796,	  802	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  2005).	  515	  Id,	  at	  802-­‐804.	  516	  Id,	  at	  805.	  517	  London-­‐Sire	  Records	  v.	  Doe	  case,	  supra	  note	  506.	  518	  Id,	  at	  168.	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court	  rejected	  and	  questioned	  the	  Hotaling’s	  decision	  that	  declines	  to	  a	  requirement	  of	  actual	  distribution.	  The	  court	   indicated	   that	   “merely	  because	   the	  defendant	  has	  ‘completed	  all	  the	  steps	  necessary	  for	  distribution’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  a	  distribution	  has	  actually	  occurred.”519	  Second,	  the	  court	  observed	  that	  “distribution”	  and	   “publication”	  were	  not	   synonymous.	  Because	   “all	   ‘distributions…to	   the	  public’	  are	  publications…not	  all	  publications	  are	  distributions	  to	  the	  public.”520	  	   Then,	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Recording	  Corp.	  v.	  Howell,521,	  the	  defendant	  use	  KaZaA	  P2P	   file	   sharing	   software	   for	   downloading	   and	   transmiting	  music	   recordings.	   The	  district	   court	   ruled	   that	   infringement	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   requires	   actual	  dissemination	  of	  copies	  or	  phonorecords,	  and	  offering	  to	  distribute	  works	  alone	  was	  not	  sufficient.522	  First,	  the	  court	  stated	  that	  the	  Hotaling	  case	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  and	   the	  “great	  weight	  of	  authority”	  supports	   the	  actual	  distribution	  requirement.523	  Then,	  the	  court	  echoed	  the	  London-­‐Sire	  court’s	  reasoning,	  held	  that	  “distribution”	  did	  not	  encompass	  “publication”—“It	  is	  untenable	  that	  the	  definition	  of	   a	   different	  word	   in	   a	   different	   section	   of	   the	   statute	  was	  meant	   to	   expand	   the	  meaning	   of	   "distribution"	   and	   liability	   under	  §	   106(3)	  to	   include	   the	   activity	   of	  offers	  to	  distribute.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  519	  Id.	  520	  Id,	  at	  168-­‐69.	  521	  Atl	  Recording	  Corp.	  v.	  Howell,	  554	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  976	  (D.	  Ariz.	  2008).	  522	  Id,	  at	  984-­‐85.	  523	  Id,	  at	  983.	  (“The	  court	  agrees	  with	  the	  great	  weight	  of	  authority	  that	  §	  106(3)	  is	  not	  violated	  unless	  the	  defendant	  has	  actually	  distributed	  an	  unauthorized	  copy	  of	  the	  work	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  public.	  The	  statute	  provides	  copyright	  holders	  with	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  distribute	  "copies"	  of	  their	  works	  to	  the	  public	  "by	  sale	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership,	  or	  by	  rental,	  lease,	  or	  lending."	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  106(3).	  Unless	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  work	  changes	  hands	  in	  one	  of	  the	  designated	  ways,	  a	  "distribution"	  under	  §	  106(3)	  has	  not	  taken	  place.	  Merely	  making	  an	  unauthorized	  copy	  of	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  available	  to	  the	  public	  does	  not	  violate	  a	  copyright	  holder's	  exclusive	  right	  of	  distribution.”)	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   Third,	  the	  Capitol	  Records,	  Inc.	  v.	  Thomas	  case	  has	  almost	  the	  same	  facts	  as	  the	   above	   cases.524	  The	   defendant	   downloaded	   alleged	   music	   recordings	   by	   the	  KaZaA	  P2P	  file	  sharing	  software.	  The	  Court	  provided	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  whether	  making	  works	  available	  constitutes	  distribution	  of	  works.	  First,	   the	  court	  analyzed	  the	   plain	   meaning	   of	   the	   word	   “distribution”	   and	   considered	   relevant	   legislative	  history	  of	  Copyright	  Act,	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Register	  of	  Copyrights,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	   “distribution”	   in	   other	   provisions	   in	   the	   US	   Code.525	  Then	   the	   Court	   again	  compared	   the	   definition	   of	   “distribution”	   with	   the	   definition	   of	   “publication”	   and	  drew	  a	  conclusion	  same	  as	  the	  Howell	  and	  London-­‐Sire	  courts—“simply	  because	  all	  distributions	   within	   the	  meaning	   of	  §106(3)	   are	   publications	   does	   not	   mean	   all	  publications	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   §101	   are	   distributions.”526 	  The	   statutory	  definition	  of	  “publication”	  is	  broader	  than	  “distribution.”	  Third,	  the	  court	  considered	  the	  National	  Car	  Rental	  and	  Hotaling	  decisions.	  The	  8th	  Circuit’s	  decision	  in	  National	  Car	  Rental	  binded	  to	  the	  court,	  and	  the	  court	  also	  indicated	  that	  National	  Car	  Rental	  decision	   “is	   consistent	   with	   the	   logical	   statutory	   interpretation	   of	  §106(3),	   the	  body	  of	  Copyright	  Act	  case	  law,	  and	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act.”527	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  court	  concluded	  that	  “liability	  for	  violation	  of	  the	  exclusive	  distribution	  right	  found	  in	  §106(3)	  requires	  actual	  dissemination.”528	  It	  means	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  need	  to	  provide	  evidence	  of	  actual	  dissemination	  of	  the	  alleged	  works	  to	  other	  users	  in	   order	   to	   constitute	   infringement	   of	   the	   distribution	   right.	   However,	   the	   Court	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  524	  Capitol	  Records,	  Inc.	  v.	  Thomas,	  579	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1210	  (D.	  Minn.	  2008).	  525	  Id,	  at	  1216-­‐19.	  526	  Id,	  at	  1220.	  527	  Id,	  at	  1226.	  528	  Id.	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interestingly	  invited	  the	  Congress	  to	  take	  legislative	  action	  towards	  this	  issue,	  since	  the	  court	  had	  clearly	  notified	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  such	  activities.529	  	   From	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  cases,	  there	  are	  two	  basic	  reasons	  for	  those	  courts	  to	  support	  the	  actual	  distribution	  requirement.	  The	  8th	  Circuit	  decision	  in	  National	  Rental	  Car	  case	  is	  binding	  and	  that	  “distribution”	  is	  not	  synonymous	  to	  “publication”	  under	   the	  Copyright	  Act.530	  Although	   those	   courts	   adopted	   the	   actual	   distribution,	  some	  of	  them	  concluded	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  are	  not	  required	  to	  offer	  direct	  proof	  of	  a	  download,	  but	  may	  prove	  the	  infringement	  through	  circumstantial	  or	  investigator’s	  evidence	   of	   the	   defendant’s	   activities.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   London-­‐Sire,	   Howell	   and	  Thomas,	   the	   courts	   confirmed	   that	   “direct	   proof	   of	   actual	   dissemination	   is	   not	  required…	  plaintiffs	   are	   free	   to	   employ	   circumstantial	   evidence…”	   to	   prove	   actual	  dissemination. 531 	  The	   Thomas	   court	   reasoned	   that	   “the	   implementation	   of	  Congress’s	  intent	  through	  a	  plain	  meaning	  interpretation	  of	  §106(3)	  will	  not	  leave	  copyright	  holders	  without	  recourse	  when	   infringement	  occurs	  over	  a	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  network.”532	  According	   to	  associate	  register	  of	  copyright,	  Prof.	  Robert	  Kasunic,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  529	  Id,	  at	  1227.	  (“The	  court	  would	  be	  remiss	  if	  it	  did	  not	  take	  this	  opportunity	  to	  implore	  Congress	  to	  amend	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  to	  address	  liability	  and	  damages	  in	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  network	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  one	  currently	  before	  this	  court…	  The	  defendant	  is	  an	  individual…by	  using	  KaZaA,	  Thomas	  acted	  like	  countless	  other	  Internet	  users….it	  does	  make	  the	  award	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  in	  damages	  unprecedented	  and	  oppressive.”)	  530	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  327.	  (“the	  language	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  indicates	  a	  more	  restrictive	  reading	  than	  ‘making	  available’	  advocates	  would	  like	  to	  include	  ‘an	  offering	  to	  distribute’	  rather	  than	  an	  actual	  distribution….a	  legislative	  fix	  would	  be	  a	  more	  constitutionally	  appropriate	  way	  to	  proceed.”)	  531	  Capitol	  Records	  v.Thomas,	  supra	  note	  524,	  	  at	  1225.	  See	  also	  Howell	  case,	  supra	  note	  521	  ,at	  983-­‐84.	  (“evidence	  that	  …in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  circumstantial	  evidence,	  support	  an	  inference	  that	  the	  copy	  was	  likely	  transferred	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  public.”)	  See	  also	  London-­‐Sire	  case,	  supra	  note	  506,	  	  at	  169.(“…	  the	  defendant	  has	  completed	  all	  the	  necessary	  steps	  for	  a	  public	  distribution,	  a	  reasonable	  fact-­‐finder	  may	  infer	  that	  the	  distribution	  actually	  took	  place.”)	  532	  Id.	  
	   175	  
circumstance	  evidence	  varies.	  For	   instance,	   the	  court	  could	  take	  the	  nature	  of	  P2P	  file	   sharing	   software	   into	   consideration	   as	   a	   circumstantial	   evidence.	   Further	   the	  court	   could	   also	   consider	   “frequent	   or	   longstanding	   use	   of	   such	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  services	   and	   the	   number	   of	   works	   offered,”	   or	   the	   defendant’s	   intent	   in	   making	  works	   available	   and	   other	   relevant	   circumstantial	   evidence.533	  According	   to	   the	  Thomas	  and	  Howell	  courts’	  analysis,	  any	  downloads	  by	  an	  investigator	  or	  agent	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  will	   suffice	   to	   constitute	   an	   actual	   distribution.534	  This	   theory	  has	  not	  been	   adopted	   by	   all	   courts	   through	   the	   U.S.,	   although	   it	   at	   least	   provides	   the	  copyright	  owners	  a	  minimum	  evidence	  standard	  to	  support	  the	  actual	  distribution	  requirement.535	  	   Lots	  of	  courts	  still	  use	  the	  actual	  distribution	  requirement,	  however,	  there’s	  a	  big	   error	   here	   now.	   As	   I	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   courts	   relied	   on	   the	  8th	   Circuit’s	  decision	  in	  National	  Rental	  Car	  case,	  and	  the	  8th	  Circuit	  draw	  its	  conclusion	  by	  citing	  Nimmer	  on	  Copyright	  Treaties.	   	  Nevertheless,	  Prof.	  Nimmer	  had	  changed	  his	  mind.	  He	  no	   longer	  supports	  the	  actual	  distribution	  requirement.	  Prof.	  Nimmer	  removed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  533	  See	  Robert	  Kasunic,	  Making	  Circumstantial	  Proof	  of	  Distribution	  Available,	  18	  FORDHAM	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  MEDIA	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.	  1145	  (2008).	  534	  Capitol	  Records	  v.	  Thomas,	  supra	  note	  524,	  at	  1216.(“The	  court	  holds	  that	  distribution	  to	  Media	  Sentry	  can	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  infringement	  claim.”);	  Howell	  case,	  supra	  note	  521,	  at	  985.(“The	  recording	  companies’	  investigator,	  MediaSentry,	  did	  download	  12	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  sound	  recordings	  from	  Howell’s	  computer…the	  12	  copies	  obtained	  by	  MediaSentry	  are	  unauthorized.”)	  Both	  Courts	  cited	  Olan	  Mills	  case.	  Olan	  Mills	  Inc.	  v.	  Linn	  Photo,	  Inc.,	  23	  F.	  3d	  1345,	  1347-­‐48	  (8th	  Cir.	  1994)	  In	  this	  case,	  an	  agent	  of	  Olan	  Mills	  asked	  the	  defendant	  Linn	  photo	  to	  make	  copies	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  works.	  The	  defendant	  argued	  that	  such	  reproduction	  act	  was	  authorized	  through	  the	  agent	  by	  the	  plaintiff.	  The	  8th	  Circuit	  disagreed	  by	  clarifying	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  authorize	  the	  investigator	  to	  waive	  its	  copyright,	  but	  rather	  authorized	  its	  third	  party	  agent	  “to	  act	  as	  if	  he	  were	  a	  customer	  who	  owned	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  copyrighted	  work.”	  Whether	  the	  agent	  was	  authorized	  was	  irrelevant	  in	  deciding	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  authority	  to	  engage	  in	  infringing	  acts.	  535	  See	  Marc	  E.	  Mayer,	  Distributive	  Principles,	  the	  Determination	  of	  Copyright	  Infringement	  
may	  Hinge	  on	  Whether	  “Actual	  Distribution”	  or	  Mere	  “Making	  Available”	  Has	  Occurred,	  32	  L.A.	  LAW	  35	  (2009-­‐2010).	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the	  statement	  from	  his	  treaties	  and	  seemingly	  adopted	  Prof.	  Menell’s	  view.	  He	  also	  invited	  Prof.	  Menell	  to	  co-­‐author	  the	  revised	  section	  on	  the	  origins	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  distribution	   right.	   And	   the	   revised	   version	   states:	   “no	   consummated	   act	   of	   actual	  distribution	   need	   be	   demonstrated	   in	   order	   to	   implicate	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	  distribution	   right,”	   and	   “the	   act	   of	   making	   available	   sound	   recordings	   for	  downloading	   by	   the	   public	   through	   file-­‐sharing	   networks	   suffices	   to	   show	  actionable	   copyright	   infringement.”536	  The	  update	  of	  Prof.	  Nimmer’s	   theory	  makes	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  8th	  Circuit	   in	  National	  Rental	  Car	  case	  unreliable	  anymore.	  And	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  whole	  actual	  distribution	  requirement	  lacks	  its	  back	  bone	  now.	  	  
b. The	  “Making	  Available”	  Requirement	  	   In	  the	  contrary,	  some	  courts	  believe	  that	  §106(3)	  should	  cover	  the	  making	  available	  of	  works	  to	  the	  public	  by	  downloading,	  and	  there’s	  no	  need	  to	  prove	  that	  an	  actual	  download	  occurred.	  The	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office	  also	  supports	  this	  view	  in	  its	  2016	  report.537	  	   The	  Hotaling	   v.	   Church	   of	   Jesus	   Christ	   of	   Latter-­‐Day	   Saints	   is	   a	   case	   solely	  involves	   the	   distribution	   right,	   and	   it’s	   also	   the	   only	   case	   to	   rule	   the	   issue	   of	  	  “making	  available”	  in	  the	  pre-­‐internet	  era.538	  	  It’s	  a	  fundamental	  case	  that	  supports	  the	   “making	   available”	   requirement.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   church	   legally	   purchased	   a	  single	   copy	   in	   microfiche	   form	   from	   Hotaling,	   and	   added	   it	   to	   its	   main	   library	  collection.	  Further,	  the	  church	  made	  copies	  of	  it	  and	  sent	  them	  to	  its	  branch	  libraries.	  The	  church	  later	  ceased	  making	  copies	  and	  deleted	  unauthorized	  copies	  as	  required	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  536	  2	  NIMMER	  on	  Copyright,	  supra	  note	  50,§8.11[B][4][d],	  [D][4][c].	  537	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office’s	  Report,	  supra	  note	  499,	  at	  24.	  538	  Hotaling	  v.	  Church	  of	  Jesus	  Christ	  of	  Latter-­‐Day	  Saints,	  118	  F.	  3d	  199	  (4th	  Cir.	  1997).	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by	  Hotaling.	  However,	  after	  the	  statute	  of	  limitation	  had	  expired,	  there	  was	  still	  one	  copy	  in	  the	  church’s	  library.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  infringing	  acts	  that	  the	  church	  had	  loaned	  the	  infringing	  copies	  to	  the	  public	  within	  the	  limitation	  period.	  The	  4th	  Circuit	   eventually	   held	   	   that	   the	   church	   distributed	   copies	   of	   a	   work	   within	   the	  meaning	  of	  §106(3)	  when	   it	  made	   them	  available	   to	   the	  public	   at	   its	   libraries.539	  The	  4th	  Circuit	   implicitly	  adopted	   the	   “making	  available”	   requirement	  by	  rejecting	  the	   church’s	   defense	   that	   proof	   of	   actual	   dissemination	  was	   required.	   The	  Court’s	  explanation	  is	  reasonable:	  “When	  a	  public	  library	  adds	  a	  work	  to	  its	  collection,	  lists	  the	   work	   in	   its	   index	   or	   catalog	   system,	   and	   makes	  the	   work	   available	   to	   the	  borrowing	   or	   browsing	   public,	   it	   has	   completed	   all	   the	   steps	   necessary	   for	  distribution	  the	  work	  to	  the	  public.	  At	  that	  point,	  members	  of	  the	  public	  can	  visit	  the	  library	   and	   use	   the	  work.	  Were	   this	   not	   to	   be	   considered	   distribution	  within	   the	  meaning	  of	  §	  106(3),	  a	  copyright	  holder	  would	  be	  prejudiced	  by	  a	  library	  that	  does	  not	   keep	   records	   of	   public	   use,	   and	   the	   library	   would	   unjustly	   profit	   by	   its	   own	  omission.”540	  	   After	   this	   back-­‐bone	   Hotaling	   case,	   some	   courts	   echoed	   its	   decision	   by	  holding	   the	   distribution	   right	   was	   infringed	   when	   a	   copyrighted	   work	   is	   made	  available	   to	   the	   public,	   including	   over	   the	   Internet.	   In	   the	   Napster	   case,	   Napster	  facilitates	   the	   transmission	  of	  MP3	   files	  among	   its	  subscribers	  via	  P2P	   file	  sharing	  software.541	  By	   using	  Napster’s	   software,	  MP3	   files	   stored	   on	   individual	   computer	  hard	   drives	   are	   available	   for	   searching	   and	   copying	   by	   other	   subscribers	   via	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  539	  Id,	  at	  201.	  540	  Id,	  at	  203.	  541	  Napster,	  supra	  note	  513.	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Internet.	  The	  9th	  Circuit	  held	  that	  “Napster	  users	  who	  upload	  file	  name	  to	  the	  search	  index	  for	  others	  to	  copy	  violate	  plaintiff’s	  distribution	  rights.”542	  The	  9th	  Circuit	  did	  not	  give	  further	  explanation	  for	  its	  conclusion.	  Based	  on	  the	  this	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  did	  not	  require	  “actual	  distribution.”	  	   A	  few	  years	  later,	  the	  district	  court	  in	  Universal	  City	  Studios	  Productions,	  LLP	  v.	  Bigwood	  cited	  both	  Hotaling	  and	  the	  9th	  Circuit’s	  Napster	  decisions,	  held	  that	  the	  defendant	   infringed	   the	  distribution	   right.543	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   individual	  defendant	  used	   KaZaA,	   which	   is	   a	   popular	   P2P	   sharing	   network,	   to	   download	   digital	   files	  without	  authorizations	  and	  stored	  the	  files	  in	  his	  shared	  directory,	  which	  makes	  the	  files	   available	   for	   downloading	   by	   other	   subscribers	   of	   KaZaA.	   The	   district	   court	  held	  the	  defendant	  liable	  for	  infringing	  the	  distribution	  right	  because	  he	  is	  “making	  available	   to	   other	   KaZaA	   users	   plaintiff’s”	  works.544	  And	   further,	  more	   courts	   had	  accepted	   the	  conclusion	  of	  making	  works	  available	  on	  a	  P2P	  network	  or	  other	   file	  sharing	   networks	   without	   authorization	   infringes	   the	   copyright	   holder’s	  distribution	  right.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Arista	  Records	  LLC	  v.	  Greubel	  Case,	  the	  defendant	  used	   an	   online	   media	   distribution	   system	   to	   download	   and	   sharing	   copyrighted	  recordings	   without	   authorizations.	   The	   defendant	   alleged	   that	   the	   copyrighted	  material	   was	   not	   actually	   disseminated	   but	  merely	  was	   accessible	   by	   others,	   and	  such	   activities	   should	   not	   be	   deemed	   as	   distribution.	   But	   the	   court	   relied	   on	  Hotaling	   and	   other	   cases	   and	   held	   that	   “making	   copyrighted	   works	   available	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  542	  Id,	  at	  1014.	  543	  Universal	  City	  Studios	  Productions,	  LLP	  v.	  Bigwood,	  441	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  185	  (D.	  Me.	  2006).	  544	  Id,	  at	  191.	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others	  may	  constitute	  infringement	  by	  distribution	  in	  certain	  circumstances.”545	  The	  courts	  accepted	  the	  plaintiff’s	  argument	  that	  “the	  right	  of	  distribution	  also	  has	  been	  identified	   as	   synonymous	   with	   the	   publication	   of	   a	   copyrighted	   work,”	   “actual	  dissemination	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  is	  unnecessary	  so	  long	  as	  there	  is	  an	  offer	  to	  distribute	  copies.”546	  	   The	   most	   recent	   case	   Diversey	   v.	   Schmidly	   held	   by	   the	   10th	   Circuit	   also	  implicitly	  indicated	  that	  making	  a	  work	  available	  to	  the	  public	  should	  constitute	  an	  act	  of	  distribution.547	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  plaintiff’s	  draft	  dissertation	  was	  deposited	  in	  the	  defendant’s	  library	  and	  was	  in	  the	  catalog	  system,	  which	  is	  available	  for	  public	  lending.	  By	  citing	  both	  Prof.	  Menell’s	  research	  and	  Prof.	  Nimmer’s	  updated	  Treaties,	  the	  10th	  Circuit	  held	  that	  “the	  essence	  of	  distribution	  in	  the	  library	  lending	  context	  is	   the	  work’s	  availability	   ‘to	   the	  borrowing	  or	  browsing	  public’”	  by	  citing	  Hotaling	  case.548	  	   As	  mentioned	  above,	  more	  and	  more	  scholars	  turned	  to	  support	  the	  making	  available	   requirement,	   including	   Prof.	   Nimmer	   and	   Prof.	  Menell.	   By	   exploring	   the	  legislative	   history	   and	   interpreting	   the	   statutory,	   Prof.	   Menell	   concluded	   that	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  545	  Arista	  Records	  LLC	  v.	  Greubel,	  453	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  961,	  970	  (N.D.	  Tex.	  2006).	  See	  also	  Elektra	  Entm’t	  Group,	  Inc.	  v.	  Barker,	  551	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  234	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2008).(	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  defendant	  use	  a	  P2P	  file	  sharing	  software	  to	  download	  and	  make	  available	  to	  others	  of	  the	  music	  recordings.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  distribution	  right	  was	  infringed	  by	  making	  copyrighted	  works	  available	  over	  the	  Internet.	  The	  courts	  reasoned:	  “Although	  the	  Court	  finds,	  using	  Congress’s	  words,	  that	  the	  distribution	  right	  of	  §106(3)	  may	  be	  infringed	  by	  ‘the	  offering	  to	  distribute	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  to	  a	  group	  of	  persons	  for	  purposes	  of	  further	  distribution,	  public	  performance,	  or	  public	  display’	  17	  U.S.C.	  §101,	  the	  Court	  hesitates	  in	  equating	  this	  avenue	  of	  liability	  with	  the	  contourless	  ‘make	  available’	  right	  proposed	  by	  plaintiff.”	  At	  243.)	  546	  Arista	  v.	  Greubel,	  supra	  note	  	  545,	  at	  969.	  547	  Diversey	  v.	  Schmidly,	  738	  F.	  3d	  1196	  (10th	  Cir.	  2013).	  548	  Id,	  at	  1203.	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Congress	   intended	   to	   add	   the	   distribution	   right	   to	   broaden	   the	   historic	   right	  “publication.” 549 	  Prof.	   Menell	   already	   agreed	   that	   the	   right	   of	   publication	  encompasses	   making	   a	   work	   available	   to	   the	   public,	   no	   matter	   there’s	   an	   actual	  distribution	  or	  not.	  As	  a	  result,	  making	  works	  available	   is	   the	  only	  requirement	   to	  prove	   violation	   of	   the	   distribution	   right,	   which	   means,	   a	   copyright	   owner	   could	  prove	   a	   violation	   of	   his	   distribution	   right	   by	   merely	   providing	   evidence	   of	   his	  copyrighted	  work	  been	  placed	  in	  a	  sharing	  folder	  that	  is	  open	  to	  the	  public.	  550	  Prof.	  Nimmer	  supported	  Prof.	  Menell’s	  statement	  and	  revised	  its	  Copyright	  Treaties.	  	  	   The	   U.S.	   Copyright	   Office	   also	   supports	   the	   above	   point	   of	   views.	  551	  The	  office	  suggests	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  distribution	  “must	  be	  read	  in	  their	  context	  and	  with	  a	  view	  to	  their	  place	  in	  the	  overall	  statutory	  scheme.”552	  It	  used	  §506(a)(1)(c)	  of	   Title	   17,	   which	   is	   a	   criminal	   copyright	   provision553 	  and§602(a)(1),	   which	  concerns	   the	  unauthorized	   importation	  of	  copies	  and	  phonorecords554	  to	  prove	   its	  conclusion:	   the	   distribution	   encompasses	   the	   making	   available	   to	   the	   public	   for	  download.	  Further,	  the	  office	  also	  reviewed	  the	  legislative	  history	  and	  analyzed	  the	  relationship	   between	   the	   distribution	   and	   publication.	   The	   office	   rejected	   some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  549	  Peter	  S.	  Menell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Copyright’s	  Lost	  Ark:	  Interpreting	  the	  Right	  of	  Distribute	  in	  the	  
Internet	  Age, Journal	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Society	  of	  the	  USA,	  201	  233-­‐37(Feb	  15,2012).	  550	  Id.	  551	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office’s	  Report,	  supra	  note	  499,	  at	  24-­‐35.	  552	  Id,	  cited	  FDA	  v.	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  Tobacco	  Corp.,	  529	  U.S.	  120,	  133	  (2000).	  553	  17	  U.S.C.	  §506((a)(1)(C).(	  A	  person	  may	  criminally	  infringe	  copyright	  “by	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  work	  being	  prepared	  for	  commercial	  distribution,	  by	  making	  it	  available	  on	  a	  computer	  network	  accessible	  to	  members	  of	  the	  public…”	  554	  17	  U.S.C.	  §602(a)(1).(“Importation	  into	  the	  United	  States,	  without	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  owner	  of	  copyright	  under	  this	  title,	  of	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  of	  a	  work	  that	  have	  been	  acquired	  outside	  the	  United	  States	  is	  an	  infringement	  of	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  distribute	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  under	  section	  106…”	  and	  “any	  unauthorized	  importer	  of	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  acquired	  abroad,	  could	  be	  sued	  of	  damages	  and	  enjoined	  from	  making	  use	  of	  them,	  even	  before	  any	  public	  distribution	  in	  this	  country	  has	  taken	  place.”)	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courts’	  view	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  distribution	  is	  different	  from	  the	  publication.	  The	  office	  stated	  that	  the	  Congress	  shall	  not	  “intend	  to	  preserve	  those	  protections	  under	  the	  distribution	  right.”555	   	  
C. Who	  Infringe	  the	  Distribution	  Right?	  	   In	   the	   Cloud	   sharing	   world,	   usually	   the	   violation	   format	   is	   that	   the	   users	  upload	  copyrighted	  files	  and	  set	  them	  in	  file-­‐sharing	  mode.	  This	  makes	  the	  users	  the	  direct	   infringer	  of	   the	  distribution	   right.	  But,	   it’s	   also	  obvious,	  without	   the	   service	  provided	  by	  the	  ISPs,	  users	  cannot	  distribute	  any	  copyrighted	  works.	  Could	  the	  ISPs	  be	  liable	  for	  infringing	  the	  distribution	  right?	  Many	  cases	  relates	  to	  this	  issue.	  	   The	  Supreme	  Court	  provided	  its	  decision	  in	  N.Y.	  Times	  Co.	  v.	  Tasini.556	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  defendant	  operated	  an	  online	  database,	  and	  from	  which	  users	  could	  view,	  read	   or	   download	   digital	   copies	   of	   newspapers	   articles	   on	   request.	   The	   Supreme	  Court	   held	   that	   the	   defendant	   distributed	   copies	   of	   the	   copyrighted	   articles	   by	  selling	   copies	   of	   them	   through	   the	   database. 557 	  The	   defendant	   infringed	   the	  distribution	  right.	  	  	   In	  2009,	  in	  Arista	  Records,	  LLC	  v.	  Usenet.com	  case,558	  the	  defendant	  runs	  the	  USENET	   networks,	   an	   online	   bulletin	   boards	   system	  which	   subscribers	  may	   post	  messages	  and	  read	  messages	  posted	  by	  other	  subscribers.	  	  By	  using	  the	  Usenet.com,	  subscribers	   are	   able	   to	   download	  music	   recordings.559	  The	   district	   court	   held	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  555	  US	  Copyright	  Office’s	  Report,	  supra	  note	  499,	  at	  34.	  556	  N.Y.	  Times	  Co.	  v.	  Tasini,	  supra	  note	  502.	  557	  Id,	  at	  498.	  	  See	  also	  id,	  at	  518	  &	  n.14.	  (The	  majority	  rejected	  the	  dissenting	  opinion	  provided	  by	  J.	  Stevens.	  J.	  Stevens	  stated	  that	  it’s	  the	  user	  who	  actually	  engaged	  in	  the	  direct	  infringing	  activity,	  “Nexis	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  users	  to	  make	  and	  distribute	  copies.”)	  558	  Arista	  Records	  LLC	  v.	  Usenet.com,	  Inc.,	  608	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  409	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2009).	  559	  Id,	  at	  161-­‐63.	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defendant	  directly	  infringes	  the	  distribution	  right.	  Firstly,	  the	  district	  court	  adopted	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Tasini	  case,	  “delivery	  of	  articles	  and/or	  content	  to	  download	  at	  the	  request	  of	  subscribers	  can	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  direct	  infringement	  of	  the	  distribution	   right.”560	  And	   then	   the	   district	   court	   rejected	   the	   Cablevision	   case’s	  holding,	  and	  held	  that	  the	  defendant’s	  behavior	  was	  a	  sufficient	  volition.	  Because	  the	  Usenet	   “took	   active	   measures	   to	   create	   servers	   dedicated	   to	   MP3	   files	   and	   to	  increase	  retention	  times	  of	  newsgroups	  containing	  MP3	  files,”	   it	  also	  had	  ability	  to	  control	   the	   infringing	   files,	   and	   further	   engaged	   in	   filtering	   of	   content.561	  The	  defendant’s	  activities	  cannot	  be	  deemed	  as	  a	   “common	  carrier”	  delivers	  requested	  content	   to	   subscribers	   passively	   and	   automatically.562	  All	   in	   all,	   the	   district	   court	  held	  that	  the	  defendant	  was	  liable	  for	  direct	  infringement	  of	  the	  distribution	  right.	  	   In	   Capitol	   Records,	   LLC	   v.	   ReDigi	   Inc,	   the	   defendant	   Redigi	   allow	   its	  subscribers	   to	   resell	   their	   digital	   used	   music	   online	   via	   the	   “Media	   Manager”	  software.563	  The	  Court	   held	   that	   the	   sale	   of	   digital	  music	   files	   on	  ReDigi’s	  website	  infringes	  Capitol’s	  distribution	  right,	  if	  Redigi	  cannot	  provide	  an	  affirmative	  defense.	  The	   court	   adopted	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   Tesini,	   and	   also	   the	   Greubel	  case’s	   decision,	   held	   that	  distribution	   infringement	   can	  occur	   in	   case	  of	   electronic	  transmission	   and	   file-­‐sharing,	   or	   by	   selling	   copies	   of	   electronic	   files.564	  The	   court	  then	  concluded	  that	  the	  defendant	  actually	  engaged	  in	  volitional	  conduct	  since	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  560	  Id,	  at	  147.	  561	  Id,	  at	  148-­‐49.	  562	  Id.	  563	  Capitol	  Records,	  LLC	  v.	  ReDigi	  Inc.	  934	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  640	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2013).	  564	  Id,	  at	  651.	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ReDigi’s	   founders	   programmed	   their	   software	   to	   choose	   copyrighted	   content.565	  ReDigi	  provided	  the	  infrastructure	  for	  its	  users’	  infringing	  sales.566	  	   However,	  in	  Disney	  Enterprises,	  Inc.	  v.	  Hotfile	  Corp.	  the	  district	  court	  in	  this	  case	  held	   that	   the	  defendant	  was	  not	  directly	   liable	   for	   infringing	   the	  distribution	  right.567	  The	  defendant	  provided	  file	  hosting	  service,	  whenever	  a	  user	  upload	  a	  file,	  the	   defendant	   makes	   copies	   of	   each	   file	   and	   create	   a	   URL	   link	   for	   each.568	  The	  district	   court	   concluded	   that	   the	   reproduction	   act	   and	   URL	   link	   creation	   act	   are	  automatic	  conduct	  of	  software,	  and	  unaided	  by	  human	  intervention,	  so	  they	  are	  not	  volitional.569	  	   Based	   on	   these	   cases,	   it’s	   obvious	   the	   U.S.	   courts	   adopted	   the	   volitional	  conduct	  test	  in	  all	  these	  cases,	  and	  most	  of	  them	  follow	  the	  Cablevision	  case	  decision	  that	   a	   direct	   infringement	  may	   exist	   if	   one’s	   infringing	   distribution	   is	   so	   great	   in	  discussing	  the	   issue	  of	  reproduction	  right.	   In	  deciding	  the	   issue	  of	  what	  constitute	  “so	  great	  distribution,”	  the	  courts	  actually	  considered	  lots	  of	  circumstantial	  evidence	  such	  as	  the	  ISPs’	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  infringements,	  the	  ISPs’	  intention	  towards	  the	  infringing	   materials,	   the	   ISPs’	   intention	   of	   developing	   the	   service	   which	   enable	  infringements	  and	  others.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  565	  Id,	  at	  657.	  566	  Id.	  (	  The	  district	  court	  notified	  the	  Cablevision	  court	  ruled	  that	  a	  case	  may	  exist	  where	  “one’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  infringing	  copy	  is	  so	  great	  that	  it	  warrants	  holding	  that	  party	  directly	  liable	  for	  the	  infringement,	  even	  though	  another	  party	  has	  actually	  made	  the	  copy.”	  Cartoon	  network,	  536	  F.	  3d	  at	  133.	  So	  as	  a	  result,	  in	  this	  case,	  ReDigi’s	  conduct	  “transform	  it	  from	  a	  passive	  provider	  of	  a	  space	  in	  which	  infringing	  activities	  happened	  to	  occur	  to	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  process	  of	  copyright	  infringement.”)	  567	  Disney	  Enterprises,	  Inc.	  v.	  Hotfile	  Corp.	  798	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1303	  (S.D.	  Fla.	  2011).	  568	  Id,	  at	  1306.	  569	  Id,	  at	  1309-­‐10.	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   To	   sum	   up,	   it’s	   reasonable	   for	   the	   U.S.	   courts	   to	   adopt	   the	   theory	   that	   the	  distribution	   right	   encompasses	   “making	   available”	   of	   works	   online.	   But	   as	   Prof.	  Leaffer	   mentioned:	   “Rather	   than	   having	   courts	   artificially	   engraft	   a	   ‘making	  available’	   right	   into	   the	   Act,	   a	   legislative	   fix	   would	   be	   a	   more	   constitutionally	  appropriate	  way	  to	  proceed.”570	  	  	  
ii. The Right of Distribution in EU 	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   EU	   had	   already	   adopted	   a	   new	   exclusive	   right—the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  to	  fulfill	  the	  requirement	  of	  Art	  8	  of	  WCT—that	  could	  regulate	   the	  online	   interactive	  communication.	  But	  with	   the	  development	  of	  technology,	   online	   distribution	   became	   more	   common.	   The	   issue	   of	   whether	   the	  distribution	   right	   could	   encompass	   such	   online	   digital	   distribution	   remains	  unanswered.	  There	  are	  four	  EU	  Directives	  regulate	  the	  right	  of	  distribution:	  Art	  4	  of	  Information	  Society	  Directives,	  Art	  5(c)	  of	  the	  Database	  Directive,	  Art	  4(1)(c)	  of	  the	  Software	   Directive	   and	   Art	   9	   of	   Rental	   and	   Lending	   Rights	   Directive.571	  	   Art	   4	   of	  Information	  Society	  firstly	  harmonized	  horizontally	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  to	  cover	  all	   types	   of	  works	   instead	   of	   certain	   types	   of	  works.	   Art	   4	   of	   Information	   Society	  Directives	   implemented	  Article	  6	  of	  WCT.	   It	  provides	  authors	  an	  exclusive	  right	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  570	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  327.	  571	  Software	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  122;	  Database	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  125;	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  112.	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authorize	  or	  prohibit	   any	   form	  of	  distribution	  of	  original	  or	   copies	  of	   copyrighted	  works	  to	  the	  public.572	  	  
A. Is	  There	  A	  Digital	  Distribution	  Under	  EU’s	  The	  Right	  Of	  Distribution?	  	   With	   the	   rise	   of	   Internet,	   a	   new	   problem	   emerged:	   is	   there	   a	   digital	  distribution	   under	   EU’s	   distribution	   right?	   According	   to	   Recital	   28,	   this	   exclusive	  protection	  only	   refers	   to	   the	  dissemination	  of	   the	  work	   incorporated	   in	  a	   tangible	  article. 573 	  The	   “tangible	   articles”	   requirement	   in	   Recital	   28	   seems	   to	   be	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Agreed	  Statements	  concerning	  Articles	  6	  and	  7	  of	  WCT,	  which	  states	   “copies	   and	  original	  …	   refer	   exclusively	   to	   fixed	   copies	   that	   can	  be	  put	   into	  circulation	   as	   tangible	   objects.”574	  And	   further	   in	   1997,	   the	   commission	   of	   the	  European	  Communities	  also	  adopted	  this	  statement	   in	   its	  Proposal	   for	  a	  European	  Parliament	   and	   Council	   Directive	   on	   the	   Harmonization	   of	   certain	   aspects	   of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  in	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  and	  clearly	  stated	  that	   “provide	   for	   a	   coherent	   level	   playing	   field	   for	   the	   electronic	   and	   tangible	  distribution	  of	  protected	  material	  and	  to	  draw	  a	  clear	  line.”575	  Under	  this	  theory,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  572	  Id,	  art	  4(1).(“Member	  States	  shall	  provide	  for	  authors,	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  original	  of	  their	  works	  or	  of	  copies	  thereof,	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  authorize	  or	  prohibit	  any	  form	  of	  distribution	  to	  the	  public	  by	  sale	  or	  otherwise.”)	  573	  Id,	  recital	  28.(	  “Copyright	  protection	  under	  this	  Directive	  includes	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  control	  distribution	  of	  the	  work	  incorporated	  in	  a	  tangible	  article.”)	  574	  Agreed	  Statement	  Concerning	  the	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty,	  adopted	  by	  the	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  on	  Dec	  20,1996.	  avaiable	  at:	  http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295456	  	  575	  Proposal	  for	  a	  European	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  Directive	  on	  the	  Harmonization	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  in	  the	  Information	  Society,	  Commission	  of	  European	  Communities,	  Brussles,	  10.12.1997	  COM(97)	  628	  final	  97/0359(COD),	  at	  22,27.(“	  As	  in	  the	  acquis	  communautaire	  on	  this	  issue,	  the	  expressions	  "copies"	  and	  "originals	  and	  copies",	  being	  subject	  to	  the	  distribution	  right,	  refer	  exclusively	  to	  fixed	  copies	  that	  can	  be	  put	  into	  circulation	  as	  tangible	  objects.”)	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seems	   that	   the	   distribution	   right	   regulates	   only	   tangible	   copies	   and	   thus	   cannot	  regulate	  digital	  distribution.	  	  	   However,	   nowadays,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   term	   “copy”	   should	   be	   broadly	  construed	  and	  encompasses	  digital	  copies	  that	  are	  disseminated	  over	  the	  Internet.	  There	   are	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   the	   Agreed	   Statements	   were	   not	   adopted	   by	   all	  countries.	   For	   instance,	   the	   U.S.	   insisted	   to	   incorporate	   the	   concept	   of	   digital	  distribution	  into	  this	  Agreed	  Statements.	  Therefore,	  the	  existing	  Agree	  Statements	  is	  more	   close	   to	   a	   product	   of	   compromise.	   This	   made	   the	   “tangible	   articles”	  requirement	  less	  reliable.	  The	  commission	  of	  European	  Communities	  also	  published	  their	  proposal	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  WCT,	  but	  without	  a	  fundamental	  root	   source,	   the	   statement	   of	   the	   proposal	   is	   also	   less	   reliable.	   Second,	   the	   broad	  construction	  of	   the	  definition	  of	   “copy”	   is	   the	  requirement	  of	  meeting	  “the	  aims	  of	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  and	  prevent	  the	  partitioning	  of	  the	  Single	  Market	  by	  means	  of	   the	  non-­‐exhaustion	  of	   rights	   in	   copies	  of	   the	  work.”576	  In	  2012,	   the	  ECJ	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  Recital	  28	  from	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  does	  not	  preclude	  that	  the	  distribution	   right	   could	   be	   applied	   in	   distribution	   of	   intangible	   form	   of	   copies.577	  Because	   such	   requirement	   did	   not	   exist	   in	   Software	   Directive,	   and	   Art	   4(2)	   of	  Software	  Directive	  by	  referring	  without	  further	  specification	  of	  the	  “sale…	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  program,”	  makes	  no	  distinction	  according	  to	  the	  tangible	  or	  intangible	  form	  of	  a	  copy.578	  But	   the	   Software	   Directive	   is	   a	   lex	   specialis	   of	   the	   Information	   Society	  Directive,	   which	   means	   that	   the	   concepts	   in	   the	   Software	   Directive	   must	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  576	  EU	  Copyright:	  A	  Commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  424,	  para	  11.42.	  577	  Case	  C-­‐128/111	  UsedSoft,	  supra	  note	  152,	  para.	  53-­‐62.	  578	  Id,	  para.55.	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interpreted	  the	  same	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	   treatment.	  The	  ECJ	   further	  analyzed	  from	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  view,	   indicated	  that	  the	  sale	  of	  a	  computer	  program	  on	  CD-­‐ROM	  or	  DVD	  and	   the	   sale	  of	   a	  program	  by	  downloading	   from	   the	   Internet	   are	  similar.	  “The	  on-­‐line	  transmission	  method	  is	  the	  functional	  equivalent	  of	  the	  supply	  of	   a	   material	   medium.”579	  As	   a	   result,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   principle	   of	   equal	  treatment,	   Art	   4(2)	   of	   Software	   Directive	   confirms	   that	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   the	  distribution	  right	  takes	  effect	  after	  the	   first	  sale	   in	  the	  EU	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  computer	  program	  by	  the	  copyright	  holder	  or	  not	  by	  the	  copyright	  holder	  but	  with	  his	  consent,	  regardless	   of	   whether	   the	   sale	   relates	   to	   a	   tangible	   or	   an	   intangible	   copy	   of	   the	  program.	   Since	   there	   is	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   on	   the	   Internet,	  digital	  distribution	  should	  not	  be	  out	  of	  the	  hook.	  So	  this	  indication	  is	  equal	  to	  that	  the	  act	  of	  dissemination	  of	  digital	  works	   (that	  are	  works	  on	   intangible	  article)	  via	  Internet	   can	   constitute	   distribution.	   As	   a	   result,	   Art	   4	   of	   Information	   Society	  Directive	  should	  encompass	  copies	  both	  in	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  form,	  so	  that	  the	  digital	  distribution	  should	  also	  be	  regulated.580	  	  	   However,	   the	   above	   reasoning	   had	   been	   rejected	   by	   the	   German	   Court	  recently.581	  The	   German	   Court	   held	   that	   because	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   Software	  Directive	   as	   lex	   specialis	   to	   the	   Information	   Society	   Directive,	   the	   reasoning	   in	  UsedSoft	  could	  not	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  subject	  matter,	  especially	  the	  digital	  content	  such	  as	  downloadable	  e-­‐books	  and	  audiobooks	  in	  this	  case.	  This	  shows	  the	  German	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  579	  Id,	  para	  61.	  580	  Some	  scholars	  supported	  that	  Recital	  28	  clearly	  define	  the	  means	  of	  distribution	  can	  be	  by	  paper,	  CD	  or	  other	  physical	  medium	  but	  the	  right	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  online	  distribution	  or	  to	  services	  in	  general.	  See	  TREVOR	  COOK	  &	  LORNA	  BRAZELL,	  THE	  COPYRIGHT	  DIRECTIVE,	  UK	  IMPLEMENTATION	  (2004).	  581	  Landgericht	  Bielefeld-­‐	  case	  no	  4	  O	  191/11	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Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  does	  not	  permit	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  exhaustion	  to	  works	  in	  intangible	  form.	  Based	  on	  the	  reasoning	  in	  UsedSoft,	  it	  means	  that	  there’s	  no	  digital	  distribution	  via	  Internet	  except	  the	  online	  software.	  	  	   Based	  on	  these	  two	  former	  cases	  in	  EU,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  discuss	  the	   issue	  of	  whether	   the	  digital	  distribution	  exist	  already.	  All	   the	  existing	   theories	  are	  based	  on	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  distribution	  right.	  The	  ECJ	  will	  definitely	   further	   analyze	   this	   issue	   in	   the	   future	   because	   of	   the	   development	   of	  cloud	   computing	   technology.	   In	   my	   opinion,	   it’s	   a	   worldwide	   trend	   that	   EU	   will	  adopt	   the	   concept	   of	   digital	   distribution.	   For	   instance,	  when	  UK	   implemented	   the	  Art	  4	  of	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  it	  added	  Section	  16(2)(b)	  to	  grant	  copyright	  holders	   the	   right	   to	   issue	   copies	   of	   the	   work	   to	   the	   public.582	  It	   is	   obvious	   the	  distribution	  right	   in	  UK	  relevant	   to	  off-­‐line	  multimedia	  works	  disseminated	   in	  CD-­‐ROM	  or	  DVD-­‐ROM	  format,	  but	  it’s	  not	  apparent	  from	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  section	  that	  it	  is	   restricted	   to	   tangible	   copies.	   	   And	   Section	   17	   supports	   the	   view	   of	   intangible	  copies	  can	  be	  distributed	  to	  the	  public.	  According	  to	  Section	  17(2),	  copying	  includes	  “storing	  the	  work	  in	  any	  medium	  by	  electronic	  means.”583	  
B. Questions	  Arouse	  With	  Regulating	  Digital	  Distribution	  By	  The	  Right	  Of	  
Distribution	  	   If	   digital	   distribution	   exists,	   what’s	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   right	   of	  distribution	   and	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   under	   EU	   Directives?	  According	  to	  Article	  6(1)	  of	  WCT,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Arts	  3	  and	  4	  of	  the	  Information	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  582	  CDPA,	  supra	  note	  168,	  section	  16(2)(b).	  583	  See	  Aplin,	  supra	  note	  159,	  at	  122-­‐123.	  
	   189	  
Society	   Directive,	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   changes	   an	   act	   of	   “communication	   to	   the	  public”	   into	   an	   act	   of	   “distribution.”584 	  Interactive	   communication	   (on-­‐demand	  transmission),	  which	  regulated	  by	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  allows	  users	   to	  enjoy	  works	  via	   the	   Internet	  at	   the	   time	  and	  place	   they	  selected.	  But	   this	  kind	  of	  transmission	  would	  hardly	  result	  in	  a	  fixation	  of	  the	  transmitted	  works	  as	  a	  copy	  on	  the	  hard	  drive.	  The	  dissemination	  of	  digital	  works	  regulated	  by	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  usually	  provides	  an	  intangible	  service	  instead	  of	  copies.	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   does	   not	   require	   the	  existence	   of	   a	   new	   copy	   of	   the	  work	   that	   being	   enjoyed	   by	   users.	  Without	   a	   new	  copy,	   it	  means	   there’s	   no	   new	  ownership	   exist.	   So,	  whether	   the	   distribution	   right	  should	   be	   applied	   or	   not	   is	   determined	   by	   whether	   a	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   has	  occurred.	   If	  a	   transfer	  of	  ownership	  has	  not	  occurred,	   then	   it	   is	  communication	   to	  the	  public	  rather	  than	  the	  distribution	  to	  the	  public.	  A	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  could	  occur	   via	   a	   sale,	   donation,	   exchange,	   barter	   or	   endowment,	   as	   a	   result,	   “this	   is	   an	  issue	  to	  be	  decided	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  contract.”585	  So,	  Rental	  and	  Lending	  rights	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  distribution	  right	  since	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  occurred.	  	   Then,	   another	   question	   arose,	  what	   if	   a	   copy	   of	   a	  work	   is	   offered	   for	   sale?	  First,	  neither	  import	  nor	  offering	  for	  sale	  within	  the	  EU	  triggers	  exhaustion	  if	  no	  sale	  has	   taken	   place.586	  Then	   following	   the	   reasoning	   in	   UsedSoft,	   if	   offering	   for	   sale	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  584	  UsedSoft	  case,	  supra	  note	  152,	  para.	  52.	  585	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  426,	  para.	  11.47.	  586	  See	  C-­‐16/03	  Peak	  Holding	  AB	  v	  Axolin-­‐Elinor	  AB	  2004	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐11313;	  see	  also	  Case	  C-­‐127/09	  Coty	  Prestige	  Lancaster	  Group	  2010	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐4965.	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cannot	  trigger	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  distribution	  right,	  the	  distribution	  right	  should	  not	  apply	  unless	  the	  copy	  is	  put	  in	  circulation.587	  	   The	  third	  issue	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  “public.”	  It	  is	  well	  accepted	  that	  a	  transfer	  of	   ownership	   takes	   place	   to	   a	  member	   of	   the	   public.588	  The	   definition	   of	   “public”	  should	   in	   line	  with	   the	  definition	  of	   “public”	   in	  Art	  3,	  and	   this	  definition	  had	  been	  analyzed	  in	  last	  chapter	  of	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  In	  general,	  if	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  is	  not	  sold	  or	  other	  kinds	  of	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  do	  not	  taken	  place	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  public,	  but	  rather	  to	  a	  relative,	  family	  members	  or	  acquaintance,	  the	  distribution	  right	  will	  not	  applied.	  	  
iii. The Right of Distribution in Other Countries—Singapore, Australia 
and Japan 	   Lots	   of	   countries	   in	   the	   world	   do	   not	   regulate	   the	   digital	   distribution	   via	  Internet	  at	  all.	  Some	  countries	  even	  don’t	  provide	  an	  exclusive	  distribution	  right	  to	  copyright	   owners.	   For	   instance,	   Singapore	   and	   Australia	   only	   provide	   copyright	  owners	   the	   right	   of	   publication.	   The	   others	   do	   provide	   the	   distribution	   right	   but	  limited	  its	  scope	  of	  object	  to	  cinematographic	  works,	  such	  as	  Japan.	  
A. Singapore	  	   Singapore	  does	  not	  provide	  copyright	  owners	  the	  exclusive	  distribution	  right,	  instead,	   it	   provides	   copyright	   owners	   of	   literary,	   dramatic	   and	   musical	   works,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  587	  See	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  425,	  para.	  11.44.	  However,	  some	  scholars	  also	  support	  the	  view	  of	  that	  the	  offer	  for	  sale	  or	  any	  other	  disposal	  of	  the	  original	  or	  copies	  of	  the	  work	  is	  covered	  by	  the	  right	  of	  distribution.	  See	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  EU	  Copyright,	  supra	  note	  132,	  at	  212	  &	  220.	  588	  UsedSoft	  case,	  supra	  note	  152,	  para.52.	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artistic	  works,	   sound	   recordings	   and	   films	   the	   right	   of	   publication.589According	   to	  Section	   24,	   the	   objects	   of	   the	   publication	   right	   are	   limited	   to	   copies	   of	   former	  mentioned	  works,	  and	  the	  publication	  occurs	  via	  supply	  (whether	  by	  sale	  or	  other	  means)	   of	   the	   copies.	   As	   a	   result,	   publication	   right	   in	   Singapore	   also	   requires	   a	  transfer	  of	  ownership.590	  
B. Australia	  	   There’s	  no	  exclusive	  right	  of	  distribution	  being	  granted	  to	  copyright	  owners	  in	   the	   Australian	   Copyright	   Act	   1968.	   However,	   the	   concept	   of	   distribution	   is	  mentioned	  lots	  of	  times	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  1968.	  The	  most	  relevant	  exclusive	  right	  which	   relates	   to	   the	   right	   of	   distribution	   is	   the	   publication	   right	   under	   the	  traditional	   circumstance.	   	   Section	   29(1)(a)	   defines	   the	   publication	   as	   “a	   literary,	  dramatic,	  musical	  or	  artistic	  work,	  or	  an	  edition	  of	  such	  a	  work,	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  been	  published	   if,	  but	  only	   if,	   reproduction	  of	   the	  work	  or	  edition	  have	  been	  supplied	  (whether	  by	  sale	  or	  otherwise)	   to	   the	  public.”591	  Based	  on	  this	  definition,	  it’s	   clear	   that	   the	   publication	   right	   does	   not	   cover	   cinematograph	   films,	   sound	  recordings	  or	  broadcasts.	  However,	  “a	  cinematograph	  film	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  been	  published	  if,	  but	  only	  if,	  copies	  of	  the	  film	  have	  been	  sold,	  let	  on	  hire,	  or	  offered	  or	  exposed	  for	  sale	  or	  hire	  to	  the	  public,”	  and	  “a	  sound	  recording	  shall	  e	  deemed	  to	  have	  been	  published	  if,	  but	  only	  if,	  records	  embodying	  the	  recording	  or	  a	  part	  of	  the	  recording	  have	  been	  supplied	  (whether	  by	  sale	  or	  otherwise)	  to	  the	  public.”592	  From	  this	   definition,	   there	   are	   three	   basic	   elements	   in	   the	   publication	   right:	   (1)	   the	   act	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  589	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  172,	  section	  12.1.7	  590	  Id,	  section	  24(1).	  591	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178,	  section	  29(1)(a).	  592	  Id,	  section	  29(1)(b)&(c).	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regulated	  by	  the	  publication	  right	  is	  supplying	  a	  reproduction	  of	  a	  work	  or	  edition;	  (2)	   the	   means	   of	   the	   supplying	   is	   by	   sale	   or	   other	   supply	   means;	   and	   (3)	   the	  recipient	   of	   the	   supplying	   is	   the	   public.	   	   It’s	   clear	   that	   in	   Australia,	   the	   right	   of	  publication	  will	  only	  be	  established	  via	  the	  act	  of	  distribution.	  And	  it’s	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  objects	   of	   the	   right	   of	   publication	   are	   tangible	  physical	  materials,	   for	   instance	  they	  are	  reproductions	  of	  a	  work,	  copies	  of	  a	  file	  or	  records	  of	  a	  sound	  recording.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  right	  of	  publication	  cannot	  regulate	  transmission	  via	  the	  Internet.	  As	  I	  mentioned	   in	   last	   chapter	   of	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public,	   Australia	  added	   a	   new	   electronic	   transmission	   right	   that	   was	  mentioned	   in	   Section	   10	   the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Amendment	  (Digital	  Agenda)	  Act	   2000.593	  In	   an	   Australian	   Discussion	   Paper:	   Copyright	   Reform	   and	   the	   Digital	  Agenda,	   it	   states	   that	   “the	   transmission	   right	   would	   not	   apply	   to	   and	   would	   be	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  physical	  copies	  of	  copyright	  material,	  such	  as	  books	  and	  sound	  recordings.”594	  As	  a	  result,	   it’s	  quite	  clear	  that	  in	  Australia,	  the	  right	   of	   publication	   will	   regulate	   the	   distribution	   of	   works	   made	   by	   physical	  materials,	   and	   the	   right	   of	   electronic	   transmission	   from	   the	   broad	   right	   of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  will	  be	  used	  to	  regulate	  digital	  distribution	  via	  Internet.	  However,	  there	  are	  no	  new	  cases	  that	  discuss	  the	  digital	  distribution	  issue	  under	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  emerged	  recently.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  593	  Copyright	  Amendment	  (Digital	  Agenda)	  Act	  2000,No.	  110,	  available	  at:	  http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=125039	  	  594	  The	  Attorney-­‐General’s	  Department	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Communications	  and	  the	  Arts,	  Discussion	  Paper	  Copyright	  Reform	  and	  the	  Digital	  Agenda	  (1997),	  para	  4.13.	  
	   193	  
C. Japan	  	   Following	   Art.	   14(1)(i)	   of	   the	   Berne	   Convention,	   Japanese	   copyright	   law	  provides	   cinematographic	   works’	   copyright	   owner	   with	   the	   exclusive	   right	   to	  distribute	  copies	  of	  their	  works	  in	  Art	  26(1).595	  Japan	  did	  not	  implement	  Article	  6	  of	  WCT,	   which	   states	   that	   the	   distribution	   right	   should	   encompass	   all	   categories	   of	  works.	   Instead,	   according	   to	   Art	   26(2),	   the	   Japanese	   distribution	   right	   is	   only	  granted	   to	   the	   cinematographic	   work	   and	   the	   works	   incorporated	   therein. 596	  “Distribution”	   is	   defined	   as	   “the	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   and	   lending	   of	   copies	   of	   a	  work	   to	   the	   public,	   whether	   with	   or	   without	   payment,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	  cinematographic	   work	   or	   a	   work	   reproduced	   therein,	   it	   includes	   the	   transfer	   of	  ownership	   and	   lending	   of	   copies	   of	   such	   work	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   making	   a	  cinematographic	  work	  available	  to	  the	  public.”597	  	   The	  most	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  Japanese	  distribution	  right	  and	  other	   countries’	   distribution	   right	   is	   that	   only	   cinematographic	   works	   enjoy	   this	  right,	   and	   this	   right	   has	   a	   non-­‐exhaustive	   character.	   For	   instance,	   the	   copyright	  owner	  will	  still	  have	  his	  right	  of	  distribution	  even	  after	  his	  film	  copies	  were	  put	  into	  circulation	  with	  his	  consent.	  This	   issue	  of	  exhaustion	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	   in	  the	  section	  talking	  about	  exhaustion	  principle.	  	  What’s	  relevant	  here	  are	  two	  cases	  that	  both	   ruled	   that	   video	   games	   software	   can	  be	  deemed	   as	   a	   cinematographic	  work,	  but	  their	  results	  are	  different	  because	  the	  issue	  of	  in	  whether	  the	  distribution	  right	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  595	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  190,	  art	  26(1).	  596	  Id,	  art	  26(2).	  597	  Id,	  art	  2(1)(xix).	  (The	  distribution	  right	  including	  both	  the	  assignment	  of	  tangible	  property	  rights	  in	  embodiments	  and	  the	  rental	  or	  lending	  of	  same	  to	  the	  public,	  with	  or	  without	  consideration.	  The	  copyright	  owner	  of	  cinematographic	  works	  can	  control	  both	  selling	  and	  renting	  or	  lending	  copies.)	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should	  be	  applied.598	  In	  Akuto	  etc.	  v.	  K.K.	  Sega	  case,	  the	  Osaka	  High	  court	  concluded	  that	   video	   game	   software	   is	   a	   cinematographic	  work	   and	   applied	   the	   distribution	  right.599	  However,	  in	  K.K.	  Enikkusu	  v.	  K.K.	  Josho	  case,	  the	  Tokyo	  High	  Court	  agreed	  that	  the	  video	  game	  software	  is	  a	  cinematographic	  work,	  but	  denied	  a	  distribution	  right.600	  Because	  the	  Tokyo	  High	  Court	  ruled	  that	  Art	  26	  provides	  copyright	  owners	  the	   right	   to	   control	   copies	   to	   be	   distributed	   and	   presented	   at	   theatres,	   however,	  copies	  of	  video	  games	  software	  were	  not	  distributed	  or	  presented	  at	  theatres.	  As	  a	  result,	  although	  video	  game	  softwares	  are	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  cinemagraphic	  works,	  there	  was	  still	  no	  infringement	  of	  the	  distribution	  right.	  	   Based	   on	   these	   two	   cases,	   it’s	   clear	   that	   Japan	   had	   already	   extended	   the	  objects	  of	  distribution	  right	  from	  cinematographic	  work	  to	  include	  video/computer	  game	  software.	  But,	  the	  objects	  of	  transmission	  via	  Internet	  in	  the	  cloud	  computing	  cannot	   be	   limited	   to	   cinematographic	   work	   or	   video	   game	   software.	   Objects	   like	  	  sound	   recordings,	   normal	   softwares,	   TV	   programs	   and	   others	   can	   be	   transmitted	  too.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   distribution	   right	   in	   Japan	   cannot	   be	   applied	   now	   in	   issuing	  digital	  distribution	  via	  Internet.	  
  	  
iv. How Cloud Computing Affect the right of Distribution?— A 
Proposal for China  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  598	  Takenaka	  Toshiko,	  Sales	  of	  Used	  TV	  Game	  Software	  is	  Legal,	  CASRIP	  Newsletter	  (2001)	  available	  at:	  https://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/2001/newsv8i1jp1.pdf	  	  599	  Akuto	  etc.	  v.	  K.K.	  Sega,	  Judgment	  of	  Osaka	  High	  Court,	  March	  29,	  2001.(In	  2002,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  denied	  the	  distribution	  right	  in	  audiovisual	  subject	  matter	  other	  than	  traditional	  film	  copies	  intended	  for	  cinema	  showing	  of	  its	  non-­‐exhaustive	  character.)	  600	  K.K.	  Enikkusu	  v.	  K.K.	  Josho,	  Judgment	  of	  Tokyo	  High	  Court,	  March	  27,2001.	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A. Digital	  distribution	  or	  not?	   	  	   People	  are	  getting	  used	   to	  enjoy	  copyrighted	  works	  online	  by	  streaming	  or	  downloading.	   They	   enjoy	   the	   convenience	   of	   paying	   iTunes	   to	   download	   music	   ,	  watching	   films	  or	  reading	  books	  at	  anytime	  and	  anywhere	   they	  selected.	  With	   the	  development	  of	  technologies,	  some	  of	  the	  video	  sharing	  websites	  or	  music	  boxes	  are	  able	  to	  film	  and	  produce	  their	  own	  TV	  series	  or	  music	  recordings	  	  then	  disseminate	  them	  via	   their	  own	  websites	  or	  music	  boxes.	  Those	  works	  will	   firstly	  and	  only	  be	  accessed	   from	  their	  own	  websites	  or	  music	  boxes.	   	  Most	  of	   the	  time	  users	  have	  to	  pay	   in	  order	   to	  enjoy	   these	  works.	   So	  under	   this	   circumstance,	   it’s	  unfair	   that	   the	  service	  providers	  of	  video	  websites	  or	  music	  boxes	  could	  not	  gain	  from	  an	  exclusive	  right	  of	  distribution.	  Because	  there’s	  no	  difference	  between	  disseminate	  a	  film	  in	  a	  theatre	  and	  disseminate	  a	   film	  on	  a	  specific	  website	  with	  payment.	  As	  a	  result,	   it’s	  reasonable	  to	  apply	  the	  distribution	  right	  to	  regulate	  the	  digital	  distribution.	  Then	  a	  divergence	   exists,	   which	   was	   discussed	   in	   the	   U.S.	   part	   in	   this	   section.	   The	  divergence	   is	  when	  decide	  whether	   there’s	   a	  digital	   distribution,	   should	   the	   court	  apply	  the	  actual	  distribution	  requirement	  or	  the	  offering	  to	  distribute	  requirement?	  In	  the	  U.S.	  part,	   I	  agreed	  that	  the	   later	  requirement—	  offer	  to	  distribute	  should	  be	  applied.	   But	   in	   the	   contour	   of	   the	   whole	   world,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   should	   apply	   the	  actual	   distribution	   requirement.	   That’s	   because	   the	   U.S.	   do	   not	   have	   an	   exclusive	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  it	  only	  extend	  the	  right	  of	  public	  performance	  and	  the	  distribution	  right	  in	  order	  to	  imply	  the	  WCT	  Art	  8.	  But	  under	  the	  umbrella	  solution,	   the	  EU	  and	  China	  had	  added	  a	  new	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  which	  controls	  disseminating	  works	  via	  the	  Internet.	  If	  EU	  and	  China	  both	  adopted	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the	  offering	   to	  distribute	   requirement,	   it	  would	   cause	   the	   conflicts	  of	   legal	  norms.	  Therefore,	  as	   for	  the	  U.S.,	   the	  offering	  to	  distribute	  requirement	  will	  work	  out,	  but	  for	  other	  countries	  with	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  such	  requirement	  is	  not	  the	  best	  choice.	  
B. The	  Right	  of	  Distribution	  and	  A	  Proposal	  for	  China	  
a. The	  definition	  of	  distribution	  in	  Chinese	  law	  and	  its	  three	  key	  components	  	   Copyright	   Law	  of	  China	   refers	   to	   other	   countries’	   regulation	  of	   the	   right	   of	  distribution,	   uses	   Art	   10(6)	   to	   authorize	   copyright	   owners	   an	   exclusive	   right	   of	  distribution.	  Art	  10	  (6)	  states	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  “that	   is,	   the	  right	  to	  provide	  the	  public	  with	  original	  copies	  or	  reproduced	  copies	  of	  works	  by	  means	  of	  selling	  or	  donating.”601	  According	  to	  this	  definition,	  in	  order	  to	  constitute	  an	  act	  of	  distribution	  under	  the	  copyright	   law	  in	  China,	  there	  are	  three	  key	  components.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  that	   the	   recipient	   of	   the	   distribution	   act	   is	   the	   public.	   Second,	   the	   objects	   of	   the	  distribution	   are	   original	   copies	   or	   reproduced	   copies.	   And	   third,	   the	   ways	   of	   the	  distribution	  are	  by	  selling	  or	  donating,	  which	  are	  ways	  of	  transfer	  of	  ownership.602	  	   For	  the	  first	  component—“public,”	  as	  I	  mentioned	  in	  last	  section	  of	  the	  right	  of	   communication	   to	   the	  public,	   China	  does	  not	   take	   this	   into	   consideration.	  Most	  Chinese	   scholars	   adopt	   the	   general	   view	   that	   public	   are	   unspecified	   numbers	   of	  people	  whose	  relationships	  are	  out	  of	   the	  scope	  of	   family	  members,	   relatives,	  and	  friends.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  601	  Copyright	  law,	  supra	  note	  460,	  art	  10(6).	  602	  Based	  on	  the	  third	  component,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  China	  adopted	  the	  narrow	  definition	  of	  the	  right	  of	  distribution,	  which	  only	  provides	  two	  ways	  of	  act:	  sale	  or	  donation.	  The	  broad	  definition	  of	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  also	  includes	  more	  ways	  of	  act:	  rental,	  lease	  or	  lending.	  For	  instance,	  the	  U.S.	  adopted	  the	  broad	  definition.	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   The	   second	   component	   is	   the	   object	   of	   the	   act	   of	   distribution.	   Chinese	  Copyright	   Law	   simply	   states	   that	   original	   copies	   or	   reproduced	   copies	   are	   the	  objects.	  But	  two	  issues	  arouse	  because	  of	  such	  unclear	  statement.	  The	  first	  issue	  is	  that	  in	  most	  cases,	  there’s	  only	  one	  original	  copy.	  Due	  to	  this	  uniqueness	  nature,	  it’s	  clear	   that	   the	  original	  copy	  can	  be	  only	  provided	   to	  one	  person	  rather	   than	   to	   the	  public	   in	   real	   life.	   Further,	   in	   the	   Regulations	   for	   the	   Implementation	   of	   the	  Copyright	  Law	  of	   the	  People's	  Republic	   of	  China	   (which	   is	   expired	  now),	  Art	  5(5)	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  object	  of	  distribution	  is	  “copies	  of	  work…the	  number	  of	  copies	  of	   work	   satisfy	   the	   reasonable	   need	   of	   the	   public.”603	  This	   expired	   regulation	   of	  implementation	   of	   the	   copyright	   law	   obviously	   required	   that	   the	   object	   of	  distribution	   needs	   to	   be	   “numbers	   of	   copies.”	   Therefore,	   it	   seems	   that	   an	   original	  copy	   cannot	  be	  distributed	   to	   the	  public.	   Lots	   of	   Chinese	   scholars	   agreed	   that	   the	  object	   should	  be	   “numbers	  of	   copies.”	  For	   Instance,	  Professor	  Wu	  Handong	  stated	  that	   “in	  general	   situation,	   the	  object	  of	  distribution	  refers	   to	   reproduced	  copies	  of	  works.”604	  Professor	  Feng	  Xiaoqing	  and	  Professor	  Wang	  Qian	  also	  agreed	  this	  view	  and	  stated	  that	  “it’s	  rare	  to	  provide	  the	  original	  copy	  to	  the	  public.”605	  Then	  comes	  the	   second	   issue:	   there’s	   no	   clear	   statement	   in	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   right	   of	  distribution	   to	   clarify	   that	   those	   reproduced	   copies	   should	   be	   in	   tangible	   form.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  603	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gongheguo	  Zhuzuo	  Quanfa	  Shishi	  Tiaoli	  (中华人民共和国著作权法实
施条例)[Regulations	  for	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Law	  of	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China](issued	  by	  the	  State	  Councile	  of	  China	  on	  May	  30,	  1991.Invalidated	  by	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Law	  of	  the	  Peoples	  Republic	  of	  China.)	  Art	  5(5).	  604	  Wu	  Handong(吴汉东),	  Wuxing	  Caichanquan	  Jiben	  Wenti	  Yanjiu（无形财产权基本问题研
究)[Analyzing	  the	  Right	  of	  Intangible	  Property](3rd	  ed.	  2013),	  at	  257.	  605	  See	  Feng	  Xiaoqing(冯晓青)，Zhuzuo	  Quanfa(著作权法)[Copyright	  Law](2010),at	  101；	  
see	  also	  Wang	  Qian(王迁),	  Zhuzuoquan	  Faxue(著作权法学)[Copyright	  Law	  Science](2007),	  at	  113.	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Without	   such	   clarification,	   it’s	   even	   less	   clear	   to	   decide	   whether	   the	   right	   of	  distribution	   could	   regulate	   the	   act	   of	   dissemination	   to	   the	   public	   through	   the	  Internet	  (whether	  digital	  distribution	  exist)	  under	  the	  Chinese	  Copyright	  Law.	  Some	  scholars	   supported	   that	   the	   distribution	   right	   can	   regulate	   digital	   distribution	   via	  Internet	  based	  on	  this	  issue.	  This	  dissertation	  will	  discuss	  more	  about	  it	  later	  in	  this	  part.	  	   The	  third	  component	  is	  transferring	  the	  ownership	  through	  sale	  or	  donation.	  According	  to	  Prof.	  Wang	  Qian,	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  is	  to	  enable	  the	  public	  to	  enjoy	  copyrighted	  works	  repeatedly	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  public	  need	   to	  possess	  copies	  of	   the	  works.606	  To	  possess	  copies	  of	   the	  works,	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	  such	  copies	  is	  significant.	  Although	  Chinese	  Copyright	  law	  did	   not	   obliquely	   mention	   the	   phrase	   “transfer	   of	   ownership”	   in	   the	   current	  copyright	  law,	  it’s	  still	  clear	  that	  both	  sale	  and	  donation	  will	  result	  in	  transferring	  of	  ownership.	   And	   the	   Copyright	   draft	   confirmed	   this	   view.	   Art	   13(2)	   (the	   right	   of	  distribution)	   of	   the	   Copyright	   draft	   states	   “by	  means	   of	   selling,	   donating	   or	   other	  ways	   of	   transferring	   of	   ownership.”607	  It’s	   clear	   that	   China	   indeed	   agrees	   that	  transfer	   of	   ownership	   is	   a	   key	   component	   of	   the	   right	   of	   distribution.	   And	   China	  increases	   the	  ways	  of	   transfer	  of	  ownership	  so	   that	   the	  ways	  of	  sale	  and	  donation	  will	  not	  limit	  the	  means	  of	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	  Transferring	  the	  ownership	  is	  also	  the	   substantive	   characteristic	   that	   causes	   the	   distribution	   right	   differs	   from	  other	  types	   of	   communicational	   economic	   copyrights,	   such	   as	   the	   right	   of	   performance,	  broadcasting	   right	   or	   the	   right	   of	   exhibition.	   The	   purpose	   of	   all	   the	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  606	  Wang	  Qian,	  supra	  note	  473,	  at	  69.	  607	  Draft	  of	  Copyright	  Law,	  supra	  note	  466.,	  art	  13(2).	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communication	   rights	   except	   the	   right	   of	   distribution	   are	   to	   disseminate	   the	  contents	   of	   works.	   Although	   sometimes	   the	   public	   who	   receive	   those	   contents	   of	  works	   via	   these	   types	   of	   dissemination	  will	   use	   some	   technical	  measure	   to	   retain	  those	  works	  on	  their	  computers,	  camera	  or	  video	  recorder,	  such	  acts	  are	  the	  public’s	  personal	   acts.	  The	  public’s	   acts	   cannot	  be	  deemed	  as	   the	  necessary	   component	  of	  the	   general	   act	   of	   dissemination	   of	   works.	   As	   a	   result,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   the	   most	  significant	  component	  in	  the	  distribution	  right	  is	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	  	  
b. Could	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  in	  China	  regulate	  digital	  distribution?	  	   With	   the	   development	   of	   Internet,	   it’s	   obvious	   that	   copyrighted	  works	   are	  disseminated	   via	   the	   Internet	   more	   and	   more	   often.	   	   China	   also	   faced	   the	   issue	  whether	  the	  distribution	  right	  could	  regulate	  “digital	  distribution”	  online.	  There	  are	  basically	   two	   theories	   in	   China	   now.	   One	   agreed	   that	   the	   distribution	   right	   can	  regulate	  digital	  distribution	  and	  the	  other	  disagreed.	  The	  following	  part	  will	  discuss	  the	   reasons	   for	   concluding	   former	   two	   theories	   and	  my	   personal	   opinion	   toward	  this	  issue.	  	   The	   scholars	   who	   agreed	   that	   the	   distribution	   right	   can	   regulate	   digital	  distribution	  online	  also	  agreed	  that	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  should	  regulate	  the	  act	  of	  disseminating	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  Internet.	  They	  provide	  three	  aspects	  of	  reasons.	  The	   first	   reason	   is	   from	  the	  aspect	  of	  civil	   law	  area.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	   objects	   of	   distribution	   are	   copies,	   and	   there’s	   no	   clear	   statement	   require	   that	  such	  copies	  must	  be	   fixed	   in	  a	   tangible	  material.	  Art	  10(6)	  only	   refers	   to	   “original	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copies	  or	  reproduced	  copies,”	  and	  Art	  58	  that	  interprets	  “publication”	  only	  refer	  to	  “reproduction	  and	  distribution	  of	  works.”	  Even	  without	  mentioning	  “copies.”608	  	  	  	   Second	   aspect	   is	   from	   criminal	   law	   area,	   there	   are	   three	   criminal	   law	  interpretations	   expressly	   point	   that	   the	   right	   of	   distribution	   can	   regulate	   digital	  distribution	  online.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  published	  in	  2014.	  Art	  11	  of	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Supreme	  People's	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  People's	  Procuratorate	  on	  Certain	  Issues	  Concerning	   the	   Application	   of	   Law	   in	   Handling	   Criminal	   Cases	   Involving	  Infringement	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  states:”	  Acts	  of	  disseminating	  a	  literary	  work,	   musical	   composition,	   motion	   picture,	   television	   program	   or	   other	   visual	  creations,	  computer	  software	  or	  other	  works	  of	  another	  to	  public	  shall	  be	  deemed	  as	  "reproducing	   or	   distributing"	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   Article	   217	   of	   the	   Criminal	  Law.”609	  Second,	   in	   2005,	   the	   Supreme	   People’s	   Court	   and	   the	   Supreme	   People’s	  Procuratorate	   affirmed	   again	   in	   Reply	   of	   the	   Supreme	   People’s	   Court	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  608	  Copyright	  Law,	  supra	  note	  460,	  art	  10(6)	  &	  art	  58.	  609 	  Zuigao	   Renmin	   Fayuan	   Zuigao	   Renmin	   Jianchayuan	   Guanyu	   Banli	   Qinfan	   Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Xingshi	  Anjian	  JutinYingyong	  Falv	  Ruogan	  Wentide	  Jieshi(最高人民法院、最高人
民检察院关于办理侵犯知识产权刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解)[Interpretation	   of	  the	   Supreme	   People's	   Court	   and	   the	   Supreme	   People's	   Procuratorate	   on	   Certain	   Issues	  Concerning	   the	   Application	   of	   Law	   in	   Handling	   Criminal	   Cases	   Involving	   Infringement	   of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights](Promulgating	  by	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Procuratorate.	  Effective	  date	  Dec	  22,	  2004),	  art	  11.	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gongheguo	  Xingfa	   ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 刑 法 )[Criminal	   Law	   of	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	  China](promulgating	   by	   National	   People’s	   Congress,	   order	   No.	   83	   of	   the	   President	   of	   the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  effective	  on	  Oct	  1,	  1997),	  art	  217.(“	  Whoever,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  profits,	  commits	  any	  of	  the	  following	  acts	  of	  infringement	  on	  copyright	  shall,	   if	  the	  amount	   of	   illegal	   gains	   is	   relatively	   large,	   or	   if	   there	   are	   other	   serious	   circumstances,	   be	  sentenced	  to	   fixed-­‐term	  imprisonment	  of	  not	  more	  than	  three	  years	  or	  criminal	  detention	  and	  shall	   also,	  or	   shall	  only,	  be	   fined;	   if	   the	  amount	  of	   illegal	   gains	   is	  huge	  or	   if	   there	  are	  other	  especially	  serious	  circumstances,	  he	  shall	  be	  sentenced	  to	  fixed-­‐term	  imprisonment	  of	  not	   less	   than	   three	   years	   but	   not	   more	   than	   seven	   years	   and	   shall	   also	   be	   fined	   :(1)	  reproducing	   or	   distributing	   a	   written	   work,	   musical	   work,	   motion	   picture,	   television	  programme	  or	  other	  visual	  works,	  computer	  software	  or	  other	  works	  without	  permission	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner;…”)	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Supreme	   People’s	   Procuratorate	   on	   Issues	   Relating	   to	   Audio-­‐visual	   Products	  Involved	   in	   the	  Trial	  of	  Criminal	  Cases	  of	  Copyright	   Infringement:	   “Distribution	  of	  audio-­‐visual	  products	  via	  the	  Internet	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  original	  producer	  shall	  be	  deemed	  as	  "duplication	  and	  distribution"	  stipulated	  in	  Item	  3	  of	  Article	  217	  of	   the	  Criminal	   Law.”610	  And	   third,	   in	   2011,	   Supreme	  People's	   Court,	   the	   Supreme	  People's	  Procuratorate	  and	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Security	  clearly	   interpreted	   that	  distribution	   should	   include	   dissemination	   on	   an	   information	   network	   in	   art	   12	   of	  Notice	  of	  the Supreme	  People's	  Court,	  the	  Supreme	  People's	  Procuratorate	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Security	  on	  Issuing	  the	  Opinions	  on	  Several	  Issues	  concerning	  the	  Application	   of	   Law	   in	   Handling	   Intellectual	   Property	   Right	   Infringement	   Criminal	  Cases.611	  There’s	  no	  reason	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  applied	  different	  scope	  of	  “distribution”	  in	  deciding	  civil	  cases	  and	  criminal	  cases.	  As	  a	  result,	  based	  on	  these	  three	  criminal	  interpretations,	   it	  seems	  that	  distribution	  right	  should	  regulate	  digital	  distribution	  online	  (dissemination	  of	  works	  to	  the	  public	  on	  information	  networks).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  610	  Zuigao	  Renmin	  Fayuan	  Zuigao	  Renmin	  Jianchayuan	  Guanyu	  Banli	  Qinfan	  Zhuzuoquan	  Xingshi	  Anjianzhong	  Sheji	  Luyin	  Luxiang	  Zhipin	  Youguan	  Wentide	  Pifu	  (最高人民法院、最
高人民检察院关于办理侵犯著作权刑事案件中涉及录音录像制品有关问题的批复)[Reply	  of	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Procuratorate	  on	  Issues	  Relating	  to	  Audio-­‐visual	  Products	  Involved	  in	  the	  Trial	  of	  Criminal	  Cases	  of	  Copyright	  Infringement](promulgating	  by	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Procuratorate,	  effected	  on	  Oct	  15,	  2005).	  611Zuigao	  Renmin	  Fayuan	  Zuigao	  Renmin	  Jianchayuan	  Gonganbu	  Yinfa	  Guanyu	  Banli	  Qinfan	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Xingshi	  Anjian	  Shiyong	  Falv	  Ruogan	  Wentide	  Yijian(最高人民法院、最高
人民检察院、公安部印发《关于办理侵犯知识产权刑事案件适用法律若干问题的意见》的
通知)[Notice	  of	  the Supreme	  People's	  Court,	  the	  Supreme	  People's	  Procuratorate	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Security	  on	  Issuing	  the	  Opinions	  on	  Several	  Issues	  concerning	  the	  Application	  of	  Law	  in	  Handling	  Intellectual	  Property	  Right	  Infringement	  Criminal	  Cases](promulgating	  by	  	  the Supreme	  People's	  Court,	  the	  Supreme	  People's	  Procuratorate	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Security,	  effected	  on	  Jan	  11,	  2011),	  art	  12.(	  “Distribution”	  includes	  general	  distribution,	  wholesale,	  retail,	  dissemination	  on	  an	  information	  network,	  lease,	  exhibition	  and	  other	  activities.”)	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   And	  the	  third	  aspect	  is	  from	  administrative	  law	  area.	  Article	  2	  of	  Provisions	  on	  Administration	  of	  Web	  Publishing	  Services	  states:	  “web	  publishing	  services	  refer	  to	   activities	   of	   providing	   web	   publications	   to	   the	   public	   through	   information	  networks.”612	  According	   to	   this	   definition,	   web	   publishing	   almost	   have	   the	   same	  meaning	  as	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  to	  the	  public	  through	  information	  networks	  in	  China,	   the	  only	  difference	   is	   the	  objects	  here	   are	  web	  publications.	   So	  publication	  should	  include	  disseminate	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  Internet.	  	  Since	  publication	  is	  defined	  as	  “reproduction	  and	  distribution	  of	  works”	  as	  I	  mentioned	  above,	  it	  seems	  that	  distribution	  right	  should	  also	  include	  the	  dissemination	  of	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	   the	   Internet.	  All	   in	   all,	   based	  on	   these	   three	   aspects	  of	   reasons,	   some	   scholars	  concluded	  that	  the	  distribution	  right	  should	  regulate	  digital	  distribution.	  	   As	   to	   the	   scholars	   who	   do	   not	   agree	   that	   the	   distribution	   right	   should	  regulate	   digital	   distribution,	   especially	   based	   on	   Professor	   Wang	   Qian’s	   theory,	  there	  are	  also	  three	  reasons.613	  First,	  the	  scholars	  stated	  that	  copies	  refer	  to	  material	  objects	   that	   fixed	   the	  works.	   Since	   the	   key	   component	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   is	  transferring	   of	   ownership	   of	   copies,	   which	   are	   material	   objects,	   and	   the	  dissemination	   to	   the	   public	   via	   the	   Internet	   does	   not	   result	   in	   transferring	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  612	  Wangluo	  Chuban	  Fuwu	  Guanli	  Guiding(网络出版服务管理规定)	  [Provisions	  on	  Administration	  of	  Web	  Publishing	  Services,	  Pormulgating	  by	  General	  Administration	  of	  Press	  and	  Publication,	  Radio,	  Film	  and	  Television;	  Ministry	  of	  Industry	  and	  Information	  Technology]	  (effected	  on	  Mar	  10,2016),	  art	  2.	  (This	  provision	  replaced	  the	  old	  Interim	  Provisions	  on	  the	  Administration	  of	  Internet	  Publication	  (which	  was	  expired	  now).	  In	  the	  old	  provision,	  art	  5	  states	  that	  “The	  Internet	  publication	  as	  used	  in	  these	  provisions	  shall	  refer	  to	  the	  online	  communication	  acts	  of	  the	  Internet	  information	  service	  providers	  to,	  after	  selection	  and	  edition,	  publish	  the	  works	  produced	  by	  themselves	  or	  by	  others	  on	  the	  Internet	  or	  to	  send	  out	  the	  works	  via	  the	  Internet	  to	  the	  users	  for	  public	  browse,	  read,	  use	  or	  download.”)	  613	  See	  Wangqian,	  supra	  note	  473,	  at	  67-­‐96.	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ownership	  of	  copies,	  the	  distribution	  right	  should	  not	  regulate	  the	  dissemination	  to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  Internet.	  Second,	  it’s	  illogical	  if	  the	  distribution	  right	  can	  regulate	  the	  dissemination	  of	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  Internet,	  because	  such	  act	  should	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	  from	  Art	  10(12)	  of	  Copyright	   Law.	   Art	   10	   of	   Copyright	   Law	   granted	   copyright	   owners	   17	   different	  kinds	  of	  exclusive	  rights,	  which	  allow	  copyright	  owner	  to	  pretend	  others	  act	  these	  17	  kinds	  of	  acts	  without	  authorizations.	  Based	  on	  the	  legislative	  logic	  and	  a	  common	  sense	   in	   interpreting	   laws,	   it’s	   reasonable	   that	   different	   kinds	   of	   exclusive	   rights	  should	  regulate	  different	  kinds	  of	  actions.	  It’s	  illogical	  to	  grant	  copyright	  owners	  an	  exclusive	   right,	   but	   another	   exclusive	   right	   can	   also	   control	   parts	   of	   the	   control	  range	   of	   this	   right.	   And	   if	   it	   is	   so,	   the	   right	   is	   not	   exclusive.	   Third,	   the	   judicial	  decisions	  of	  courts	   in	  China	  can	  also	  support	  that	  the	  distribution	  right	  should	  not	  be	  used	   to	   regulate	   the	  dissemination	  of	  works	   to	   the	  public	   via	   the	   Internet.	   For	  instance,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Huaxia	   Films	   Distribution	   Co.	   v.	   Hunan	   Internet	  Communication	   Ltd., 614 	  the	   plaintiff	   Huaxia	   Films	   legally	   being	   authorized	   to	  distribute	  the	  film	  “The	  Terminator	  3”	  to	  the	  public	  from	  cinemas	  in	  China.	  However,	  the	  defendant	  uploaded	  this	  film	  to	  its	  own	  website	  and	  enable	  users	  to	  download	  it	  by	  paying	  money	  without	  Huaxia’s	  authorizations.	  The	  plaintiff	  sued	  the	  defendant	  for	   infringing	   its	   exclusive	   right	   of	   distribution	   of	   the	   film.	   The	   court	   held	   for	   the	  defendant,	   because	   the	   act	   of	   disseminating	   the	   film	   to	  users	   for	  downloading	   via	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  614	  Huaxia	  Dianying	  Faxing	  Youxian	  Zeren	  Gongsi	  Su	  Beijing	  Huawang	  Huitong	  Jishu	  Fuwu	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  He	  Hunan	  Zaixian	  Wangluo	  Chuanbo	  Youxian	  Gongsi(华夏电影发行有限责
任公司	  诉北京华网汇通技术服务有限公司和湖南在线网络传播有限公司)[	  Huaxia	  Film	  Distribution	  Co.	  Ltd.	  v.	  Beijing	  Huawang	  Network	  Tech.	  Ltd.](Beijing	  Chaoyang	  Dist.	  People’s	  Ct.	  	  June	  10,2004).	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the	   Internet	  could	  not	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  plaintiff’s	  exclusive	  right	  of	  distributing	  the	  film	  from	  theatres.	  The	  plaintiff	  cannot	  sue	  for	  acts	  that	  cannot	  be	  regulated	  by	  his	   exclusive	   right.	   	   The	   second	   case	   is	   Beijing	   Yuanquan	   IP	   Agency	   Company	   v.	  Baidu.com.615	  The	  plaintiff	  has	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  authorize	  ISPs	  to	  provide	  some	  music	   recordings	   to	   the	   public	   via	   the	   Internet	   in	   the	   main	   land	   of	   China.	   The	  defendant	   runs	   a	  music	  website	   that	   enables	   users	   to	   audit	   and	   download	  music	  recordings,	  and	  the	  defendant	  has	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  distribute	  the	  same	  music	  in	  the	   main	   land	   of	   China.	   The	   plaintiffs	   sued	   for	   infringing	   his	   exclusive	   right	   of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	  But	  the	  defendant	  argued	  that	  his	  exclusive	  distribution	   right	   ought	   to	   authorize	   he	   legally	   provide	   those	  music	   recordings	   to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  Internet.	  The	  court	  disagreed	  and	  ruled	  that	  the	  distribution	  right	  cannot	  be	  extended	  to	  regulate	  parts	  of	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	  The	   reason	  provided	  by	   the	   courts	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   second	  reason	  of	   scholars	   in	   supporting	   that	   the	  distribution	   right	   cannot	   regulate	  digital	  distribution.	  First,	  the	  courts	  stated	  provide	  the	  definitions	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  and	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	   information	   networks	   that	   provided	   in	   the	  Copyright	  Law.	  And	  then	  the	  courts	  stated:”	  As	  far	  as	  the	  logical	  relationship	  of	  legal	  norms,	   since	   the	  Copyright	  Law	  regulate	   copyright	  owners’	   exclusive	   rights	   in	   the	  way	  of	  listing,	  it	  means	  that	  these	  rights	  are	  independent	  from	  each	  other	  and	  there	  should	  be	  no	  coincident	  points	  or	  intersection	  area	  among	  them.	  Further	  according	  to	   the	   literary	   content	   of	   legal	   norms,	   the	   distribution	   right	   is	   copyright	   owners’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  615	  Beijing	  Yuanquan	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Daili	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  Su	  Baidu	  Gongsi	  He	  Shanghai	  Shuzi	  Shiji	  Wangluo	  Gongsi(北京源泉知识产权代理有限公司诉百度公司和上海数字世纪网
络公司)[	  Beijing	  R2G.net	  v.	  Baidu	  Network	  Co.	  Ltd.]	  (Shanghai	  1st	  Interm.	  People’s	  Ct.	  	  Jun	  25,	  2010).	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right	  to	  transfer	  ownership	  of	  copies,	  but	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	   is	   copyright	   owners’	   right	   to	   enable	   users	   to	   obtain	  works	   in	   a	   way	   of	  interactive	   communication.	   It’s	   clear	   that	   to	   copyright	   owners,	   the	   emphasis	   and	  scope	   of	   these	   two	   rights	   are	   different.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	  information	   networks	   should	   be	   deemed	   independently	   from	   the	   right	   of	  distribution.”	  The	  court	  provided	  a	  real	  convictive	  reason	  that	  the	  distribution	  right	  should	  not	  regulate	  the	  act	  of	  dissemination	  of	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  Internet.	  	  
c. A	  proposal	  for	  China	  	   In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  distribution	  right	  should	  regulate	  the	  act	  of	  dissemination	  of	  works	  to	  the	  public	  via	   the	  Internet,	  but	  with	  certain	   limitations.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   extending	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   is	   an	  international	   trend	   of	   the	   world.	   There’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   U.S.	   stably	   use	   the	  distribution	  right	  to	  regulate	  digital	  distribution.	  What’s	  impressing	  is	  that	  the	  E.U.,	  which	  also	  provide	  a	  new	  exclusive	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  also	  began	  to	  extend	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  (UsedSoft	  case).	  They	  are	  the	  leaders	  in	  IP	  laws,	  and	  they	  can	  lead	  the	  trend	  of	  amending	  IP	  laws.	  Since	  U.S.	  and	  EU	  are	  doing	  so,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  extending	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  is	  imperative.	  In	  order	  to	   face	   the	   challenges	  may	   be	   brought	   by	   them,	   China	   should	   follow	   this	   existing	  trend	  to	  enable	  the	  distribution	  right	  to	  regulate	  digital	  distribution	  online.	  	  Second	  from	   an	   economic	   point	   of	   view,	   more	   and	   more	   copies	   of	   publications	   are	  disseminated	   to	   the	   public	   via	   the	   Internet.	   For	   instance,	   people	   are	   able	   to	  subscribe	  digital	  version	  of	  newspaper,	  magazines,	  or	  purchase	  computer	  software	  online.	   It’s	   a	   irreversible	   trend	   of	   new	   economic.	   It’s	   reasonable	   to	   repeal	   the	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requirement	  that	  objects	  of	  distribution	  have	  to	  be	  in	  tangible	  forms.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  the	   legislators	   of	   Copyright	   Law	   draft	   should	   also	   agree	   that	   the	   object	   of	  distribution	  should	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  tangible	  forms	  since	  they	  did	  not	  change	  their	  statement—	   they	   did	   not	   add	   “in	   tangible	   forms”	   in	   limiting	   the	   objects	   of	  distribution.616	  	  	   Although	   I	   think	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   should	   be	   extended,	  there’s	  definitely	  should	  be	  limitations,	  or	  otherwise	  will	  cause	  conflicts	  of	  the	  scope	  between	   the	   distribution	   right	   and	   the	   right	   of	   dissemination	   on	   information	  networks.	   As	   I	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   key	   component	   of	   the	   distribution	   right	   is	  actually	   “transfer	   of	   ownership,”	   this	   component	   should	   remain	   its	   significant	  position	  whether	  extend	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  or	  not.	  So,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  these	  two	  rights,	  it’s	  effective	  to	  estimate	  actors’	  intention.	  If	  actors	   intend	  to	  transfer	  ownerships	  of	  copies	  of	  works,	   the	  related	  actions	  online	  should	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  distribution	  right.	  If	  not,	  the	  acts	  should	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks.	   	  Then	  how	  to	  estimate	  actors’	  intention?	  In	  my	  opinion,	  if	  a	  person	  uploaded	  a	  work	  on	  the	  Internet,	  if	  others	  can	  enjoy	   the	   work	   online	   but	   cannot	   download	   it,	   such	   act	   only	   constitutes	  dissemination	  on	  information	  networks	  but	  not	  digital	  distribution.	  If	  users	  can	  not	  only	  enjoy	  the	  work	  online	  but	  also	  download	  it	  for	  free,	  the	  downloading	  act	  can	  be	  deemed	  as	  the	  actor’s	  donation,	  so	  such	  act	  should	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  distribution	  right.	   If	   users	   only	   can	   enjoy	   or	   download	   the	  work	   by	   paying	   certain	   fees,	   enjoy	  online	  with	  fees	  can	  be	  deemed	  as	  an	  act	  of	  rental	  and	  download	  with	  fees	  is	  an	  act	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  616	  Draft	  of	  Copyright	  Law,	  supra	  note	  466,	  art	  13(2).	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of	   sale,	   as	   a	   result,	   there’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   such	   acts	   should	   be	   regulated	   by	   the	  distribution	  right.	  	   In	  conclusion,	  I	  will	  suggest	  3	  points	  in	  this	  proposal	  of	  China:	  (1)	  Do	  not	  add	  “in	   tangible	   forms”	  requirement	   in	   limiting	  “original	  copies	  or	  reproduced	  copies.”	  (2)Extend	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  to	  regulate	  digital	  distribution	  online.	  (3)	   At	   the	   mean	   time,	   limit	   (2)	   by	   estimating	   whether	   the	   actor’s	   intention	   is	   to	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	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Chapter	  4	  :	  Intermediaries’	  Potential	  Defense	  	  
I. Exhaustion	  Doctrine	  (First	  Sale	  Doctrine)	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  legislative	  purpose	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Law	  (whether	  it’s	   national	   copyright	   law	   or	   international	   agreement),	   is	   to	   reach	   “a	   balance	  between	  the	  artist’s	  right	  to	  control	  his	  work…	  and	  the	  public’s	  need	  for	  access…”617	  Therefore	  the	  Copyright	   law	  not	  only	  grants	  copyright	  owners	  exclusive	  rights	  but	  also	   adds	   a	   series	   of	   exceptions	   and	   limitations	   on	   their	   exclusive	   rights.	   The	  exhaustion	   doctrine	   is	   one	   of	   these	   limitations	   limiting	   copyright	   owner’s	  distribution	   right.	   	   It	   is	   used	   to	   balance	   copyright	   owners’	   interests	   in	  monopoly	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  their	  copyrighted	  works	  and	  consumers’	  interests	  in	  able	  to	  sell	  their	  property.	  	  	   Neither	   the	   Berne	   Convention	   nor	   the	   Rome	   Convention	   reflects	   the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	   in	   their	   content.	  Article	   6	   of	  TRIPs	  mentioned	   the	   exhaustion	  doctrine,	  but	  left	  it	  open	  without	  particular	  regulation.	  Accordingly,	  the	  signatories	  are	  free	  to	  regulate	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine.618	  WCT	  uses	  Art	  6(2)	  to	  limit	  the	  right	  of	   distribution:	   “Nothing	   in	   this	   Treaty	   shall	   affect	   the	   freedom	   of	   Contracting	  Parties	  to	  determine	  the	  conditions,	  if	  any,	  under	  which	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  right	  in	  paragraph	  (1)[right	  of	  distribution]	  applies	  after	  the	  first	  sale	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	  the	  original	  or	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  work	  with	  the	  authorization	  of	  the	  author.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  617	  Stewart	  v.	  Abend,	  495	  U.S.	  207,	  228	  (1990).	  618	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (Marrakesh,	  Morocco,	  15	  April	  1994),	  Marrakesh	  Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  Annex	  1C,	  1869	  U.N.T.S.	  299,	  33	  I.L.M.	  1197	  (1994)	  [hereinafter	  TRIPS	  Agreement],	  art.	  6.	  (“For	  the	  purposes	  of	  dispute	  settlement	  under	  this	  Agreement,	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Articles	  3	  and	  4	  nothing	  in	  this	  Agreement	  shall	  be	  used	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights.”)	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This	  Art	  6(2)	  provides	  exhaustion	  to	  the	  first	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	  the	  original	  copy	  or	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  original	  work	  with	  the	  authorization	  of	  the	  author.619	  Countries	  all	  over	  the	  world	  provide	  similar	  statutes	  reflecting	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  to	  protect	   consumers’	  property	   right,	  which	  allow	   them	   to	  alienate	   their	  property	  legally.	   For	   instance,	   the	   U.S.	   granted	   the	   owner	   of	   a	   copy	   to	   resell	   or	   otherwise	  dispose	  of	  the	  possession	  of	  his	  copy	  by	  codifying	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine.620	  Similarly,	  Japan	   states	   that	   the	   exclusive	   right	   to	   offer	   the	   author’s	   work	   to	   the	   public	   by	  transfer	   of	   ownerships	   shall	   not	   apply	   in	   the	   case	   of	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   of	   the	  original	  or	  copies	  of	  a	  work	  with	  authorizations	  by	   the	  right	  holder	  of	   the	  right	  of	  transfer	  of	  ownership.621	  	  	   This	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  works	  well	  and	  efficiently	  for	  many	  years,	  however	  in	   recent	   decades,	   as	   I	   mentioned	   in	   last	   chapter	   (the	   section	   of	   the	   right	   of	  distribution),	   forms	   of	   distribution	   of	   copyrighted	   works	   has	   transited	   from	   the	  delivery	   of	   tangible	   copies	   to	   the	   transmission	   of	   data	   through	   the	   Internet.	   For	  example,	   Amazon	   now	   sells	   e-­‐books	   in	   a	   cheaper	   price	   than	   hardbacks,	   and	   the	  development	   of	   Apple’s	   iTunes	   service	   that	   allow	   downloading	   music	   cause	   the	  dropping	  of	  CD	  sales.	  People	  are	  getting	  used	   to	  pay	   for	  downloading	  copyrighted	  works	  via	  the	  Internet.	  Under	  such	  circumstance,	  do	  people	  have	  the	  right	  to	  resell	  their	   lawfully	   obtained	   digital	   copies	   of	   copyrighted	   works	   under	   the	   exhaustion	  doctrine?	  Furthermore,	  with	  the	  development	  of	   the	  cloud	  technology,	  people	  also	  can	  use	  software	  via	  the	  Internet	  to	  complete	  their	  project	  without	  downloading	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  619	  Ginsburg	  &	  Treppoz,	  supra	  note	  492,	  at	  383.	  620	  17	  U.S.C.	  §106(a).	  621	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  190,	  §26	  bis	  (2).	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software.	  So,	   could	   the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  be	  applied	   into	   the	  digital	  world?	  This	  dissertation	   will	   analyze	   the	   different	   countries’	   attitude	   toward	   these	   issues	   in	  applying	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  or	  not.	  There’s	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  digital	  world	  had	  already	   changed	   the	   distribution	   of	   copyright	   works’	   medium,	   its	   market	   and	   its	  business	  model.	  This	  dissertation	  will	  also	  analyze	  how	  China	  deal	  with	  these	  issues	  and	  provide	  a	  reasonable	  proposal	  based	  on	  former	  analysis.	  	  
i. The U.S. Part—The First Sale Doctrine 	   The	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   is	   the	   codification	   of	   the	   common	   law	   principle	   of	  copyright	   exhaustion	   doctrine.	   It	   is	   designed	   to	   reconcile	   the	   restrictions	   of	  copyright	   law	   with	   property	   law	   goals	   of	   avoiding	   restraints	   on	   alienation.622	  	  Restraints	  on	  alienation	  are	   inconsistent	  with	   the	   “essential	   incidents	  of	  a	   right	  of	  general	   property	   in	   movables,	   and	   …	   obnoxious	   to	   public	   policy,	   which	   is	   best	  subserved	  by	  great	  freedom	  of	  traffic	  in	  such	  things	  as	  pass	  from	  hand	  to	  hand.”623	  The	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   can	   be	   deemed	   as	   American	   copyright	   law’s	   solutions	   to	  protect	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  goods	  in	  the	  stream	  of	  commerce.624	  	   The	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court	   adopted	   the	   concept	   of	   exhaustion	   firstly	   the	   in	  Bobbs-­‐Merril	  Co.	  v.	  Straus	  in	  1908.625	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  plaintiff	  printed	  a	  notice	  that	  required	  the	  dealers	  to	  sell	  the	  book	  at	  a	  price	  no	  less	  than	  one	  dollar.	  Selling	  a	  book	  less	   than	  one	  dollar	  will	  be	   treated	  as	  an	   infringement	  of	   the	   copyright.	  However,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  622	  Brian	  W,	  Carver,	  Why	  License	  Agreements	  Do	  Not	  Control	  Copy	  Ownership:	  First	  Sales	  and	  
Essential	  Copies,	  25	  BERKELEY	  TECH.	  L.J.	  1887,	  1890	  (2010).	  623	  John	  D.	  Park	  &	  Sons	  Co.	  v.	  Hartman,	  153	  F.	  24,39	  (6th	  Cir.	  1907).	  624	  See	  Aaron	  Perzanowski	  &	  Jason	  Schultz,	  Digital	  Exhaustion,58	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  889,	  911	  (2011).	  625	  Bobbs-­‐Merril	  Co.	  v.	  Straus,	  210	  U.S.	  339	  (1908).	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the	  defendants	   sold	   the	  copies	  of	   the	  book	  below	  one	  dollar.	  The	  plaintiff	   claimed	  that	   the	   defendant	   violate	   its	   “sole	   right	   and	   liberty	   of	  …vending.”626	  The	   plaintiff	  further	  argued	  that	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  granted	  copyright	  owners	  the	  “whole	  field	  of	  the	   right	   of	   exclusive	   sale,”	   which	   means	   that	   a	   publisher	   could	   withhold	   copies	  from	  the	  market	  or	  sell	  copies	  conditionally.627However	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  rejected	  that	   a	   copyright	  owner	   can	   continue	   to	   control	   subsequent	   resale	  of	   copies	  under	  the	  right	  to	  vend	  by	  declaring	  conditions	  on	  its	  initial	  sale.628	  Once	  the	  plaintiff	  sold	  copies	  “in	  quantities	  and	  at	  a	  price	  satisfactory	  to	  it,	  it	  exercised	  the	  right	  to	  vend,”	  and	   exhausted	   the	   right	   to	   vend	   concerning	   the	   particular	   copies	   sold.629	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  once	  the	  first	  sale	  occurred,	  the	  copyright	  owner	  cannot	  apply	   copyright	   law	   to	   impose	   limits	   on	   future	   sale.630	  Congress	   embraced	   the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Bobb-­‐Merril	  case,	  and	  codified	  this	  doctrine	  in	  §41	  of	  the	  1909	  Copyright	  Act	  and	  recodified	  it	  in	  1947	  without	  alteration:	  “nothing	  in	  this	  Act	   shall	   be	   deemed	   to	   forbid,	   prevent,	   or	   restrict	   the	   transfer	   of	   any	   copy	   of	   a	  copyrighted	  work	  the	  possession	  of	  which	  has	  been	  lawfully	  obtained.”631	  In	  1976,	  Congress	   amended	   §109(a)	   which	   embodied	   the	   current	   version	   of	   first	   sale	  doctrine.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  626	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1790,	  ch.	  15,§1,	  1	  Stat.	  124	  (amended	  1802).	  627	  Bobbs	  case,	  supra	  note	  625	  ,	  at	  351.	  628	  Id,	  at	  350-­‐351.	  629	  Id,	  at	  351.	  630	  Id.	  (But	  contractual	  obligation	  may	  support	  restrictions	  on	  future	  sales.)	  631	  H.R.	  REP.	  No.	  98-­‐987,	  at	  2.	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1909,	  ch.	  320,	  §1,	  17	  U.S.C.	  §41	  (1946)(amended	  147).	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A. What	  is	  the	  First	  Sale	  Doctrine?	  	   §109(a)	   limits	   the	  copyright	  owner’s	  control	  over	  copies	  of	   the	  work	  after	  the	   first	   sale	   or	   transfer	   by	   stating:	   “Notwithstanding	   the	   provisions	   of	   section	  106(3),	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  particular	  copy	  or	  phonorecord	  lawfully	  made	  under	  this	  title,	  or	   any	   person	   authorized	   by	   such	   owner,	   is	   entitled,	  without	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  copyright	   owner,	   to	   sell	   or	   otherwise	   dispose	   of	   the	   possession	   of	   that	   copy	   or	  phonorecord…”632	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  once	  a	  legal	  copy	  of	  an	  expression	  is	  sold,	  the	  copyright	  owner,	  with	  limited	  exceptions,	  cannot	  control	  how	  the	  copy	  is	  later	  used.	  And	  the	  owner	  of	  that	  copy	  could	  then	  dispose	  of	  it	  as	  he	  sees	  fit.633	  In	  order	  to	  use	  the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   to	   defeat	   a	   copyright	   infringement,	   there	   are	   four	  requirements:	   (1)	   the	  copy	  at	   issue	  was	   lawfully	  produced	  with	   the	  permission	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner;	  (2)	  the	  copy	  left	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  under	  his	  authority;	  (3)	  the	  defendant	  was	  a	  lawful	  owner	  of	  the	  copy	  in	  questions;	  (4)	  the	  defendant	   distributed	   the	   particular	   copy	   that	   he	   acquired.634	  From	   the	   second	  requirement,	  we	   know	   the	   transfer	   of	   the	   copy	   could	   happen	   via	   lawfully	   sale,	   or	  donation.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  known	  that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  does	  not	  apply	  when	  there’s	  no	  actual	  transferring	  of	  ownership	  but	  only	  rental,	  lease	  or	  loan.	  This	  requirement	  is	  quite	  important	  when	  discuss	  the	  next	  part—	  whether	  using	  software	  from	  cloud	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  632	  17	  U.S.C.	  §109(a).	  633	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  328.	  634	  See	  2	  Nimmer	  on	  Copyright,	  supra	  note	  50,	  §8.12(B)(1)(a);	  see	  also	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  328.	  (Prof.	  Leaffer	  stated	  that	  the	  4th	  requirement	  as:	  “the	  defendant’s	  use	  implicates	  the	  distribution	  right	  only,	  not	  the	  reproduction	  right.”	  Although	  Prof.	  Leaffer	  did	  not	  specifically	  pointed	  out	  that	  only	  the	  “particular”	  copy	  could	  be	  distributed,	  	  from	  his	  latter	  discussion	  of	  whether	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  should	  be	  extended	  to	  digital	  transmission,	  he	  clearly	  pointed	  that	  since	  digital	  transmission	  will	  result	  in	  a	  reproduction	  of	  the	  work,	  it	  will	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  defended	  by	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine.	  )	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should	  be	  deemed	  as	  a	  licensed	  activity	  or	  a	  result	  from	  sale.	  It’s	  clear,	  if	  it’s	  an	  act	  of	  licenses,	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	  will	  not	  be	  applied	  at	  all.	   	   	  Prof.	  Leaffer	  stated	   that	  because	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine,	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  copy	  can	  “dispose	  of	  it	  physically”	  by	  resell,	  rent,	  donate,	  rebind	  or	  destroy.635	  	   As	  for	  the	  issue	  of	  jurisdiction,	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  recently	  adopted	  the	  application	  of	  international	  exhaustion	  for	  works	  firstly	  sold	  outside	  the	  U.S.	  In	  the	  Kirtsaeng	  v.	   John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	   Inc	  case,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  copies	  that	  lawfully	  made	  outside	  the	  U.S.	  may	  be	  imported	  into	  the	  U.S.	  without	  infringing	  the	  copyright	   owner’s	   copyright.	   The	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   should	   be	   equally	   applied	   to	  goods	  lawfully	  manufactured	  outside	  the	  U.S..	  636 
B. Is	  it	  License	  or	  Sale?	  	   According	  to	  §106(3),	  a	  mere	  licensee	  cannot	  be	  protected	  by	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine,	  which	  means	  he	  cannot	  sell,	  rent,	  lease,	  give	  away	  or	  otherwise	  distribute	  the	   work.	   A	   licensee	   will	   infringe	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	   right	   in	  §106(3).637	  For	  instance,	   a	   person	   who	   has	   rented	   a	   copy	   of	   a	   movie	   from	   the	   copyright	   owner	  would	   have	   no	   right	   to	   rent	   it	   to	   someone	   else	   without	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	  permission.638	  So,	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   there’s	   a	   license	   or	   sale	   is	   essential	   for	  determining	   whether	   the	   first	   doctrine	   should	   be	   applied.	   In	   the	   digital	   world,	  copyright	   owners	   often	   use	   restrict	   methods,	   such	   as	   Digital	   Right	   Management	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  635	  Id.	  636	  Kirtsaeng	  v.	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  Inc.,	  133	  S.	  Ct	  1351	  (2013).	  637	  17	  U.S.C.§106(3).(	  The	  copyright	  owner	  has	  the	  right	  or	  the	  right	  to	  authorized	  “to	  distribute	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  to	  the	  public	  by	  sale	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership,	  or	  by	  rental,	  lease,	  or	  lending.”)	  638	  H.R.	  REP.	  No.	  94-­‐1476,	  at	  80	  (1976).	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(DRM)	  software,	  End	  User	  License	  Agreements	  (EULAs),639	  to	  extend	  their	  exclusive	  right	   in	  order	   to	  control	   the	  digital	  content.	  Under	   this	  circumstance,	   the	   first	  sale	  doctrine	   often	   times	   cannot	   be	   applied	   to	   copyrighted	  works	   embodied	   in	   digital,	  since	  copyright	  owners	  always	  claimed	  that	  there’s	  no	  sold	  but	  only	  license	  to	  users.	  If	  there’s	  no	  limitation	  on	  these	  “license	  agreement”	  which	  allow	  copyright	  owner	  to	  control	  users’	  use	  of	  the	  digital	  content,	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  delicate	  balance	  which	  is	   required	   by	   the	   Copyright	   Act.640	  According	   to	   Prof.	   Nimmer,	   “the	   balance	   us	  disrupted	  when	  state	  [contract]	   law	  is	  permitted	  to	  enlarge	  the	  rights	  of	  copyright	  proprietor	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   copyright	   users.”641	  	   There’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   Congress	  should	   provide	   guidelines	   to	   prevent	   copyright	   owners	   from	   abusing	   the	   license	  tools	  to	  control	  users’	  use	  of	  digital	  works.	  However,	  there’s	  no	  such	  guideline	  to	  be	  used	  now.	  As	  a	  result,	  nowadays,	  copyright	  owners	  and	  users	  both	  need	  to	  find	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  proposed	  guideline	  from	  the	  court’s	  decision	  relevant	  to	  this	  issue.	  There	  are	  three	  conductive	  cases	  that	  implicate	  the	  9th	  Circuit’s	  judgment	  over	  this	  issue.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  639	  Digital	  Right	  Management(DRM),	  WIKIPEDIA.	  ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management	  (“various	  access	  control	  technologies	  that	  are	  used	  to	  restrict	  usage	  of	  proprietary	  hardware	  and	  copyrighted	  works”)	  End	  User	  License	  Agreement	  (EULAs),	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at:	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-­‐user_license_agreement	  (“an	  end-­‐user	  license	  agreement	  (EULA)	  or	  software	  license	  agreement	  is	  the	  contract	  between	  the	  licensor	  and	  purchaser,	  establishing	  the	  purchaser's	  right	  to	  use	  the	  software.	  The	  license	  may	  define	  ways	  under	  which	  the	  copy	  can	  be	  used,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  automatic	  rights	  of	  the	  buyer	  including	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  and	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  117	  (freedom	  to	  use,	  archive,	  re-­‐sale,	  and	  backup).”	  It	  is	  also	  known	  as	  click-­‐wrap	  or	  shrink-­‐wrap	  licensing.	  EULAs	  are	  terms	  and	  conditions	  that	  users	  must	  accept	  to	  use	  software,	  such	  as	  iTune,	  or	  make	  purchases	  on	  a	  cloud	  platform	  such	  as	  Amazon.com.	  )	  640	  See	  Stewart	  v.	  Abend,	  495	  U.S.	  207,	  228	  (1990).(“The	  Copyright	  Act	  creates	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  artist’s	  right	  to	  control	  the	  work	  during	  the	  term	  of	  the	  copyright	  protection	  and	  the	  public’s	  need	  for	  access	  to	  creative	  works.”)	  641	  David	  Nimmer	  et	  al.,	  The	  Metamorphosis	  of	  Contract	  into	  Expand,	  87	  CALIF.	  L.	  REV.	  17,	  19	  (1999).	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   The	   First	   case	   is	   F.B.T.	   v.	   Aftermath	   Records.642	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   plaintiff	  signed	  an	  agreement	  that	  granted	  the	  defendant	  the	  right	  to	  distribute	  recordings	  of	  an	  artist	  by	  paying	  certain	  royalties	  of	  the	  retail	  price	  of	  copies	  of	  the	  artist’s	  records	  sold	   (Record	   Sold	   provision).	   And	   by	   paying	   net	   revenue	   that	   the	   defendant	  obtained	  by	  licensing	  out	  the	  use	  of	  the	  artist’s	  master	  recordings	  (Master	  Licensed	  provision).	  The	  defendant	   licensed	  various	   third	  parties	   the	  right	   to	  distribute	   the	  artist’s	   records	   via	   the	   Internet.	   The	   plaintiff	   claimed	   that	   the	   royalties	   for	   the	  artist’s	   digital	   downloads	   and	   mastertones	   should	   be	   calculated	   pursuant	   to	   the	  “Master	   Licensed”	   provision	   of	   the	   agreement,	   but	   the	   defendant	   argued	   that	   the	  royalties	  should	  be	  calculated	  pursuant	  to	  the	  “Record	  Sold”	  provision.	  The	  District	  court	   agreed	   with	   the	   defendant,	   however,	   the	   9th	   Circuit	   reversed	   the	   district	  court’s	   decision	   and	   concluded	   that	   the	   defendant’s	   agreements	   permitting	   third	  parties	   to	  use	   its	  sound	  recordings	   to	  produce	  and	  sell	  permanent	  downloads	  and	  mastertones	  were	  licenses	  rather	  than	  sales.	  	  By	  referring	  §114,	  §115	  and	  the	  first	  sale	   doctrine,	   the	  9th	   Circuit	   provided	   its	   reasons.643	  The	  9th	   Circuit	   clarified	   the	  definition	  of	   the	   term	  sale	  and	   license,	  644	  and	  concluded	   that	   there’s	  no	  sale	  since	  the	  download	  distributors	  did	  not	  obtain	  title	  to	  the	  digital	  files,	  and	  the	  defendant	  remained	  the	  ownership	  of	   those	  digital	   files.	  And	  since	   the	  defendant	   transferred	  the	   copy	   of	   copyrighted	  material,	   retained	   title	   and	   limited	   the	   use	   to	   which	   the	  material	  may	  be	  put,	   and	  was	   compensated	  periodically	  based	  on	   the	   transferee’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  642	  F.B.T.	  Prods.,	  LLC	  v.	  Aftermath	  Records,	  621	  F.	  3d	  958	  (	  9th	  Cir.	  2010).	  643	  Id,	  at	  965-­‐67.	  644	  Id,	  at	  965.	  (	  “A	  sale	  of	  a	  work	  may	  either	  be	  transfer	  in	  title	  of	  an	  individual	  copy	  of	  a	  work,	  or	  a	  sale	  of	  all	  exclusive	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  in	  a	  work.”)	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exploitation	   of	   the	   material,	   the	   transaction	   should	   be	   a	   license.645	  As	   a	   result,	   it	  seems	  that	  digital	  music	  files	  that	  could	  be	  downloaded	  from	  iTunes,	  Sprint	  or	  other	  digital	   stores	   may	   be	   considered	   license	   from	   the	   music	   industry	   in	   regards	   to	  payments	  to	  artists	  and	  none	  transfer	  of	  title.	  Under	  this	  circumstance,	  it	  seems	  that	  copyright	   owners	   are	   able	   to	   take	   steps	   to	   limit	   and	   control	   the	  use	  of	   the	  digital	  music	  files	  by	  the	  users	  who	  lawfully	  downloaded	  them.	  	  	   Then,	   in	   the	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk,	   Inc	   case,	   the	  defendant	  purchased	   several	  used	   copies	   of	   the	   plaintiff’s	   software	   from	   the	   plaintiff’s	   direct	   customer.646	  However,	  its	  direct	  customer	  had	  made	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  destroy	  all	  copies	  of	  these	  used	  software.	  But	  eventually	  he	  broke	  the	  agreement	  and	  sold	  those	  softwares	  to	  the	  defendant.	  The	  defendant	  then	  resold	  these	  used	  software	  on	  ebay.	  The	  plaintiff	  claimed	  that	  it	  only	  licensed	  and	  never	  sold	  copies	  of	  its	  software	  since	  it	  put	  a	  “shrinkwrap”	  notice	  on	  the	  standard	  packaging.647	  The	  9th	  Circuit	  held	  that	  “a	  software	  user	   is	  a	   licensee	  rather	   than	  an	  owner	  of	  a	  copy	  where	   the	  copyright	  owner	  (1)	  specifies	  that	  the	  user	  is	  granted	  a	  license;	  (2)	  significantly	  restricts	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  645	  Id.	  646	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk,	  Inc.,	  621	  F.3d	  1102	  (9th	  Cir.	  2010).	  647	  Id,	  at	  1104-­‐05.	  (The	  “shrinkwrap”	  noticed	  that	  the	  “software	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  license	  agreement	  that	  appears	  during	  the	  installation	  process	  or	  is	  included	  in	  the	  package.”	  The	  standard	  license	  agreement	  accompanying	  the	  CDs	  contains	  several	  key	  terms:	  (a)	  “Autodesk	  retains	  title	  to	  all	  copies;”(b)	  “the	  customer	  has	  a	  nonexclusive	  and	  nontransferable	  license	  to	  use”	  the	  software;(c)	  “it	  imposes	  transfer	  restrictions,	  prohibiting	  customers	  from	  renting,	  leasing,	  or	  transferring	  the	  software	  without	  Autodesk’s	  prior	  consent	  and	  from	  electronically	  or	  physically	  transferring	  the	  software;”	  (d)	  “it	  imposes	  use	  restrictions—you	  may	  not	  (1)modidy….the	  software…	  (3)	  remove	  any	  proprietary	  notices,	  lables,	  or	  marks	  from	  the	  software…(4)	  use…	  the	  software	  outside	  of	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere;	  …(6)	  use	  the	  software	  for	  commercial	  or	  other	  revenue-­‐generating	  purposes	  if	  the	  software	  has	  been	  licensed	  or	  labeled	  for	  educational	  use	  only;”	  (e)	  “provides	  for	  license	  termination	  if	  the	  user	  copies	  the	  software	  without	  authorization	  …”(f)”the	  software	  is	  an	  upgrade..”)	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user's	  ability	  to	  transfer	  the	  software;	  and	  (3)	  imposes	  notable	  use	  restrictions.”648	  Since	   the	   plaintiff	   already	   specified	   the	   license	   requirement	   and	   imposes	  restrictions,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   the	   direct	   customer	   was	   a	   licensee	   rather	   than	   an	  “owner	  of	  a	  particular	  copy”	  of	  the	  software,	  as	  a	  result	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  could	  not	   apply	   and	   he	   was	   not	   entitled	   to	   resell	   the	   copies	   of	   the	   software.	   	   And	   the	  defendant	   did	   not	   receive	   title	   to	   the	   copies,	   and	   could	   not	   invoke	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	  either.	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  ruled	  that	  a	  purchaser	  of	  software	  bound	  by	  a	   restrictive	   license	   agreement	   could	  be	   a	   licensee	   (but	  not	   the	  owner	  of	   a	   copy),	  therefore	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine.	  However,	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  limited	  this	  holding	  to	  software	  applications	  and	  it	  will	  not	  apply	  to	  digital	  music	  files	  or	  other	  digital	  files.649	  	   Third,	   in	   the	   UMG	   Recordings,	   Inc.	   v.	   Augusto	   case,650	  the	   plaintiff	   mailed	  promo	   CDs	   to	   individuals	   such	   as	   music	   critics	   and	   radio	   disc	   jockeys	   without	  charges	   solely	   for	   marketing	   purposes.	  651	  The	   defendant	   was	   not	   one	   of	   those	  individuals,	  he	  obtained	  these	  promo	  CDs	  from	  various	  sources.	  Then	  the	  defendant	  sold	   the	  promo	  CDs	  at	  auction.	  The	  plaintiff	  sued	   for	   infringement	  of	  his	  exclusive	  right	  to	  distribute	  the	  CDs.	  The	  9th	  Circuit	  held	  that	  the	  act	  of	  mailing	  promo	  CDs	  to	  the	  recipients	  result	  in	  a	  sale	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine.	  The	  plaintiff’s	  distribution	   of	   promo	   CDs	   enable	   the	   recipient	   “to	   use	   or	   dispose	   of	   them	   in	   any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  648	  Id,	  at	  1111.	  649	  Id,	  footnote	  14.	  	  650	  UMG	  Recordings,	  Inc.	  v.	  Augusto,	  628	  F.3d	  1175	  (9th	  Cir.	  2011).	  651	  Id,	  at	  1177-­‐78.	  (	  The	  promo	  CDs	  asserted	  that	  the	  transaction	  is	  a	  license	  by	  labeling	  with	  a	  statement	  :	  “This	  CD	  is	  the	  property	  of	  the	  record	  company	  and	  is	  licensed	  to	  the	  intended	  recipient	  for	  personal	  use	  only.	  Acceptance	  of	  this	  CD	  shall	  constitute	  an	  agreement	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  license.	  Resale	  or	  transfer	  of	  possession	  is	  not	  allowed	  and	  may	  be	  punishable	  under	  federal	  and	  state	  laws,”	  or	  “	  Promotional	  use	  only,	  not	  for	  sale.”)	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manner	  they	  saw	  fit,”	  and	  the	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  enter	  a	  license	  agreement.652	  The	  9th	  Circuit	   provided	   two	   reasons	   for	   its	   conclusion.	   The	   first	   reason	   is	   “based	   on	   the	  nature”	   of	   the	   plaintiff’s	   distribution.	   Since	   the	   promo	   CDs	   are	   “dispatched	   to	   the	  recipients	  without	  any	   further	  prior	  arrangement	  as	   to	   those	  particular	  copies.”653	  Second,	   the	   plaintiff’s	   restrictions	   in	   the	   labels	   of	   the	   CDs	   did	   not	   establish	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  license	  agreement.	  The	  restriction	  statement	  stated	  that	  acceptance	  of	  the	   CD	   constitutes	   an	   agreement	   to	   a	   license	   and	   its	   restrictions,	   but	   such	  acceptance	   could	   be	   assumed	   if	   the	   recipients	   made	   no	   responses	   at	   all.654	  As	   a	  result,	  “without	  meaningful	  control	  or	  even	  knowledge	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  CDs	  after	  shipment,”	   the	   plaintiff’s	   transfer	   of	   possession	   to	   the	   recipients	   resulted	   in	   a	  transfer	  of	  title.655	  	   Based	   on	   these	   decisions,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   the	  9th	   Circuit	   provided	   its	   own	  guideline	  to	  decide	  whether	  a	  license	  or	  a	  sale	  exists:	  to	  accomplish	  a	  license,	  there	  are	  three	  requirements.	  (1)	  The	  copyright	  owners	  have	  to	  explicitly	  state	  that	  users	  are	   granted	   licenses	   and	   clearly	   demonstrate	   the	   use	   restrictions;	   (2)	   The	   users	  affirmatively	   and	   explicitly	   disclosed	   that	   they	   accept	   the	   license	   agreement	  provided	  by	  the	  copyright	  owners,	  implication	  of	  agreement	  could	  not	  be	  accepted	  as	   agree	  with	   the	   license;	   (3)	  The	   license	  agreement	  must	   specify	   that	   it	   limit	   the	  users’	   ability	   to	   transfer	   the	   copies.	   However,	   in	  my	   opinion,	   there’s	   still	   need	   of	  limitations	   toward	   these	   restrict	   licenses,	   otherwise	   copyright	   owners’	   abuse	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  652	  Id,	  at	  1180.	  653	  Id.	  (“The	  CDs	  are	  not	  numbered,	  and	  no	  attempt	  is	  made	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  where	  particular	  copies	  are	  or	  what	  use	  is	  made	  of	  them.”)	  654	  Id,	  at	  1182.	  655	  Id,	  at	  1182.	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such	  expanded	  right	  may	  occur	  soon.	  For	  instance,	  nowadays,	  copyright	  owners	  are	  using	   EULAs	   to	   reserve	   their	   right	   to	   suspend	   or	   terminate	   access	   to	   purchased	  content	  at	  any	  time	  they	  desired	  without	  notice.656	  All	  in	  all,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  Congress	  may	  firstly	  codify	  how	  to	  reach	  a	  license	  agreement	  between	  a	  copyright	  owner	  and	  a	  user	  into	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  and	  then	  add	  reasonable	  limitations	  on	  these	  licenses	  that	  expand	  copyright	  owners	  exclusive	  right.	  	  
C. Could	  the	  First	  Sale	  Doctrine	  Be	  Applied	  to	  the	  Digital	  World?	  	   As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   section	   of	   the	   right	   of	   distribution,	   the	   Internet	   and	  cloud	   computing	   technology	   are	   challenging	   the	   traditional	   business	   mode	   and	  market	  place	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Internet	  era.	  The	  traditional	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  developed	  in	  the	  old	  days	  when	  the	  objects	  are	  physical	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  works.	  But	  when	  the	   copyrighted	   works	   are	   being	   transferred	   through	   the	   Internet	   even	   without	  downloading,	  should	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  still	  being	  applied?	  
a. The	  ReDigi	  case	  and	  reasons	  for	  not	  extending	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  to	  the	  
digital	  transmission	  	  	  	   The	  Copyright	  Office	   and	   some	   scholars	  pointed	   that	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	  should	   not	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   digital	   world.	   The	   Copyright	   office	   noted	   that	   “The	  tangible	  nature	  of	  a	  copy	  is	  a	  defining	  element	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  and	  critical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  656	  APPLE	  ITUNES	  TERMS	  &	  CONDITIONS,	  http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-­‐services/itunes/us/terms.html	  	  (“Notwithstanding	  any	  other	  provision	  of	  this	  Agreement,	  Apple	  and	  its	  licensors	  reserve	  the	  right	  to	  change,	  suspend,	  remove,	  or	  disable	  access	  to	  any	  iTunes	  Products,	  content,	  or	  other	  materials	  comprising	  a	  part	  of	  the	  iTunes	  Service	  at	  any	  time	  without	  notice.”)(last	  visited	  Jun.	  28,	  2016)	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to	   its	   rationale.”657 	  The	   Department	   of	   Commerce	   Internet	   Policy	   Task	   Force	  supported	  the	  Copyright	  Office’s	  opinion	   in	   its	  White	  Paper	  on	  Remixes,	  First	  sale,	  and	   Statutory	   Damages	   in	   2016.658	  It	   concluded	   that	   the	   Copyright	   Office’s	   2001	  observation	  of	  extending	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  to	  digital	  transmissions	  is	  harmful	  to	  primary	   markets	   is	   still	   valid,	   since	   the	   technology	   to	   “effectively	   prevent	   the	  retention	  of	  copies	  after	  a	  transmission	  has	  not	  yet	  become	  a	  practical	  reality.”	  Prof.	  Leaffer	   also	   agreed	   that	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   should	   not	   be	   extended	   to	   digital	  transmission	  and	  supported	  the	  Copyright	  Office	  report.	  He	  provides	  the	  following	  reasons:	  (1)	  “the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  physical	  copies	  of	  the	  work;”	  (2)	  it	  “provides	  no	  defense	  to	  infringements	  of	  the	  reproduction	  right,”—“an	  Internet	  transmission	  results	  in	  a	  reproduction	  of	  the	  work;”(3)”physical	  copies	  degrade	  over	  time,	  whereas	  digital	  information	  does	  not;”(4)	  “works	  in	  digital	  form	  can	   be	   reproduced	   flawlessly	   and	   be	   disseminated	   globally	   at	   little	   cost	   and	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  657	  See	  U.S.	  COPYRIGHT	  OFFICE,	  DIGITAL	  MILLENNIUM	  COPYRIGHT	  ACT:	  SECTION	  104	  REPORT,	  EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  (2001),	  at	  82-­‐83.(“Physical	  copies	  of	  works	  degrade	  with	  time	  and	  use,	  making	  used	  copies	  less	  desirable	  than	  new	  ones.	  Digital	  information	  does	  not	  degrade,	  and	  can	  be	  reproduced	  perfectly	  on	  a	  recipient’s	  computer.	  The	  ‘used’	  copy	  is	  just	  as	  desirable	  as	  a	  new	  copy	  of	  the	  same	  work.	  Time,	  space,	  effort	  and	  cost	  no	  longer	  act	  as	  barriers	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  copies,	  since	  digital	  copies	  can	  be	  transmitted	  nearly	  instantaneously	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world	  with	  minimal	  effort	  and	  negligible	  cost.	  The	  need	  to	  transport	  physical	  copies	  of	  works,	  which	  acts	  as	  a	  natural	  brake	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  resales	  on	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	  market,	  no	  longer	  exists	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  digital	  transmissions…Additionally,	  unless	  a	  ‘forward-­‐and-­‐delete’	  technology	  is	  employed	  to	  automatically	  delete	  the	  sender’s	  copy,	  the	  deletion	  of	  a	  work	  requires	  an	  additional	  affirmative	  act	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  sender	  subsequent	  to	  the	  transmission.	  This	  act	  is	  difficult	  to	  prove	  or	  disprove,	  as	  is	  a	  person’s	  claim	  to	  have	  transmitted	  only	  a	  single	  copy,	  thereby	  raising	  complex	  evidentiary	  concerns.”	  )	  658	  The	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  Internet	  Policy	  Task	  Force,	  White	  Paper	  on	  Remixes,	  First	  
sale,	  and	  Statutory	  Damages—Copyright	  Policy,	  Creativity,	  and	  Innovation	  in	  the	  Digital	  
Economy,	  at	  65	  (2016),	  available	  at	  :	  http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf	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low	  visibility.”659	  And	   further,	   according	   to	   the	  ReDigi	   case,	   it	   is	  much	  clearer	   that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  could	  not	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  digital	  world.	   	  	   The	  court’s	  decision	   in	  the	  ReDigi	  case	  shows	  problems	  caused	  by	  applying	  the	  traditional	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  to	  new	  technology	  which	  challenged	  the	  traditional	  form	   of	   distribution	   and	   business	   modes.660 	  This	   decision	   extended	   copyright	  owners’	   exclusive	   control	   over	   digital	   copies	   of	   their	   copyrighted	   works	   without	  adding	   equivalent	   limitations	   on	   such	   extension.	   It	   also	   illustrated	   that	   the	  importance	  to	  amend	  the	  traditional	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  it	  to	  current	  digital	  world	  and	  new	  technologies.	  	   In	   the	   ReDigi	   case,	   after	   the	   users	   uploaded	   their	   legally	   purchased	  music	  files	  to	  the	  ReDigi’s	  “Cloud	  Locker,”	  they	  could	  offer	  to	  sale	  these	  music	  files	  to	  other	  users	   at	   a	   discounted	   price.661 	  Once	   the	   music	   files	   were	   sold,	   ReDigi	   use	   a	  technology	  called	  “forward-­‐and-­‐delete”	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  seller’s	  access	  to	  the	  files	  is	   terminated,	  and	  the	  new	  owner	  can	  store	  the	  files	   in	  their	  Cloud	  Locker,	  stream	  them,	  sell	  them,	  or	  download	  them	  to	  his	  personal	  device.662	  The	  District	  court	  held	  that	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   should	   not	   be	   applied	   when	   users	   resell	   copyrighted	  works	   via	   digital	   distribution,	   even	   if	   the	   technology	   of	   “forward-­‐and-­‐delete”	  software	  can	  ensure	  that	  the	  seller’s	  copy	  is	  deleted	  during	  the	  digital	   transaction.	  The	  district	  court	  provided	  two	  main	  reasons.	  First,	   the	  court	  emphasized	  that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  only	  protects	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  “particular”	  copy	  or	  phonorecord	  to	  distribute	   “that	   particular”	   copy	   or	   phonorecord.	   Nonetheless,	   based	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  659	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  331-­‐32.	  	  660	  Capitol	  Records	  v.	  ReDigi,	  supra	  note	  563.	  661	  Id,	  at	  645.	  662	  Id,	  at	  646.	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technology	   of	   ReDigi	   service,	   the	   owner	   could	   only	   distribute	   unlawful	  “reproductions	  of	   the	  copyrighted	  code	  embedded	   in	  new	  material	  objects,”	  which	  could	  not	  be	  “that	  particular”	  copy	  or	  phonorecord.663	  But	  the	  court	  further	  asserted	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  could	  not	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  digital	  world	  at	  all.	  It	   could	   still	   be	   used	   to	   protect	   digital	   works—a	   lawful	   owner’s	   sale	   of	   his	  “particular”	  phonorecord,	  “be	  it	  a	  computer	  hard	  disk,	  iPod,	  or	  other	  memory	  device	  onto	   which	   the	   file	   was	   originally	   downloaded.”664	  Second,	   the	   District	   court	   also	  rejected	   the	   defendant’s	   argument	   that	   the	   court	   should	   amend	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	   in	   order	   to	   construe	   the	  basic	   purpose	   of	   the	  Copyright	  Act.	   The	  District	  court	   reasoned	   that	   not	   only	   because	   the	   court	   is	   not	   authorized	   to	   do	   such	  amendment,	  which	  should	  be	  a	  legislative	  prerogative,	  but	  also	  the	  Copyright	  Office	  already	  noted	  that	  the	  justifications	  for	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  could	  not	  be	  imported	  into	  the	  digital	  domain.665	  	  	   It	   seems	   that	   the	   mainstream	   opinion	   of	   the	   U.S.	   perspective	   towards	   the	  issue	   of	   whether	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   should	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   digital	   world	   is	  negative.	   	  However,	  because	  of	   the	  rise	  of	  new	  technology	  and	  the	  Copyright	  Act’s	  requirement	  of	  delicate	  balance,	  more	  scholars	  are	  turning	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  should	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  digital	  world	  nowadays.	  I	  myself	  also	  support	  to	  extend	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  to	  the	  digital	  distribution,	  and	  will	  provide	  further	  discussion	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  663	  Id,	  at	  655.	  664	  Id,	  at	  656.	  665	  Id.	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b. But,	  Why	  Not?	  	   As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  more	  scholars	  are	  changing	  their	  attitude	  that	  it	  could.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  there	  are	  three	  basic	  reasons	  in	  supporting	  that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  should	  be	  applied.	  	   First,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  District	  court’s	  reasoning	  for	  its	  conclusion	  that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  could	  not	  be	  imported	  into	  the	  digital	  domain	  has	  a	  problematic	  logic.	  The	  District	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  can	  still	  be	  used	  to	  protect	  digital	  works	  under	  the	  requirement	  of	  “particular”	  copy	  or	  phonorecord,	  if	  a	  lawful	  owner	   of	   the	   copyrighted	   work	   transfer	   a	   computer	   hard	   disk,	   iPod	   or	   other	  memory	   device	  with	   the	   copyrighted	  work	   .	   Nonetheless,	   the	   district	   ignored	   the	  fact	  that	  this	  way	  of	  distribution	  also	  facing	  the	  Redigi	  case’s	  “sole	  copy	  problem.”	  If	  the	   court	   believes	   the	   “forward-­‐and-­‐delete”	   technology	   in	   that	   case,	   cannot	  guarantee	  that	  only	  the	  lawful	  owner	  can	  retain	  a	  sole	  copy	  of	  the	  works.	  Then	  how	  could	  the	  court	  feel	  safe	  about	  the	  lawful	  owner	  would	  not	  retain	  more	  copies	  of	  the	  same	  copyrighted	  work	  in	  his	  other	  devices.	  If	  so,	  the	  lawful	  owner	  can	  simply	  resell	  the	  devices	  onto	  which	  the	  file	  was	  stored	  for	  multiple	  times.	  Such	  action	  will	  also	  using	  the	  district	  court’s	  words,	  “do	  harm	  to	  the	  primary	  markets.”	  	   Second,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	   is	   used	   to	  maintain	   the	  delicate	  balance	  between	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	  right	  to	  control	  the	  work	  during	  the	  term	  of	  copyright	  protection	  and	  the	  public’s	  need	  for	  access	  to	  copyrighted	  works.	  	  And	  it’s	  also	  the	  codification	  of	  the	  common	  law	  principle	  of	  copyright	  exhaustion,	  which	  is	  used	  to	  avoid	  restraints	  on	  alienation.	  There’s	  no	  reason	  for	  the	  Copyright	  Act	   to	   only	   extend	   copyright	   owners’	   exclusive	   right	   over	   the	   control	   of	   digital	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transmissions	  without	  granting	  users	  equivalents	  responses	  to	  limit	  such	  extension.	  Usually,	   users	   can	  purchase	   a	   single	   song	   at	   the	  price	   of	   $0.99	   from	   iTunes	   store,	  they	  could	  also	  purchase	  the	  CD	  which	  not	  only	  include	  that	  particular	  song	  but	  also	  another	  9	  songs	  at	  the	  price	  around	  $10	  from	  Amazon.	  There’s	  no	  price	  difference	  for	   the	   user	   who	   decides	   to	   purchase	   all	   songs	   from	   an	   album.	   Under	   this	  circumstance,	  why	  the	  user	  who	  pay	  the	  same	  price	  for	  the	  same	  number	  of	  songs	  from	  iTunes	  cannot	  resell	  his	  property	  just	  like	  the	  user	  who	  purchase	  a	  CD	  which	  stored	  the	  same	  songs?	  And	  further,	  the	  user	  who	  decides	  to	  purchase	  digital	  songs	  from	  iTunes	  may	  even	  pay	  more	  than	  the	  user	  who	  purchased	  a	  CD	  from	  Amazon,	  because	  he	  has	  to	  pay	  for	  his	  storage	  space	  in	  iCloud.	  The	  user	  paid	  not	  only	  price	  for	  the	  songs,	  but	  also	  price	  for	  the	  storage	  space.	  Then	  why	  he	  could	  not	  resell	  his	  property?	   Although	   the	   “forward-­‐and	   –delete”	   technology	   cannot	   fulfilled	   the	  requirement	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine,	  there’s	  no	  reason	  to	  reject	  to	  apply	  the	  whole	  first	  sale	  doctrine	   to	   the	  digital	  world.	  What’s	   interesting	  here,	   is	   that	   the	  ReDigi’s	  specified	  “forward-­‐and-­‐delete”	  software	  had	  already	  been	  issued	  a	  patent	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Office.	  The	  ReDigi’s	  software	  was	  designed	  to	  scan	  the	  user’s	  hard	  drive	  to	  ensure	  no	  other	  copy	  of	  the	  file	  was	  retained.	  ReDigi	  gained	  a	  patent	  for	   its	   instantaneous	   “copy-­‐less”	   digital	   file	   transfer	   that	   includes	   a	   “Removal	   and	  Monitoring	   Mechanism”	   to	   ensure	   “personal-­‐use	   copies	   of	   the	   sold	   media	   are	  removed.”666	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  666	  REDIGI,	  INC.	  AWARDED	  SIGNIFICANT	  U.S.	  PATENT	  (Jan	  29,	  2014),	  http://www.prnewswire.com/news-­‐releases/redigi-­‐inc-­‐awarded-­‐significant-­‐us-­‐patent-­‐242554041.html	  ;	  see	  also	  U.S.	  Patent	  No.	  8,627,500	  B2	  (filed	  Dec.	  31,2010).	  
	   225	  
	   Third,	  according	   to	  scholars	  Aaron	  Perzanowski	  and	   Jason	  Schultz,	   the	   first	  sale	  doctrine	   itself	   can	  provide	  both	  social	  and	  economic	  benefits.667	  They	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	  key	  social	  benefits	  of	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	  generally	   falling	   into	   four	  categories:	  access,	  preservation,	  privacy,	  and	  transaction	  clarity.	  For	  access,	  the	  role	  of	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  can	  increase	  affordability	  and	  availability	  to	  different	  types	  of	  copyrighted	   work	   through	   secondary	   markets,	   libraries,	   or	   rental-­‐based	  businesses.668	  For	  preservation,	  with	  the	  application	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine,	  public	  can	   still	   access	   to	   the	  works	   that	   copyright	   owners	   determined	   to	  withdrawn,	   or	  suppressed	  because	  of	  cultural	  or	  political	  reasons.	  Secondary	  market	  can	  keep	  the	  works	   in	   circulations,	   which	   will	   remain	   copyrighted	   works	   as	   “a	   portion	   of	   our	  cultural	  history…	  preservation	  benefits	  society	  broadly.”669	  For	  privacy,	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  enables	  people	  to	  transfer	  works	  privately	  and	  anonymously	  since	  they	  can	  transfer	  without	  permission	  of	   the	   copyright	   owner.670	  For	   transaction	   clarity,	   the	  first	   sale	   doctrine	   “promotes	   market	   efficiency	   and	   transactional	   clarity	   by	  protecting	  consumers	  from	  high	  information	  and	  transaction	  costs	  and	  deceptively	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  667	  See	  Perzanowski	  &	  Schultz,	  supra	  note	  624,	  at	  892-­‐901.	  	  668	  Id,	  at	  894.	  	  See	  also	  Anindya	  Ghose	  et	  al.,	  Internet	  Exchanges	  for	  Used	  Books:	  An	  Empirical	  
Analysis	  of	  Product	  Cannibalization	  and	  Welfare	  Impact,	  17	  INFO.	  SYS.	  RES.	  3	  (2006).(	  The	  authors	  noted	  that	  empirical	  evidence	  does	  not	  show	  that	  secondary	  market	  cannibalize	  the	  primary	  market,	  as	  the	  ReDigi	  court	  suggested.	  Anindya	  Ghose	  study,	  which	  cited	  by	  Perzanowski	  and	  Schultz,	  shows	  that	  84%	  of	  used	  book	  purchasers	  on	  Amazon	  would	  not	  have	  purchased	  the	  book	  at	  a	  ‘new’	  book	  prices.	  And	  despite	  a	  0.3%	  reduction	  of	  publisher’	  gross	  profits	  due	  to	  Amazon’s	  secondary	  book	  market,	  the	  new	  welfare	  gain	  was	  nearly	  $88	  million	  annually.)	  669	  Id,	  at	  895.	  670	  Id,	  at	  896.	  (Otherwise,	  copyright	  owners	  are	  able	  to	  “track	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  work	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  each	  participant	  in	  the	  transaction.”)	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completes	   limitations	   on	   the	   use	   of	   low-­‐cost	   copyrighted	   goods.”671	  As	   to	   the	  economic	   benefits,	   the	   first	   one	   is	   that	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   can	   encourage	  innovations	   through	   competitions	   between	   copyright	   owners	   and	   secondary	  markets,	   innovation	  by	   secondary	  market	  providers,	   and	   innovation	  by	  users.	   For	  instance,	  copyright	  owners	  have	  to	  create	  new	  things	  in	  order	  to	  differentiate	  their	  new	  copies	   from	  used	  copies,	  which	  are	   in	  circulation	   in	   the	  secondary	  market.672	  An	   add	   on	   is	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   	   “promotes	   platform	   competition	   by	   reducing	  consumer	   lock-­‐in.”	   Under	   the	   circumstance	   of	   DRM,	   people	   can	   only	   playback	  certain	  content	  on	  a	  particular	  device	  or	  platform	  (for	  instance,	  before	  2009,	  songs	  downloaded	   from	   iTunes	   can	   only	   be	   played	   via	   Apple	   devices),	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	   allow	   people	   to	   sell	   their	   existing	   content	   and	   lowering	   the	   cost	   of	  switching	  to	  another	  platform.673	  	   All	  in	  all,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  Congress	  has	  the	  duty	  to	  re-­‐codify	  statute	  reflecting	  the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   to	   protect	   copyright	   owners’	   right,	   consumers’	   interests,	  technological	  innovation	  and	  new	  digital	  market.	  Even	  though	  the	  current	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  cannot	  be	  directly	  apply	  to	  the	  current	  situation,	   it	  should	  be	  known	  that	  certain	   restriction	   of	   copyright	   owners’	   right	   to	   control	   digital	   transmission	   is	  needed.	  And	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  best	  move	  of	  such	  restriction	  should	  be	  directly	  re-­‐codify	   the	   current	   statute	   reflecting	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   to	   enable	   it	   adapts	   to	   the	  current	  situation	  without	  legal	  loops.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  671	  Id.	  (	  With	  contrary	  to	  the	  various	  legal	  terms	  that	  may	  be	  tied	  to	  a	  copyrighted	  work,	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  “gives	  consumers	  a	  reliable	  baseline	  that	  simplifies	  these	  transactions.”)	  672	  Id,	  at	  897.	  673	  Id,	  at	  900-­‐01.	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ii. The E.U. Part— the Exhaustion Doctrine 	   It	   is	  known	  that	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  harmonizing	  IP	  rights	  and	  the	  European	  principle	  of	  free	  circulation	  of	  goods,	  the	  E.U.	   legislated	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine.674	  The	   E.U.	   adopted	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   aiming	   at	   the	   distribution	   right	   in	   its	  several	  Directives	  to	  limit	  copyright	  owner’s	  rights	  in	  conformity	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  free	   circulation	  of	  goods.	   	  Article	  5	  of	   the	  Database	  Directive	  provides	   that	   “…	   the	  first	  sale	  in	  the	  Community	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  database	  by	  the	  right	  holder	  or	  with	  his	  consent	   shall	   exhaust	   the	   right	   to	   control	   resale	   of	   that	   copy	   within	   the	  Community;…”675 	  Article	   4	   of	   Software	   Directive	   states:	   “The	   first	   sale	   in	   the	  Community	   of	   a	   copy	   of	   a	   program	   by	   the	   right	   holder	   or	   with	   his	   consent	   shall	  exhaust	   the	   distribution	   right	   with	   in	   the	   Community	   of	   that	   copy,	   with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  674	  See	  Ginsburg	  &	  Treppoz,	  supra	  note	  492,	  at	  391.	  See	  also	  Consolidated	  versions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  Declarations	  annexed	  to	  the	  Final	  Act	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Conference	  which	  adopted	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  signed	  on	  13	  December	  2007,	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT	  ,	  art	  28,	  34-­‐36.	  (“Article	  28	  1.	  The	  Union	  shall	  comprise	  a	  customs	  union	  which	  shall	  cover	  all	  trade	  in	  goods	  and	  which	  shall	  involve	  the	  prohibition	  between	  Member	  States	  of	  customs	  duties	  on	  imports	  and	  exports	  and	  of	  all	  charges	  having	  equivalent	  effect,	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  common	  customs	  tariff	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  third	  countries.	  2.	  The	  provisions	  of	  Article	  30	  and	  of	  Chapter	  3	  of	  this	  Title	  shall	  apply	  to	  products	  originating	  in	  Member	  States	  and	  to	  products	  coming	  from	  third	  countries	  which	  are	  in	  free	  circulation	  in	  Member	  States.”	  ”Article	  34	  Quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  and	  all	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect	  shall	  be	  prohibited	  between	  Member	  States.”	  “Article	  35	  Quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  exports,	  and	  all	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect,	  shall	  be	  prohibited	  between	  Member	  States.”	  “Article	  36	  The	  provisions	  of	  Articles	  34	  and	  35	  shall	  not	  preclude	  prohibitions	  or	  restrictions	  on	  imports,	  exports	  or	  goods	  in	  transit	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  public	  morality,	  public	  policy	  or	  public	  security;	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  or	  plants;	  the	  protection	  of	  national	  treasures	  possessing	  artistic,	  historic	  or	  archaeological	  value;	  or	  the	  protection	  of	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  property.	  Such	  prohibitions	  or	  restrictions	  shall	  not,	  however,	  constitute	  a	  means	  of	  arbitrary	  discrimination	  or	  a	  disguised	  restriction	  on	  trade	  between	  Member	  States.”	  )	  	  675	  Database	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  140,	  art	  5(c).	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exception	  of	  the	  right	  to	  control	  further	  rental	  of	  the	  program	  or	  a	  copy	  thereof.”676	  It’s	   clear	   that	   these	   two	  directives	  only	   expressly	   granted	   the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  for	  software	  and	  database	  (both	  for	  copyright	  and	  the	  sui	  generis	  right).	  It	  was	  until	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  that	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  was	  explicitly	   used	   in	   regulating	   all	   types	   of	   works	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   Art	   4(2)	   of	  Information	   Society	   Directive	   provided	   that	   “the	   distribution	   right	   shall	   not	   be	  exhausted	  within	   the	   Community	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   original	   or	   copies	   of	   the	  work,	  except	  where	  the	  first	  sale	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  in	  the	  Community	  of	  that	  object	  is	  made	  by	  the	  right	  holder	  or	  with	  his	  consent.”677	  	  	   According	   to	   these	   articles	   from	   those	   directives,	   the	   key	   principle	   of	   the	  exhaustion	   doctrine	   in	   E.U.	   is	   that	   once	   a	   copyrighted	   good	   (for	   instance,	   a	   CD,	   a	  book	   or	   a	   software)	   have	   been	   put	   on	   the	   market	   with	   the	   consent	   from	   the	  copyright	   owner	   within	   the	   E.U.,	   the	   copyright	   owner	   then	   cannot	   prohibit	   the	  further	  circulation	  of	  the	  good	  within	  the	  E.U.	   	   In	  a	  nutshell,	   the	  copyright	  owner’s	  right	  toward	  this	  good	  are	  exhausted	  once	  the	  good	  was	  successfully	  distributed	  to	  others.	  There	  are	  two	  basic	  features	  of	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine.	  First,	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  applies	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  copyrighted	  goods	  rather	  than	  service.	   It	   means	   that	   if	   a	   copyrighted	   work	   being	   performed	   or	   otherwise	  transmitted	  via	  cable,	  there’s	  no	  exhaustion	  of	  rights.	  The	  copyright	  owner	  can	  still	  prevent	   further	   subsequent	   retransmission	   within	   the	   E.U..	   Thus,	   the	   exhaustion	  doctrine	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  communication	  right	  or	  the	  rental	  and	  lending	  rights.	  Second,	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   has	   a	   jurisdiction	   requirement.	   The	   exhaustion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  676	  Software	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  122,	  art	  4(2).	  677	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  art	  4(2).	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doctrine	   of	   the	   E.U.	   only	   applies	   to	   goods	   in	   circulation	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   E.U.	  members	  (which	  includes	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  EEA678).	  679	  It	  means	  that	  the	  E.U.	  does	  not	   recognize	   international	   exhaustion	   of	   a	   copyright	   owner’s	   right.	   Thus,	   if	   the	  good	  is	  sold	  outside	  the	  EU,	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  not	  exhausted.	  For	  instance,	  when	  a	  CD	  was	  sold	  in	  Canada,	  the	  owner’s	  right	  would	  not	  be	  exhausted	  in	  the	  E.U.680	  
A. What	  constitutes	  a	  “sale”?	  	   It’s	   important	   to	   clarify	   the	   principle	   of	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   that	   it	   only	  applies	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  copyrighted	  goods.	  The	  basic	  condition	  to	  constitute	  a	  distribution	   of	   copyright	   goods	   is	   the	   sale	   or	   other	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   of	   the	  copyrighted	   goods.	   It	   means	   that	   the	   right	   of	   distribution	   is	   exhausted	   when	   the	  lawfully	   first	   sale	   (or	   transfer	   of	   ownership)	   happened.	   Thus	   it’s	   important	   to	  interpret	  the	  definition	  of	  “sale.”	  	  	   As	  to	  Article	  4(2)	  of	  the	  Software	  Directive,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  meaning	  of	   the	   term	   “sale”	   upon	   national	   laws,	   it	   instead	   referred	   to	   settled	   case	   law	   and	  concluded	   that	   the	   term	   “sale”	   must	   be	   designated	   “an	   autonomous	   concept	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  678	  EEA,	  European	  Economic	  Area,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Economic_Area	  	  (“The	  European	  Economic	  Area	  (EEA)	  is	  the	  area	  in	  which	  the	  Agreement	  on	  the	  EEA	  provides	  for	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons,	  goods,	  services	  and	  capital	  within	  the	  internal	  market	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU).	  The	  EEA	  was	  established	  on	  1	  January	  1994	  upon	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.”)	  679	  But	  the	  distribution	  right	  continues	  fully	  to	  apply	  with	  respect	  to	  copies	  imported	  from	  out	  side	  the	  E.U.	  See	  Simon	  Stokes,	  Digital	  Copyright	  Law:	  Law	  and	  Practice	  105	  (4th	  ed.	  2014),	  (“However,	  where	  goods	  are	  put	  on	  the	  market	  outside	  the	  EEA	  then	  the	  issue	  is	  one	  of	  consent:	  only	  if	  the	  right	  holders	  has	  clearly	  consented	  to	  the	  export	  of	  the	  goods	  from	  outside	  the	  EEA	  into	  the	  EEA	  then	  will	  there	  be	  international	  exhaustion.”	  “Consent	  must	  be	  unequivocal	  so	  will	  very	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  be	  implied	  from	  the	  facts	  and	  certainly	  not	  from	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  rights	  owner.”	  )	  680	  See	  Case	  T-­‐198/98,	  Micro	  Leader	  Business	  v.	  European	  Commission,	  2000	  CTLR	  N-­‐113.	  (The	  lawful	  sale	  of	  Microsoft	  software	  in	  Canada	  did	  not	  exhaust	  Microsoft’s	  rights	  to	  prevent	  import	  of	  the	  software	  in	  Canada	  into	  France.)	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European	   Union	   Law,”	   which	   must	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	   uniform	   manner	   in	   each	  Member	   States.681	  The	   ECJ	   adopted	   a	   broad	   interpretation	   of	   the	   term	   sale	   in	   the	  Usedsoft	   case:	   a	   sale	   means	   a	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   in	   an	   item	   of	   tangible	   or	  intangible	   property	  with	   certain	  payment.682	  It	   further	   construed	   that	   a	   sale	   of	   all	  forms	   of	   product,	   characterized	   by	   a	   sale	   of	   computer	   programs	   (software),	   was	  constituted	  if	  a	  user	  is	  granted	  a	  right	  to	  use	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  computer	  program,	  for	  an	  unlimited	  period,	  with	  a	  payment	  of	  a	  fee	  designed	  to	  enable	  the	  copyright	  owner	  to	  obtain	   a	   remuneration	   corresponding	   to	   the	   economic	   value	   of	   the	   copy	   of	   the	  work.683	  Therefore,	  when	   the	   two	   conditions	   of	   certain	   payment	   and	  usage	   for	   an	  unlimited	  period	  are	  met,	  a	  sale	  is	  constituted.	  	  	   	  The	  Defendant	  in	  the	  Usedsoft	  case	  argued	  that	  it	  merely	  made	  the	  software	  available	   to	   download	   by	   users	   with	   no	   charges	   and	   the	   downloadable	   software	  cannot	  be	  used	  without	  concluding	  a	  user	  license	  agreement.684	  	  And	  such	  a	  license	  only	  provides	  users	  a	  “non-­‐exclusive	  and	  non-­‐transferable	  user	  right.”685	  Thus	  there	  was	  no	  sale	  in	  this	  case.	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  disagreed.	  The	  ECJ	  firstly	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  download	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  computer	  program	  and	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  user	  license	  agreement	   should	   be	   examined	   as	   a	   whole	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   their	   legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  681	  UsedSoft	  case,	  supra	  note	  152,	  paras.	  39-­‐41.	  (“A	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term	  sale	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  protection	  offered	  to	  copyright	  holders	  by	  that	  directive	  varying	  according	  to	  the	  national	  law	  applicable.”)	  See	  also	  Infopaq	  case,	  para	  27.	  682	  Id,	  para.	  42.	  683	  Id,	  paras.	  45	  &	  49.	  (Advocate	  General	  observed	  in	  point	  59	  of	  his	  opinion	  that	  “if	  the	  term	  sale	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  4(2)	  of	  Directive	  2009/24	  were	  not	  given	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  as	  encompassing	  all	  forms	  of	  product	  marketing….	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  that	  provision	  would	  be	  undermined,	  since	  suppliers	  would	  merely	  have	  to	  call	  the	  contract	  a	  lisence	  rather	  than	  a	  sale	  in	  order	  to	  circumvent	  the	  rule	  of	  exhaustion.)	  684	  Id,	  para.43.	  685	  Id.	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classification,	  since	  an	  act	  of	  downloading	  a	  copy	  of	  computer	  program	  is	  useless	  if	  the	  copy	  cannot	  be	  used	  by	  its	  possessor.686	  Then	  the	  ECJ	  found	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  making	   available	   of	   a	   copy	   of	   its	   software	   and	   the	   conclusion	   of	   a	   user	  license	  agreement	  is	  to	  make	  users	  permanently	  use	  the	  copy	  by	  paying	  fees	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  remunerate	  the	  plaintiff.687Therefore	  the	  manner	  by	  which	  the	  copy	  of	  the	  software	  has	  been	  made	  available	  does	  not	  make	  a	  difference.688	  Consequently,	  copyright	  owners	  cannot	  merely	  claim	  that	  the	  contract	  is	  a	  “license”	  rather	  than	  a	  “sale”	  to	  prohibit	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine.689	  
B. Should	  the	  E.U.	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  encompass	  digital	  transmissions?	  	   In	  order	  to	  know	  whether	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  should	  encompass	  digital	  transmissions,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   object	   of	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   should	   be	  contoured.	   Thus,	   this	   issue	   now	   turns	   to	   whether	   the	   application	   of	   exhaustion	  doctrine	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  tangible	  copies.	  	  	   Traditionally,	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   indeed	   only	   applies	   to	   tangible	  property	  and	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  intangible	  copies.	  The	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  can	  apply	  to	  digital	  copies	  of	  software	  only	  if	  it	  has	  been	  fixed	  on	  a	  tangible	  medium	  such	  as	  a	  CD.	   As	   to	   the	   Database	   Directive,	   Recital	   33	   clearly	   states	   “the	   question	   of	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  does	  not	  arise	  in	  the	  case	  of	  on-­‐line	  database,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  686	  Id,	  para.	  44.	  687	  Id,	  para.	  45.	  688	  Id,	  para.	  47.	  (	  The	  ECJ	  specified	  there’s	  no	  difference	  	  between	  the	  means	  of	  a	  download	  from	  the	  rightholder’s	  website	  and	  the	  means	  of	  a	  material	  medium	  such	  as	  a	  CD-­‐ROM	  or	  DVD.0	  689	  Id,	  para.	  48.	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which	  come	  within	  the	  field	  of	  provision	  of	  services.”690	  And	  according	  to	  Recital	  28	  and	   Recital	   29	   of	   the	   Information	   Society	   Directive,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   exhaustion	  doctrine	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  tangible	  copies.691	  However,	  recently,	  based	  on	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   ECJ	   in	  Usedsoft	   case,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  both	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  copies.	  This	  scope	  of	  the	  objective	  is	   contoured	   to	   “avoid	   the	   partitioning	   of	   market	   and	   to	   limit	   restrictions	   of	   the	  distribution	   of	   those	  works	   to	  what	   is	   necessary	   to	   safeguard	   the	   specific	   subject	  matter	  of	  the	  intellectual	  property	  concerned.”692	  	   In	   the	   Usedsoft	   case,	   the	   plaintiff	   specifically	   cited	   Recital	   29	   of	   the	  Information	   Society	   Directive	   to	   prove	   that	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   does	   not	  encompass	   intangible	   copies.	   But	   the	   ECJ	   rejected	   the	   plaintiff’s	   argument	   upon	  three	   reasons.	   First,	   Article	   4(2)	   does	   not	   explicitly	   state	   that	   the	   exhaustion	  doctrine	  is	  limited	  to	  copies	  of	  software	  on	  a	  material	  medium	  such	  as	  a	  CD	  or	  DVD.	  It	  makes	  no	  distinction	   to	   the	   tangible	  or	   intangible	   form	  of	  a	   copy.693	  Second,	   the	  Software	   Directive	   is	   the	   specific	   directive	   that	   deal	   with	   computer	   programs	  relevant	   in	  this	  case,	  and	  it’s	  a	   lex	  specialis	  of	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive.694	  Third,	  the	  ECJ	  also	  observed	  that	  “from	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  view,”	  software	  online	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  690	  Database	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  140,	  recital	  33.	  (Electronic	  databases	  in	  tangible,	  material,	  medium	  are	  subject	  to	  exhaustion.)	  691	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  28	  &	  29.	  (“The	  question	  of	  exhaustion	  does	  not	  arise	  in	  the	  case	  of	  services	  and	  online	  services	  in	  particular.”)	  692	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  429,	  para.	  11.52.	  See	  also	  Usedsoft	  case,	  supra	  note	  152,	  paras.	  62-­‐3.	  693	  Id,	  paras.	  53-­‐5.	  694	  Id,	  paras.	  56-­‐7.	  (Article	  1(2)	  of	  the	  Software	  Direct	  points	  that	  “protection	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  Directive	  shall	  apply	  to	  the	  expression	  in	  any	  form	  of	  a	  computer	  program.”)	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transmission	   is	   “functional	   equivalent”	   to	   deliver	   in	   tangible	  medium.695	  And	   as	   I	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  ECJ	  indicated	  that	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  to	  tangible	   copies	   not	   only	   out	   range	   of	   what	   is	   necessary	   to	   safeguard	   the	   specific	  subject	   matter	   of	   the	   intellectual	   property,	   but	   also	   result	   in	   the	   partitioning	   of	  market.696	  	  	   In	   2015,	   in	   the	   Art	   &	   Allposters	   International	   BV	   v	   Stichting	   Pictoright	  case,697	  the	  defendant	  used	  a	  chemical	  process	  to	  transfer	  protected	  image	  from	  the	  plaintiff’s	  paper	  poster	  onto	  a	  canvas,	  and	  then	  sell	  these	  canvasess.	  The	  protected	  image	  disappeared	  from	  the	  paper	  poster	  during	  the	  transfer	  process.	  The	  plaintiff	  claimed	   that	   the	   defendant’s	   acts	   constitute	   infringement	   of	   copyright	   and	   the	  exhaustion	   doctrine	   did	   not	   apply.	   The	   ECJ	   agreed	   and	   held	   that	   “the	   rule	   of	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  4(2)	  of	  Directive	  2001/29	  does	  not	  apply	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  reproduction	  of	  a	  protected	  work,	  after	  having	  been	  marketed	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   with	   the	   copyright	   holder's	   consent,	   has	  undergone	   an	   alteration	   of	   its	  medium,	   such	   as	   the	   transfer	   of	   that	   reproduction	  from	   a	   paper	   poster	   onto	   a	   canvas,	   and	   is	   placed	   on	   the	  market	   again	   in	   its	   new	  form.”698	  The	  ECJ	  provide	  two	  main	  reasons	   in	  supporting	   its	  conclusion.	  First,	   the	  exhaustion	   doctrine	   should	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   tangible	   object	   rather	   than	   the	  protected	   work	   (intellectual	   creation)	   that	   incorporated	   into	   it.699 	  Second,	   the	  defendant’s	   transfer	  process	  constituted	  a	  new	  reproduction	  of	   the	  original	  poster	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  Id,	  para	  61.	  696	  Id,	  paras	  62-­‐3.	  697	  Case	  C-­‐419/13,	  Art	  &	  Allposter	  International	  BV	  v	  Stichting	  Pictoright	  	  2015.	  698	  Id,	  paras.	  49-­‐50.	  699	  Id,	  paras.	  34-­‐40.	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and	  the	  previous	  consent	  of	  the	  rightholder	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  his	  work	  does	  not	  cover	   the	   distribution	   of	   this	   new	   reproduction	   of	   the	  work.	   Thus	   the	   exhaustion	  rule	  did	  not	  apply	  when	  the	  object,	  which	  was	  marketed	  with	  the	  copyright	  holder’s	  consent,	  has	  undergone	  subsequent	  alterations	  to	  its	  physical	  medium.	  700	  This	  case	  resulted	   in	  a	   stronger	  exclusive	  distribution	  right	   for	   the	  copyright	  owners,	   and	   it	  turns	   out	   that	   the	   ECJ	   turns	   to	   favored	   the	   copyright	   owners’	   interests	   over	   the	  consumers’	  interests.	  However,	  most	  importantly,	  this	  case	  did	  not	  mention	  a	  word	  in	  analyzing	  whether	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  digital	  content	  or	  not.	  Thus,	  the	  decision	  of	  this	  case	  only	  addresses	  the	  distribution	  of	  tangible	  objects,	  and	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  digital	  rights.701	  This	  decision	   cannot	   serve	   as	   a	   reference	   for	   similar	   cases	   fact	   such	   as	   Redigi	   where	  users	  are	  able	  to	  transfer	  music	  files	  from	  lawfully	  purchased	  CD	  to	  “Cloud	  Locker.”	  
C. Limitations	  on	  ECJ’s	  conclusion	  	   Although	   the	   ECJ	   reached	   a	   rather	   broad	   approach	   for	   applying	   the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  in	  two	  aspects:	  (1)	  “sale,”	  which	  is	  the	  trigger	  of	  this	  provision	  is	  constituted	  when	  the	  software	   is	  able	   to	  be	  used	  for	  an	  unlimited	  period	  and	   in	  return	  for	  a	  fee	  corresponding	  to	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  the	  work;	  (2)	  the	  object	  of	  this	   provision	   encompass	   intangible	   copies,	   the	   ECJ	   provided	   two	   important	  restrictions	   to	   the	  application	  of	   this	  broader	  provision	   in	   relation	   to	  downloaded	  copies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  700	  Id,	  paras.	  41-­‐6.	  701	  See	  Maša	  (Savič)	  Galič,	  The	  CJEU	  Allposters	  Case:	  Beginning	  of	  the	  End	  of	  Digital	  
Exhaustion?,	  37	  E.I.P.R.,	  Issue	  6,	  389	  391(2015).	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   First,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   infringing	   the	   exclusive	   right	   of	   reproduction,	   an	  original	   acquirer	  must	  make	   his	   own	   copy	   unusable	   at	   the	   time	   he	   reselling	   this	  tangible	   or	   intangible	   copy	   of	   a	   software.702	  And	   the	   distributor	   can	   use	   technical	  protective	   measure	   such	   as	   product	   keys	   to	   assure	   that	   the	   copy	   is	   made	  unusable.703	  	   Second,	   “if	   the	   license	   acquired	   by	   the	   first	   acquirer	   relates	   to	   a	   greater	  number	  of	  users	   than	  he	  needs,	   the	  acquirer	   is	  not	  authorized	  by	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  exhaustion	  of	   the	  distribution	  right…	  to	  divide	   the	   license	  and	  resell	  only	   the	  user	  right	   for	   the	   computer	   program	   concerned	   corresponding	   to	   a	   number	   of	   users	  determined	  by	  him.”704	  	   Generally	   speaking,	   according	   to	   the	   ECJ’s	   decision,	   it’s	   unclear	   whether	  digital	  exhaustion	  only	  occurs	  as	   far	  as	  downloading	  computer	  programs	  or	   it	   can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  types	  of	  works	  such	  as	  music	  recordings,	  e-­‐books	  or	  films.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  based	  on	  the	  ECJ’s	  reasons	  in	  the	  Usedsoft	  case,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  ECJ	  is	   adopting	   the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	   to	  apply	   to	  all	   types	  of	  digital	  works.	  Because	  the	  ECJ	  not	  only	  clarified	  that	  a	  sale	  occurs	  when	  a	  user	  get	  a	  permanent	  license	  by	  paying	   the	   specifically	   designed	   fee,	   but	   also	   pointed	   the	   “functional	   equivalent”	  feature	   of	   digital	   works	   compare	   to	   tangible	   works	   from	   an	   economic	   point	   of	  view.705	  The	   ECJ’s	   reasons	   in	   the	   Usedsoft	   case	   are	   so	   convincing	   and	   reasonable,	  which	  keep	  up	  to	  the	  trend	  of	  technical	  development.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  702	  Id,	  para.	  70.	  703	  Id,	  paras.	  78-­‐9.	  704	  Id,	  para.	  69.	  705	  However,	  the	  European	  Commission	  published	  “Public	  Consultation	  on	  the	  review	  of	  the	  EU	  copyright	  rules”	  in	  December,	  2013.	  It	  stated	  that	  the	  application	  of	  exhaustion	  doctrine	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iii. The Exhaustion Doctrine in Other Countries 	   Since	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  digital	  transmission	  remained	  unsolved,	   it’s	  necessary	   to	  analyze	   the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  in	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  before	  provide	  a	  proposal	  for	  China.	  
A. Singapore	  	   The	   Singapore	   Copyright	   Act	   contains	   four	   sections	   regulating	   the	  distribution	  and	  circulation	  of	  infringing	  copies	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  or	  subject	  matter	  other	  than	  works	  and	  to	  ensure	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  works	  in	  Singapore.	  The	   four	   sections	   include	   Section	   33,	   Section	   25(2)	   and	   Section	   105.706	  Copyright	  owner’s	  distribution	  right	  toward	  his	  work	  exhausts	  after	  the	  first	  sale	  of	  the	  work	  with	  his	  authorization.	  	  Singapore	  adopted	  the	  international	  exhaustion	  principle,	  it	  means	  that	  once	  genuine	  goods	  onto	  which	  copyright	  works	  stored	  had	  been	  put	  on	  the	   circulation	   anywhere	   in	   the	   world	   with	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	   consent,	   the	  copyright	  owner	  can	  no	   longer	  control	   further	  sale	  and	  distribution	  of	   that	  goods.	  Here	   the	   issue	   is	   what	   constitute	   a	   “genuine”	   good,	   in	   other	   sense	   what’s	   the	  requirement	  of	   the	  copyright	  owner’s	   consent.	  Parliament	  amended	   the	  Copyright	  Act	   and	   stated	   that	  where	   the	   copyright	   owner	   in	   Singapore	   is	   different	   from	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  in	  digital	  transmission	  should	  be	  questioned	  in	  two	  aspects.	  First	  is	  how	  to	  avoid	  resellers	  from	  keeping	  their	  own	  copy,	  and	  second	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economic	  implications	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  second-­‐hand	  market	  of	  copies	  of	  perfect	  quality	  that	  never	  deteriorate.	  The	  European	  Commission	  concerned	  the	  same	  issue	  as	  the	  U.S..	  706	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  172,	  sections	  33,	  25(2)	  &105.	  (Section	  25(2):	  Without	  prejudice	  to	  subsection	  (1),	  where	  under	  any	  provision	  of	  this	  Act	  a	  question	  arises	  whether	  an	  article	  of	  any	  description	  has	  been	  imported	  or	  sold,	  or	  otherwise	  dealt	  with,	  without	  the	  licence	  of	  the	  owner	  of	  any	  copyright,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  determining	  that	  question,	  shall	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  person	  entitled	  to	  the	  copyright	  in	  respect	  of	  its	  application	  to	  the	  making	  of	  articles	  of	  that	  description	  in	  the	  country	  into	  which	  the	  article	  was	  imported,	  or,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  in	  which	  it	  was	  sold	  or	  otherwise	  dealt	  with.	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copyright	   owner	   in	   the	   country	   of	   manufacture,	   copyrighted	   goods	   made	   by	   the	  latter	  were	  nevertheless	  genuine	  goods.707	  Thus	  a	  genuine	  good	  means	  a	  good	  which	  is	  made	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  in	  the	  country	  of	  manufacture,	  and	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  in	  Singapore	  is	  irrelevant.	  Further,	  according	  to	  Section	  25(3),	  if	  there	  is	  no	  copyright	  owner	  in	  the	  country	  of	  manufacture,	  it	  turns	  to	   require	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   person	   who	   has	   been	   entitled	   to	   the	   copyright	   in	  Singapore.708	  Parliament	  provided	  its	  reason	  that	  “the	  government	  is	  mindful	  of	  the	  need	  of	  achieve	  a	  proper	  balance	  between	  ensuring	  cheaper	  prices	   for	   consumers	  and	  providing	  sufficient	   incentives	   for	  copyright	   industries	   to	  develop	  and	  remain	  competitive.”709	  	   Then	   the	   problem	   is	   whether	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   can	   be	   limited	   by	  contract	   in	   Singapore.	   According	   to	   Section	   25(4),	   in	   determining	   whether	   the	  making	  of	  the	  goods	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner,	  any	   condition	   as	   to	   the	   sale,	   distribution	   or	   other	   dealings	   that	   imposed	   by	   the	  copyright	   owner	   shall	   be	   disregarded.710	  It	   means	   that	   a	   copyright	   owner	   in	   the	  country	   of	   manufacture	   cannot	   take	   advantage	   of	   restrictions	   (contractual	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  707	  See	  Speech	  by	  the	  Parliamentary	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Minister	  for	  Law	  at	  the	  Third	  Reading	  of	  the	  Copyright	  (Amendment)	  Bill	  1994,	  63	  HANSARD	  col.	  415-­‐16	  (Aug	  25,1994).	  Before	  this	  amendment	  which	  stated	  that	  genuine	  means	  consent	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  in	  the	  manufacture	  country	  came	  out,	  the	  Singapore	  High	  Court	  ruled	  that	  only	  the	  copyright	  owner	  in	  Singapore	  whose	  consent	  was	  relevant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  determining	  if	  the	  imported	  copies	  were	  infringing	  copies.	  See	  PP	  v.	  Teoh	  Ai	  Nee,	  [1993]	  S.L.R.	  (R)	  755	  (Sing.).	  See	  also	  Irene	  Calboli	  &	  Edward	  Lee,	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  Exhaustion	  and	  Parallel	  Imports,	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing,	  187-­‐88	  (Jun,	  2016).	  708	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  172,	  section	  25(3).	  709	  Supra	  note	  707.	  710	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  172,	  section	  25(4).	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otherwise)	  on	  further	  movement	  of	  the	  good.	  For	  instance,	  restricting	  sale	  of	  goods	  to	  a	  particular	  territory	  cannot	  restrict	  the	  act	  of	  legal	  importation	  into	  Singapore.	  	   Singapore	   did	   not	   recognize	   digital	   exhaustion	   in	   its	   copyright	   law	   or	   deal	  with	  cases	  relevant	  to	  digital	  exhaustion	  nowadays.	  But,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  based	  on	  the	  legislative	   history,	   there’s	   a	   constant	   and	   fundamental	   rationale	   in	   the	   Singapore	  Parliament	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  issue.	  The	  rationale	  is	  about	  public	  interests,	  that	  there	  are	   benefits	   to	   the	   public	   when	   genuine	   copies	   of	   copyright	   work	   can	   be	   made	  available	   to	   the	  Singapore	  public	  at	  a	   lower	  price.711	  It’s	   clear	   that	  public	  will	  gain	  more	  interest	  from	  their	  digital	  goods	  such	  as	  MP3	  files	  or	  software	  by	  legally	  resell	  them	   without	   consent	   from	   its	   goods’	   copyright	   owners.	   Thus,	   there’s	   a	   high	  possibility	  for	  the	  Singapore	  Parliament	  to	  adopt	  the	  digital	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  in	  order	   to	   protect	   public	   interests	   over	   copyright	   owners’	   interests	   in	   the	   digital	  world.	  712	  
B. Australia	  	  	   The	  Australian	  Copyright	  Act	   does	  not	   explicitly	   regulate	   the	   exhaustion	  of	  copyright	   in	   a	   work.	   It	   seems	   that	   all	   the	   exclusive	   rights	   of	   copyright	   owners	  mentioned	   in	   Section	   31	   will	   not	   exhaust	   after	   the	   first	   sale	   of	   a	   copyrighted	  work.713	  However,	   the	   purchaser	   can	   generally	   resell	   or	   rent	   the	   good	   without	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  711	  See	  AIPPI	  Singapore	  Report	  on	  Question	  240:	  Exhaustion	  Issues	  in	  Copyright	  Law,	  2014,	  http://aippi.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/committees/240/GR240singapore.pdf	  	  (last	  visited	  Jun	  23,	  2016).	  712	  See	  Id.	  (This	  report	  provides	  reasons	  of	  disagreement	  of	  the	  digital	  exhaustion.	  First,	  it	  states	  that	  the	  ownership	  cannot	  be	  transferred	  in	  intangible	  goods	  and	  the	  exhaustion	  cannot	  occur	  without	  a	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	  Then,	  the	  exhaustion	  only	  refers	  to	  the	  distribution	  right.	  But	  in	  the	  digital	  world,	  the	  act	  of	  reproduction	  and	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  usually	  occur	  via	  downloading,	  streaming	  or	  otherwise.)	  713	  Australia	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178,	  section	  31.	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infringing	  its	  copyright	  owner’s	  right	  after	  he	  lawfully	  purchased	  the	  physical	  good	  on	  which	  there	   is	  a	   literary	  or	  artistic	  work.	  The	  reason	  of	  why	  the	  purchaser	  can	  resell	  or	  rent	  the	  good	  without	  exhaustion	  of	  copyright	  owner’s	  exclusive	  right,	  but	  rather	  that	  resell	  or	  rent	  a	  good	  does	  not	  generally	  involve	  doing	  an	  act	  comprised	  in	  the	  copyright.	  For	  instance,	  if	  the	  purchaser	  firstly	  reproduces	  the	  good	  and	  then	  sells	  the	  copy	  of	  the	  good,	  copyright	  owner	  is	  able	  to	  prevent	  such	  act	  because	  of	  the	  reproduction	  act	  that	  regulated	  by	  the	  copyright	  law.	  The	  practical	  effect	  is	  the	  same	  with	   the	   application	   of	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine.	   Further,	   there	   are	   generally	   no	  restrictions	   for	   the	   purchaser	   to	   resell	   or	   rent	   the	   goods,	   which	   can	   be	   proved	  originally	  produced	  and	  acquired	   lawfully.	  However,	   copyright	  owners	  are	  able	   to	  impose	   restrictions	   on	   the	   purchasers’	   resale	   act	   through	   contract,	   such	   as	  commercial	  distribution	  agreement.	  Once	  a	  purchaser	  enter	  into	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  copyright	  owner	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  good	  or	  to	  used	  copyrighted	  material	  in	  his	  product,	  he	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  agreement	  because	  of	  contract	  law.	  And	  such	  agreements	  may	  limit	  the	  price	  at	  which	  the	  product	  should	  be	  sold,	  the	  territories	  in	  which	  the	  product	  could	  be	  sold,	  or	  other	  conditions.	  	   As	  to	  whether	  there’s	  also	  a	  practical	  effect	  of	  online	  exhaustion,	  the	  answer	  from	  Australian	  legislation	  seems	  to	  be	  negative.	  Because	  if	  a	  purchaser	  try	  to	  sell	  or	  resale	   of	   a	   copyrighted	  work	   in	   digital	   form	   online,	   he	   is	   likely	   to	   reproduce	   and	  electronically	  communicate	  it	  in	  order	  to	  sell	  or	  resale.	  Customers	  further	  also	  need	  to	   reproduce	   the	   work	   in	   order	   to	   use	   it.	   But	   copyright	   owners	   are	   granted	   the	  exclusive	   rights	   of	   reproduction	   and	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public.	  Accordingly,	  copyright	  owners	  are	  able	  to	  control	  the	  online	  sale	  or	  resale	  of	  their	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works.	   Further,	   based	   on	   the	  Australian	   Court’s	   decisions,	   a	   person	  who	   acquires	  copyrighted	  works	  online,	  even	  with	  certain	  payment,	  he	  could	  generally	  only	  have	  the	  right	  to	  use	  the	  particular	  material.714	  It’s	  a	  license	  to	  use	  between	  the	  copyright	  owner	  and	  the	  person	  who	  acquired	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  online,	  even	  the	  use	  is	  in	  perpetuity.	   Thus	   there’s	   no	   online	   exhaustion	   in	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   in	   Australia	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly.715	  
C. Japan	  	  	   As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  section	  of	  distribution	  right,	  the	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act	  use	   the	   distribution	   right	   to	   regulate	   cinematographic	   works	   and	   the	   right	   of	  transfer	   of	   ownership	   to	   regulate	   works	   other	   than	   cinematographic	   works.	  According	  to	  the	  case	  law	  and	  the	  statute,	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  exists	  in	  both	  of	  these	  two	  rights,	  and	  only	  in	  these	  two	  rights	  in	  the	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act.716	  	  	   The	  same	  as	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  in	  Japan	  the	  trigger	  of	  exhaustion	  doctrine	   is	   the	   transfer	  of	   copyrighted	  work’s	  ownership.	   	  As	   to	  works	  other	   than	  cinematographic	  works,	  the	  Art	  26	  bis(2)	  clearly	  pointed	  that	  the	  right	  of	  transfer	  of	  ownership	   will	   exhaust	   after	   the	   lawful	   first	   sale.717	  And	   as	   to	   cinematographic	  works,	  the	  Japanese	  Supreme	  Court	  clearly	  made	  a	  distinction	  between	  (1)	  works	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  714	  See	  Centrestage	  Management	  v.	  Reidle	  [2008]	  77	  IPR	  550;	  see	  also	  Acoh	  v.	  Ucorp	  [2012]	  95	  IPR	  117.	  715	  See	  AIPPI	  Asutralia	  Report	  on	  Question	  240:	  Exhaustion	  Issues	  in	  Australian	  Copyright	  Law,	  2014,	  http://aippi.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/committees/240/GR240australia.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Jul	  18,	  2016);	  see	  also	  Australian	  Copyright	  Council,	  Information	  Sheet	  G112v02,	  Selling	  Copyright	  Material,	  2014.	  716	  It’s	  generally	  understood	  that	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction,	  the	  right	  of	  rental	  of	  copies	  to	  the	  public,	  the	  right	  of	  performance	  and	  others	  will	  not	  exhaust.	  717	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  190,	  art	  26	  bis(2).	  (“The	  provision	  of	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  shall	  not	  apply	  in	  the	  case	  of	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	  the	  original	  or	  copies	  of	  a	  work	  under	  the	  following	  conditions:	  (i)	  the	  original	  or	  copies	  of	  a	  work,	  the	  ownership	  of	  which	  has	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  public	  by	  a	  person	  so	  authorized	  under	  the	  preceding	  paragraph,	  or	  with	  his	  consent…”)	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film	   and	   their	   copies	   for	   movie	   theatres	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   a	   distribution	   system	  which	  presupposes	   the	   rental	  of	   such	   films;	  and	   (2)	   copies	  of	   film	   for	  home	  video	  game	  machines	  with	  purpose	  of	  which	  is	  not	  to	  make	  them	  available	  to	  the	  public.718	  The	  former	  one	  remains	  the	  unexhausted	  nature,	  but	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  latter	  one,	  the	  distribution	   right	  will	   exhaust	  upon	   the	   lawful	   transfer	  of	  ownership.	  Thus,	   in	  case	  of	  copies	  containing	  cinematographic	  work,	  when	  the	  purpose	  of	  which	  is	  not	  that	  of	  showing	  them	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  such	  as	  DVDs,	  the	  distribution	  right	  will	  exhaust	   after	   the	   lawful	   transfer	   of	   ownership.	   The	   Japanese	   Supreme	   Court	  provided	   the	   rationale	   for	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   that	   is	   the	   requirement	   of	   the	  smooth	  distribution	  of	  goods	  in	  the	  market	  and	  no	  need	  to	  allow	  copyright	  owners	  gain	  a	  double	  benefit.719	  	   Then,	   the	   AIPPI	   Japanese	   Report	   provided	   a	   clear	   statement	   and	   analysis	  about	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   the	   Japanese	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   could	   be	   applied	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  718	  Japanese	  Supreme	  Court,	  2001	  (Ju)	  952,	  Minshu	  Vol.56,	  No.4,	  at	  808	  (Apr	  25,	  2002).	  Available	  at	  http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=581	  	  719	  Id.	  (“	  This	  is	  because	  (1)	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  copyright	  holder	  by	  the	  Copyright	  Law	  needs	  to	  be	  realized	  in	  harmony	  with	  public	  and	  social	  interests,	  (2)	  in	  general,	  in	  cases	  of	  the	  assignment	  of	  products,	  the	  assignor	  transfers	  the	  rights	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  products	  to	  the	  assignee	  and	  the	  assignee	  acquires	  the	  rights	  which	  belonged	  to	  the	  assignor.	  In	  cases	  where	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  or	  its	  duplicate	  is	  placed	  in	  the	  market	  for	  distribution,	  the	  transaction	  is	  effected	  with	  the	  presupposition	  that	  the	  assignee	  acquires	  the	  right	  to	  reassign	  the	  products	  freely.	  If	  each	  assignment	  of	  the	  product	  or	  its	  duplicate	  requires	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  copyright	  holder	  every	  time,	  this	  would	  inhibit	  the	  free	  distribution	  of	  the	  products	  in	  the	  market,	  the	  smooth	  distribution	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  and	  its	  duplicate	  will	  be	  inhibited,	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  harm	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  copyright	  holder,	  and	  ultimately	  may	  be	  against	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Law	  which	  purports	  to	  'aim	  at	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  authors	  and	  thus	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  culture'	  (Article	  1,	  Copyright	  Law),	  (3)	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  copyright	  holder	  receives	  the	  payment	  for	  the	  assignment	  when	  he	  assigns	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  or	  its	  duplicate,	  or	  receives	  a	  royalty	  when	  licensing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  copyright,	  and	  therefore,	  is	  guaranteed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  secure	  compensation,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  allow	  a	  double	  benefit	  to	  the	  copyrightholder	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  or	  its	  duplicate	  which	  had	  been	  assigned	  by	  the	  copyrightholder	  or	  the	  licensee.”)	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digital	   world	   in	   case	   of	   downloaded	   copies	   of	   copyrighted	   works.	   The	   answer	   is	  negative,	  which	  means	  that	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  download	  copy,	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  right	  of	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   or	   other	   rights	   will	   not	   apply,	   regardless	   of	   types	   of	  works.720	  The	   report	   discussed	   this	   issue	   in	   three	   cases:	   (1)	   a	   party	   transfers	   a	  tangible	   medium	   onto	   which	   stores	   a	   downloaded	   copy	   to	   others;	   (2)	   a	   party	  transmits	  a	  downloaded	  copy	  to	  others;	  (3)	  a	  party	  uploads	  a	  downloaded	  copy	  and	  makes	  it	  downloadable	  to	  others.	  	  As	  to	  case	  (1),	  the	  copy	  that	  stored	  on	  the	  tangible	  medium	   was	   obtained	   via	   download	   but	   not	   through	   transfer	   of	   ownership.	   The	  requirement	  of	  lawful	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	  “the	  original	  or	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  work”	  cannot	  be	  met,	  thus	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  cannot	  be	  applied.	  For	  the	  case	  (2)	  and	  (3),	   there	   ‘s	   no	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   of	   a	   copy	   because	   the	   right	   of	   transfer	   of	  ownership	  requires	  to	  transfer	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  original	  or	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  work	  as	   a	   tangible	   object.	   This	   report	   also	   explicitly	   rejected	   the	   ECJ’s	   decision	   in	   the	  Usedsoft	   case,	   for	   is	   in	   Japan,	   a	   license	   (even	   a	   perpetual	   one)	   cannot	   cause	   the	  transfer	   of	   ownership	   and	   then	   result	   in	   exhaustion.	   In	   conclusion,	   Japan	   has	   not	  adopted	  the	  online	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  at	  least	  for	  now.721	   	  
v. How could Cloud Computing Affect the Exhaustion Doctrine?— A 
Proposal for China. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  720	  See	  AIPPI	  Japanese	  Report	  on	  Question	  240:	  Exhaustion	  Issues	  in	  Copyright	  Law,	  8-­‐10,	  2014.	  http://aippi.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/committees/240/GR240japan.pdf	  	  721	  Id,	  at	  16.	  (This	  report	  also	  indicates	  the	  Japanese	  further	  attitude	  towards	  online	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  with	  respect	  to	  downloaded	  copies.	  That	  is	  Japan	  may	  keep	  rejecting	  such	  doctrine,	  Japan	  insists	  that	  downloaded	  copies	  should	  be	  treated	  differently	  from	  copies	  stored	  on	  tangible	  data	  media.)	  See	  also	  Christopher,	  at	  84-­‐5.	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A. The	  affection	  of	  cloud	  computing	  towards	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  	   In	  order	  to	  analyze	  whether	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  issues	  caused	  by	  cloud	  computing	  technology,	  the	  starting	  point	  should	  be	  whether	  there’s	   online	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   exist	   around	   the	   world.	   Generally,	   nowadays,	  only	   the	   E.U.	   adopted	   the	   online	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   with	   respect	   to	   computer	  programs	   with	   permanent	   license	   and	   required	   payments	   beyond	   other	   types	   of	  works.	  All	  the	  other	  countries	  stayed	  with	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  should	   not	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   digital	   world.	   However,	   the	   debate	   is	   still	   on	   going	  nowadays.	   For	   instance,	   the	  U.S.	   scholars	   are	   providing	   reasons	   in	   supporting	   the	  digital	   first	   sale	   doctrine.	   	   Thus,	   I	   will	   analyze	   how	   cloud	   computing	   effects.	   As	   I	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section,	  there	  are	  basically	  two	  questions	  caused	  by	  the	  cloud	  computing	  are	  relevant	  to	  discussion	  about	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine.	  	   The	  first	  one	  is	  showed	  as	  the	  SaaS.	  In	  the	  cloud	  business	  models,	  particularly	  in	   the	   SaaS	  models,	   ISPs	  usually	   retain	   the	  possession	  of	   their	   software	   copies	   on	  their	  servers,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  enable	  users	  to	  remotely	  access	  and	  take	  use	  of	  the	  software.	  Users	  can	  gain	  limited	  remote	  access	  to	  software	  to	  create	  work	  products	  in	   limited	   time,	   but	  without	   taking	   possession	   of	   such	   software	   either	   in	   physical	  possession	  or	  in	  digital	  forms	  as	  a	  reproduction	  on	  their	  own	  device.	  	  Basically,	  the	  model	  works	   like	  this:	  a	  customer	  enters	   into	  an	  agreement	  with	   ISPs	  by	  paying	  a	  recurring	   fee,	   receives	  access	   credentials	   as	  user	   IDs,	   then	  he	   can	  access	   software	  provided	  by	  ISPs	  via	  simple	  web	  browsers	  from	  his	  own	  device,	  in	  the	  end	  he	  is	  able	  to	  download	  the	  work	  he	  had	  created	  with	  the	  software.	  There	  maybe	  RAM	  copies	  generate	  during	  the	  use	  of	  the	  software	  by	  the	  user	  on	  his	  own	  device,	  but	  the	  ISP	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always	   retain	   the	   copy	   of	   the	   software	   on	   their	   server.	   Thus,	   under	   such	  circumstance,	  there’s	  no	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	  the	  software	  at	  all	  no	  matter	  the	  object	   is	   tangible	  or	   intangible.	  Without	   the	   transfer	  of	  ownership,	   the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  cannot	  be	  applied.	  	   The	   second	   one	   is	   that	   people	   are	   getting	   used	   to	   purchase	   digital	   works	  online	  and	  store	  them	  in	  the	  cloud	  to	  enjoy	  them	  anywhere	  and	  anytime	  they	  want.	  For	   instance,	   people	   can	  purchase	  digital	  music	   recordings	   from	   iTunes	   store	   and	  stored	  the	   lawfully	  purchased	  files	   into	  their	  own	  iCloud	  space	  or	  Apple	  devices。	  People	  can	  also	  download	  Music	  app	  such	  as	  NetEase	  Music	  box	  from	  iTunes	  store	  or	  Android	  shop,	  by	  paying	  monthly	  fees	  or	  by	  purchasing	  songs,	  people	  are	  able	  to	  stored	   the	  music	   recording	   in	   their	   own	   cloud	  music	   locker	   and	   enjoy	   the	  music	  directly	   via	   the	   music	   box	   app	   without	   downloading.722	  As	   for	   e-­‐books,	   Amazon	  provides	   e-­‐books	   in	   the	   form	   of	   EPUB,723	  which	   can	   be	   store	   in	   devices	   such	   as	  kindle	  or	  directly	  download	  to	  Kindle	  cloud	  reader	  for	  latter	  read.724	  With	  respect	  to	  these	  downloaded	  copies,	  can	  people	  resell	  them?	  According	  to	  the	  ECJ’s	  decision	  in	  the	  UsedSoft	  case,	  it	  seems	  that	  with	  particular	  conditions	  such	  as	  the	  work	  can	  be	  used	  permanently	  with	  designed	  payment,	   the	  digital	   files	   can	  be	   resold	   since	   the	  exhaustion	   doctrine	   applied	   to	   the	   digital	   world.	   The	   limitation	   is	   that	   individual	  who	  resells	  the	  digital	  file	  had	  to	  delete	  all	  the	  copies	  of	  this	  particular	  file.	  However,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  722	  NETEASE	  MUSIC	  BOX(网易云音乐),	  https://itunes.apple.com/cn/app/wang-­‐yi-­‐yun-­‐yin-­‐le-­‐pao-­‐bufm/id590338362?l=en&mt=8	  (last	  visited	  May.	  6,	  2016)	  723	  EPUB,	  WIKIPEDIA.ORG,	  available	  at,	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPUB	  (“EPUB	  is	  an	  e-­‐book	  file	  format	  with	  the	  extension	  .epub	  that	  can	  be	  downloaded	  and	  read	  on	  devices	  like	  smartphones,	  tablets,	  computers,	  or	  e-­‐readers.”)	  724	  KINDLE	  CLOUD	  READER,	  http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200701430	  (last	  visited	  May.6,	  2016)	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according	   to	   the	   U.S.	   court	   in	   the	   ReDigi	   case,	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   cannot	   be	  applied	  where	  users	   try	   to	   resell	   their	   digital	  music	   files	   via	  ReDigi’s	   cloud	  music	  locker.	  And	  almost	  all	  the	  other	  countries	  reach	  the	  same	  conclusion	  as	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  digital	  world	  since	  there’s	  no	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  actually	  occur	  when	  user	  download	  digital	  files	  to	  their	  own	  devices	  or	  cloud	  storage	  space	  no	  matter	  with	  or	  without	  payment.	  Under	   this	   circumstance,	  how	  could	  China	  deal	  with	  the	  digital	  exhaustion	  doctrine?	  
B. China’s	  Situation	  and	  A	  Proposal	  for	  China	  	   China	  did	  not	   legislate	  a	  particular	  article	  to	  reflect	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  in	   the	  Copyright	  Law	   in	  China,	  but	   recognize	   the	  exhaustion	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  after	  the	  first	  sale	  of	  the	  work	  in	  practical	  and	  in	  theory.	  	  	   In	   practical,	   several	   cases	   actually	   apply	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine.	   And	   the	  Supreme	   People’s	   Court	   explicitly	   supported	   one	   of	   the	   cases	   in	   an	   article	   in	   its	  official	  journal:	  “The	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  in	  the	  IP	  law,	  means	  that	  a	  third	  party	  can	  legally	  use	  or	  sell	  the	  particular	  product	  without	  infringement	  after	  the	  patent	  right	  holder,	   trademark	   right	   holder	   or	   copyright	   owner	   sold	   that	   product,	   which	   was	  made	   personally	   by	   himself	   or	   by	   others	   with	   authorization.	   The	   exhaustion	  doctrine	  is	  a	  limitation	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  IP	  rights.	  It	  intends	  to	  avoid	  excessive	  monopoly	  that	  hinders	  circulation	  of	  products	  in	  the	  free	  market,	  and	  also	  to	  protect	  the	  third	  party	  to	  exercise	  his	  legal	  property	  right.”725	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  725	  See	  Shanghai	  Shanjun	  Shiye	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  Su	  Shanghai	  Jiliang	  Ruanjian	  Keji	  Youxian	  Gongsi(上海山钧实业有限公司诉上海吉量软件科技有限公司)[Shanghai	  Shanjun	  Industry	  Co.	  Ltd.	  v.	  Shanghai	  Jiliang	  Software	  Tech.	  Co.	  Ltd.]	  (Shanghai	  Super	  People’s	  Ct.	  Dec 15, 
2008);	  see	  also	  Jiangsu	  Lixiahe	  Diqu	  Nongye	  Kexue	  Yanjiusuo	  Su	  Baoyingxian	  Tianbu	  Nongzi	  Jingying	  Youxian	  Gongsi	  Qinfan	  Zhiwu	  Xinpin	  Zhongquan	  Jiufen(江苏里下河地区农业科学
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   In	   theory,	   according	   to	   Prof.	   Zheng	  Chengsi,	   the	   exhaustion	  doctrine	   in	   the	  copyright	  area	  means:	  “copyright	  owners	  exhaust	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  once	  they	  exercise	   it,	   they	   cannot	   excise	   the	   distribution	   right	   again.	   It	   also	   points	   out	   that	  once	  the	  original	  or	  copies	  of	  work	  be	  put	  into	  the	  market	  with	  the	  authorization	  of	  copyright	   owners,	   the	   copyright	   owner	   cannot	   control	   the	   further	   sale	   and	  distribution	  of	  that	  original	  or	  copies	  of	  work	  as	  goods.”726	  	   The	   former	   statements	   of	   the	   Supreme	   People’s	   Court	   and	   Prof.	   Zheng	  Chengsi	  enable	  I	  to	  conclude	  the	  conditions	  of	  exhaustion	  in	  Chinese	  literature.	  First,	  when	  the	  original	  or	  copies	  of	  works	  be	  put	  into	  market	  to	  be	  distributed,	  it	  must	  be	  made	   under	   the	   authorization	   of	   the	   copyright	   owner	   of	   the	  work.	   Second,	   there	  must	  be	  a	   transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	   the	  good.	  Third,	   there	  should	  be	  no	  more	  new	  copies	   of	   the	   work	   in	   the	   further	   distribution.	   I	   would	   like	   to	   limit	   the	   third	  condition	   here	   as	   there	   can	   be	   new	   copy	   of	   the	  work,	   but	   the	   total	   number	   of	   it	  cannot	  be	  increased,	  because	  I	  myself	  support	  the	  idea	  to	  apply	  a	  digital	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  in	  China.	  However,	  as	  for	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  digital	  world,	  most	  Chinese	   scholars	  provide	   a	  negative	   answer	  based	  on	   the	   following	   reasons.	  First,	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   was	   legislated	   because	   of	   the	   clash	   between	   the	  traditional	  property	  right	  and	  the	  distribution	  right	  under	  the	  copyright	  law.	  Under	  the	   traditional	   form	   of	   distribution,	   copyrighted	   work	   has	   to	   be	   distributed	   in	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
研究所诉宝应县天补农资经营有限公司侵犯植物新品种权纠纷案)[Jiangsu Lixiahe Acad. 
Agric. Sic. v.  Baoying Tianbu Agric. Co. Ltd.](Jiangsu Super People’s Ct. Oct 27, 2008). See 
also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao(中华人民共和国最高人民
法院公报)No. 160 [P.R.C. Gazette of Sup. People’s Ct.] (2010).	  726	  Zheng	  Chengsi(郑成思).	  Banquanfa(版权法)[Copyright	  Law](2009),	  	  at	  293.	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tangible	   form.	  Without	  a	   tangible	   form,	  copyrighted	  work	  cannot	  be	  distributed	  at	  all.	  	  If	  the	  copyright	  owner	  remains	  his	  distribution	  right	  after	  distribution,	  owners’	  property	   right	   towards	   the	   tangible	   good	   on	   which	   stored	   the	   copyrighted	   work	  thus	  cannot	  be	  complete.	  	  However,	  there’s	  no	  requirement	  of	  tangible	  goods	  in	  the	  distribution	   of	   copyrighted	  works	   online.	   There’s	   no	   conflict	   between	   the	   right	   of	  distribution	   and	   property	   right	   any	   longer.	   Thus	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   is	   not	  needed	   anymore.	   Second,	   transmission	   of	  works	   online	   results	   in	   reproduction	   of	  the	  works.	  If	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  applies	  to	  the	  online	  transmission,	  it	  is	  actually	  being	  applied	  to	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction.	  Such	  result	  is	  conflict	  with	  the	  traditional	  theory	   of	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction—	   the	   right	   of	   reproduction	   does	   not	   exhaust.	  Third	  is	  that	  current	  technology	  cannot	  ensure	  there	  are	  no	  copies	  remain	  with	  the	  owner	  who	  transmit	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  to	  others.727	  	  Further	  some	  scholars	  even	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  the	  distribution	  right	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  digital	  world,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  distribution	  right	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  digital	  world	  either.	  	  	   However,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  digital	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  to	  limit	  the	  digital	  distribution	   right.	  The	  most	   fundamental	   reason	  of	  my	  conclusion	   is	   to	  keep	   the	   dedicate	   balance	   between	   the	   interests	   of	   users	   and	   copyright	   owners.	  	  Users	   have	   the	   interests	   to	   access	   copyrighted	  works,	   and	   copyright	   owners	  have	  the	  right	   to	  control	   the	  work	  during	   the	   term	  of	   copyright	  protection.	   If	   copyright	  law	  expanded	  copyright	  owner’s	  distribution	  right	  in	  the	  digital	  world,	  users	  should	  also	   gain	  more	   protection	   to	   limit	   the	   result	   caused	   by	   the	   expanded	   distribution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  727	  See	  Wang	  Qian,	  supra	  note	  473,	  at	  100-­‐110.	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right.	   Further,	   the	   technology	   cannot	   be	   an	   excuse	   for	   avoiding	   the	   digital	  exhaustion	  doctrine.	  There’s	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  technology	  will	  develop	  very	  fast,	  one	  cannot	  step	  back	  from	  the	  legal	  loop	  we	  have	  already	  realized.	  And	  there’s	  evidence	  of	  ReDigi	  had	  already	  successfully	  made	  a	  useful	  “forward-­‐and	  –delete”	  software	  to	  solve	  the	  issue	  caused	  by	  technology.	  Third,	  some	  scholars	  argued	  their	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  the	  digital	  exhaustion	  doctrine	   is	   that	  copyright	  owners’	   interests	  will	  be	  decreased	  since	  users	  may	  tend	  to	  purchase	  “used”	  digital	  works	  online.	  The	  quality	  of	   digital	  works	  will	   never	   degraded	   and	   the	   distribution	   via	   Internet	  will	   not	   be	  limited	  geographically.	  Therefore,	  what	  if	  copyright	  owners	  can	  gain	  royalties	  from	  each	   sale	   of	   their	   works	   in	   digital	   form?	   Follow	   the	   instance	   of	   how	   copyright	  owners	  cooperate	  with	  online	  music	  radio—	  they	  gain	  certain	  royalties	  when	  their	  works	   have	   been	   played	   for	   certain	   times	   via	   the	   online	   music	   radio,	   copyright	  owners	   can	   also	   gain	   similar	   royalties	   from	   the	   resale	   of	   digital	  works	   via	   certain	  website	   such	   as	   ReDigi.	   	   Forth,	   what	   China	   needs	   now	   is	   to	   keep	   up	   pace	   with	  world’s	   development.	   If	   the	   E.U.	   and	   the	   U.S.	   explicitly	   extend	   the	   existing	  exhaustion	  doctrine	   to	   the	  digital	  world,	  we	  may	  consider	  adopt	   it	  under	  our	  own	  context..	   If	   they	   create	   a	   new	   limitation	   toward	   digital	   distribution,	   we	   should	  consider	  it	  under	  the	  actual	  circumstance	  of	  China	  and	  then	  adopted	  it	  rationally.	  	  	   In	   conclusion,	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   exhaustion	   doctrine	   in	   China,	   in	   my	  proposal,	  China	  should	  try	  to	  reflect	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  into	  the	  statute.	  And	  then,	  follow	  the	  future	  trend	  of	  adopting	  the	  digital	  exhaustion	  doctrine.	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II. Fair	  Use—Legal	  Exceptions	  or	  Limitations	  	   Copyright	   owners’	   right	   must	   be	   protected	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   the	  development	   of	   art,	   science	   and	   literature.	   Meanwhile,	   there’s	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	  public	   should	   also	   have	   the	   access	   to	   such	   protected	   works	   to	   gain	   useful	  information	  to	  benefit	  the	  whole	  society	  and	  live	  a	  better	  life.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	   delicate	   balance	   between	   copyright	   owners	   and	   the	   public,	   once	   copyright	  owners	  gain	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  control	  their	  copyrighted	  works,	  public	  should	  also	  have	   privileges	   under	   some	   circumstance	   to	   use	   these	   copyrighted	   works.	   This	  privilege	   should	   enable	   public	   to	   access	   copyrighted	   work	   without	   infringing	  copyright	   even	   without	   copyright	   owners’	   consents.	   In	   international	   copyright	  conventions	   or	   national	   copyright	   laws,	   legislators	   usually	   use	   “limitations”	   and	  “exceptions”	  as	  vehicles	  to	  regulate	  public’s	  privilege	  in	  using	  copyright	  works.	  728	  	  	   The	  Berne	  Convention	  included	  a	  three-­‐step	  test	  to	  control	  the	  reproduction.	  The	  three-­‐step	  test	  is	  a	  criterion	  for	  estimating	  exceptions	  to	  copyright	  to	  determine	  whether	   a	   use	   of	   copyrighted	  works	   is	   lawful	   or	   not.729	  Article	   9	   (2)	   of	   the	  Berne	  Convention	   stated	   the	  possible	   exceptions	   to	   the	   reproduction	   right:	   “It	   shall	   be	   a	  matter	   for	   legislation	   in	   the	   countries	   of	   the	  Union	   to	   permit	   the	   reproduction	   of	  such	   works	   in	   certain	   special	   cases,	   provided	   that	   such	   reproduction	   does	   not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  and	  does	  not	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  728	  See	  Ginsburg	  &	  Treppoz,	  supra	  note	  492	  ,	  at	  436.	  	  729	  Sam	  Ricketson,	  The	  Three-­‐step	  Test,	  Deemed	  Quantities,	  Libraries	  and	  Closed	  Exceptions	  2	  (2002),	  available	  at	  http://copyright.com.au/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/08/CCS0202-­‐Ricketson.pdf	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the	   legitimate	   interest	   of	   the	   author.”730	  According	   to	   this	   statement,	   an	   act	   of	  reproduction	  without	  certain	  consent	  will	  not	  infringe	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  if	  it	  conforms	   to	   three	   requirements	   :(1)	   in	   certain	   special	   cases;	   (2)	   which	   does	   not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work;	  (3)	  which	  should	  not	  unreasonable	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  authors.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Berner’s	  three-­‐step	  test	  only	  covers	  the	  reproduction	  right.	  	   TRIPs,	  WPPT	  and	  WCT	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  and	  further	  adopted	  it	  and	  extended	  its	  scope	  to	  cover	  all	  types	  of	  exclusive	  rights.	  Art	  13	   of	   TRIPs	   requires	   that	   all	   members	   shall	   add	   limitations	   or	   exceptions	   to	  exclusive	  rights,	  and	  the	  conditions	  for	  adding	  such	  limitations	  and	  exceptions	  are:	  (1)	  to	  certain	  special	  cases;	  (2)	  which	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	   and	   (3)	   do	   not	   unreasonably	   prejudice	   the	   legitimate	   interests	   of	   the	   right	  holder.731	  The	   legislators	  did	  not	   limit	   the	  scope	  of	  concept	  of	   “exclusive	  rights”	   in	  Art	   13	   as	   legislators	   did	   in	   Berne	   Conventions,	   thus	   it’s	   obvious	   that	   the	   Berne’s	  scope	  of	  three-­‐step	  test	  had	  been	  extended	  from	  simply	  the	  right	  of	  reproduction	  to	  other	   exclusive	   rights.	  732	  Art	   10	   of	   WCT	   and	   Art	   16	   of	   WPPT	   also	   extended	   the	  scope	  of	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  when	  adopted	  the	  basic	  Berner’s	  three-­‐step	  test.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  730	  Berner	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  226,art	  9(2).	  (Art	  10	  &10bis	  also	  listed	  several	  free	  use,	  such	  as	  quotations,	  illustrations	  for	  teaching,	  indication	  of	  source	  and	  author,	  and	  free	  use	  of	  certain	  articles	  and	  broadcast	  works	  or	  works	  seen	  or	  heard	  in	  connection	  with	  current	  events.)	  731	  TRIPs,	  supra	  note	  618,	  art	  13.	  732	  WCT,	  supra	  note	  230,	  art	  10	  (“(1)	  Contracting	  Parties	  may,	  in	  their	  national	  legislation,	  provide	  for	  limitations	  of	  or	  exceptions	  to	  the	  rights	  granted	  to	  authors	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  works	  under	  this	  Treaty	  in	  certain	  special	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  and	  do	  not	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  author.	  (2)	  Contracting	  Parties	  shall,	  when	  applying	  the	  Berne	  Convention,	  confine	  any	  limitations	  of	  or	  exceptions	  to	  rights	  provided	  for	  therein	  to	  certain	  special	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  conflict	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   The	   three-­‐step	   test	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   guiding	   principle	   since	   all	   the	  international	   treaties	   that	   stipulated	   it.	   Member	   states	   of	   those	   international	  treaties	   shall	   accordingly	  make	   a	   reasonable	   adoption	   of	   it	   by	   satisfying	  domestic	  social	   cultural,	   and	   economic	   needs.733	  This	   provision	   provided	  much	  more	   room	  than	   the	   specific	   exceptions	   recognized	   in	   international	   law.	   In	   adopting	   this	  provision	  of	  three-­‐step	  test,	  countries	  made	  different	  efforts.	  	  
i. The U.S. Part—Fair Use 	   Copyright	   Act	   adds	   numbers	   of	   limitations	   on	   copyright	   owners’	   exclusive	  rights.	   In	   the	   digital	   world,	   Internet	   service	   providers,	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   ISPs	  provide	  cloud	  services,	  are	   favoring	   in	  using	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  as	  their	  defense.	  The	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   allows	   a	   defendant	   use	   a	   copyrighted	   work	   without	   the	  copyright	  owner’s	  consent	  and	  not	  being	   liable	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  where	  an	  infringement	   can	   be	   proven.734	  Thus,	   it’s	   quite	   simple	   for	   an	   individual	   to	   use	   the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  as	  a	  possible	  defense	  when	  facing	  a	  copyright	  infringement	  lawsuit.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  and	  do	  not	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  author.”)	  WPPT,	  art16(2).(	  2)	  Contracting	  Parties	  shall	  confine	  any	  limitations	  of	  or	  exceptions	  to	  rights	  provided	  for	  in	  this	  Treaty	  to	  certain	  special	  cases	  which	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  performance	  or	  phonogram	  and	  do	  not	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  performer	  or	  of	  the	  producer	  of	  the	  phonogram.”)	  Based	  on	  these	  two	  treaties,	  it’s	  obvious	  that	  not	  only	  the	  right	  of	  author	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  works	  but	  also	  the	  right	  of	  performers	  and	  producers	  of	  phonogram	  are	  limited	  under	  the	  three-­‐step	  test.	  733	  See	  Martin	  Senftleben,	  The	  International	  Three-­‐Step	  Test:	  A	  Model	  Provision	  for	  EC	  fair	  use	  
Legislation,	  1	  J.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  INFO.	  TECH.	  &	  E-­‐COMMERCE	  L.	  67,	  67	  (2010).	  734	  See	  Rosemont	  Enters.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Random	  House,	  Inc.,	  366	  F.2d	  303	  306	  (2d	  Cir.	  1966).(The	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “privilege	  in	  others	  than	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  copyright	  to	  use	  the	  copyrighted	  material	  in	  a	  reasonable	  manner	  without	  consent,	  notwithstanding	  the	  granted	  to	  the	  owner	  monopoly.”)	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   The	  purpose	  of	  codifying	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  is	  to	  promote	  the	  “progress	  of	  science	  and	  useful	  arts”	  by	  allowing	  the	  use	  other	  than	  preventing	  it.735	  Under	  this	  purpose,	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  developed	  through	  case	  law,	  and	  it	  was	  finally	  codified	  by	  Congress	  into	  the	  1976	  Copyright	  Act.	  The	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  is	  “an	  unremunerated	  exception	  of	  overarching	  general	  application,”	  besides	  different	  kinds	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	   and	   specific	   exceptions	   to	   the	   public	   performance	   right. 736 	  However,	  Congress	  didn’t	  give	  a	  precise	  definition	  to	  the	  term	  “fair	  use,”	  instead	  it	  lists	  several	  kinds	  of	  use	  that	  usually	  conform	  to	  the	  defense	  in	  its	  preamble	  and	  provides	  four	  criteria	   that	  must	   all	   be	   applied	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   defense	   succeeds.	   The	  following	  part	  will	  analyze	  both	  the	  preamble	  and	  the	  four	  criteria.	  
A. Productive	  Use	  (Transformative	  Use)	  Theory	  in	  the	  Preamble	  	   According	  to	  §107	  preamble,	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  permits	  reproduction	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  or	  by	  any	  other	  means	  without	   the	  copyright	  owner’s	   consent,	  “for	   purpose	   such	   as	   criticism,	   comment,	   news	   reporting,	   teaching	   (including	  multiple	   copies	   for	   classroom	   use),	   scholarship,	   or	   research…”737Based	   on	   the	  statement	  of	   the	  preamble,	   judges	  and	  scholars	   realized	   that	  all	   these	  uses	  can	  be	  deemed	  as	  “productive”	  use	  (transformative	  use).738	  Judge	  Leval	  stated	  in	  his	  1990	  article	  that	  a	  transformative	  use	  “must	  be	  productive	  and	  must	  employ	  the	  quoted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  735	  See	  Castel	  Rock	  Entm’t,	  Inc.	  v.	  Carol	  Publ’g	  Grp.,	  Inc.,	  150	  F.3d	  132,141	  (2d	  Cir	  1998).	  (	  The	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  is	  a	  doctrine	  of	  equity	  that	  permits	  certain	  uses	  of	  copyrighted	  works,	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  copyright	  holder’s	  individual	  economic	  interests	  and	  the	  public’s	  interest	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  new	  works	  by	  using	  works	  that	  have	  come	  before	  them.)	  736	  See	  Ginsburg	  &	  Treppoz	  supra	  note	  492,	  at	  473.	  737	  17	  U.S.C.	  §107.	  738	  See	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  490-­‐92.	  (“	  A	  productive	  use	  should	  be	  impeded	  only	  when	  it	  is	  so	  excessive	  as	  to	  undermine	  the	  incentive	  to	  produce	  copyrighted	  works.	  On	  the	  other	  had,	  non-­‐productive	  use	  merely	  appropriates	  without	  creating	  anything	  of	  social	  value.”)	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matter	  in	  a	  different	  manner	  or	  for	  a	  different	  purpose	  from	  the	  orginal…,”	  and	  “the	  secondary	   use	   adds	   value	   to	   the	   original—if	   the	   quoted	   matter	   is	   used	   as	   raw	  material,	   transformed	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   information,	   new	   aesthetics,	   new	  insights	   and	   understandings….”739	  Judge	   Leval	   also	   pointed	   that	   “a	   quotation	   of	  copyrighted	  material	  that	  merely	  repackages	  or	  republishes	  the	  original	  is	  unlikely	  to	   pass	   the	   test.”740	  Thus,	   “a	   nonproductive	   use	   (reproductive	   use)	   occurs	  when	   a	  user	   copies	   the	   material	   to	   use	   it	   for	   the	   same	   intrinsic	   purpose	   for	   which	   the	  copyright	  owner	  intended	  it	  to	  be	  used.”741	  	  Judge	  Leval’s	  transformative	  use	  theory	  had	  been	  applied	  by	  all	  courts.	  	  He	  himself	  ruled	  that	  reproduction	  of	  a	  single	  copy	  from	  the	  plaintiff’s	  journals	  is	  not	  a	  transformative	  use	  even	  it’s	  used	  for	  a	  research	  purpose,	   thus	   there’s	   no	   fair	   use.742	  	   Further,	   in	   the	   Campbell	   v.	   Acuff-­‐Rose,	   the	  Supreme	   Court	   explicitly	   supported	   the	   transformative	   use	   theory	   by	   stating	   “the	  goal	  of	  copyright,	  to	  promote	  science	  and	  arts,	  is	  generally	  furthered	  by	  the	  creation	  of	   transformative	  works.”743	  After	   this	  case,	   judges	  assess	  whether	   the	  defendant’s	  use	  is	  transformative	  in	  virtually	  all	  fair	  use	  decisions.	  	  	   However,	  besides	  the	  case	  law,	  the	  transformative	  use	  theory	  is	  not	  endorsed	  by	  the	  language	  of	  the	  statute	  or	  by	  the	  legislative	  history.	  Some	  courts	  either	  took	  an	   expansion	   view	   of	   the	   transformative	   use	   theory	   or	   directly	   rejected	   it.	   	   For	  instance,	   the	   2nd	   Circuit	   adopted	   an	   expansive	   view	   that	   it	   constitutes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  739	  Pierre	  N.	  Leval,	  Commentary,	  Toward	  a	  Fair	  Use	  Standard,	  103	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1105,	  1111(1990).	  740	  Id.	  741	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  490.	  742	  Am.	  Geophysical	  Union	  v.	  Texaco,	  Inc.,	  802	  F.	  Supp.	  1	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1992).	  743	  Campbell	  v.	  Acuff-­‐Rose	  Music,	  Inc.,	  510	  U.S.	  569,	  579	  (1994).	  (A	  commercial	  parody	  can	  qualify	  as	  fair	  use.)	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transformative	   use	   where	   the	   copyrighted	   work	   is	   used	   in	   an	   entirely	   different	  context	   in	   the	   Blanch	   v.	   Koons.744	  In	   this	   case,	   the	  2nd	   Circuit	   held	   that	   since	   the	  defendant	   did	   not	   use	   the	   image	   of	   the	   woman’s	   feet	   for	   the	   same	   intent	   of	   the	  original	   photograph	   and	   such	  usage	  was	  not	  merely	   a	   change	   of	   artistic	  media	   or	  venue,	  the	  defendant’s	  use	  was	  transformative.745	  Then	  in	  the	  Perfect	  10	  v.	  Google,	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  further	  expanded	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  transformative	  use	  in	  the	  digital	  world.746	  In	   this	  case,	   the	  defendant	  Google,	  which	   is	   famous	   for	   its	  search	  engine,	  provides	   responses	   to	   search	   queries	   in	   the	   form	   of	   images.	   It	   is	   called	   “Google	  Image	   Search,”	   and	   the	   search	   results	   are	  provided	   as	   a	  webpage	  of	   small	   images	  called	   thumbnails.	   The	   thumbnails	   are	   reduced,	   lower-­‐resolution	   version	   of	   full-­‐sized	  images	  stored	  on	  third-­‐party	  servers.747	  The	  9th	  Circuit	  determined	  that	  “even	  making	  an	  exact	  copy	  of	  a	  work	  may	  be	  transformative	  so	  long	  as	  the	  copy	  serves	  a	  different	  function	  than	  the	  original	  work,”	  and	  “here,	  Google	  uses	  Perfect	  10’s	  image	  in	  a	  new	  context	  to	  serve	  a	  different	  purpose.”748	  Thus	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  concluded	  that	  Google’s	   reproductions	   of	   the	   plaintiff’s	   work	   in	   thumbnails	   were	   transformative	  use.	  	  	  	   However,	   in	   the	   Betamax	   case	   (the	   famous	   Sony	   rule	   case),	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  even	  if	  a	  usage	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  transformative	  use,	  it	  could	  still	  fall	  within	   the	   category	   of	   fair	   use.	   This	   case	   expanded	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   fair	   use	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  744	  Blanch	  v.	  Koons,	  467	  F.3d	  244	  (2d	  Cir.	  2006).	  745	  Id.	  746	  Perfect	  10	  v.	  Google,	  508	  F.3d	  1154	  (9th	  Cir.2007).	  747	  Id,	  1155.	  748	  Id,	  1165.	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doctrine.749	  The	  defendant	  Sony	  manufactured	  video	  cassette	  recorder	  that	  enables	  purchasers	  to	  tape	  free	  TV	  programs	  for	  a	  time-­‐shifting	  purpose.	  The	  plaintiff	  sued	  the	   defendant	   Sony	   as	   a	   contributory	   infringer	   for	   supplying	   the	   direct	   infringer.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  cited	  the	  House	  Report	  to	  prove	  that	  fair	  use	  should	  be	  deemed	  as	   a	   broader	   term	   and	   be	   determined	   case	   by	   case,	   rather	   than	   limit	   it	   to	  transformative	  use	   theory.750	  The	   act	   at	   issue	  of	   taping	   free	   airwave	  TV	  programs	  was	  a	  private,	  noncommercial	  use.	  Although	  it	  was	  not	  a	  transformative	  use,	  it	  still	  constituted	   a	   fair	   use	   because	   it	   has	   no	   harm	   to	   the	  market	   from	   an	   economical	  point	   of	   view.	   Thus,	   based	   on	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision,	   a	   defendant	   can	   still	  successfully	  raise	  a	  fair	  use	  defense	  even	  its	  use	  cannot	  fulfill	  the	  transformative	  use	  theory.	  	  	   In	  the	  digital	  world,	  the	  transformative	  use	  theory	  had	  been	  challenged	  again,	  because	  all	   content	   can	  be	  ultimately	   reduced	   to	  bytes.	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	  A.V.	  v.	  iParadigms	   case,	   the	  4th	   Circuit	   ruled	   that	   the	   defendant’s	   digital	   archiving	   of	   the	  plaintiff’s	   school	   papers	   for	   a	   software	   system	   which	   was	   designed	   to	   detect	  plagiarism	  was	  transformative	  use,	  thus	  such	  use	  constitute	  fair	  use.751	  However,	  in	  the	  UMG	  Recordings	   v.	  MP3.Com	   case,	   the	  district	   court	   held	   that	   the	  defendant’s	  “space	  shifting”	  service	  which	  eliminate	  users’	  need	  for	  physical	  CD	  copies	  of	  their	  musical	  collections	  was	  not	  a	  transformative	  use.	  Such	  use	  was	  not	  a	  fair	  use	  even	  when	  previous	  ownership	  was	  demonstrated	  before	  a	  download	  was	  allowed.752	  It’s	  obvious	  that	  only	  apply	  the	  transformative	  use	  theory	  in	  determining	  whether	  a	  fair	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  749	  Betamax	  case,	  supra	  note	  79.	  	  750	  Id,	  at	  448-­‐50.	  751	  A.V.	  v.	  iParadigms,	  LLC,	  562	  F.3d	  630,	  640	  (4th	  Cir.	  2009).	  752	  UMG	  Recordings,	  Inc.	  v.	  MP3.	  Com,	  Inc.,	  92	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  349,	  351	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2000).	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use	  defense	   is	  valid	   is	  not	  enough.	  Therefore,	   the	   four	  criteria	  need	   to	  be	  brought	  into	  the	  discussion	  of	  whether	  there’s	  a	  fair	  use.	  
B. Four	  Criteria	  of	  the	  Fair	  Use	  Doctrine	  	   As	  mentioned,	  a	  defendant	  can	  still	  raise	  a	  successful	  fair	  use	  defense	  without	  qualifying	   as	   a	   transformative	   use.	   Four	   criteria	   in	   §107	   must	   be	   applied	   to	  determine	  whether	   the	  use	   is	   fair	  use.	  The	   four	   criteria	   are:	   “(1)	   the	  purpose	  and	  character	  of	  the	  use,	  including	  whether	  such	  use	  is	  of	  a	  commercial	  nature	  or	  is	  for	  nonprofit	   educational	   purposes;	   (2)	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   copyrighted	   work;	   (3)	   the	  amount	  and	  substantiality	  of	  the	  portion	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  as	  a	   whole;	   (4)	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   use	   upon	   the	   potential	   market	   for	   or	   value	   of	   the	  copyrighted	   work.”753 	  Whether	   a	   copyrighted	   work	   is	   fairly	   used	   usually	   was	  decided	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  The	  statutory	  factors	  cannot	  be	  “treated	  in	  isolation”	  but	   should	  be	   “weighed	   together,	   in	   light	  of	   the	  purposes	  of	   copyright.”754	  But	   the	  courts	  can	  also	  consider	  other	   factors	  rather	  than	  be	   limited	  to	  these	  four	  criteria.	  For	   instance,	  whether	   a	   defendant	  made	   a	   use	   of	   the	   copyrighted	  work	   in	   a	   good	  faith	  is	  always	  an	  important	  factor,	  but	  most	  includes	  in	  these	  four	  criteria.	  	  	   As	   to	   the	   first	   factor—purpose	   of	   the	   use,	   the	   courts	   usually	   consider	  whether	   the	  use	  constitute	   transformative	  use.	  And	   then,	  whether	   the	  use	   itself	   is	  commercial	   always	   influences	   the	   Judges’	   determination	   of	   fair	   use.755	  Generally,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  753	  17	  U.S.C.	  §107.	  754	  iParadigms	  case,	  supra	  note	  752,	  at	  638,	  755	  See	  Betamax	  case,	  supra	  note	  79,	  at	  451.	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once	   a	   use	   is	   commercial,	   a	   defendant’s	   fair	   use	   defense	   may	   easily	   fail.756	  The	  commercial	  nature	  means	  that	  a	  defendant	  can	  make	  an	  economic	  benefit	  with	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  work.	  And	   the	  use	  can	  still	  be	  commercial	  even	   the	  purpose	  of	  such	   use	   is	   a	   transformative	   use	   such	   as	   for	   news	   reporting,	   for	   education	   or	  otherwise.	  	  	   With	  respect	  to	  the	  second	  factor—	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work,	  there	  are	   two	   issue	   involved.	   	   The	   first	   one	   is	  whether	   the	   copyrighted	  work	   has	   been	  published,	   and	   the	   second	  one	   is	  whether	   the	   copyrighted	  work	   is	   informative	   or	  creative.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  “the	  unpublished	  nature	  of	  a	  work	  is	  a	  key,	  though	   not	   necessarily	   determinative,	   factor,	   tending	   to	   negate	   a	   defense	   of	   fair	  use.”757	  It	   means	   “the	   author’s	   right	   to	   control	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   work	   may	  outweigh	  an	  extensive	  fair	  use	  privilege.”758	  	  But	  it	  also	  should	  be	  known	  that	  a	  fair	  use	  defense	  will	  not	  fail	  simply	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  work	  is	  unpublished.759	  As	   for	   the	   second	   issue,	   it	   was	   proposed	   because	   of	   the	   fundamental	   goal	   the	  copyright	  law,	  which	  is	  to	  “promote	  the	  progress	  of	  science	  and	  useful	  arts.”	  A	  useful	  way	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal	  is	  to	  increase	  people’s	  knowledge	  and	  information.	  Thus,	  a	  work	  for	  informational	  use	  such	  as	  scientific,	  historical	  or	  medical	  science	  works	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  gain	  successful	  fair	  use	  defense	  than	  a	  use	  of	  works	  of	  entertainment.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  756	  See	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  496.	  (“	  A	  commercial	  purpose	  will	  not	  conclusively	  negate	  a	  finding	  of	  fair	  use,	  but	  a	  court	  should	  not	  strain	  to	  apply	  the	  fair	  use	  defense	  when	  it	  is	  being	  invoked	  by	  a	  profitmaking	  defendant.”)	  757	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  Publishers,	  Inc.	  v.	  Nation	  Enterprises.,	  471	  U.S.	  539	  554	  (1985).	  758	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  497.	  759	  17	  U.S.C.	  §107.(“The	  fact	  that	  a	  work	  is	  unpublished	  shall	  not	  itself	  bar	  a	  finding	  of	  fair	  use	  if	  such	  finding	  is	  made	  upon	  consideration	  of	  all	  the	  above	  factors.”)	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   Then,	   for	   the	   third	   factor—	   the	   amount	   of	   copyrighted	   works	   being	   used,	  generally,	   the	  more	   the	   defendant	   had	   taken	   from	   the	   copyrighted	  work,	   the	   less	  likely	  the	  fair	  use	  test	  will	  be	  passed.760	  Further,	  the	  court	  should	  also	  consider	  the	  quality	   and	   importance	   of	   the	   used	   portions.761“This	   factor	   properly	   focuses	   on	  whether	  the	  defendant	  has	  taken	  more	  than	  necessary	  to	  satisfy	  the	  specific	  fair	  use	  purpose.”762	  When	  apply	  this	  factor	  to	  the	  digital	  world,	  such	  as	  upload	  or	  download	  service	   via	   cloud,	   with	   the	   convenient	   and	   rapid	   reproduction	   or	   transmission	  technology,	   the	   whole	   copyrighted	   works	   can	   be	   reproduced	   or	   transmitted	   in	   a	  second.	   	  A	  defendant	  provides	  online	  service	  may	  easily	  fail	  on	  this	  factor	  to	  prove	  fair	  use.	  	   The	   forth	   factor—	   the	   effect	   upon	   the	   potential	  market,	  which	   is	   the	  most	  significant	  one	  in	  determining	  fair	  use.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  a	  copyright	  owner	  wishes	  to	  keep	  a	  exploitable	  potential	  market	  for	  its	  copyrighted	  work.	  Failure	  to	  preserve	  a	   potential	   exploitable	   market	   will	   harm	   a	   copyright	   owner’s	   incentives	   for	  creativity,	   which	   are	   explicitly	   protected	   by	   copyright	   law.	   When	   weighing	   this	  factor,	   there’s	   no	  need	  of	   actual	   harm	   to	   be	  proved.	   	   The	   court	   “will	   consider	   not	  only	   the	  extent	  of	  market	  harm	  caused	  by	   the	  particular	  actions	  of	   the	  defendant,	  but	   also	   whether	   the	   widespread	   conduct	   of	   the	   kind	   that	   the	   defendant	   has	  engaged	   in	  would	  result	   in	  a	  substantially	  adverse	   impact	  on	   the	  potential	  market	  for	  the	  original.”763	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  760	  Betamax	  case,	  supra	  note	  79,	  at	  449-­‐50.	  761	  Sundeman	  v.	  Seajay	  Society,	  Inc.,	  142	  F.	  3d	  194,	  201-­‐08	  (4th	  Cir.	  1998).	  (It	  also	  should	  be	  known	  that	  even	  a	  relatively	  small	  portion	  may	  cause	  copyright	  infringement.)	  762	  Leaffer,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  499.	  763	  Id,	  at	  501.	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C. Napster	  Case,	  ReDigi	  Case	  and	  Google	  books	  Case	  –	  Application	  of	  the	  Fair	  Use	  
Doctrine	  in	  the	  Digital	  World	  	   In	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  to	  apply	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  in	  the	  digital	  world,	  there	  are	  three	  important	  cases:	  Napster,	  ReDigi	  and	  Google	  books.	  	   In	  the	  Napster	  case,	  as	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  defendant	  Napster	  provided	  P2P	   file	   sharing	   service	   for	   users.	   It	   enabled	   users	   to	   access	   and	   download	  compressed	   digital	   music	   files	   from	   other	   Napster	   users’	   computers.764	  Napster	  alleged	   three	   fair	   uses	   of	   its	   service:	   (1)	   it	  merely	   provide	   access	   to	   “samples”	   of	  music,	   users	   can	   make	   temporary	   copies	   before	   they	   actually	   purchased	   music	  recordings;	  (2)	  it’s	  a	  “space-­‐shifting”	  service,	  which	  enabled	  users	  to	  access	  to	  music	  recordings	  that	  they	  already	  own	  in	  a	  tangible	  CD	  form;	  (3)	  it	  provided	  permissive	  distribution	  of	  recordings.765	  The	  9th	  Circuit	  ruled	  that	  “downloading	  MP3	  files	  does	  not	   transform	   the	   copyrighted	   work,”	   merely	   transmitted	   the	   original	   work	   in	   a	  different	  medium	  is	  not	  fair	  use.766	  As	  for	  the	  first	  criteria,	  the	  9th	  circuit	  ruled	  that	  “repeated	  and	  exploitative	  unauthorized	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  works”	  would	  result	  in	  saving	  the	  expense	  of	  purchasing	  authorized	  copies,	  therefore	  a	  commercial	  use	  existed.767	  Then,	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work,	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  affirmed	  that	  the	   music	   recordings	   in	   question	   are	   “closer	   to	   the	   core	   of	   intended	   copyright	  protection”	  as	  creative	  works.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  musical	  recordings	  is	  against	  a	  find	  of	   fair	   use.768	  Third,	   the	  9th	   Circuit	   admitted	   that	   “wholesale	   copying”	   of	   a	   work	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  764	  Napster	  case,	  supra	  note	  513.	  765	  Id,	  at	  1014.	  766	  Id,	  at	  1015.	  767	  Id.	  768	  Id,	  at	  1016.	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might	  be	  protected	  in	  some	  cases	  such	  as	  time-­‐shifting.	  But	  in	  this	  case,	   it	  was	  not	  the	  same	  case.769	  At	  last,	  the	  9th	  Circuit	  affirmed	  that	  widespread	  entirely	  transfer	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  music	  recordings	  harm	  the	  potential	  market	   for	  CD	  sales,	  and	   it	  also	  jeopardizes	  the	  record	  industry’s	  future	  in	  the	  digital	  markets.770	  	   With	   regarding	   to	   the	   cloud	   computing	   technology,	   the	   ReDigi	   case	   is	   the	  most	  relevant	  here	  where	  the	  defendant	  actually	  tried	  to	  raise	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  as	  a	  defense.771	  The	  defendant	  ReDigi	  allows	  users	   to	  upload	  to	  or	  download	   from	  Cloud	   Locker	   music	   recordings.	   ReDigi	   claimed	   that	   such	   uploading	   and	  downloading	   actions	   were	   for	   personal	   use	   and	   storage,	   therefore	   should	   be	  protected	  as	  fair	  use.772	  The	  Court	  indicate	  that	  those	  several	  examples	  listed	  in	  the	  transformative	  use	  merely	  illustrate	  the	  typical	  types,	  and	  the	  court	  will	  not	  simply	  made	  a	  conclusion	  without	  considering	  the	  four	  criteria	  of	   fair	  use.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  ReDigi’s	  use	  was	  not	  transformative	  by	  citing	  the	  Napster	  case,	  in	  which	  ruled	  that	  downloading	  MP3	  files	  does	  not	  transform	  the	  copyrighted	  work.	  And	  further,	  when	   applied	   the	   four	   criteria,	   the	   court	   indicated	   that	   the	   general	   principle	   in	  adapting	   them	   is	   “free	   to	   adapt	   the	  doctrine	   to	  particular	   situations	  on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.”773	  First,	  ReDigi’s	  use	  is	  commercial	  since	  it	  can	  directly	  profit	   from	  the	  sale	  of	  a	  digital	  music	   file	  and	   the	  downloading	  users	  can	  save	  on	   the	  price	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  769	  Id.	  770	  Id,	  at	  1016-­‐17.	  771	  ReDigi	  case,	  supra	  note	  563.	  772	  Id,	  at	  653.	  (ReDigi	  also	  argued	  that	  “copying”	  to	  the	  Cloud	  Locker	  is	  protected	  as	  space-­‐shifting	  under	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine.	  But	  according	  to	  the	  UMG	  v.	  MP3.com	  case,	  a	  defense	  that	  stated	  space-­‐shifting	  should	  be	  deemed	  as	  fair	  use	  was	  not	  effective	  at	  all.)	  See	  also	  Arista	  Records,	  LLC	  v.	  Doe	  3,	  604	  F.3d	  110,	  124	  (2d	  Cir.	  2010).	  (The	  2nd	  Circuit	  rejected	  to	  adapt	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  to	  users	  uploads	  and	  downloads	  on	  P2P	  file-­‐sharing	  network.)	  773	  Id,	  at	  653,	  cited	  Betamax	  case,	  at	  448	  n	  31,	  quoting	  H.	  Rep.	  No.	  94-­‐1476,	  at	  65-­‐66.	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songs	   in	   the	   primary	   market.774	  Second,	   the	   digital	   music	   files	   in	   question	   have	  creative	   nature,	   which	   should	   be	   protected	   by	   copyright	   law.775	  Third,	   ReDigi’s	  wholesale	  transmission	  “negating	  any	  claim	  of	  fair	  use.”776	  Forth,	  ReDigi’s	  sales	  are	  likely	   to	   harm	   both	   the	  market	   and	   the	   value	   of	   the	   copyrighted	  work,	   since	   the	  product	   that	   sold	   on	   ReDigi’s	   digital	   secondary	  market	   is	   “indistinguishable	   from	  that	  sold	   in	  the	   legitimate	  primary	  market”	  except	   for	   its	   lower	  price.777	  	  Since	  not	  only	  the	  transformative	  use	  theory	  but	  also	  all	  the	  four	  criteria	  resulted	  against	  the	  defendant	  ReDigi,	  the	  court	  in	  sum	  concluded	  the	  fair	  use	  defense	  does	  not	  permit	  ReDigi’s	  service.	  	   In	  2015,	   the	  2nd	  Circuit	  held	   that	   the	  Google	  Book's	   “search”	  and	   “snippet”	  functions	  constituted	  fair	  use	  of	  books	  that	  Google	  had	  copied	  without	  the	  copyright	  owners'	   authorization. 778 	  Google	   makes	   and	   retains	   digital	   copies	   of	   books	  submitted	   to	   it	   by	  major	   libraries,	   and	   allows	   the	   libraries	   who	   had	   submitted	   a	  book	   to	   download	   and	   retain	   a	   digital	   copy.	   Google	   further	   allows	   the	   public	   to	  search	  the	  texts	  of	  the	  digital	  copies	  of	  the	  book	  and	  use	  display	  of	  snippets	  of	  text.	  The	  2nd	   Circuit	   held	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   Google’s	  making	   of	   a	   digital	   copy	   of	   the	  plaintiff’s	   books	   is	   “highly	   transformative,”	   since	   such	   copying	   was	   “essential	   to	  permit	   searchers	   to	   identify	   and	   locate	   the	   books	   in	   which	   words	   or	   phrases	   of	  interest	   to	   them	   appeared.”779	  The	  2nd	   Circuit	   concluded	   that	   when	   the	   complete	  digital	  copies	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  “served	  a	  different	   function	   from	  the	  original,”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  774	  Id.	  775	  Id,	  at	  654.	  776	  Id.	  777	  Id.	  778	  Authors	  Guild	  et	  al.	  v.	  Google,	  Inc.,	  804	  F.3d	  202	  (2d	  Cir.	  2015).	  779	  Id,	  at	  216-­‐7.	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the	  creation	  of	   such	  copies	  are	   transformative	   fair	  use.780	  And	   further	  Google	  only	  provide	   tiny	   snippet	   view	   of	   works	   that	   is	   designed	   to	   show	   the	   searcher	   just	  enough	   context	   to	   help	   them	   evaluate	  whether	   the	   book	   falls	  within	   the	   scope	   of	  their	  interests,	  	  Google	  only	  displays	  the	  text	  limitedly	  to	  public.	  781	  Then,	  Google	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  significant	  market	  substitute	  for	  the	  protected	  aspects	  of	  the	  originals,	  and	  its	  commercial	  nature	  and	  profit	  motivation	  did	  not	  justify	  denial	  of	  fair	  use.782	  	   There’s	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  Internet	  and	  cloud	  computing.	  However,	  under	  the	  U.S.	  case	  law,	  when	  dispute	  happens	  in	  digital	  world,	  especially	  relates	  to	  cloud	  service,	  the	  fair	  use	  defense	  is	  usually	  useless.	  The	  court	  had	  already	  affirmed	  by	  cases	  that	  “space-­‐shifting”	  use	  is	  not	  transformative.	  And	  as	  to	  the	  four	  criteria,	  most	  of	  them	  are	  also	  against	  the	  usual	  cloud	  service	  such	  as	   storage,	   upload	   and	   download	   and	   otherwise.	   However,	   there	   are	   several	  situations	   have	   not	   been	   deliberated	   yet.	   For	   instance,	   ISPs	   provide	   private	   cloud	  music	  locker	  service.	  People	  are	  only	  able	  to	  upload	  their	  music	  recordings	  to	  their	  own	  cloud	  music	  locker	  from	  their	  legally	  purchased	  CDs,	  or	  directly	  stored	  legally	  purchased	  digital	  music	  recordings	  to	  their	  cloud	  music	  locker.	  They	  can’t	  share	  or	  resell	  the	  files,	  but	  can	  only	  enjoy	  what	  they	  have	  in	  their	  own	  cloud	  storage	  space	  at	  anytime	  and	  anywhere.	  	  In	  my	  opinion,	  this	  constitutes	  a	  fair	  use	  in	  this	  situation.	  It	  mainly	   because	   that	   the	   use	   is	   for	   personal	   private	   purpose	   and	   will	   leave	   no	  potential	   harm	   to	   the	   market	   since	   users	   have	   already	   paid	   for	   the	   copyrighted	  works.	  Another	   instance	   is	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  work	  for	   informational	  purpose.	   It’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  780	  Id,	  at	  217.	  781	  Id,	  at	  218-­‐220.	  782	  Id,	  at	  221-­‐225.	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clear	  that	  once	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  has	  a	  creative	  nature	  such	  as	  music	  recordings,	  films,	   and	   otherwise,	   there’s	   no	   existence	   of	   fair	   use.	   But,	  what	   if	   the	   copyrighted	  work	  has	   an	   informative	  nature?	   In	  my	  opinion,	   the	  defendant	   can	  make	  a	   strong	  argument	  by	  applying	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  in	  this	  situation.	  	  
ii. The E.U. Part—Limitations and Exceptions 
A. Limitations	  and	  Exceptions	  in	  the	  Software	  Directive	  	   The	   E.U.	   firstly	   harmonized	   the	   limitations	   and	   exceptions	   in	   specific	  directives	  related	  to	  specific	  objects	  or	  specific	  rights,	  such	  as	  software,	  or	  the	  rental	  rights.	  Here,	   this	  dissertation	  will	   take	   the	  Software	  Directive	  as	  an	  example	  since	  it’s	   the	   most	   cited	   directive	   for	   disputes	   happens	   in	   digital	   world.	   Art	   5	   of	   the	  Software	  Directive	   provided	   exceptions	   to	   the	   restricted	   acts,	  which	   allow	   certain	  forms	  of	  usage	  of	  software,	  can	  be	  made	  without	   infringing	  the	  exclusive	  rights.783	  According	   to	  Art	  8,	   these	  exceptions	  must	  be	   interpreted	  strictly.	  And	   they	  have	  a	  mandatory	   effect	   in	   contrast	   to	   general	   exceptions,	   which	   can	   be	   void	   by	   legal	  contracts	  or	   licenses.	   In	   the	  SAS	  v.	  World	  Programming,	   the	  defendant	  obtained	  a	  copy	   of	   software	   under	   a	   license	   that	   restricted	   the	   use	   of	   the	   software	   to	   “non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  783	  Software	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  122,	  art	  5.	  (	  “1.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  specific	  contractual	  provisions,	  the	  acts	  referred	  to	  in	  points	  (a)	  and	  (b)	  of	  Article	  4(1)	  shall	  not	  require	  authorisation	  by	  the	  rightholder	  where	  they	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  computer	  program	  by	  the	  lawful	  acquirer	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  intended	  purpose,	  including	  for	  error	  correction.	  2.	  	  	  The	  making	  of	  a	  back-­‐up	  copy	  by	  a	  person	  having	  a	  right	  to	  use	  the	  computer	  program	  may	  not	  be	  prevented	  by	  contract	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  that	  use.3.	  	  	  The	  person	  having	  a	  right	  to	  use	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  computer	  program	  shall	  be	  entitled,	  without	  the	  authorisation	  of	  the	  rightholder,	  to	  observe,	  study	  or	  test	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  program	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  ideas	  and	  principles	  which	  underlie	  any	  element	  of	  the	  program	  if	  he	  does	  so	  while	  performing	  any	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  loading,	  displaying,	  running,	  transmitting	  or	  storing	  the	  program	  which	  he	  is	  entitled	  to	  do.)	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production	  purpose.”784	  By	  analyzing	  that	  the	  defendant	  only	  carried	  out	  acts	  under	  the	   license	   and	  his	   acts	   of	   loading	   and	   running	  were	   necessary	   for	   the	   use	   of	   the	  software,	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  such	  actions	  are	  within	  the	  Art	  5(3)	  of	  the	  Software	  Directive.	  785 In	  the	  Usedsoft	  case,786	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  since	  the	  right	  holder	  cannot	  prevent	   the	   resale	   of	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   software	   because	   of	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   the	  distribution	  right,	  the	  purchaser	  of	  the	  used	  copy	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  lawful	  acquirer.	  Thus	  the	  purchaser	  would	  be	  enabled	  to	  download	  the	  copy	  that	  had	  been	  sold	  to	  him	  by	  its	  original	  purchaser.	  The	  act	  of	  download	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  reproduction	  of	  a	  software	  that	  was	  necessary	  to	  enable	  the	  purchaser	  of	  the	  used	  copy	  to	  use	  the	  program	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  intended	  purpose	  under	  Art	  5(1).787	  
B. Limitations	  and	  Exceptions	  in	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  	   Then,	   in	   the	   Information	   Society	   Directive,	   the	   E.U.	   adopted	   a	   general	  approach	  to	  limitations	  and	  exceptions.	  It	  contains	  an	  E.U.	  version	  of	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  laid	  down	  in	  Art	  5	  (5)	  that	  is	  used	  as	  an	  additional	  control	  to	  the	  exhaustively	  listed	  exceptions	   in	  Art	  5(1)-­‐(4).	  To	  comply	  with	  Art	  5(5),	   limitations	   listed	   in	   the	  former	  four	  provisions	  in	  Art	  5	  should	  only	  apply	  in	  “certain	  special	  cases	  which	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  784	  Case	  C-­‐406/10,	  SAS	  Institute	  Inc.	  v.	  World	  Programming	  Ltd.	  supra	  note	  135.	  .	  785	  Id,	  para.	  59.	  (“Consequently,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  a	  computer	  program	  may	  not	  prevent,	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  licensing	  agreement,	  the	  person	  who	  has	  obtained	  that	  license	  from	  determining	  the	  ideas	  and	  principles	  which	  underlie	  all	  the	  elements	  of	  that	  program	  in	  the	  case	  where	  that	  person	  carries	  out	  acts	  which	  that	  license	  permits	  him	  to	  perform	  and	  the	  acts	  of	  loading	  and	  running	  necessary	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  computer	  program,	  and	  on	  condition	  that	  that	  person	  does	  not	  infringe	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  of	  the	  owner	  in	  that	  program.”)	  786	  Usedsoft	  case,	  supra	  note	  152.	  	  787	  Id,	  para.	  80.	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not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  or	  other	  subject-­‐matter	  and	  do	  not	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  right	  holder.”788	  	  	   As	  I	  mentioned	  above,	  the	   international	  three-­‐step	  test	   is	   flexible	  and	  tends	  to	  allow	  national	  lawmakers	  to	  satisfy	  a	  member	  countries’	  domestic	  social,	  cultural,	  and	   economic	   needs.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   agreed	   statement	   of	   Art	   10	   of	  WCT	   permits	  contracting	   parties	   to	   rationally	   extend	   it	   into	   the	   digital	   environment	   or	   other	  situation	  caused	  by	  new	  technology,	  and	   to	  devise	  new	  exceptions	  and	   limitations	  that	  appropriate	   in	   the	  digital	  network	  environment.789	  However,	  Recital	  44	  of	   the	  Information	   Society	   Directive	   firstly	   required	   to	   apply	   the	   exceptions	   and	  limitations	   in	   accordance	   with	   international	   obligations;	   but	   then	   specified	   with	  regard	   to	   electronic	   environment,	   “the	   scope	   of	   certain	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	  may	  have	  to	  be	  even	  more	  limited	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  certain	  new	  uses	  of	  copyright	  works	  and	  other	  subject-­‐matter.”790	  Thus,	  according	  to	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  Recital	  44,	   it	  made	  the	   three-­‐step	   in	   the	  Directive	  a	  “further	  restriction	  mechanism	  to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  788	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  art	  5(5).	  789	  Agreed	  Statement	  Concerning	  about	  the	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty,	  Adopted	  by	  Diplomatic	  Conference	  on	  December	  20,	  1996.	  (	  “Concerning	  Article	  10:	  It	  is	  understood	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  10	  permit	  Contracting	  Parties	  to	  carry	  forward	  and	  appropriately	  extend	  into	  the	  digital	  environment	  limitations	  and	  exceptions	  in	  their	  national	  laws	  which	  have	  been	  considered	  acceptable	  under	  the	  Berne	  Convention.	  Similarly,	  these	  provisions	  should	  be	  understood	  to	  permit	  Contracting	  Parties	  to	  devise	  new	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  that	  are	  appropriate	  in	  the	  digital	  network	  environment.”)	  790	  Information	  Society	  Direct,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  44	  (“When	  applying	  the	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  provided	  for	  in	  this	  Directive,	  they	  should	  be	  exercised	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  obligations.	  Such	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  may	  not	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  way	  which	  prejudices	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  rightholder	  or	  which	  conflicts	  with	  the	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  his	  work	  or	  other	  subject-­‐matter.	  The	  provision	  of	  such	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  by	  Member	  States	  should,	  in	  particular,	  duly	  reflect	  the	  increased	  economic	  impact	  that	  such	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  may	  have	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  new	  electronic	  environment.	  Therefore,	  the	  scope	  of	  certain	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  may	  have	  to	  be	  even	  more	  limited	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  certain	  new	  uses	  of	  copyright	  works	  and	  other	  subject-­‐matter.”)	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scope	  of	   limitations	  and	  exceptions.”791	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  EU	  three-­‐step	  test	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  disputes	  happens	  in	  the	  digital	  world.	  	  	   The	  latter	  requirement	  from	  Recital	  44	  had	  been	  criticized	  by	  scholars	  since	  it	   “leads	   to	   a	  worst	   case	   scenario;	   a	   system	   that	  offers	  neither	   flexibility	  nor	   legal	  certainty.”792	  And	   the	   scholars	   also	   criticized	   that	   the	   Art	   5	   of	   the	   Information	  Society	   Directive	   averted	   the	   three-­‐step	   test	   of	   its	   fundamental	   goal,	   nature	   and	  rationale.	  The	  provision	   further	  be	   criticized	   for	   turning	   the	   guideline	   into	   a	   legal	  infrastructure	  for	  the	  judges	  to	  restrict	  the	  application	  of	  the	  existing	  exceptions.793	  Under	  such	  circumstance,	  scholars	  argued	  that	  at	  least	  the	  EU	  three-­‐step	  should	  be	  read	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Recital	  44,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  corresponding	  provisions	  of	  WCT	  and	  TRIPs.794	  	  	   According	   to	   the	   scholars,	   EU	   should	   construe	   the	   international	   three-­‐step	  test	  as	  an	  enabling	  clause	  such	  as	  “EU-­‐fair	  use.”795	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	   three-­‐step	   test,	   according	   to	   the	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Balanced	   Interpretation	  of	  the	  Three-­‐step	  test	  in	  Copyright	  Law,	  firstly,	  the	  three	  steps	  should	  be	  “considered	  together	  and	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  overall	  assessment,”	  and	  secondly,	  the	  limitations	   are	   not	   necessarily	   to	   be	   interpreted	   narrowly	   according	   to	   their	  objectives	  and	  purposes.796	  It	  should	  be	  known	  that	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  not	  only	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  791	  Id.	  792EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  442,	  para.	  11.70.	  793	  Id,	  at	  444.	  (Citing	  K.L.	  Koelman,	  Fixing	  the	  Three-­‐step	  Test,	  (2006)	  EIPR	  28(8),	  407,	  407).	  794	  Read	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  considerations	  in	  Arts	  7-­‐8	  of	  TRIPs,	  Art	  13	  allows	  for	  a	  wider	  exception.	  795	  See	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  107,	  at	  444;	  see	  also	  Martin	  Senftleben,	  
supra	  note	  734.	  	  796	  C.	  Geiger,	  R.	  Hilty,	  J.	  Griffiths	  and	  U.	  Suthersanen,	  Declaration	  a	  Balanced	  Interpretation	  of	  
the	  Three-­‐step	  Test	  in	  Copyright	  Law	  1	  J.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  INFO.	  TECH.	  &	  E-­‐COMMERCE	  L.	  119	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be	   used	   to	   direct	   the	   a	   member	   countries’	   legislators	   to	   stipulate	   its	   domestic	  provisions,	  but	  also	  direct	  member	  countries’	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  to	  interpret	  and	  apply	  the	  exceptions	  listed	  in	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive.797	  	   As	   I	   mentioned	   above,	   Article	   5,	   which	   regulated	   the	   exceptions	   and	  limitations,	   could	  be	  viewed	  as	   rights	  granted	   to	  users.	  Article	  5	  provided	  a	   list	  of	  specific	   exceptions	   that	   encompass	   different	   activities.	   Based	   on	   the	   Recital	   32,	  which	   confirms	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   E.U.	   legislature	   to	   adopt	   a	   “closed	   list-­‐approach,	  stating	  that	  the	  Directive	  provides	  for	  an	  exhaustive	  enumeration	  of	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	   to	   the	   reproduction	   right	   and	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	  public.”798	  Thus	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  specific	  exception	  list	  is	  a	  closed	  one	  that	  could	  not	  add	  new	  categories.	  However,	  Art	  5(3)(o),	  the	  so	  called	  “grandfather	  clause,”	  allows	  “use	   in	   certain	   other	   cases	   of	   minor	   importance	   where	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	  already	  exist	  under	  national	  law,	  provided	  that	  they	  only	  concern	  analogue	  uses	  and	  do	   not	   affect	   the	   free	   circulation	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   within	   the	   Community,	  without	   prejudice	   to	   the	   other	   exceptions	   and	   limitations	   contained	   in	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2010),	  art	  1	  &	  Point	  2.	  	  See	  also	  point	  3	  &	  4,	  for	  further	  detailed	  interpretation.	  (As	  to	  step	  1,	  all	  situations	  described	  in	  Art	  5	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  The	  step1	  should	  “neither	  be	  an	  impediment	  to	  the	  introduction,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  of	  open	  ended	  limitations,	  nor	  to	  the	  extended	  application	  of	  existing	  limitations	  or	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  ones	  by	  the	  judiciary.”	  With	  respect	  to	  step	  2,	  if	  the	  limitation	  is	  based	  on	  significant	  competing	  considerations,	  or	  help	  counter	  anti-­‐competitive	  practices	  or	  effects,	  the	  conditions	  of	  step	  2	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  fulfilled.	  Then	  as	  to	  the	  step	  3,	  it	  should	  focus	  on	  adequate	  compensation,	  which	  should	  provide	  for	  sufficient	  incentives	  for	  the	  continued	  creation	  and	  dissemination	  of	  works.)	  797	  Proposal	  for	  a	  European	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  Directive	  on	  the	  Harmonization	  of	  Certain	  Aspects	  of	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights	  in	  the	  Information	  Society,	  COM(97)0628,	  32-­‐33,46.	  (The	  Commission	  firstly	  provided	  that	  the	  exceptions	  could	  only	  be	  applied	  to	  certain	  special	  cases	  and	  these	  could	  not	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  conflicted	  with	  the	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  or	  brought	  unreasonable	  prejudice.	  And	  in	  further	  proposals,	  member	  states	  are	  not	  required	  to	  implement	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  in	  their	  national	  laws,	  but	  the	  courts	  must	  interpret	  the	  harmonized	  exceptions	  in	  this	  right.)	  798	  Information	  Society,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  32.	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Article.”799	  Thus,	  this	  grandfather	  clause	  provides	  more	  space	  for	  Member	  States	  to	  apply	  the	  optional	  exception	  list	  according	  to	  diversity	  of	  their	  regimes.	  	  	   There’s	  one	  mandatory	  exception	  for	  transient	  or	  incidental	  copies,	  which	  is	  regulated	  by	  Art	  5(1).	  This	  exception	  was	  mandatory	  for	  all	  Member	  States.800	  This	  exception	  had	  been	  analyzed	   in	   the	  section	  of	   the	   reproduction	  right.	  Thus,	  here	   I	  will	  not	  discuss	  this	  issue	  in	  detail	  again	  here	  in	  this	  section.	  	   Then,	  Art	  5	  also	  provides	  an	  optional	  menu	  of	  20	  exceptions	  or	   limitations	  for	  Member	  States	  to	  choose	  to	  implement.	  Art	  5(2)	  provides	  5	  optional	  exceptions	  and	   limitations	   to	   the	   reproduction	   right:	   reprographic	   copying,	   private	   copying,	  non-­‐profit	   copying	   by	   public	   libraries,	   educational	   establishments	   or	   museums,	  ephemeral	  copying	  by	  broadcasters,	  and	  reproductions	  of	  broadcasts	  made	  by	  social	  institutions.801	  Art	  5	  (3)	  then	  provides	  15	  optional	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  to	  both	  the	   reproduction	   right	   and	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	   public:	   (1)	   use	   for	  teaching	   and	   scientific	   purposes;	   (2)	   use	   for	   people	   with	   disabilities;	   (3)	   use	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  799	  Id,	  art	  5(3)(o).	  800	  Id,	  art	  5(1).	  801	  Id,	  art	  5(2).(	  “Member	  States	  may	  provide	  for	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  to	  the	  reproduction	  right	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  2	  in	  the	  following	  cases:(a)	  in	  respect	  of	  reproductions	  on	  paper	  or	  any	  similar	  medium,	  effected	  by	  the	  use	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  photographic	  technique	  or	  by	  some	  other	  process	  having	  similar	  effects,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  sheet	  music,	  provided	  that	  the	  rightholders	  receive	  fair	  compensation;(b)	  in	  respect	  of	  reproductions	  on	  any	  medium	  made	  by	  a	  natural	  person	  for	  private	  use	  and	  for	  ends	  that	  are	  neither	  directly	  nor	  indirectly	  commercial,	  on	  condition	  that	  the	  rightholders	  receive	  fair	  compensation	  which	  takes	  account	  of	  the	  application	  or	  non-­‐application	  of	  technological	  measures	  referred	  to	  in	  Article	  6	  to	  the	  work	  or	  subject-­‐matter	  concerned;(c)	  in	  respect	  of	  specific	  acts	  of	  reproduction	  made	  by	  publicly	  accessible	  libraries,	  educational	  establishments	  or	  museums,	  or	  by	  archives,	  which	  are	  not	  for	  direct	  or	  indirect	  economic	  or	  commercial	  advantage;(d)	  in	  respect	  of	  ephemeral	  recordings	  of	  works	  made	  by	  broadcasting	  organizations	  by	  means	  of	  their	  own	  facilities	  and	  for	  their	  own	  broadcasts;	  the	  preservation	  of	  these	  recordings	  in	  official	  archives	  may,	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  their	  exceptional	  documentary	  character,	  be	  permitted;(e)	  in	  respect	  of	  reproductions	  of	  broadcasts	  made	  by	  social	  institutions	  pursuing	  non-­‐commercial	  purposes,	  such	  as	  hospitals	  or	  prisons,	  on	  condition	  that	  the	  rightholders	  receive	  fair	  compensation.”)	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reporting	   current	   events;	   (4)	   quotations;	   (5)	   uses	   for	   public	   security;	   (6)	   use	   for	  political	   speeches;	   (7)	   use	   during	   religious	   celebrations;	   (8)use	   of	   works	   of	  architecture;	  (9)	  incidental	  inclusion	  of	  a	  work	  or	  other	  subject-­‐matter;	  (10)	  use	  for	  advertising	  public	  exhibitions;	  (11)	  use	  for	  caricature,	  parody	  or	  pastiche;	  (12)	  use	  related	  to	  the	  demonstration	  or	  repair	  of	  equipment;	  (13)	  use	  for	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  buildings;	  (14)	  use	   for	  research	  or	  private	  study;	  and	  (15)	  use	   in	  other	  cases	  of	  minor	   importance.802	  Art	   5(4)	   allows	  Member	   Countries	   to	   provide	   exceptions	   or	  limitations	   to	   the	  distribution	  right,	   as	   referred	   to	  cases	  where	  Member	  Countries	  allow	  those	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  reproduction	  right.	  Scholars	  suggest	  that	  these	  20	  optional	  specific	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	   categories	  based	  on	   their	   respective	   justification.	  The	   first	   is	   for	   freedom	  of	  expression;	  within	  this	  category	  are	  quotations,	  caricature,	  religious	  celebrations	  or	  private	  copying.	  The	  second	  category	  is	  for	  public	  interests,	  within	  this	  category	  are	  education,	   libraries,	  social	   institutions,	  people	  with	  disabilities,	  public	  security	  and	  others.	   The	   third	   category	   is	   practical	   justifications,	   temporary	   copies,	   ephemeral	  recordings	  related	  to	  broadcasting	  are	  within	  this	  category.803	  	   Since	  Member	   Countries	   can	   choose	   to	   apply	   the	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	  from	  the	  optional	  menu	  provided	  by	   the	   Information	  Society	  Directive,	   the	   role	  of	  ECJ	  and	  other	  national	  courts	  became	  really	  important.	  Courts	  are	  at	  the	  front	  line	  applying	   the	   chosen	   exceptions	   or	   limitations.	   The	   Information	   Society	   Directive	  does	   not	   provide	   clear	   definition	   or	   scope	   of	   the	   listed	   exceptions	   or	   limitations,	  thus	  it’s	  the	  court’s	  responsibility	  to	  interpret	  the	  applied	  exceptions	  or	  limitations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  802	  Id,	  art	  5	  (3).	  803	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  441,	  para.	  11.69.	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According	  to	  Recital	  4	  &	  9,	  the	  courts	  shall	  interpret	  the	  copyright	  owners’	  exclusive	  right	   in	   a	   broad	  way	   but	   give	   a	   narrow	   interpretation	   to	   exceptions.804	  Recital	   21	  also	   stated	   “a	   broad	   definition	   of	   these	   acts	   is	   needed	   to	   ensure	   legal	   certainty	  within	   the	   internal	   market.” 805 	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   court	   supported	   the	   narrow	  interpretation	   of	   exceptions.806	  With	   respect	   to	   the	   application	   of	   the	   mandatory	  exception	   for	   certain	   temporary	   acts	   of	   reproduction,	   the	   ECJ	   held	   that	   the	  conditions	  mentioned	   in	   Art	   5(1)	   are	   cumulative	   and	   need	   to	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	  restrictive	  manner	   in	   light	  of	   the	   three-­‐step	   test.807	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   cumulative	  conditions	  of	  applicability	  of	  Art	  5(1),	  the	  ECJ	  relied	  on	  Recitals	  4,	  6	  and	  21,	  stated	  that	   “	   the	  conditions	   laid	  down	   in	  Article	  5(1)	   thereof	  must	  also	  be	   interpreted	   in	  light	   of	   the	   need	   for	   legal	   certainty	   for	   authors	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   protections	   of	  their	  works.”808	  Thus,	  with	   these	   two	   references,	   the	   ECJ	   adopted	   the	   principle	   of	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  in	  the	  Infopaq	  case.	  Further,	  the	  three-­‐step	   test	   was	   also	   used	   to	   require	   Member	   Countries	   to	   ensure	   that	   “the	  application	  of	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  does	  not	  unreasonably	  disadvantage	  right	  holders	  in	  a	  number	  of	  other	  situations.”809	  	   However,	   the	   principle	   of	   narrow	   interpretation	   has	   not	   been	   applied	  consistently.	  The	  courts	  questioned	  the	  binding	  effect	  of	  recitals	  in	  EU	  legislation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  804	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  127,	  recital	  4	  &	  9.	  (Recital	  4	  states	  that	  “A	  harmonised	  legal	  framework	  on	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights,	  through	  increased	  legal	  certainty	  and	  while	  providing	  for	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property,….”	  And	  recital	  9	  mentioned	  “Any	  harmonisation	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  must	  take	  as	  a	  basis	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection,….”)	  805	  Id,	  recital	  21.	  806	  C	  Case-­‐5/08	  Infopaq	  I	  case,	  supra	  note	  150.	  807	  Id,	  para.	  56-­‐9.	  808	  Id,	  para.	  59.	  809	  See	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  para.	  20.32.	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the	   Information	   Society	   Directive.	   The	   court	   clarified	   that	   “the	   preamble	   to	   a	  Community	  act	  has	  no	  binding	   legal	   force	  and	  cannot	  be	  relied	  on	  as	  a	  ground	   for	  derogating	  from	  the	  actual	  provisions	  of	  the	  act	   in	  question.”810	  Thus	  a	  recital	  may	  not	   restrict	   a	   right.	   	   Although	   the	   FAPL	   court	   reiterated	   the	   principle	   of	   narrow	  interpretation	  of	   exceptions	  or	   limitations,	   the	   court	   further	   concluded:	   “none	   the	  less,	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Art	   5(1)	  must	   enable	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   exception	  thereby	   estabilished	   to	   be	   safeguarded	   and	   permit	   observance	   of	   the	   exception’s	  purpose….	   In	   accordance	  with	   its	   objective,	   that	   exception	  must	   allow	  and	  ensure	  the	   development	   and	   operation	   of	   new	   technologies	   and	   safeguard	   a	   balance	  between	  the	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  rights	  holders,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  of	  users	  of	  protected	  works	  who	  wish	   to	  avail	   themselves	  of	  whose	  new	   technologies,	  on	   the	  other.”811	  Then,	   in	   the	   Infopaq	   II	   case,	   the	  Danish	   court	   concluded	   that	   the	   three-­‐step	   test	   should	   not	   further	   restrict	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	   for	  transient	  copies	  theoretically	  by	  stating	  that	  “if	  those	  acts	  of	  reproduction	  fulfill	  all	  the	  conditions	  of	  Article	  5(1)	  of	  Directive	  2001/29,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court,	   it	  must	  be	  held	  that	  they	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  the	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  or	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  right	  holder.”812	  Follow	  this	  trend,	  in	  Painer	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  exceptions	  of	  Art	  5(3)(d)	  was	  to	  “strike	  a	  fair	  balance	  between	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  of	   users	   of	   a	   work	   or	   other	   protected	   subject-­‐matter	   and	   the	   reproduction	   right	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  810	  Case-­‐162/97	  Nilsson	  and	  others	  (1998)	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐7477,	  para.54.	  811	  C-­‐403/08	  FAPL	  case,	  supra	  note	  151,	  para.	  163-­‐4.	  812	  Case	  C-­‐302/10	  Inforpaq	  II	  case,	  supra	  note	  161,	  para.56.	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conferred	   on	   authors.”813	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   EU	   courts	   seem	   to	   begin	   to	   adopt	   a	  principle	  of	  broad	   interpretation	  of	  exceptions	  or	   limitations	   in	  order	   to	   “enhance	  transparency	   through	   harmonious	   interpretation.”814	  Thus,	   with	   the	   principle	   of	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  exceptions	  or	  limitations,	  new	  technology	  providers,	  such	  as	  ISPs	  could	  also	  apply	  content	  of	  Art	  5	  of	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  to	  their	  usage	  as	  a	  useful	  defense	  in	  protecting	  their	  own	  interests.	  	  	   In	   general,	   EU	   provided	   a	   specific	   list	   of	   exceptions	   or	   limitations,	   and	  enabled	  Member	  Countries	  to	  choose	  to	  implement.	   It’s	  obvious	  that	  based	  on	  this	  chosen	   menu,	   Member	   Countries	   will	   have	   more	   flexibility	   in	   applying	   theses	  exceptions	   or	   limitations	   to	   better	   accommodate	   a	   country’s	   domestic	   culture,	  regime	  and	  technological	  developments	  or	  new	  business	  models.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  make	   sure	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	   properly	   and	  rationally,	   E.U.	   should	   adopt	   a	   basic	   and	   uniform	   guideline	   in	   interpreting	   these	  exceptions	  or	  limitations.	  Member	  Countries	  will	  do	  better	  if	  they	  know	  clearly	  the	  contour	  of	  these	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  is.	  	  	   What’s	  more,	  The	  EU	  Member	  States	  are	  questioning	  the	  current	  scope	  of	  the	  listed	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  provided	  by	  the	  Directives.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  UK’s	  response	   to	   the	   EU	   commission’s	   green	   paper	   on	   single	   digital	   market,	   UK	   had	  already	   proposed	   to	   expand	   the	   current	   exceptions	   of	   libraries	   and	   archives;	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  Case	  C-­‐145/10	  Eva-­‐Maria	  Painter	  v	  Standard	  Verlag	  GmbH	  and	  Others	  2011,	  para.	  134-­‐5.	  (The	  ECJ	  concluded:	  “The	  fair	  use	  balance	  is	  truck,	  in	  this	  case,	  by	  favouring	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  users’	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  over	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  author	  in	  being	  able	  to	  prevent	  the	  reproduction	  of	  extracts	  from	  his	  work	  which	  has	  already	  been	  lawfully	  made	  available	  to	  the	  public,	  whilst	  ensuring	  that	  author	  has	  the	  right,	  in	  principle,	  to	  have	  his	  name	  indicated.”)	  814	  See	  EU	  Copyright	  Law:	  A	  commentary,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  449.	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dissemination	   of	   works	   for	   teaching	   and	   research	   purposes;	   and	   user-­‐created	  content.815	  This	   Green	   Paper	   focused	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   digitization	   towards	  education	   and	   research.	   First,	   According	   to	   Article	   5(5)	   and	   Recital	   40	   of	   the	  Information	   Society	   Directive,	   the	   exception	   only	   provides	   libraries	   or	   other	  beneficiaries	  a	  copyright	  owner’s	  exclusive	  reproduction	  right’s	  exception	  in	  specific	  cases.816However,	   digitization	   will	   result	   in	   copies	   that	   involve	   the	   reproduction	  right.	  Article	  5(2)(c)	  does	  not	  cover	  such	  digitization	  operated	  by	  private	  parties.817	  Then,	  as	  for	  the	  aspect	  of	  the	  making	  available	  of	  digitized	  works,	  electronic	  delivery	  of	   documents	   to	   end-­‐users	   cannot	   be	   covered	   by	   Article	   5(3)(n).	   Third,	   for	   the	  dissemination	   of	   works	   for	   teaching	   and	   research	   purposes,	   Article	   5(3)(a)	   does	  explicitly	   exclude	   the	   modern	   e-­‐learning	   methods	   such	   as	   distance	   education.818	  Forth,	   as	   to	   user-­‐created	   content,819	  there’s	   no	   exception,	  which	   “would	   allow	   the	  use	  of	  existing	  copyright	  protected	  content	  for	  creating	  new	  or	  derivative	  works.”820	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  815	  Commision	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  Green	  Paper,	  Copyright	  in	  the	  Knowledge	  Economy,	  Brussels,	  COM(2008)	  466/3.	  	  available	  at:	  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-­‐infso/greenpaper_en.pdf	  	  816	  CDPA	  1988,	  supra	  note	  168,	  section	  42.	  (Section	  42	  allows	  libraries	  or	  archives	  to	  make	  a	  single	  copy	  of	  a	  literary,	  dramatic	  or	  musical	  work	  held	  in	  their	  libraries	  or	  archives	  to	  make	  a	  single	  copy	  of	  a	  literary,	  dramatic	  or	  musical	  word	  held	  in	  their	  permanent	  collection	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preservation	  and	  replacement.	  “The	  UK	  government	  is	  trying	  to	  expand	  this	  exception	  to	  allow	  for	  copying	  and	  formant	  shifting	  of	  sound	  recordings,	  films	  and	  broadcasts	  and	  to	  allow	  for	  more	  than	  a	  single	  copy	  where	  successive	  coping	  may	  be	  required	  to	  preserve	  permanent	  collections	  in	  an	  accessible	  format.	  “	  Cited	  Id.)	  817	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  112.	  818	  Id.	  See	  also	  Green	  paper,	  supra	  note	  816,	  at	  16.	  819	  Id,	  at	  19.	  (“User-­‐created	  content	  was	  defined	  as	  ‘content	  made	  publicly	  available	  over	  the	  Internet,	  which	  reflects	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  creative	  effort,	  and	  which	  is	  created	  outside	  of	  professional	  routines	  and	  practices.’”)	  820	  Id.	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Thus,	  UK	  calls	  for	  a	  “mandatory	  exception	  for	  teaching	  and	  scientific	  research,	  with	  a	  clearly	  defined	  scope	  in	  the	  Directive,”821	  and	  exception	  for	  transformative	  use.	  	  	   Professor	  Ian	  Hargreaves	  further	  proposed	  other	  types	  of	  exceptions	  for	  the	  digital	  age	  in	  his	  independent	  report.822In	  this	  report,	  he	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	  need	  of	   “extension	   of	   the	   non-­‐commercial	   research	   exception	   to	   all	   forms	   of	   copyright	  work,”	  and	  extension	  of	  archiving.	  823	  Then	  after	  comparing	  the	  U.S.	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  with	   the	   UK	   exceptions,	   and	   the	   application	   of	   them	   to	   the	   developing	   new	  technology	   entities,	   Professor	   Hargreaves	   indicated	   that	   more	   sufficient	   flexible	  exceptions	   to	   “realize	   the	   benefits	   of	   new	   technologies	   without	   losing	   the	   core	  benefits	   to	   creators	   and	   to	   the	  economy	   that	   copyright	  providers”	   are	  needed	  not	  only	   in	   the	   UK	   but	   also	   in	   the	   EU.824	  He	   specifically	   pointed	   the	   UK’s	   options	   of	  feasible	   exceptions:	   (1)	   “enabling	   new	   research	   tools;”	   (2)	   exceptions	   of	   private	  copying	  or	   format	  shifting.825	  He	  stated	   that	  such	  exceptions	  should	  be	  mandatory	  since	   using	   contracts	   to	   regulate	   exceptions	   has	  many	   uncertainties:	   (1)”override	  the	   exceptions	   and	   limitations	   allowed	   in	   copyright	   law;”(2)	   “right	   holders	   can	  rewrite	  the	  limits.”826	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  821	  Id,	  at	  18.	  822	  Ian	  Hargreaves,	  Digital	  Opportunity:	  A	  review	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Growth	  (May	  18,	  2011)	  available	  at:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-­‐opportunity-­‐review-­‐of-­‐intellectual-­‐property-­‐and-­‐growth	  	  823	  Id,	  at	  49-­‐50.	  824	  Id,	  at	  47.	  (	  UK	  should	  adopt	  a	  “twin	  track	  approach”	  :	  (1)	  add	  immediate	  specific	  exceptions	  that	  are	  feasible	  with	  the	  current	  EU	  directives;	  (2)	  “a	  new	  mechanism	  in	  copyright	  law	  to	  create	  a	  built-­‐in	  adaptability	  to	  future	  technologies	  which,	  by	  definition,	  cannot	  be	  foreseen	  in	  precise	  detail	  by	  today’s	  policy	  makers.”)	  825	  Id.	  826	  Id,	  at	  51.	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   All	  in	  all,	  EU	  member	  countries	  are	  now	  questioning	  the	  practical	  effect	  of	  the	  application	   of	   current	   listed	   exceptions	   in	   the	   directives.	   Member	   countries	   need	  more	   flexible	   exceptions	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	   challenges	   brought	   by	   the	   new	  technology	  and	  the	  potential	  issue	  brought	  by	  the	  upcoming	  new	  technology.	  	   	  
iii. Other Countries 	   The	   following	   sections	   will	   discuss	   the	   limitations	   or	   exceptions	   in	   other	  countries	   such	   as	   Singapore	   and	   Japan.	   	   Both	   Singapore	   and	   Australia	   adopted	   a	  concept	  of	  “fair	  dealing,”	  but	  Japan	  provide	  a	  list	  of	  limitation	  instead.	  
A. Singapore	  	   Before	  the	  current	  version	  of	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  was	  consolidated	  in	  the	  Copyright	   Act	   Revised	   Edition	   of	   2006,	   Singapore	   amended	   the	   fair	   dealing	  provision	   for	   several	   times.	   This	   latest	   version	   of	   fair	   dealing	   had	   been	   strongly	  affected	  by	  the	  U.S.	  fair	  use	  doctrine.	  	   Singapore’s	   copyright	   act	   allows	   users	   to	   several	   kinds	   of	   acts	   of	  reproduction	   in	   absence	   of	   copyright	   owners’	   authorization	   without	   copyright	  infringement	   for	   “fair	   dealing”	   situations.	   As	   to	   a	   literary,	   dramatic,	   musical	   or	  artistic	  work,	  or	  with	  an	  adaptation	  of	   a	   literary,	  dramatic	  or	  musical	  work,	   a	   fair	  dealing	   with	   them	   shall	   not	   constitute	   a	   copyright	   infringement	   if	   it’s	   for	   the	  purpose	   of	   research	   or	   study,	   criticism	   or	   review,	   reporting	   current	   events	   and	  judicial	   proceedings	   or	   professional	   advice. 827 	  Besides	   these	   limited	   purposes	  defining	   fair	   dealing,	   S	   35	   (2)	   also	   provided	   five	   factors	   to	   be	   considered	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  827	  Singapore	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  172,	  s	  35-­‐38.	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determine	   whether	   a	   use	   of	   copyrighted	   works	   constitutes	   a	   fair	   dealing	   for	   any	  purpose	  other	  than	  the	  purposes	  listed	  above:	  “(a)	  the	  purpose	  and	  character	  of	  the	  dealing,	   including	   whether	   such	   dealing	   is	   of	   a	   commercial	   nature	   or	   is	   for	   non-­‐profit	  educational	  purposes;(b)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  work	  or	  adaptation;(c)	  the	  amount	  and	   substantiality	   of	   the	   part	   copied	   taken	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   whole	   work	   or	  adaptation;(d)	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  dealing	  upon	  the	  potential	  market	  for,	  or	  value	  of,	  the	  work	   or	   adaptation;	   and(e)	   the	   possibility	   of	   obtaining	   the	   work	   or	   adaptation	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  at	  an	  ordinary	  commercial	  price.”828	  Compare	  with	  the	  E.U.	  specific	   lists	   of	   exceptions	   to	   copyright	   infringements;	   the	   Singapore	   fair	   dealing	  exceptions	  are	  more	  flexible.	  	   Singapore	   scholars	   are	   arguing	   whether	   to	   extend	   the	   current	   fair	   dealing	  exceptions	  to	  the	  U.S.	  model	  fair	  use	  doctrine.	  Most	  of	  them	  support	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  flexible	   fair	  use	  doctrine	  because	  of	   the	  development	  of	   technology;	  Copyright	   law	  resolves	   market	   failures	   that	   result	   from	   the	   non-­‐excludable	   and	   non-­‐rivalrous	  nature	   of	   information	   products	   and	   services	   by	   granting	   copyright	   owners	   the	  exclusive	   rights	   to	   distribute.	   Copyright	   policy	   incentivizes	   the	   creation	   and	  distribution	  of	  new	  works,	  and	  lead	  to	  development	  of	  scientific	  and	  cultural.	  But	  it	  should	  be	  known	  that	  the	  development	  of	  scientific	  and	  cultural	  also	  depend	  upon	  accessing	   to	   useful	   copyrighted	   works.	   Thus	   a	   more	   flexible	   fair	   use	   policy	   is	   a	  reasonable	   and	   useful	   tool	   to	   promote	   access	   to	   copyrighted	   works,	   such	   as	  information	  products.829	  The	  scholars	  interestingly	  focus	  on	  what’s	  the	  commercial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  828	  Id,	  s	  35(2).	  829	  See	  Roya	  Ghafele	  &	  Benjamin	  Gibert,	  A	  Counterfactual	  Impact	  Analysis	  of	  Fair	  Use	  Policy	  
on	  Copyright	  Related	  Industries	  in	  Singapore,	  Laws	  (2014)	  available	  at:	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effect	   will	   be	   brought	   to	   Singapore’s	   market	   by	   adopting	   the	   U.S.	   model	   fair	   use	  doctrine.	   Some	   may	   argue	   that	   since	   the	   digital	   technologies	   enable	   copyright	  owners	  to	  control	  the	  consumption	  of	  copyrighted	  works	  with	  reduced	  transaction	  costs,	   a	   fair	   use	   may	   harm	   a	   commercial	   market.	   However,	   some	   scholars	   in	  contrary	  argued	  that	  the	  extended	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  would	  not	  only	  contribute	  to	  a	  valuable	   high-­‐technology	   industry	   but	   also	   stimulate	   demands	   for	   copyrighted	  works	   by	   encouraging	   investment	   and	   innovation	   in	   private	   copying	   technologies	  and	   by	   promoting	   the	   technology	   of	   transactions	   of	   copyrighted	   works,	   such	   as	  enable	  users	  to	  enjoy	  copyrighted	  works	  at	  any	  time	  and	  anywhere	  they	  choose	  via	  cloud	  computing	  service.830	  Under	  this	  circumstance,	  “fair	  use	  is	  the	  only	  defense	  for	  these	   increasingly	   common,	   non-­‐transformative	   copying	   activities	   that	   fall	   under	  the	  personal	  fair	  use	  class.”831	  	   Thus,	   it’s	   clear	   that	   after	   adopting	   flexible	   fair	   dealing	   exceptions	   in	   2005,	  Singapore	   is	   trying	  to	  adopt	   the	  U.S.	  model	  of	   fair	  use	  doctrine	   in	  order	   to	  dealing	  with	  the	  development	  of	  new	  technology	  such	  as	  private	  copying.	  	  
B. Australia	  	   The	   Copyright	   Act	   1968	   allows	   people	   to	   use	   copyrighted	   works	   without	  copyright	   owners’	   consent	   in	   certain	   situation	   for	   certain	   purpose.	   This	   parallel	  concept	   is	   regulated	   in	   Section	   40	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   1968,	   and	   named	   as	   “fair	  dealing.”	   	  Australia	  is	  the	  first	  common	  law	  country	  that	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://www.mdpi.com/2075-­‐471X/3/2/327	  See	  also	  Roya	  Ghafele	  and	  Benjamin	  Gibert,	  
The	  Economic	  Value	  Of	  Fair	  Use	  In	  Copyright	  Law:	  Counterfactual	  Impact	  Analysis	  Of	  Fair	  Use	  
Policy	  On	  Private	  Copying	  Technology	  And	  Copyright	  Markets	  In	  Singapore	  (2012),	  avaible	  at:	  https://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/41664/1/MPRA_paper_41664.pdf	  	  830	  See	  id.	  831	  Id,	  at	  346.	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fair	  dealing	   into	   the	  copyright	   law.832	  It	   also	  should	  be	  known	   that,	  unlike	   the	  U.S.	  copyright	  law,	  Australian	  law	  does	  not	  have	  a	  general	  fair	  use	  principle.	  Besides	  the	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions,	  there	  are	  also	  other	  important	  exceptions	  including:	  (1)	  for	  educational	   institutions;	   (2)	   for	   libraries;	   (3)for	   governments;	   (4)	   private	   copying	  exceptions;	  (5)other	  special	  cases.	  Under	  the	  current	  Australian	  copyright	   law,	  the	  dealing	  must	  be	  for	  a	  specific	  statutory	  purpose	  listed	  in	  Section	  40:	  (1)	  research	  or	  study;833	  (2)	  criticism	  or	  review;	  834(3)	  parody	  or	  satire;835	  (4)	  reporting	  news;836	  (5)	  professional	   advice	   by	   a	   legal	   practitioner,	   patent	   or	   trader	   mark	   attorney.837	  There’s	   no	   general	   exception	   for	  using	   copyrighted	  works,	   unlike	   the	  U.S.	   provide	  four	   general	   criteria	   and	   a	   transformative	   use.	   If	   a	   person’s	   purpose	   of	   using	  copyrighted	  works	  is	  not	  within	  the	  statutory	  limits,	  he	  will	  infringe	  that	  copyright.	  The	   Copyright	   Act	   further	   provides	   that	   fair	   dealings	   for	   the	   former	   specified	  purposes	   may	   still	   work	   within	   the	   following	   copyrighted	   works:	   (1)	   literary,	  dramatic,	  musical	  or	  artistic	  works;838	  (2)	  adaptions	  of	  literary,	  dramatic	  or	  musical	  works;839	  and	  (3)	  audio-­‐visual	  items.840	  	   Generally,	  when	  determine	  whether	  a	  use	  is	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  fair	  dealing,	  the	  courts	  usually	  take	  a	  two-­‐step	  analysis.	  First,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  use	  must	  be	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  832	  Melissa	  De	  Zwart,	  	  A	  Historical	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Birth	  of	  Fair	  Dealing	  and	  Fair	  Use:	  Lessons	  
for	  the	  Digital	  Age	  1	  Intellectual	  Property	  Quarterly	  60,	  89	  (2007).	  833	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  supra	  note	  178,	  s	  40.	  834	  Id,	  s.	  41.	  835	  Id,	  s	  41	  A.	  836	  Id,	  s	  42.	  837	  Id,	  s	  43(2).	  838	  Id,	  s	  40(1),	  s	  41,	  s	  41A,	  s	  42,	  s	  43.	  839	  Id,	  s	  40(1),	  s	  41,	  s	  41A,	  s	  42.	  840	  Id,	  s	  103C(1),	  s	  103A,	  s	  103AA,	  s	  103B.	  (It	  should	  be	  defined	  as	  sound	  recordings,	  cinematograph	  films,	  sound	  broadcasts	  or	  television	  broadcasts.)	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of	   the	   specific	   purposes	   provided	   by	   the	   copyright	   law	   that	   mentioned	   above.	  Second,	  the	  use	  must	  be	  fair,	  and	  whether	  the	  use	  is	  fair	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  particular	  case.	  There	  are	  still	  specific	  requirements	  for	  different	  purposes.	  First,	  as	  to	  the	  fair	  dealing	  provisions	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  criticism	  or	  review,	  and	  for	  the	  purpose	   of	   reporting	   news,	   there’s	   an	   additional	   requirement	   for	   a	   “sufficient	  acknowledgement”	  of	  the	  work	  or	  audio-­‐visual	  item.841	  Further,	  as	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  research	  or	  study	  with	  regard	  to	  works	  and	  adaptations	  contains	  a	  quantitative	  test.	  A	  quantitative	  test	  is	  used	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  use	  of	  quantities	  of	  copyrighted	  works	   is	   fair	   or	   not.842	  It	  means	   that	   if	   no	  more	   than	   a	   “reasonable	   portion”	   of	   a	  work	  or	  adaptation	  that	  is	  described	  in	  an	  item	  of	  the	  table	  and	  is	  not	  contained	  in	  an	  article	  in	  a	  periodical	  publication	  is	  taken,	  the	  use	  can	  be	  deem	  as	  a	  fair	  dealing.	  A	  “reasonable	   portion”	  means	   the	   amount	   described	   in	   the	   item,	   and	  here	   as	   to	   the	  literary,	  dramatic	  or	  musical	  work,	   it’s	  10%	  of	   the	  number	  of	  pages	  or	  number	  of	  words.843	  There’s	   also	   a	   general	   guidance	   to	   fair	   dealing	   for	   research	   and	   study,	  which	   includes	   five	   factors:	   (1)	   the	   purpose	   and	   character	   of	   the	   dealing;	   (2)	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   work	   or	   adaptation;	   (3)	   the	   possibility	   of	   obtaining	   the	   work	   or	  adaptation	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  at	  an	  ordinary	  commercial	  price;	  (4)	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  dealing	  upon	  the	  potential	  market	  for,	  or	  value	  of,	  the	  work	  or	  adaptation;	  and	  (5)	  in	  a	  case	  where	  part	  only	  of	  the	  work	  or	  adaptation	  is	  reproduced—the	  amount	  and	   substantiality	   of	   the	   part	   copied	   taken	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   whole	   work	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  841	  Id,	  ss	  41	  &	  103A;	  ss	  42(1)(a)	  &	  103	  B(1)(a).	  842	  Id,	  s	  40(3)-­‐(8).	  843	  Id,	  s	  40(5).	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adaptation.844 	  However,	   as	   for	   the	   other	   fair	   dealing	   exceptions,	   the	   Australia	  copyright	   law	   left	   them	   “completely	   to	   the	   courts	   to	   determine	   what	   factors	   are	  relevant	  to	  determining	  fairness	  in	  any	  particular	  case.”845	  	   Compare	  to	  the	  U.S.	  fair	  use	  doctrine,	  the	  fair	  dealing	  in	  Australia	  has	  a	  more	  limited	   scope	   since	   it	   only	   provide	   several	   specific	   purposes	   of	   fair	   dealing.	   	   As	   a	  result,	  the	  Australian	  Copyright	  Law	  Review	  Committee	  has	  recommended	  to	  adopt	  a	   more	   broad	   fair-­‐use	   alike	   model	   to	   replace	   the	   current	   narrow	   fair	   dealing	  exceptions.846	  The	   function	  of	   fair	  dealing	   exceptions	   in	   the	  digital	   environment	   is	  also	  been	  expected	  to	  echo	  the	  U.S.’s	  fair	  use	  doctrine.847	  The	  Australian	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  raised	  three	  questions:	  “(1)	  What	  problems,	  if	  any,	  are	  there	  with	  any	  of	  the	  existing	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  in	  the	  digital	  environment,	  (2)	  how	  could	  the	  fair	   dealing	   exceptions	   be	   usefully	   simplified;	   and	   (3)	   should	   the	   Copyright	   Act	  provide	   for	   any	   other	   specific	   fair	   dealing	   exceptions?”848 	  According	   to	   most	  copyright	  owners,	  entities	  representing	  or	  assisting	  copyright	  owners,	  stakeholders	  submitted	  their	  opinions	  that	  the	  existing	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  work	  “adequately	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  Id,	  s	  40(2).	  845	  See	  USE	  OF	  ‘BROADCAST’	  IN	  COPYRIGHT	  EXCEPTIONS,	  available	  at:	  https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/16-­‐broadcasting/use-­‐%E2%80%98broadcast%E2%80%99-­‐copyright-­‐exceptions	  (last	  visited	  July	  13,	  2016).	  See	  
also	  Copyright	  Advisory	  Group—Schools,	  Submission	  231,	  available	  at:	  http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/231._org_thecopyrightadvisorygroup_schools.pdf	  	  846	  Copyright	  Law	  Review	  Committee,	  Report	  on	  the	  Simplification	  of	  Copyright	  Act	  1968,	  para.	  1.	  847	  See	  Australian	  Law	  Reform	  Commission,	  Copyright	  and	  Digital	  Economy	  (DP	  79)	  (Jun	  2013),	  available	  at	  https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/copyright-­‐and-­‐digital-­‐economy-­‐dp-­‐79	  (last	  visted	  July	  1	  2016).	  848	  Id.	  See	  also	  Australian	  Law	  Reform	  Commission,	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Digital	  Economy,	  IP	  42	  (2012),	  question	  45-­‐47.	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and	   effectively.”849	  Even	   the	   Australian	   Copyright	   Council	   stated	   that	   they	   did	   not	  notice	   any	  practical	   problems	   in	   applying	   the	   current	   fair	   dealing	   exceptions.	   The	  only	   issue	   they	  notice	   is	   that	   the	  public’s	  understanding	  as	   to	  how	  web	  users	   can	  interact	  with	  the	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions.	  They	  suggested	  supporting	  “an	  education	  campaign	  directed	  at	   informing	  Australians	  of	   their	  copyrights	  and	  obligations.”850	  Opponents	  who	  disagreed	  to	  adopt	  the	  U.S.	  model	  of	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  also	  pointed	  that	   the	   current	   copyright	   law	   provides	   a	   fair	   balance	   between	   copyright	   owners	  and	  users,	   however,	   the	   adoption	  of	   new	   fair	   use	  doctrine	  may	  break	   the	  balance	  and	  result	  in	  confusions	  and	  expenses.	  However,	  supporters,	  basically	  a	  number	  of	  copyright	   works’	   users	   argued	   that	   the	   existing	   fair	   dealing	   exceptions	   are	  problematic	   because	   of	   its	   limited	   scope.	   They	  provided	   three	   reasons.	   First,	   they	  pointed	   that	   current	   fair	   dealing	   exceptions	   are	   not	   broad	   enough	   to	   provide	   an	  effective	  balance	  between	  owners	  and	  users	  in	  the	  digital	  environment.	  Second,	  they	  complained	   about	   the	   Australian	   Courts’	   problematic	   interpretation	   of	   the	  complaining	  purpose-­‐based,	  close-­‐ended	  existing	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions.	  Third,	  they	  stated	  that	  some	  particular	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  were	  too	  specific.851	  By	  analyzing	  these	  submissions	  from	  both	  sides,	  the	  Australia	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  proposed	  its	  own	  proposal	  to	  reform	  the	  current	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions.	  The	  Australian	  Law	  Reform	   Commission	   admitted	   “the	   closed-­‐end	   nature	   of	   the	   current	   fair	   dealing	  exceptions	   is	   problematic	   in	   the	   digital	   environment	   since	   it’s	   not	   sufficiently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  849	  See	  id.	  (Lots	  of	  submissions	  provided	  by	  this	  discussion	  paper	  had	  been	  listed	  in	  note	  38-­‐57.)	  850	  See	  id.	  (Arts	  Law	  Centre	  of	  Australia,	  Submission	  171).	  851	  See	  id,	  note	  58-­‐64.	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adapted	  or	  flexible	  to	  respond,	  to	  changing	  circumstances.”852	  It	  provided	  a	  detailed	  proposal	   7-­‐1	   through	   7-­‐4	   in	   its	   discussion	   paper.	   In	   its	   proposal,	   it	   suggested	   to	  repeal	  the	  current	  specific	  exceptions,	  	  and	  suggest	  to	  illustrate	  the	  new	  purposes	  in	  the	  fair	  use	  exception.853	  	   In	   consequence,	   based	  on	   the	  discussion	  paper,	   although	   copyright	   owners	  and	   their	   representatives	   rejected	   to	  amend	   the	   current	   fair	  dealing	  exceptions	   in	  Australia,	  the	  trend	  of	  extending	  the	  limited	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  to	  broad	  fair	  use	  exceptions	   cannot	   be	   prevented.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   in	   the	   future,	   “fair	   dealing”	  exceptions	  in	  Australia	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  digital	  environment.	  
C. Japan	  	   It	   should	   be	   known	   that	   Japan	   does	   not	   have	   provisions	   reflecting	   fair	   use	  doctrine.	   Japanese	   Copyright	   Act	   enumerates	   several	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  852	  Id,	  para.	  7.80.	  853	  Id.	  (Proposal	  7–1	  The	  fair	  use	  exception	  should	  be	  applied	  when	  determining	  	  whether	  a	  use	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  research	  or	  study;	  criticism	  or	  review;	  parody	  	  or	  satire;	  reporting	  news;	  or	  professional	  advice	  infringes	  copyright.	  ‘Research	  or	  study’,	  ‘criticism	  or	  review’,	  ‘parody	  or	  satire’,	  and	  ‘reporting	  news’	  should	  be	  illustrative	  purposes	  in	  the	  fair	  use	  exception.	  Proposal	  7–2	  The	  Copyright	  Act	  should	  be	  amended	  to	  repeal	  the	  following	  exceptions:(a)	  ss	  40(1),	  103C(1)—fair	  dealing	  for	  research	  or	  study;(b)	  ss	  41,103A—fair	  dealing	  for	  criticism	  or	  review;(c)	  ss	  41A,	  103AA—fair	  dealing	  for	  parody	  or	  satire;(d)	  ss	  42,	  103B—fair	  dealing	  for	  reporting	  news;(e)	  s	  43(2)—fair	  dealing	  for	  a	  legal	  practitioner,	  registered	  patent	  attorney	  or	  registered	  trade	  marks	  attorney	  giving	  professional	  advice;	  and(f)	  ss	  104(b)	  and(c)—professional	  advice	  exceptions.	  Proposal	  7–3	  If	  fair	  use	  is	  not	  enacted,	  the	  exceptions	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  professional	  legal	  advice	  in	  ss	  43(2),	  104(b)	  and	  (c)	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  should	  be	  repealed	  and	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  should	  provide	  for	  new	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  ‘for	  the	  purpose	  of	  professional	  advice	  by	  a	  legal	  practitioner,	  registered	  patent	  attorney	  or	  registered	  trade	  marks	  attorney’	  for	  both	  works	  and	  subject-­‐matter	  other	  than	  works.	  Proposal	  7–4	  If	  fair	  use	  is	  not	  enacted,	  the	  existing	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions,	  and	  the	  new	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  proposed	  in	  this	  Discussion	  Paper,	  should	  all	  provide	  that	  the	  fairness	  factors	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  determining	  whether	  copyright	  is	  infringed.)	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copyright	   owners’	   exclusive	   rights:	   (1)	   reproduction	   for	   private	   use; 854 	  (2)	  reproduction	   in	   libraries;855	  (3)	   quotation	   privileges;856 	  (4)	   use	   for	   educational	  purpose; 857 	  (5)	   performances	   for	   non-­‐profit	   purposes; 858 	  (6)	   use	   for	   news	  reports; 859 	  (7)	   use	   in	   political	   speeches; 860 	  (8)	   reproduction	   in	   judicial	  proceedings;861	  (10)	   exhibitions	   of	   artistic	   works	   by	   the	   owner;862	  (11)	   use	   of	  artistic	   works	   located	   in	   public	   spaces.863	  These	   specific	   limitations	   or	   exceptions	  are	   set	   out	   in	   Art	   30	   through	   49	   of	   the	   Japanese	   Copyright	   Act.	   Besides	   these	  exceptions	   or	   limitations,	   the	   2012	   Japanese	   Copyright	   Amendment	   added	   five	  specific	  provisions	  concerning	  the	  so-­‐called	  “incidental	  involvement”	  of	  copyrighted	  works.864	  	   The	   most	   similar	   provision	   to	   the	   U.S.	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   and	   Japan’s	   fair	  dealing	  model	  is	  Art	  32(1).	  It’s	  called	  the	  “quotation	  exception.”	  Under	  this	  provision,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  854	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  190,	  art	  30.	  855	  Id,	  art	  31.	  856	  Id,	  art	  32(1)	  857	  Id,	  art	  33,	  33bis,	  34,	  35	  &	  36.	  858	  Id,	  art	  38.	  859	  Id,	  art	  39	  &	  41.	  860	  Id,	  art	  40.	  861	  Id,	  art	  42.	  862	  Id,	  art	  45.	  863	  Id,	  art	  4.	  	  864	  Id.(	  (1)	  Article	  30bis(1):	  the	  duplication	  or	  adoption	  of	  copyrighted	  material	  if	  such	  material	  is	  involved	  as	  an	  incidental	  object	  or	  sound	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  split	  off	  from	  other	  subjects;	  provided	  that	  the	  duplication	  or	  adaptation	  is	  made	  in	  the	  form	  of	  photographing,	  sound	  recording	  or	  video	  recording;(2)	  Article	  30bis(2):	  the	  use	  of	  the	  duplicated	  or	  adapted	  material	  made	  in	  the	  cases	  above;(3)	  Article	  30ter:	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  material	  to	  the	  extent	  necessary	  for	  the	  process	  of	  considering	  obtaining	  a	  license	  from	  the	  copyright	  owners;(4)	  Article	  30quater:	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  material	  that	  has	  been	  published,	  to	  the	  extent	  necessary	  for	  tests	  conducted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  to	  develop	  or	  put	  into	  practical	  use	  of	  sound/video	  recording	  technologies;	  and(5)	  Article	  47novies:	  the	  recording	  or	  adaptation	  of	  copyrighted	  material	  to	  the	  extent	  necessary	  to	  prepare	  for	  streamlining	  of	  computer	  processing	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  material	  when	  such	  data	  will	  be	  provided	  through	  networks.)	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the	   quotation	   of	   a	   published	  work	   is	   permitted	   if	   it	   accord	  with	   fair	   practice	   and	  does	   not	   exceed	   that	   justified	   by	   purposed	   such	   as	   news	   reporting,	   criticism	   or	  research.865	  If	   the	   quotation	   is	   in	   a	   form	   of	   adapting	   a	   work	   by	   summarizing	   its	  essential	   content,	   it	  may	   still	   justify	  by	   these	  purposes.866	  According	   to	  Arts	  48(1)	  and	   (2),	   the	  quotation	  must	  be	   “clearly	   indicated	   in	   the	  manner	  and	   to	   the	  extent	  deemed	   reasonable	   by	   the	   form	   of	   reproduction	   or	   exploitation,”	   along	   with	   the	  name	  of	  the	  author	  of	  the	  quoted	  work	  if	  it	  appears	  on	  the	  work.867	  As	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  object	  of	  the	  “quotation”,	  it	  seems	  that	  Japan	  intends	  to	  encompass	  more	  than	  just	  copying	  or	  written	  words.	  In	  the	  Jokoku	  case,	  the	  Japanese	  Supreme	  Court	  took	  no	   issue	  with	  being	  asked	   to	  assess	  whether	   the	  use	  of	   a	   copyrighted	  photograph	  could	  be	  exempted	  as	  a	  citation	  under	  Article	  32(1).868	  The	  Japanese	  Supreme	  Court	  did	   not	   determine	  whether	   a	   photograph	  was	   a	   type	   of	  work	  within	   the	   scope	   of	  object	   in	   the	   quotation	   exception,	   it	   directly	   considered	   whether	   the	   citation	   of	  photograph	  was	  fair	  or	  not.	  If	  followed	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  ignorance	  of	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  object	  of	  quotation	  exceptions,	   it	   can	  be	  applied	   to	   all	   kinds	  of	   copyrighted	  works.	   It’s	   then	   a	   broad	   reading	   of	   the	   quotation	   exceptions	   from	   this	   point.	  However,	   the	   Japanese	  Supreme	  Court	  also	   took	  a	  quite	   restrictive	  position	   in	   the	  same	  case	  when	  decided	  the	  issue	  of	  parody	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  quoted	  work	  must	  be	   clearly	   distinguishable	   from	   the	   parody.	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   held	   that	   the	  quotation	  exceptions	  would	  be	  applied	  only	  when	  the	  following	  two	  elements	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  865	  Id,	  art	  32(1).	  866	  See	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  190,	  at	  60.	  867	  Japanese	  Copyright	  Act,	  supra	  note	  190,	  art	  48	  (1)	  &	  (2).	  868	  Case	  1976(O)	  923,	  Minshu	  Vol.34,	  No.3,	  at	  244	  (Mar,28	  1980),	  available	  at:	  http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=60	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satisfied:	  “(1)	  a	  clear	  separation	  exists	  between	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  and	  the	  using	  work;	  and	  (2)	  the	  using	  work	  must	  be	  the	  major	  part,	  and	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  a	  minor	   part.	   “869	  Thus	   the	   Japanese	   Supreme	  Court	   held	   that	   it	  was	   a	  modification	  which	   infringed	   the	   copyright	   owner’s	   right	   of	   integrity	   rather	   than	   a	   parody.870	  Thus,	   it	   seems	   that	   Japan	   still	   contain	   a	   narrow	   view	   of	   interpretation	   of	   its	  exceptions	   or	   limitations	   of	   exclusive	   rights	   especially	   towards	   the	   quotation	  exceptions.	  Once	  an	  act	  of	  using	  copyrighted	  works	  cannot	  precisely	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  specific	  limitations	  or	  exceptions,	  it	  will	  be	  held	  as	  an	  infringement.	  	   Japan	  is	  also	  considering	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  model	  of	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  should	  be	  introduced	  to	  its	  own	  copyright	  law.	  By	  adopting	  the	  American	  fair	  use	  doctrine,	  more	  room	  can	  be	  provided	  to	  exceptions	  to	  the	  users,	  and	  made	  the	  application	  of	  exceptions	   or	   limitations	   more	   flexible.	   Such	   adoption	   may	   benefit	   the	   ongoing	  balancing	  process	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.	   in	  terms	  of	  royalty	  payments,	  and	   it	  also	  has	  positive	  effect	  for	  Japan’s	  culture	  and	  economy.871Other	  Scholars	  provided	  opposing	  opinions.	  They	  believed	  that	  Japan	  has	  a	  civil	  law	  system	  and	  it	  only	  had	  a	  few	  cases	   in	   the	  past	   can	  serves	  as	   “case	   law.”	  However,	   the	  U.S.	   fair	  use	  doctrine	  requires	  an	  analysis	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  	  basis.872	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  869	  DOES	  THE	  JAPANESE	  COPYRIGHT	  ACT	  NEED	  FAIR	  USE	  IN	  ORDER	  TO	  EMBRACE	  PARODY?	  http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Course_Pages/IP_Theory_13/Papers2Discuss/Kaneko_Japanese_fair_use.htm#_ftn21	  (last	  visited	  July,	  30).	  See	  also	  id.	  870	  Id.	  871	  See	  id.	  (Citing	  Kensaku	  Fuku).	  872	  See	  id.	  (However,	  Korea	  had	  adopted	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  U.S.	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  and	  the	  international	  three-­‐step	  test.	  It	  could	  provide	  a	  reference	  for	  civil	  law	  countries,	  such	  as	  China.	  Korea	  Copyright	  Act,	  Article	  35-­‐3	  (Fair	  Use	  of	  Copyrighted	  Material).	  Except	  for	  situations	  enumerated	  in	  art.	  23	  to	  art.	  35-­‐2	  and	  in	  art.	  101-­‐3	  to	  101-­‐5,	  provided	  it	  does	  not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  copyrighted	  work	  and	  does	  not	  unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interest	  of	  the	  copyright	  holder,	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  may	  be	  used,	  among	  other	  things,	  for	  reporting,	  criticism,	  education,	  and	  research.	  2.	  In	  determining	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iv. A Proposal for China to deal with fair use exception under cloud 
computing context 
A. Exceptions	  or	  Limitations	  to	  Copyright	  under	  Cloud	  Computing	  Context.	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	   important	  reasons	  for	  countries	  to	  adopt	  the	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	   to	   copyright	   owners’	   exclusive	   rights	   is	   to	   enable	   public’s	   access	   to	  information	  and	  incentivize	  development	  of	  culture	  and	  technology.	  In	  the	  world	  of	  cloud	  computing,	  the	  cloud	  is	  the	  pool	  for	  almost	  all	   information.	  Cloud	  computing	  software	   has	   become	   the	   carrier	   of	   presenting	   and	   distributing	   works.	   Both	  copyright	   owners	   and	   users	   can	   take	   advantage	   of	   cloud	   computing.	   By	   using	   it,	  copyright	   owners	   can	   distribute	   their	  works	  more	   easily	  with	   less	   cost	   and	   time.	  	  More	  people	  can	  become	  “copyright	  owners”	  by	  using	  the	  cloud	  to	  share	  their	  own	  works	  without	  the	  trouble	  of	  dealing	  with	  publisher,	  distributor	  or	  other	  middleman.	  The	   cloud	   computing	   definitely	   incentivize	   people	   to	   create	   more	   works	   in	  copyrightable	   areas.	   Correspondingly,	   users	   are	   able	   to	   enjoy	   copyrighted	   works	  with	  less	  effort	  in	  less	  time.	  By	  a	  single	  click,	  copyrighted	  works	  are	  stored	  in	  their	  cloud	   space	   and	   are	   ready	   to	   be	   streamed	   online	   or	   downloaded.	   Because	   of	   the	  open	   nature	   of	   most	   cloud	   service,	   it’s	   obvious	   that	   users	   are	   able	   to	   gain	   more	  information	   by	   using	   the	   cloud	   service	   than	   by	   getting	   the	   traditional	   physical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  whether	  art.	  35-­‐3(1)	  above	  applies	  to	  a	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  work,	  the	  following	  factors	  must	  be	  considered:	  the	  purpose	  and	  character	  of	  the	  use,	  including	  whether	  such	  use	  is	  of	  a	  commercial	  nature	  or	  is	  of	  a	  nonprofit	  nature;	  the	  type	  or	  purpose	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work;	  the	  amount	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  portion	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  as	  a	  whole;	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  upon	  the	  current	  market	  or	  the	  current	  value	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  or	  on	  the	  potential	  market	  or	  the	  potential	  value	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work.)	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copies.	   Access	   to	   information	   is	   essential	   for	   users’	   development	   of	   their	   own	  creative	  work,	  and	  with	  which	  users	  are	  likely	  to	  become	  “copyright	  owners.”	  	  	   However,	  as	  for	  copyright	  owners,	  they	  have	  to	  put	  their	  copyrighted	  works	  into	   the	   cloud	   in	   order	   to	   distribute	   and	   gain	   benefits.	   As	   I	   mentioned	   above,	  because	  of	  the	  openness	  and	  share	  nature	  of	  the	  cloud,	  people	  are	  able	  to	  access	  to	  those	  copyrighted	  works.	  And	  in	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  people	  would	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  whether	   they	   are	   accessing	   the	   copyrighted	  works	   legally	   or	   not.	   All	   they	  want	   is	  that	  they	  can	  get	  the	  copyrighted	  works	  they	  need	  with	  minimal	  cost—both	  money	  and	  time.	  Further,	   there	  are	   lots	  of	   ISPs	  who	  provide	  cloud	  computing	  service	  and	  they	   are	   in	   competition.	   To	   win	   the	   competition	   and	   gain	   more	   benefits	   is	   by	  attracted	   more	   users	   and	   provided	   more	   works.	   ISPs	   definitely	   do	   not	   want	  copyright	  owners	  to	  earn	  a	  share	  of	  the	  profits.	  Thus	  ISPs	  will	  not	  wholeheartedly	  use	   certain	   technological	   measures	   to	   protect	   copyright	   owners.	   Thus,	   copyright	  owners’	  copyrighted	  work	  being	  putted	  into	  the	  cloud	  can	  be	  infringed	  at	  any	  time.	  Meanwhile,	  users	  and	  ISPs	  can	  raise	  exceptions	  or	  limitations	  as	  defenses	  for	  their	  activities,	   copyright	   owners	   may	   face	   a	   big	   loss.	   But	   people	   shall	   still	   have	   the	  	  access	   to	   some	   information	   without	   authorization	   from	   copyright	   owners	   and	  without	   infringing	   copyright	   law.	   It’s	   the	   public	   interests.	   Thus	   it’s	   important	   to	  adopt	  rationale	  exceptions	  or	  limitations.	  	   Further,	   it	   seems	   that	   ISPs	  mostly	   just	   provide	   the	   basic	   service	   under	   the	  direction	  of	  users.	  However,	  ISPs	  also	  provide	  linking	  service	  or	  provide	  thumbnails	  for	  search	  result.	  	  These	  kinds	  of	  services	  are	  fully	  under	  their	  direction.	  According	  to	  the	  U.S.	  court,	  thumbnails	  can	  be	  deemed	  as	  a	  transformative	  use	  of	  copyrighted	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works	   because	   they	   serve	   a	   different	   function	   from	   the	   original	   copies.	   The	  thumbnails	   also	   do	   not	   harm	   the	   copyright	   owners’	   potential	   interests.	   ISPs	  successfully	   defend	   themselves	   in	   copyright	   lawsuits	   by	   using	   exceptions	   or	  limitations	   toward	   copyright	   owners’	   exclusive	   rights.	   In	  my	   opinion,	   referring	   to	  the	  U.S.,	   it	  seems	  that	   the	  basic	  purpose	  of	   ISPs’	  activities	   is	   important	   in	  deciding	  whether	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	   can	   be	   applied	   or	   not.	   For	   instance,	   if	   an	   ISP	  provides	   a	   link	   for	   illustrating	   background,	   providing	   other	   support	   or	   opposite	  opinions,	   his	   activity	   may	   be	   deemed	   as	   “fair	   use”	   of	   the	   copyrighted	   works.	  Although	  I	  myself	  preferred	  the	  U.S.	  model	  of	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  in	  dealing	  with	  issues	  caused	  by	  digital	  world,	  the	  E.U.	  and	  other	  civil	  law	  countries	  such	  as	  China	  are	  still	  struggling	   in	   determining	   whether	   to	   adopt	   a	   broader	   exceptions	   or	   limitations	  model	   such	   as	   the	   U.S..	   The	   following	   part	  will	   analyze	   the	   Chinese	   situation	   and	  provide	  a	  reasonable	  proposal	  for	  China.	  
B. Chinese	  Limitation	  List	  and	  A	  Proposal	  for	  China	  China	  Copyright	  Law	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  concept	  of	  “fair	  use”	  or	  “fair	  dealing.”	  However,	   “fair	  use”	  as	  a	   terminology	  has	  been	  used	  a	   lot	   in	  discussing	   the	  related	  copyright	  issue.	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  defining	  “fair	  use”	  in	  China.	  First	  is	  from	  Prof.	  Zheng	  Chengsi’s	  acticle,	  stated	  that	  “fair	  use	  refers	  to	  when	  use	  copyrighted	  works,	  there’s	  not	  only	  not	  necessary	  to	  acquire	  a	  copyright	  owners’	  authorization,	  but	  also	  not	   necessary	   to	   pay,	   and	   such	   use	  will	   not	   constitute	   copyright	   infringement.”873	  The	  other	  one	  is	  from	  Prof.	  Wu	  Handong’s	  article,	  in	  which	  he	  stated	  “fair	  use	  means	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  873	  Zheng	  Chengsi(郑成思),	  Zhishi	  Chanquanfa	  Tonglun(知识产权法通论)[General	  Statement	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law](1988)，at	  124.	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an	  act	  of	  using	  others’	  copyrighted	  works	  for	  a	  fair	  purpose	  under	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  statute,	  without	  copyright	  owners’	  consents	  and	  payments	  to	  them.”874	  
a. China’s	  Limitation	  List	  	   China	  as	  a	  civil	  law	  country,	  also	  provide	  a	  specific	  list	  of	  limitations	  in	  Art	  22	  of	  its	  Copyright	  Law	  just	  like	  E.U.	  has	  provided	  in	  its	  Information	  Society	  Directive.	  China	   provides	   12	   kinds	   of	   specific	   limitations.	   They	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   eight	  categories:	   (1)	   personal	   fair	   use; 875 	  (2)	   medias’	   use	   for	   news	   reporting	   or	  otherwise;876	  (3)	   educational	   use;877(4)	   state	   organ	   to	   fulfill	   official	   duties;878	  (5)	  library,	  memorial	  hall	  or	  other	  similar	  institutes	  use	  to	  display	  or	  preservation	  of	  a	  copy;879	  (6)	   free	   performance	   of	   a	   published	   work;880	  (7)	   display	   or	   locate	   in	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  874	  Wu	  Handong(吴汉东),	  Zhuzuoquan	  Heli	  Shiyong	  Zhidu	  Yanjiu(著作权合理使用制度研
究)[Analyzing	  Fair	  Use	  Doctrine	  Under	  Copyright	  Law](1996),	  at	  144.	  875	  China	  Copyright	  Law,	  supra	  note	  460,	  art	  22(1)-­‐(2).((1)	  use	  of	  a	  published	  work	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  user's	  own	  private	  study,	  research	  or	  self-­‐entertainment;	  (2)	  appropriate	  quotation	  from	  a	  published	  work	  in	  one's	  own	  work	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  introduction	  of,	  or	  comment	  on,	  a	  work,	  or	  demonstration	  of	  a	  point;)	  876	  Id,	  art	  22(3)-­‐(5).((3)	  inevitable	  reappearance	  or	  citation	  of	  a	  published	  work	  in	  newspapers,	  periodicals,	  radio	  stations,	  television	  stations	  or	  other	  media	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  reporting	  current	  events;(4)	  reprinting	  by	  newspapers	  or	  periodicals	  or	  other	  media,	  or	  rebroadcasting	  by	  radio	  stations	  or	  television	  stations	  or	  other	  media,	  of	  the	  current	  event	  articles	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  politics,	  economy	  and	  religion,	  which	  have	  been	  published	  by	  other	  newspapers,	  periodicals,	  radio	  stations	  or	  television	  stations	  or	  other	  media,	  except	  where	  the	  author	  has	  declared	  that	  publication	  or	  broadcasting	  is	  not	  permitted;(5)	  publication	  in	  newspapers	  or	  periodicals	  or	  other	  media,	  or	  broadcasting	  by	  radio	  stations	  or	  television	  stations	  or	  other	  media,	  of	  a	  speech	  delivered	  at	  a	  public	  assembly,	  except	  where	  the	  author	  has	  declared	  that	  publication	  or	  broadcasting	  is	  not	  permitted;)	  877	  Id,	  art	  22(6).((6)	  translation	  or	  reproduction,	  in	  a	  small	  quality	  of	  copies,	  of	  a	  published	  work	  for	  use	  by	  teachers	  or	  scientific	  researchers	  in	  classroom	  teaching	  or	  scientific	  research,	  provided	  that	  the	  translation	  or	  reproduction	  is	  not	  published	  or	  distributed;)	  878	  Id,	  art	  22	  (7).	  ((7)	  use	  of	  a	  published	  work	  by	  a	  State	  organ	  within	  the	  reasonable	  scope	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  fulfilling	  its	  official	  duties;)	  879	  Id,	  art	  22(8).	  ((8)	  reproduction	  of	  a	  work	  in	  its	  collections	  by	  a	  library,	  archive,	  memorial	  hall,	  museum,	  art	  gallery	  or	  similar	  institution,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  display	  or	  preservation	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  work;)	  880	  Id,	  art	  22(9).	  ((9)	  free	  of	  charge	  performance	  of	  a	  published	  work,	  that	  is,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  performance,	  neither	  fees	  are	  charged	  from	  the	  public	  nor	  the	  remuneration	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  performers;)	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outdoor	   public	   place; 881 	  (8)	   use	   for	   a	   public	   interest	   goal	   and	   base	   on	  humanitarianism.882	  It	  is	  a	  closed	  list,	  which	  means	  other	  usage	  of	  copyrighted	  work	  will	  constitute	   infringement	  of	  copyright	   law	   if	   there	   is	  no	  consent	   from	  copyright	  owner.	  	  	  	   This	  model	  of	  listing	  all	  kinds	  of	  specific	  limitations	  is	  quite	  useful	  in	  civil	  law	  countries,	  especially	  in	  China,	  since	  the	  guideline	  for	  judicial	  practice	  is	  this	  area	  is	  vague.	  Due	   to	  Chinese	  own	  realistic,	   this	  model	  has	  more	  stability	  and	  can	   lead	   to	  consistent	  judgment	  from	  courts.	  It’s	  much	  more	  easy	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  directly	  refer	  to	  some	  fixed	  rules	  rather	  than	  let	  them	  apply	  flexible	  general	  guidelines.	  	  	   However,	   such	  model	   is	   also	  problematic.	   It	   is	  not	   enough	   flexible	   to	  apply	  when	  courts	  face	  new	  challenges.	  Further,	  the	  language	  used	  in	  this	  provision	  is	  not	  strict	  enough.	  For	  instance,	  Art	  22(2)	  uses	  “appropriate”	  to	  describe	  the	  portion	  of	  quotation.	  There’s	  no	  interpretation	  of	  “appropriate”	  in	  the	  statutes.	  Thus	  the	  courts	  had	   to	   interpret	   by	   themselves.	   Such	   interpretation	   leads	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   uniformity	  among	   courts.	   Art	   22(6)	   states	   an	   act	   of	   copying	   “in	   a	   small	   quantity,”	   there’s	   no	  interpretation	  of	  “small	  quantity”	  either.	  Art	  22(7)	  mentions	  “within	  the	  reasonable	  scope”	  without	  further	  interpretation.	  All	  these	  unclear	  statements	  in	  the	  limitation	  provision	  may	   result	   in	   different	   judgments	   but	   based	   on	   similar	   facts,	   since	   the	  courts	  may	  interpret	  those	  terms	  in	  different	  ways.	  Art	  22(1)	  lists	  a	  personal	  private	  use	   limitation	  of	   a	  published	  work	   for	   self-­‐entertainment.	  This	   limitation	  may	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  881	  Id,	  art	  22(10).	  ((10)	  copying,	  drawing,	  photographing,	  or	  video	  recording	  of	  an	  artistic	  work	  located	  or	  on	  display	  in	  an	  outdoor	  public	  place;)	  882	  Id,	  art	  22(11)-­‐(12).((11)	  translation	  of	  a	  work	  published	  by	  a	  Chinese	  citizen,	  legal	  entity	  or	  organization,	  which	  is	  created	  in	  the	  Han	  language	  (Chinese),	  into	  a	  minority	  nationality	  language	  for	  publication	  and	  distribution	  within	  the	  country;	  (12)	  ranslation	  of	  a	  published	  work	  into	  Braille	  and	  publication	  of	  the	  work	  so	  translated;)	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work	  out	  well	  in	  digital	  world.	  People	  are	  able	  to	  download	  or	  stream	  pirate	  content	  privately	   for	   self-­‐entertainment	  purpose	  without	   infringing	   copyright	   law	  because	  of	   this	   limitation.	   In	   my	   opinion,	   this	   limitation	   does	   not	   have	   positive	   effect	   for	  which	  copyright	  law’s	  legislators	  intended.	  
b. The	  General	  Guideline	  for	  Applying	  The	  Limitations	  List	  	  	   What’s	   important	   here	   is	   that	   China	  provides	   a	   general	   guideline,	   although	  it’s	   not	   comprehensive	   or	   strict	   enough.	   It’s	   in	   the	   Regulation	   for	   the	  Implementation	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Law	   of	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China.	   Art	   21	  provides	  a	  general	  and	  basic	  guideline	   in	  determining	  whether	   the	   limitations	  can	  be	   applied	   or	   not.	   A	   user	   can	   use	   a	   published	  work	  without	   permission	   from	   the	  copyright	   owner	   when	   the	   following	   two	   requirements	   are	   fulfilled:	   (1)	   the	   use	  “shall	  not	  impair	  the	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	  work	  concerned;”	  (2)	  the	  use	  shall	  not	  “unreasonably	  prejudice	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner.”883	  	  	   Although	   the	   guideline	   states	   two	   requirements	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   in	  practical,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   Chinese	   court	   had	   considered	   more	   than	   those	   two	  requirements.	   The	   Chinese	   court	   also	   considered	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   usage	   of	  copyrighted	  works,	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  portion	  from	  copyrighted	  work	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  Shanghai	   Animated	   Film	   Studio	   v.	   Zhejiang	   Xinying	   Niandai	   Media	   Co.,	   Ltd,	   the	  plaintiff	   owns	   copyright	   of	   several	   cartoon	   characters.884	  However,	   the	   defendant	  used	   the	   cartoon	   characters	   in	   its	  movie	   poster	   as	   background.	   The	  plaintiff	   sued	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  883	  Regulation	  for	  the	  Implemantation,	  supra	  note	  603,	  art	  21.	  884	  Shanghai	  Meishu	  Dianyin	  Zhipianchang	  Su	  Zhejiang	  Xinying	  Niandai	  Wenhua	  Chuanbo	  Youxian	  Gongsi(上海美术电影制片厂诉浙江新影年代文化传播有限公司)[Shanghai	  Animation	  Film	  Studio	  v.	  Zhejiang	  Zhejiang	  Xinying	  Niandai	  Media	  Co.,	  Ltd.](Shanghai	  IP	  Ct.	  Apr.	  25	  2016).	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due	   to	   copyright	   infringement.	   The	   Shanghai	   IP	   court	   held	   that	   such	   usage	  constitutes	   “fair	   use”	   based	   on	   four	   reasons.	   First,	   the	   claimed	   cartoon	   characters	  had	   already	   been	   published	   for	   years.	   Second,	   the	   purpose	   for	   using	   these	   two	  cartoon	  characters	  is	  only	  to	  illustrate	  the	  age	  of	  leading	  roles	  in	  this	  film.	  Third,	  the	  cartoon	  characters	  have	  been	  placed	  in	  the	  background	  of	  the	  poster,	  they	  are	  just	  in	  the	  role	  of	  assistance	  and	  dependency.	  Forth,	  the	  cartoon	  characters	  only	  showed	  in	  the	  movie	  poster	  rather	  than	  the	  movie,	  the	  defendant	  did	  not	  advertise	  them	  either.	  There’s	   no	   harm	   to	   the	   normal	   use	   of	   these	   cartoon	   characters.	   	   Based	   on	   the	  opinion	  of	  this	  case,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  Chinese	  court	  is	  trying	  to	  adopt	  a	  U.S.	  type	  general	  guideline	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  “fair	  use”	  issue.	  	   	  
c. There	  Is	  An	  Existing	  Limitations	  List	  To	  The	  Information	  Network	  	   As	  to	  the	  information	  network,	  China	  had	  already	  adopted	  8	  kinds	  of	  specific	  limitations	  in	  Art	  6	  of	  the	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Communicate	  Works	  to	  the	  Public	  over	  information	  Networks	  in	  2013,	  which	  is	  an	  administrative	  regulation.	  Art	  6	  provides:	  “A	  work	  of	  another	  person	  may	  be	  made	  available	  via	  an	  information	  network	  without	   the	  copyright	  owner's	  authorization	  and	  payment	  of	  remuneration	  thereto	  when	  involving	  any	  of	  the	  following	  circumstances:(1)	  Quote	  of	  a	  published	  work,	  in	  a	  fair	  amount,	  in	  one's	  work	  made	  available	  to	  the	  public	  for	  introducing	   or	   commenting	   on	   a	   particular	   work	   or	   for	   elaborating	   a	   particular	  issue;(2)	   Inevitable	   display	   or	   quote	   of	   a	   published	   work	   in	   one's	   work	   made	  available	   to	   the	   public	   for	   reporting	   news	   on	   current	   events;(3)	   Provision	   of	   a	  published	   work,	   in	   a	   small	   amount,	   to	   a	   small	   number	   of	   teachers	   or	   scientific	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researchers	   for	   classroom	   teaching	   or	   scientific	   research;(4)	   Provision	   of	   a	  published	  work	  to	   the	  public	  within	  a	  reasonable	  extent	   for	  a	  government	  organ's	  performance	   of	   its	   official	   duties;(5)	   Translation,	   into	   a	   minority	   nationality	  language,	   of	   a	   published	  work	   created	   in	   the	   Chinese	   Han	   language	   by	   a	   Chinese	  citizen,	  legal	  person,	  or	  any	  other	  organization	  and	  provision	  thereof	  to	  the	  minority	  nationalities	  inside	  China;(6)	  Provision	  of	  a	  published	  written	  work	  to	  the	  blind	  in	  a	  peculiar	  manner	   that	   enables	   them	   to	   perceive	   it,	   for	   purposes	   other	   than	   profit-­‐making;(7)	  Provision	  to	  the	  public	  of	  articles	  that	  are	  related	  to	  current	  political	  or	  economic	   issues	   and	   are	   already	   published	   via	   an	   information	   network;	   or(8)	  Provision	   to	   the	   public	   of	   a	   speech	   delivered	   at	   a	   public	   gathering.”885	  At	   some	  points,	   the	  existing	   information	  networks	   limitations	   fill	   in	  gaps	  and	  provide	   legal	  standings.	   However,	   Art	   6	   still	   uses	   a	   specific	   list,	   without	   a	   general	   guideline	   to	  determine	   issues	   fall	   outside	  of	   the	   list.	   The	  negative	   effect	   caused	  by	   specific	   list	  had	   been	   analyzed	   above	   will	   be	  more	   serious	   here	   due	   to	   the	   ongoing	   evolving	  nature	  of	  Internet	  and	  new	  technology.	  	  	   As	   for	   issues	  of	   thumbnails,	  Art	  5(2)	  of	  Provisions	  of	   the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  on	  Several	  Issues	  Concerning	  the	  Application	  of	  Law	  in	  Hearing	  Civil	  Dispute	  Cases	   Involving	   Infringement	   of	   the	   Right	   of	   Dissemination	   on	   Information	  Networks	   uses	   the	   general	   guideline	   that	   mentioned	   above	   as	   a	   limitation.886	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  885	  Xinxi	  Wangluo	  Chuanbo	  Tiaoli(信	  息	  网	  络	  传	  播	  条	  例)[Regulation	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Network	  Dissemination	  of	  Information](promulgated	  by	  the	  Standing	  Comm.	  Nat’l	  People’s	  Cong.,	  May	  10,	  2006,	  effective	  July	  1,2006),	  art	  6.	  886	  Id,	  art	  5.	  (“Where	  a	  web	  service	  provider	  makes	  relevant	  works	  available	  to	  the	  public	  substantially	  in	  lieu	  of	  any	  other	  web	  service	  provider	  in	  the	  form	  of	  webpage	  screenshot,	  thumbnail	  or	  the	  like,	  the	  people’s	  court	  shall	  decide	  that	  its	  act	  constitutes	  the	  behavior	  of	  making	  the	  works	  available	  to	  the	  public.	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clearly	  showed	  China’s	  attitude	  towards	  use	  of	  the	  thumbnails,	  webpage	  screenshot	  or	   alike:	   it	  may	   constitute	   “fair	   use”	  when	   it	   neither	   affects	   the	  normal	  use	  of	   the	  works	   nor	   unreasonable	   damages	   the	   legitimate	   rights	   and	   interests	   of	   the	  copyright	  owner.	  
d. A	  Proposal	  For	  China	  	   Based	   on	   the	   relevant	   regulations	   and	  provisions,	   and	   the	   court’s	   decision,	  it’s	   obvious	   that	   China	   is	   trying	   to	   use	   a	   basic	   guideline	   as	   a	   catch-­‐out	   clause.	  However,	   such	   basic	   guideline	   is	   not	  mentioned	   in	   the	   new	   Copyright	   Law	  Draft.	  Although	   the	   legislators	   brought	   new	   limitations	   toward	   computer	   programs,	   as	   I	  mentioned	  above,	  a	  closed	  specific	   limitation	   list	   is	  not	  enough	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  challenges	  brought	  by	  new	  technologies.	  And	  further,	  the	  unclear	  language	  was	  not	  changed	  or	  interpreted	  either.	  It	  will	  still	  cause	  confusion	  in	  applications.	  	   Thus,	  this	  dissertation	  will	  provide	  three	  potential	  provisions	  for	  amending	  the	  current	  Copyright	  Law.	  First,	  if	  precise	  language	  cannot	  be	  used	  in	  the	  provisions,	  a	  new	  provision	  that	  interprets	  those	  words	  in	  specialty	  should	  be	  added.	  For	  instance,	  when	  interpret	  the	  word	  “appropriate”	  that	  describe	  the	  portion	  of	  quotation	  in	  Art	  22(2),	  China	  may	  follow	  the	  Australia’s	  example—	  10%	  of	  the	  number	  of	  pages	  or	  number	  of	  words.	  It’s	  better	  for	  legislator	  to	  provide	  a	  precise	  percentage	  of	  the	  portion	  of	  quotation.	  The	  phrase	  of	  “in	  a	  small	  quality”	  and	  “	  within	  in	  a	  reasonable	  scope”	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Second,	  private	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If	  the	  behavior	  of	  making	  the	  works	  available	  to	  the	  public	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  preceding	  paragraph	  neither	  affects	  the	  normal	  use	  of	  the	  works	  nor	  unreasonably	  damages	  the	  legitimate	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  relevant	  right	  holders	  in	  the	  works	  and	  the	  web	  service	  provider	  claims	  that	  it	  has	  not	  infringed	  upon	  the	  right	  of	  dissemination	  through	  information	  networks,	  the	  people’s	  court	  shall	  uphold	  its	  claim.”)	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use	  of	  copyrighted	  work	  for	  “self-­‐entertainment”	  should	  be	  removed.	  Third,	  China	  should	  clearly	  add	  a	  basic	  guideline	  as	  a	  catch	  out	  clause,	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  proposal	  of	  general	  clause—“a	  new	  mechanism	  in	  copyright	  law	  to	  create	  a	  built-­‐in	  adaptability	  to	  future	  technologies	  which,	  by	  definition,	  cannot	  be	  foreseen	  in	  precise	  detail	  by	  today’s	  policy	  makers.”	  887	  Prof.	  Wu	  Handong	  adopted	  a	  U.S.	  model	  of	  fair	  use,	  there	  should	  be	  four	  factors:	  (1)	  the	  purpose	  of	  use,	  mainly	  consider	  whether	  such	  use	  is	  of	  a	  commercial	  nature	  or	  not;	  (2)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work;	  (3)	  the	  amount	  and	  substantiality	  of	  the	  portion	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  as	  a	  whole;	  (4)	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  use	  upon	  the	  potential	  market	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner.	  Prof.	  Feng	  Xiaoqing	  provided	  three	  factors	  :(1)	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  work	  neither	  damages	  the	  legitimate	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  copyright	  owners,	  nor	  negatively	  effects	  copyright	  owners’	  incentive	  to	  create;	  (2)	  the	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  work	  should	  comfort	  with	  social	  needs;	  (3)	  if	  a	  user	  ask	  for	  permission	  from	  copyright	  owners	  by	  payment	  a	  forehand,	  such	  acts	  inevitably	  result	  in	  market	  failure.	  Based	  on	  these	  two	  scholars’	  proposals,	  the	  current	  guideline	  and	  relevant	  court’s	  decision,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  general	  guideline	  should	  include	  three	  factors:	  (1)	  the	  purpose	  of	  use.	  When	  applying	  this	  factor,	  court	  should	  not	  only	  consider	  whether	  such	  use	  is	  of	  a	  commercial	  nature,	  but	  also	  consider	  whether	  such	  use	  serves	  the	  same	  function	  as	  the	  normal	  use;	  (2)	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  portion	  used	  about	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  portion	  used	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  new	  work	  as	  a	  whole;	  (3)	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  use,	  whether	  it	  unreasonable	  damages	  the	  legitimate	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  887	  Hargreaves,	  supra	  note	  	  823.	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Chapter 5: Conclusion 	   In	   order	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   challenges	   brought	   by	   the	   cloud	   computing	  technology,	   this	   dissertation	   analyzes	   how	   it	   affects	   copyright	   (such	   as	   the	  reproduction	   right)	   and	   copyright	   infringers’	   potential	   defenses	   (such	   as	   the	  exhaustion	   doctrine).	   Major	   countries’	   relevant	   legislation	   and	   cases	   have	   been	  examined	  and	  proposals	  for	  China	  for	  each	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  topics	  have	  been	  made.	   Due	   to	   its	   length,	   this	   dissertation	   focuses	   on	   copyright	   infringer’s	   direct	  liability.	  	   After	   examining	   major	   countries’	   literature,	   a	   three	   steps	   analysis	   is	  extracted	  and	  applied	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  These	  steps	  are	  indispensable	  for	  making	  a	  proposal	  for	  China’s	  future	  cloud	  computing	  copyright	  legislation.	  The	  first	  step	  is	  to	   examine	   the	   relevant	   articles	   in	   the	   Berne	   Convention,	   WCT	   and	   WPPT.	   Such	  worldwide	   agreements	   provide	   a	   basic	   and	   general	   guideline	   in	   cloud	   computing	  area	   for	   signatory	   countries	   to	   follow.	   Therefore,	   these	   relevant	   articles	   are	  backbones	   of	   countries’	   specific	   statutes.	   China	   then	   as	   a	   signatory	   country,	   shall	  follow	  what	  have	  been	  stipulated	   in	   those	  agreements.	  China,	  after	  considering	   its	  own	  reality,	  shall	  also	  selectively	  incorporate	  those	  articles	  into	  its	  own	  legislation	  like	  other	  major	  signatory	  countries.	  The	  second	  step	  is	  to	  examine	  major	  countries’	  legislators’	   intent	   when	   legislated	   their	   statutes	   and	   to	   review	   major	   countries’	  relevant	   statute’s	   legislative	   history.	   Legislative	   history	   can	   provide	   essential	  information	  such	  as	  background	  or	   legislators’	  concerns	   for	   legislating	  a	  statute.	  A	  synthesis	  for	  major	  countries’	  legislative	  history	  and	  intent	  will	  benefit	  for	  Chinese	  literature	   and	   scholars.	   It	   could	   also	   serve	   as	   a	   study	   for	   western	   countries’	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legislation	  methodology	  for	  Chinese	  legislators.	  The	  third	  step	  is	  to	  review	  the	  cases	  relevant	   to	   the	   cloud	   computing	   technology	   to	   see	   how	  major	   countries’	   current	  statutes	  work	  out	  so	  far	  and	  how	  major	  countries’	  courts	  apply	  those	  statutes.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  courts	  at	  the	  frontline	  facing	  with	  legal	  loopholes	  evolved	  with	  new	  technology.	   Thus,	   getting	   to	   know	   how	   courts	   decide	   those	   cases	   relevant	   to	   the	  cloud	   computing	   technology	   is	   getting	   to	   understand	   how	   cloud	   computing	  technology	   is	   dealt	   in	   legal	   world.	   Potential	   legal	   resolutions	   towards	   the	   new	  technology	   can	   be	   implied	   from	   Court’s	   decisions,	   too.	   Those	   decisions	   are	   also	  meaningful	   because	   developers	   of	   new	   technologies	   need	   such	   guidance	   to	   avoid	  potential	  legal	  risks	  caused	  by	  their	  technologies.	  In	  some	  countries,	  higher	  courts’	  decisions	   are	   binding	   to	   lower	   courts,	   such	   as	   the	   common	   law	   country.	   In	   other	  countries,	  higher	  courts’	  decisions	  can	  be	  recognized	  as	  guidelines	  to	  lower	  courts	  .	  	   China,	   as	   a	   developing	   country	   is	   face	   increasing	   online	   piracies	   copyright	  lawsuits	  brought	  by	  developed	  countries.	  Due	  to	  its	  characteristic,	  cloud-­‐computing	  technology	  always	  plays	  a	   role	   in	  online	  piracies.	  Therefore,	  China	  needs	   to	   fill	   its	  legislation	  vacancy	  in	  cloud-­‐computing	  area	  as	  a	  response	  to	  those	  countries’	  claims.	  After	  applying	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  three-­‐step	  analysis	  to	  US,	  EU,	  Japan,	  Australia,	  and	  Singapore,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  generated	  several	  legislative	  advices	  for	  China.	  I	  also	  consider	  China’s	  social	  reality	  and	  Chinese	  Copyright	  Law.	  	  	   First,	   Copyright	   Law	   in	   China	   needs	   to	   be	   amended	   as	   a	   response	   to	   legal	  loopholes	  created	  by	  the	  cloud	  computing	  technology.	  Such	  amendments	  should	  be	  codified.	   As	   a	   civil	   law	   country,	   China	   does	   not	   have	   the	   tradition	   to	   follow	   the	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precedents.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   much	   more	   practical	   for	   Chinese	   courts	   to	   refer	   to	   a	  statute.	  	  	  	  	  	   Second,	  a	  catch-­‐out	  clause	  should	  always	  be	   included.	  Technologies	  evolves	  faster	  than	  copyright	  statue	  with	  no	  doubt.	  Civil	  law	  countries	  such	  as	  China	  usually	  use	  a	  list	  to	  indicate	  the	  exclusive	  right’s	  exceptions.	  If	  a	  list	  is	  a	  closed	  list,	  it	  gives	  judges	  no	  space	  using	  their	  discretion	  to	  deal	  with	  new	  situations.	  A	  good	  catch-­‐out	  clause	  should	  be	  general	  and	  reasonable	  and	  written	  under	  moderate	  foresight.	  	   Third,	   if	  words	   used	   in	   the	   existing	   statutes	   are	   not	   clear	   and	  may	   lead	   to	  different	   understandings.	   Such	   different	   understanding	   may	   also	   cause	   various	  courts’	  decision	  even	  with	  similar	  facts.	  Interpretations	  clauses	  will	  guide	  the	  courts	  in	  apply	  the	  relevant	  statute	  correctly.	  	   Forth,	  keep	  up	  pace	  with	  worldwide	  copyright	  law’s	  development,	  especially	  the	  legislative	  trend	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  EU.	  They	  have	  more	  experiences	  in	  dealing	  with	   the	  problems	  caused	  by	   the	  cloud	  computing	   technology.	  China	  has	  better	   to	  learn	  from	  their	  experiences.	  	  	   Except	  for	  legislative	  format,	  an	  amendment	  to	  Chinese	  Copyright	  Law	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  substantial	  concerns	  as	  well.	   I	   suggested	   the	  amended	  Copyright	  Law	  covers	   following	   substantial	   points	   to	   deal	   with	   cloud-­‐computing	   technology	  involved	  legal	  issue.	  	  	   As	   to	   the	   reproduction	   right,	   I	   suggest	   to	   treat	   temporary	   copy	   as	   regular	  copies	   and	   to	   be	   regulated	   under	   the	   reproduction	   right.	   However,	   there	   are	  potential	  exemptions:	  (1)	  the	  temporary	  copy’s	  generation	  is	  incidental;	  (2)	  it’s	  sole	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purpose	  is	  to	  enable	  non-­‐infringing	  use;	  (3)	  the	  temporary	  copy	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  technical	  process;(4)	  the	  temporary	  copy	  has	  no	  independent	  economic	  value.	  	   As	   to	   the	   right	  of	   communication	   to	   the	  public,	   I	   suggest;	   (1)	   to	  extend	   the	  current	   scope	   of	   broadcasting	   right	   to	   regulate	   the	   non-­‐interactive	   online	  communication;	  (2)	  to	  adopt	  the	  “users’	  perception”	  standard	  when	  decide	  whether	  ISPs	   “provides”	   the	   infringing	   work;	   (3)	   to	   consider	   the	   ISP’s	   business	   model,	  control	   ability,	   financial	   benefits	   when	   decide	   whether	   he’s	   the	   infringer;	   (4)	   to	  define	  “public”	  as	  “us	  specified	  person	  or	  a	  large	  number	  of	  persons.”	  	   As	   to	   the	   right	   of	   distribution,	   I	   suggest	   (1)	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   right	   of	  distribution	   should	   be	   extended	   to	   intangible	   forms,	   then	   to	   regulate	   digital	  distribution	  online;	  (2)	  to	  limit	  (1)	  by	  estimating	  whether	  the	  actor’s	  intention	  is	  to	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	  	   As	  to	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine,	  China	  should	  reflect	  the	  exhaustion	  doctrine	  in	  its	  Copyright	  Law	  amendment.	  	  	   As	  to	  the	  legal	  exceptions	  or	  limitations,	  (1)	  add	  interpretations	  of	  words	  that	  being	  used	  in	  current	  statutes;	  (2)	  a	  specific	  exception—	  private	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  work	   for	   “self-­‐entertainment”	   should	   be	   removed;	   (3)	   add	   a	   catch	   out	   clause	   that	  provides	  basic	  guideline.	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